逃亡行动

从Keilalahti海湾的老诺基亚之家看见的小的绿色间谍小船,埃斯波,芬兰。 JariIjäs于2010年12月8日与诺基亚C7合影。

2017年10月8日,微软的Joe Belfiore随随便便宣布Windows Phone死亡。 他在一系列推文中解释说,微软将继续支持Windows Phone(和Windows 10 Mobile)平台,但是“构建新功能/硬件不是重点”。 微软的智能手机工作到此结束。

快退到2010年。

2010年9月10日,芬兰诺基亚取代现任诺基亚总裁30年的首席执行官Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo取代了现年46岁的史蒂芬·埃洛普(Stephen Elop),他是安大略省安卡斯特市人,也是微软业务部负责人软件部门,以扭转该公司苦苦挣扎的智能手机阵容,并阻止其在美国市场份额的下降

2011年2月11日,诺基亚和微软宣布了建立广泛战略合作伙伴关系的计划,以利用Windows Phone建立新的全球移动生态系统。 [1]在提议的合作伙伴关系下,诺基亚将采用Windows Phone作为其主要的智能手机策略,并在硬件设计,语言支持方面贡献自己的专业知识,并帮助将Windows Phone带到更大的价位,细分市场和地区。

2013年9月2日,微软宣布将以72亿美元的价格收购诺基亚的设备和服务业务,并许可其专利。 作为交易的一部分,诺基亚首席执行官斯蒂芬·埃洛普(Stephen Elop)被宣布最终回到微软并领导扩大的设备团队。 2014年11月,微软宣布推出第一款微软(非诺基亚)品牌的Lumia智能手机Lumia535。但是,在2015年推出Windows 10之后,Lumia设备的销售急剧下降。2015年6月17日,微软首席执行官Satya Nadella宣布“现在是他(斯蒂芬·埃洛普)从微软退休的合适时机”。

2014年10月7日,两名芬兰记者Mer​​ina Salminen和PekkaNykänen用芬兰语出版了他们的《 经营埃洛普》 ,探讨了CEO埃洛普·埃洛普在2010-2013年期间诺基亚设备业务中发生的事件。 作者为这本书采访了100多人,其中大多数是诺基亚现任或前任员工。 该书以芬兰语出版,尽管对英语版本感兴趣,但作者的出版代理商从未能够为该书的英语版本建立可行的商业案例。 一些以前的诺基亚人建议在2015年将本书的英文翻译进行众包,但出版代理商的合同协议一直推迟到2017年出版任何英文版本。一些章节在2015年由志愿者翻译,其余章节现已翻译成英文。 现在,已根据知识共享署名-非商业性-相同方式共享国际4.0(CC BY-NC-SA 4.0)的许可证,首次在此处发布完整的英语翻译。

我们英语翻译团队对记者和作家Merina Salminen和PekkaNykänen的大力支持和信息传播精神表示最热烈的感谢。 请购买原著以支持Merina和Pekka! 而且,当您阅读芬兰语书或我们的英语译本时,请记住,故事发生在2014年,我们的使命是用英语翻译芬兰语的原始手稿,而不是为了反映2018年的背景而改写或反映我们的个人意见。 因此,当这本书说“当前”时,请读为“ 2014年10月”。 在对文本进行美化时,我们已对其进行了一些简化,为帮助全球读者,我们决定使用参考时适用的汇率,以美元显示书中提到的欧元数据。

当我们进行英语翻译时,一小段关于斯蒂芬·埃洛普(Stephen Elop)和芬兰的新闻引起了我们的注意,甚至提到了原著。 芬兰日报Iltalehti写道,埃洛普(Elop)于2017年11月13日在埃斯波·卡拉波特蒂(Espoo Karaportti)校区的诺基亚总部见过。该文章推测,这次访问可能与埃洛普(Elop)目前在澳大利亚的网络提供商Telstra的工作有关。开始于2016年4月,并进一步提到《 经营埃洛普 》一书中,他被描述为“世界上最糟糕的首席执行官之一,即使不是最糟糕的首席执行官之一”。

本书的翻译版本不受Teos出版社,诺基亚公司或任何其他公司或组织的认可。 所有产品和公司名称以及广告口号均为其各自所有者的商标或注册商标。 使用它们并不意味着与它们有任何从属关系或认可。

对于喜欢使用Kindle或PDF版本而不是此在线版本的读者,我们提供了Medium的PDF / EPUB / MOBI格式的导出功能。 在打印300页之前,请考虑环境。

本着联结人的精神,

N. Asokan,Liisa Holma,Sirpa Ikonen,Timothy Jasionowski,Harri Kiljander,Jyrki Kimmel,Asko Komsi,Jason Madhosingh,Emma Oivio,Janne Parkkila,Kimmo Savolainen,William Smith,Katarina Suvitaival,PetraSöderling,Mailiina Turanlahti,贡献者。

现在到书上。


[1] 公告仍在2011年2月10日在华盛顿州雷德蒙德发布。


诺基亚手机的最后几年

第一章前言
第2章。希望唤醒
第三章Vanjoki先生,最后一刻获得亚军
第4章卡拉斯沃先生The足的遗产
第5章来自安卡斯特的神童
第6章平台和生态系统
第7章。最初几周的兴奋
第8章隆隆声开始
第9章具有Microsoft连接的顾问
第10章平台选择
第十一章反应
第十二章虚张声势
第13章。称为塞班的灾难
Chapter 14. MeeGo天鹅
第15章。Meltemi的秘密
第16章。走向第一个Lumia
Chapter 17. Lumia的旅程
第18章,等待数位板的漫长等待
第十九章下一个十亿
Chapter 20.诺基亚网站的艰难时期
第21章。诺基亚精神蒸发
第22章为什么Lumias不飞?
第23章。西拉斯玛先生的艰难选择
第24章。额外的烦恼沸腾了
第25章。世界上最糟糕的CEO?
Chapter 26.如果……
第二十七章结语
附录1:它们现在在哪里?
附录2:词汇表
附录3:图形
参考文献
人指数
最后的结语


返回目录

诺基亚的兴衰是一个独特的故事。 在短短的十年中,一家小型,多行业的公司转型为工业史上最耀眼的明星之一。 从手机市场的领先地位到最大的利润空间,它的灭亡和崩溃也同样独特。 2013年9月3日,诺基亚宣布有意将其手机业务出售给微软。 那个日期已经烙在芬兰人的心上,等于爱沙尼亚的损失[2]和9月11日的袭击。

本书旨在寻找诺基亚前董事长乔玛·奥利拉(Jorma Ollila)的回忆录中未回答的问题的答案:斯蒂芬·埃洛普(Stephen Elop)是谁,为什么加拿大人被选为诺基亚的新首席执行官? 采用诺基亚以外构想的智能手机操作系统的逻辑是什么? 为什么微软的Windows Phone而不是诺基亚自己的MeeGo或Google的Android平台(前诺基亚高管曾经将其描述为“像冬天一样在冬天撒尿以求温暖”)的一种选择?[3]为什么公司失去了顶尖人才,在哪里他们去了吗? 为什么著名的诺基亚精神就消失了?

在埃洛普(Elop)于2010年10月上任时,诺基亚的市场地位已经受到威胁,但一些人认为,正是他的战略决策导致了诺基亚的下滑,并将诺基亚的移动设备部门出售给了微软。 其他人则认为,他从越来越少的坏选择中选择了最好的选择,即诺基亚面对新的竞争是不可避免的下滑,并且植根于它缓慢接受Symbian替代产品和自吹自va的S60平台。 直到今天,仍然有人认为Elop是微软首席执行官史蒂夫·鲍尔默(Steve Ballmer)的“内线人物”,这是雷德蒙德(Redmond)寄来的,目的是在微软创始人的移动平台上取得市场成功。 在叙述冲突的广阔环境中,我们试图记录导致这个小国结束不太可能主导移动设备市场的艰难选择,并评估是否存在挽救“诺基亚之道”的方法,或者其终结之路是真正的必然。

在研究本书的过程中,我们采访了100多名具有第一手知识的人,他们了解诺基亚为什么会像现在这样结局。 他们的故事相结合,编织出一种叙述,直接或间接地影响了大多数芬兰人的生活,因为在这个拥有六百万人口的北欧国家中,几乎每个人都知道在诺基亚工作过的人。 2010年至2013年期间,诺基亚处于动荡时期,当时旧法律不再适用,许多受访者在诺基亚工作。 更换关键人物时。 当行政领导去了AWOL。 当不该发生的事情发生时。 本书描述了高层管理人员决策如何在整个组织中级联,产生了什么样的后果,最重要的是,如何在公司的中层管理人员和员工中看到它们。

此外,我们还调查了诺基亚的行为如何在公司外部出现。 新的Windows策略是否说服了其网络提供商[4]客户? 诺基亚在硅谷的前景如何? 在诺基亚股东眼中,诺基亚对此有何看法?

这本书与诺基亚早期的研究有所不同,因为它着重于最近的历史和事件,力求综合这些命运的叙述。 这本书既不是关于诺基亚的历史,也不是关于前员工的分手。 这是对诺基亚退出移动设备市场的一个批判性观察,它是使用传统新闻方法从中立的角度构建的。

许多受访者希望保持匿名,因为有些人仍然害怕或仍然敬佩诺基亚在芬兰的独特地位。 显而易见的是,这些前诺基亚人对公司的影响。 在公司任职期间,他们认为自己正在建立未来。 之后,他们为遗留下来的残骸哀悼。 最终,许多人只需要告诉我们他们故事的一面。

本书是从史蒂芬·埃洛普(Stephen Elop)进入诺基亚悠久的历史之日开始的事件,旨在揭示各级事件的背景,并加深所有参与该故事的人们的看法。 为此目的,观点将在各章之间转移,因为这些事件是通过工程师,中层管理人员,高层领导和诺基亚董事会的眼光观察的,但是一起寻求回答一个简单的问题:如果有其他首席执行官,诺基亚的灭亡是否可以避免?

我们希望这本书能够提供有关2010年至2013年诺基亚究竟发生了什么的独特见解,并为某些芬兰人提供帮助,帮助他们完成芬兰最伟大的国家冠军的悲痛过程。 诺基亚手机已经成为历史,不太可能再出现。 它的客户将继续前进。 但是,芬兰在移动设备市场上的统治结束时有其一线希望:前诺基亚创建了数百家初创公司,从而创造并主导了新市场。 更新后的诺基亚将重新集中于网络和基于位置的服务,其前景一片光明。 最终,人们可以从好选择中学习并受益,但是真正重要的是要进步。


[2] 1994年波罗的海海上灾难,当时爱沙尼亚号渡轮沉没,造成852人死亡。
[3] 这实际上是一句古老的芬兰谚语,灵感来自芬兰的北极气候。 有趣的是,诺基亚的MeeGo和Google的Android都共享开源Linux操作系统内核。
[4] 网络提供商也称为“运营商”或“运营商”。 在此翻译中,我们使用术语“网络提供商”。 附录2中的词汇表附录中有 更多解释


返回目录

新闻编辑米尔贾米·萨里宁(Mirjami Saarinen)坦言,她对2010年某个工作日结束的回忆只有含糊的回忆。

那是2010年9月10日。芬兰主要的商业报纸Kauppalehti的大多数员工正在参加赫尔辛基市中心的上午研讨会。 当编辑尼古·兰塔(Niko Ranta)的显示屏上出现新闻稿时,不参加研讨会的工作人员正在制作早晨的在线新闻并计划第二天的报纸。 标题太惊人了,Ranta开始大声朗读发行内容。 新闻服务台的气氛变成了电。 那一刻,弥漫了米尔贾米·萨里宁对那天的回忆。 她仍然记得,工作人员是如何从研讨会上匆匆返回的,早餐期间的新闻突然传开了。 此后,她几乎记不清任何事情。

在星期五的时候, Kauppalehti做为期5天的论文感到两难。 芬兰的其他媒体将在周末完全消费该新闻,但Kauppalehti仍必须能够为星期一的报纸提供相关新闻。 根据她的经验,Saarinen知道她必须做什么。 首先,她收集了所有可用的编辑来处理新闻。 同时,她为在线头版新闻快报工作。 此后,团队开始思考各个角度,这在周一仍然是热门话题。 该消息是否仍将是星期一的头版新闻,还是会在第三页结束? 分配多少页,依此类推。 同时必须决定谁将参加即将举行的新闻发布会。 根据Saarinen所说,一天的其余时间就像控制巨大的交通拥堵。

新闻发布的开始(即解雇诺基亚当时的首席执行官Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo(在诺基亚内部普遍称为“ OPK”))并不意外。 芬兰媒体一直猜测这一切都是失败的。传统上,诺基亚对于诺基亚来说几乎是毫无用处的。 最近,它变得越来越关键,要求卡拉什沃坚守立场。 直到今天,公众对于卡拉什沃的立场的批评都是忌讳的:诺基亚在芬兰媒体中备受推崇,甚至被恐惧,所有批评通常都被掩盖和掩盖。

新闻稿中的下一个确实令人震惊。 熟悉公司的每个人都在押注Anssi Vanjoki(一个非常强大且有争议的诺基亚权力人物)来接替OPK。 相反,新闻稿引入了一个几乎不为人知的加拿大人作为公司的新任首席执行官。 斯蒂芬·埃洛普到底是谁? 一个没人听说过的男人! 他真的是可用的坏选择中最好的吗? 真是个奇怪的名字!

Saarinen很快有六位编辑在处理新闻,并且更多信息开始流传。一个软件专家。 来自微软。 曾负责微软最大的部门。 全球知名度超过芬兰。

一名摄影师,两名编辑和新闻主编Arno Ahosniemi于下午1点前往新闻发布会。诺基亚在Keilaniemi Espoo总部的礼堂里有芬兰所有相关知名媒体以及国际媒体的参与芬兰,包括路透社和彭博社。 这也是全球范围的新闻。

表演的明星们等待了片刻,然后一切开始了。 芬兰媒体众所周知的两个人物进入了会议:诺基亚集团传播执行副总裁乔玛·奥利拉(Jorma Ollila)和Arja Suominen。 他们的陪伴下是一个小而同情的男人。 他的表情不受影响,甚至谦虚。 他的领带,酒红色和红色相结合,看上去几乎像苏联。 而且,他的灰色西服和白色灰色衬衫显得有些谨慎。 他有军队风格的发型,沉闷的眼镜似乎不太适合放在耳朵后面。 那个人不是下一个史蒂夫·乔布斯,是对房间的快速集体裁决。

约玛·奥利拉(Jorma Ollila)迅速掌权。 他介绍了埃洛普(Elop),并强调诺基亚全体董事会一直在积极参与新首席执行官的选拔。 董事会曾希望找到可能的最佳人选来加速诺基亚的更新。 根据Ollila的说法,埃洛普(Elop)将软件背景和成熟的领导技能完美地结合在一起,以应对挑战。 此外,奥利拉(Ellila)(将诺基亚提升到首位的人)强调埃洛普(Elop)对文化差异的敏感性。 了解诺基亚的传统和“芬兰式”的本质将是促成埃洛普(Elop)成功的关键因素。 Ollila估计,埃洛普(Elop)是位能够理解诺基亚的核心和潜力的人。

然后轮到埃洛普了。 他与奥利拉握手,在摆满了麦克风的小圆桌后面摇摆。 仅仅花了几秒钟,他就意识到这个人是个大师。 光滑的外观和可靠的存在就像一根魔杖,一波消除了媒体的任何疑问。 这个人会说话…真的在说话! 他的英语听起来不错,与他的前任Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo的不同。 观众中发出了一线希望。 毕竟,一切都可能会顺利结束。

埃洛普(Elop)首先对奥利拉(Ollila)和诺基亚董事会的提名表示感谢,这是我的荣幸。 然后,他继续并概述了有关撼动移动行业的重大变化的愿景。 演讲期间自然会弹出流行的流行词汇和短语,例如云计算,社交媒体,平板电脑,应用程序等。 根据埃洛普(Elop)的说法,诺基亚的问题是巨大的机遇。 诺基亚拥有巨大的优势,尤其是其超能力的人。 “我们”巧妙地滑入演讲中,埃洛普(Elop)保证他会非常认真地听取员工和客户的意见。 他坚称自己是“诺基亚人”之一(如果您愿意的话,几乎是芬兰人),并表示他将在即将到来的奥运会中为两个国家加油。

经过充分准备的演讲结束后,奥利拉(Ollila)搬到埃洛普(Elop)旁进行问答。 埃洛普(Elop)从玻璃杯中water水,准备就绪。

第一个问题已提交给董事会主席奥利拉。 有人问他什么时候退休。 奥利拉没有模糊的评论,而是说“很快”。 第二个问题也指向奥利拉。 一位瑞典记者要求概述卡拉斯沃的错误,但奥利拉回答说,这不是进行回顾的时间,而是期待的时间,然后补充说,公司战略的实施存在缺陷。 现在,是时候与新任首席执行官一起进入下一阶段了。

当第三个问题也发给奥利拉时,情况变得有些可笑。 但是,埃洛普(Elop)做出了迅速反应,并回答了奥利拉(Ollila)。 “诺基亚下一步将采取什么行动?”埃洛普回答,对此发表评论还为时过早,但他坚信答案将在诺基亚内部找到,而他的任务是确保能够做到这一点。 埃洛普以类似的方式难以回答该问题,即是否应该更改移动设备操作系统。 但是,他表示操作系统将是该策略的关键因素。

如果没有准备好的演讲,埃洛普(Elop)甚至更可信。 他的手自然地走动,并在适当的时机强调了关键信息。 运动几乎是神奇的。 也许,这可能会变成一些东西。 也许美国股东最终会感到高兴。 也许这个人可以拯救诺基亚。 埃洛普(Elop)毫不掩饰的野心对诺基亚来说可谓是甘露。

一小时后,会议结束了,媒体开始返回他们的办公室。 在Kauppalehti ,直到星期一的任务清单已经很清楚了。 新闻发布会将由IlkkaSinervä主持。 Merina Salminen将分析Elop关于诺基亚所面临挑战的报价。 Antti Mustonen将制作有关Elop的专题报道。 总编辑汉努·莱农宁(Hannu Leinonen)将在他的每周专栏中分析诺基亚作为一家芬兰公司的特殊遗产会发生什么,直到那时,这几乎都是由约玛·奥利拉(Jorma Ollila)领导的。

回顾那不寻常的一天,很明显,至少Kauppalehti编辑人员很快指出了埃洛普(Elop)与微软的牢固且可能是不祥的联系。 立刻有诸如“微软要收购诺基亚?”之类的言论,许多人认为埃洛普的提名是迈向合并的第一步。 对于某些人来说,愿景是令人恐惧的,但并非对所有人而言。 后者之一是诺基亚高层管理人员的匿名成员,他与埃洛普(Elop)进行了很多往来。 他[5]回忆起埃洛普(Elop)的到来感到欣喜若狂,并在那天开了一瓶非常不错的红酒。

在那漫长的一天之后,我们不知道Jorma Ollila的感受。 我们确实知道,这一天是几个月前开始的奥利拉(Ollila)拯救诺基亚计划的第一步。 诺基亚现在有了新的领导者。 市场和外国股东一直期望的一种领导者。 名为“逃亡行动”的项目已经开始。 [6]


[5] 还是“她”? —原始的芬兰代词“hän”未传达性别信息。

[6] 作者想指出的是,在现实生活中没有“逃亡行动”。 这只是他们为原始书选择的名称。


返回目录

更换诺基亚首席执行官的出发点是在2009年8月举行的董事会小龙虾晚宴上。乔玛·奥利拉(Jorma Ollila)在回忆录《 对所有赔率》中写道,其中一位董事会成员与他接洽,询问公司管理层是否全部对。 奥利拉本人一直想知道的事情,就是那只猫被从包里拿出来了。 长期以来,董事会一直忠于Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo,他是Ollila的长期同工,也是一个颇受欢迎的同事,通常被称为OPK。 普遍的共识是,这些问题将在没有援助的情况下得到解决,但是现在情况正在迅速恶化。

晚宴之后,事情开始发展。 更换诺基亚首席执行官的决定如此巨大,只有在奥利拉的同意下才能做出。 到2009年底,奥利拉(Ollila)也准备着手进行这项工作。 董事会在11月至12月进行了年度评估,评估其自身绩效以及董事会主席的职责。 副主席Marjorie Scardino主持了这些讨论,而讨论主要集中在手术管理上。 奥利拉在回忆录中提到,几乎每个董事会成员都提出了行政长官是否能胜任其职的问题。

这些讨论实际上是更换过程的开始。 在2010年1月,董事会就组织的绩效进行了长时间的讨论,奥利拉(Ollila)受权与集团执行董事会成员就公司管理层的状况进行讨论。 在卡尔拉斯沃的同意下,他做到了。

奥利拉说,大约有十二种这样的谈话,关于卡拉斯沃的观点在毫无疑问地支持OPK的人和有严重怀疑的人之间平均分配。 奥利拉写道:“奥利·佩卡是一个令人愉快的人,不会激起强烈的反感。 然而,这些疑问是明确而强烈的。 与执行委员会的讨论不是导致更换行政长官的主要因素,但确实提供了支持决策的其他数据。”

据说董事会内部的担忧已逐渐增加。 董事会日新月异地很少相信所使用的方法会成功。 产品出现延误。 有些决定是基于缺乏选择和仓促进行的。 Kallasvuo和Ollila一起工作的方式也引起了董事会的不满,因为他们两个有时倾向于在彼此之间达成一致。 显然,其中一个例子是决定聘请芬兰前总理埃斯科·阿霍(Esko Aho)担任公司关系和责任执行副总裁。

2007年,诺基亚公布了创纪录的财务业绩。 此后,董事会能够将诺基亚的某些问题归咎于始于2008年的全球金融危机。 直到2009年才唤醒人们,董事会的语言也开始引起人们的注意。

在2010年夏季,董事会访问了加利福尼亚的硅谷。 卡拉什沃对公司运营能力的怀疑变成了一种主要的心态。 奥利拉在回忆录中提到一位董事会成员反对解散卡拉斯沃。 另一位熟悉此案的消息人士称这与奥利拉本人站在阻碍变革的方向相矛盾。 诚然,他是一个活泼的传奇人物,也是一个充满挑战的人物。 许多人认为,一旦事情开始走下坡路,他就应该下台,以便对当前情况进行适当的检查和评估,从而为质疑现有结构留出了空间。

股东之间也越来越担心。 “我们应该满足什么?”一位股东代表问到奥利拉(Ollila)主持的董事会在20世纪最后几年的运作情况。

Ilmarinen Mutual Pension Insurance的副首席执行官Timo Ritakallio认为,奥利拉(Ollila)出任诺基亚首席执行官后没有离开公司就感到惊讶。 他指出,奥利拉的单纯存在,尽管无意间,却束缚了他的继任者。 Ritakallio表示:“在奥利拉(Ollila)领导诺基亚的崛起以及他非常坚强的董事会主席的职责之后,很显然,卡拉斯沃(Kalasvuo)并非完全自由自在地运作,就像他可能想要的那样。”

芬兰大股东的代表使董事会对诺基亚的问题同样负责。 董事会留下了无人注意的问题,其中之一就是诺基亚西门子通信公司的情况。 由于西门子和诺基亚的整合被推迟,NSN陷入了艰难的僵局。 改变的需求是巨大的,但是奥利拉并没有为了改变操作模式而介入初发电动机的角色。 僵局显然让Scardino感到最沮丧。 她正考虑在2009年离开诺基亚。

接受本书采访的许多人认为,董事会任命奥利拉(Ollila)为诺基亚新任首席执行官的主要猎头是很奇怪的,因为他毕竟是选择Kallasvuo的人,而他现在在他的任务上失败了。 任命委员会的其他成员是Scardino和瑞典顾问Per Karlsson(奥利拉的长期受托人)。

玛乔丽·斯卡迪诺夫人(生于1947年)是首位荣登FTSE英国最大上市公司100强名单的女性高管:她被任命为英国出版公司Pearson的首席执行官。 她于2001年加入诺基亚董事会,并于2007年被任命为董事会副主席。斯卡迪诺被誉为英美出版业的铁娘子。 她还曾担任《乔治亚州公报》的发行人和《经济学人》集团首席执行官。 当她加入诺基亚时,她在传统出版行业拥有杰出的职业,但是没有基于互联网的行业经验,也没有对移动业务的深入了解。 诺基亚的两个主要利益相关者表示,Scardino作为董事会成员的投入微弱。

Karlsson(生于1955年)的背景与Scardino相似。 奥利拉(Ollila)要求他于2002年加入诺基亚董事会。他是一位职业生涯卓著的高级公司顾问。 他一直在波士顿咨询集团工作,直到加入宜家创始人因格瓦尔•坎普拉德(Ingvar Kamprad)的儿子们创立的融资公司Ikano Holdings。 Karlsson和Ollila在金融领域有着共同的利益。

在任命委员会的三名成员中,只有奥利拉(Ollila)拥有技术行业的经验,但根据许多人的说法,甚至连他都与服务驱动的互联网时代运营模式保持联系。

总部位于伦敦的猎头公司Spencer Stuart专门从事信息和通信技术领域,该公司于2010年6月制定了诺基亚首席执行官候选人名单。奥利拉和团队选择了一个简短的名单:三个来自北美,两个来自芬兰。 在美国候选人中有加拿大的斯蒂芬·埃洛普(Stephen Elop)。 芬兰的候选人是诺基亚移动解决方案负责人Anssi Vanjoki和服务与设备负责人Niklas Savander。

Vanjoki(出生于1956年)于1991年加入诺基亚。他是Ollila核心团队的成员,该团队是带领诺基亚成功的所谓梦想团队。 团队的其他成员包括Kallasvuo,Matti Alahuhta,PekkaAla-Pietilä和Sari Baldauf。 在加入诺基亚之前,Vanjoki曾在3M集团工作。 在诺基亚,Vanjoki曾领导诺基亚手机,多媒体部门和市场部门。 在2010年夏季,他正在执行董事会分配给他的任务,以检查研发工作。 同时,他正在为诺基亚制定新的战略,并经Kallasvuo的同意再次由董事会任命。

Savander自1997年以来一直在诺基亚任职,但尽管他在销售,市场营销和服务方面具有适当的背景,但从一开始就不太可能选择他担任诺基亚下一任首席执行官。 诺基亚组织内部和外部的人都被视为领导者。

完成候选人短名单后,任命团队开始旅行。 董事会对奥利拉的努力表示赞赏:“他在旅行和承担主要责任方面做得很出色。”奥利拉乘坐私人飞机从赫尔辛基飞往旧金山,采访了外国候选人。 他制定时间表的方式是,他可以在三天内与五名候选人见面。 采访中的三场是在硅谷的东帕洛阿尔托酒店-第一次是早餐,第二次是午餐,第三次是在会议室。 然后,他继续在雷德蒙德(Microsoft)的微软与埃洛普(Elop)见面,在自己套房的私密环境中享用早餐。 下午,奥利拉(Ollila)向东飞到南安普敦(Southampton),与第五位候选人共进晚餐。

实施这项任务并非易事。 在芬兰,他是国王,但在硅谷,他是一家过时的科技公司的董事长。

要充分理解奥利拉在执行任务时遇到的困难,必须了解诺基亚在加利福尼亚州的看法。 一位美国分析师认为,董事会高估了为下一任诺基亚首席执行官吸引美国顶级企业高管的机会。 加利福尼亚是美国自己的手机服务技术CDMA(码分多址)的核心。 “每个人都在片上系统制造商高通公司的阵营中。 所有谷歌和苹果高管都与高通关系密切,生活在CDMA世界。 这些人过去一直将诺基亚视为代表欧洲GSM(全球移动通信系统)的恐龙。 在加利福尼亚,这种观点与埃斯波的观点有所不同。”

奥利拉在回忆录中提到,不确定他返回家乡时是否会在受访者中找到新的首席执行官。 很快,美国的候选人名单就减少到了两个。 排名第一的候选人是一家知名技术公司的第二名。 根据Ollila的说法,他是五十多岁的高管,已经在公司工作了很多年,通过担任公司的各种职务而升任。 奥利拉说已经见过两次候选人。 他认为该候选人是正确的选择-他对世界各地的技术公司都非常了解,他的领导风格和价值观都很合适,但经过长期考虑,该候选人出于个人原因退出了流程,而不是出于个人原因。诺基亚称奥利拉。

在媒体以及本书的采访中,都猜测出了各种各样的第一候选人。 一个人是苹果公司现任首席执行官蒂姆·库克,他在2010年是苹果公司的第二人。 根据我们的采访,库克很可能是该过程的一部分,并且是这份工作的候选人。 他非常符合奥利拉的描述。

库克于1998年加入苹果公司,在奥利拉旅行时年仅49岁,这可被解释为“五十多岁”。 他也是耐克董事会成员的事实,只会增加他的适用性。

被提议为奥利拉在面试中排名第一的候选人的另一个名字是太阳的乔纳森·施瓦茨。 他听起来确实不错,但并不完全符合奥利拉的描述。 当时他只有44岁,并且已经在2010年2月辞去Sun的首席执行官的职务,这不符合Ollila对第二名人物的描述,尽管事实上甲骨文在那段时间收购了Sun。

居住在芬兰的美国记者David J. Cord在他的《 诺基亚的衰落与衰落》一书中写道,奥利拉排名第一的候选人实际上应该是前Sun首席执行官斯科特·麦克尼利。 媒体广泛传播了这个想法,只是发现麦克尼尔(McNealy)早在几周前就在一条推文中否认了这一点:毫无疑问:奥利拉(Ollila)从未要求他经营诺基亚。

最疯狂的猜测是雅虎当时的首席执行官玛丽莎·梅耶(Marissa Mayer),他是谷歌前芬兰裔高管。 梅耶(Mayer)育有一个小孩,因此她的家庭状况使她无法搬到芬兰。 但是她肯定不符合“五十多岁的男人”的描述。

我们相信Ollila对第一名候选人的描述是正确的。 他不得不共享虚假信息的可能原因是什么? 他本来可以完全忽略掉那部分。


为了了解选择过程,重要的是要知道谁来做决定。

2010年,诺基亚董事会除主席奥利拉,副主席斯卡迪诺和卡尔森外,还由其他六名成员组成。

拉利塔·古普特(Lalita Gupte,生于1948年)曾是印度金融公司ICICI的董事长。 她在财务运营和官方职位方面都有丰富的经验。

BengtHolmström(生于1949年)是麻省理工学院的经济学教授。 对于芬兰研究员来说,他是一位杰出的学术巨星。

Henning Kagermann(生于1947年)是德国软件公司SAP的前首席执行官。 他当时是欧洲技术行业的头号人物。

Keijo Suila(生于1945年)是Finnair的前首席执行官。 他是最有价值的公司高管之一,过去曾在Huhtamäki和Leira担任过多个高级职位。

伊莎贝尔·玛丽·森珀(Isabel Marey-Semper,生于1967年)是法国化妆品公司L’Oreal的高管。 她在欧洲公司的高层战略,公司计划以及知识产权方面经验丰富。

里斯托·西拉斯玛(Risto Siilasmaa)(生于1966年)是该公司的创始人兼董事长
芬兰信息安全公司F-Secure。 Siilasmaa是芬兰技术行业中备受推崇的公司高管之一。

缺乏技术能力在人群中脱颖而出。 只有Siilasmaa代表了当前的信息和通信技术。 SAP的Kagermann是该领域的另一位专家,代表了老一辈。 这位德国绅士不太可能在流行的Techno场景中度过自己的时间。 Holmström正在美国受人尊敬的技术界发展,但是却是一名研究员。 成立董事会时,Ollila重视IT领域的财务和消费者业务方面的技术经验。 Karlsson和Gupte具有金融背景,Suila,Scardino和Marey-Semper在消费者业务方面经验丰富。 让Scardino和Marey-Semper担任诺基亚等高端技术公司的董事会成员,令许多接受本书采访的人感到奇怪,因为他们的移动能力不足。 还值得注意的是,几乎没有关于Marey-Semper的公开数据。

有人会问,为什么诺基亚董事会没有其他类型的能力? 技术初创企业家? 风险资本家? 是否有人与网络提供商,分包商以及最重要的是移动设备消费者建立了最新的连接?

熟悉诺基亚和微软的分析师Horace Dediu指出,在诺基亚竞争对手中,董事会主要扮演顾问的角色。 例如,最大的股东谢尔盖·布林(Sergei Brin),拉里·佩奇(Larry Page)和埃里克·施密特(Eric Sc​​hmidt)在Google中的声音最大。 迪迪厄认为,美国的科技公司不愿向金融家或其他外部人士提供权力,因为这会削弱颠覆和质疑现有结构的颠覆性思维。 颠覆性思维及其作用的最鲜明的例子是传奇创始人兼苹果首席执行官史蒂夫·乔布斯。 Dedieu认为诺基亚董事会是经过专业管理的,但与其专注于愿景,不如专注于优化。

让我们看一下苹果董事会在2010年的比较情况。 它由Genentech董事会主席Arthur D. Levinson担任主席。 制药和技术业务具有相似性,例如研发的核心。 创新以及保护知识产权都是至关重要的。 董事会成员之一是软件公司因纽特人董事长比尔·坎贝尔(Bill Campbell),他在软件业务领域拥有悠久的职业生涯。 航空和航天技术公司诺斯罗普·格鲁曼公司董事长Ronald D. Sugar也代表了技术行业。 美国前副总统阿尔·戈尔(Al Gore)在那里管理高层公共关系。 在诺基亚,芬兰前总理埃斯科·阿霍(Esko Aho)担任诺基亚集团执行委员会成员。 苹果董事会中的消费者观点由服装公司J.Crew董事会主席Millard Drexler代表。

除了Page,Brin和Schmidt之外,2010年Google董事会还有六名成员。 约翰·杜尔(L. John Doerr)是专门从事技术行业的风险投资家,曾是亚马逊在线商店的高管,约翰·汉尼斯(John L. Hennessy)是斯坦福大学计算机科学教授,半导体公司Atheros的创始人安·马瑟(Ann Mather)是董事会成员专注于游戏和互联网业务的专家,皮克斯动画工作室(Pixar Animation Studios)的前高管,保罗·奥特里尼(Paul S. Otellini),英特尔公司的前首席执行官,谢尔帕洛(Serpalo)Ventures的首席执行官K. Ram Shriram,普林斯顿大学生物化学教授,雪莉·米(Shirley M)。蒂尔曼

诺基亚最激烈的两个竞争对手,苹果和谷歌,显然拥有比诺基亚更胜任全球技术和互联网专业技能的董事会。 更糟的是,诺基亚董事会的职务更多是头衔,而不是实质内容。 尽管在美国发现了最高水平的软件能力,但Scardino是唯一的董事会成员。

Google和Apple董事会会否选择Elop担任首席执行官? 几乎不。 在他们看来,埃洛普代表了过去的世界。 他对消费者的业务一无所知,来自Microsoft,这是一种从PC到移动环境都没有发展的恐龙。


董事会成员意识到肩负着巨大的责任。 他们最想要的是摆脱深深的挫败感。 此外,由于不断更换首席执行官,所有的进步工作都停止了。 因此,招募工作迅速进行。 当奥利拉的第一候选人退缩时,剩下的只有埃洛普和凡乔基。

据《 彭博商业周刊》( Bloomberg Businessweek)报道 ,埃洛普(Elop)的经历和他的简历给奥利拉留下了深刻的印象。 埃洛普(Elop)一直领导着价值190亿美元的微软办公业务,是世界上最大,最赚钱的商业企业之一。 埃洛普(Elop)的声誉也在于,它不惧怕挑战,并且能够解决内部冲突。

实际上,2009年,当诺基亚和微软就诺基亚智能手机中Microsoft Office应用的配置进行谈判时,埃洛普已经给诺基亚领导者留下了深刻的印象。 谈判被证明是困难的。 诺基亚正处于鼎盛时期,而微软以其灵活性而闻名。 诺基亚的一位领导人说,问题从一开始就出现了。 上午9点,微软律师大军进军诺基亚选择的会议地点。 接待处的一名搬运工要求他们在传统纸上签名,以使他/她可以向他们出示访客通行证。 那篇文章的措辞有些不符合微软律师的喜好,最后,他们被允许没有访客通行证的情况下进入。 谈判的那天开局令人不快。

谈判一开始就进行,很困难。 但是,4月,诺基亚高管KaiÖistämö和他的团队与现在由埃洛普(Elop)领导的微软谈判团队会面。 他以坦诚和渴望解决问题的方式给诺基亚管理人员留下了很好的印象,而且他对任何事情都不抱有政治上的态度。 他给人以自己是一个强大的领导者和语言大师的印象。 他的芬兰同行认为埃洛普(Elop)的举止既熟悉又愉快。 在“五一”前夕,令双方惊讶的是,谈判取得了突破,该协议于夏季的晚些时候签署。

埃洛普(Elop)在这些谈判中表现出色的消息一定是那些现在正在选举他为诺基亚新CEO的人们的耳闻。

Vanjoki在诺基亚组织内部和外部都有许多支持者。 他知道诺基亚及其参考小组很喜欢手背。 在2010年8月,天平似乎将对他有利。 董事会尚未做出最终决定,但结果似乎可以肯定。 新任首席执行官将是芬兰人。 分配给Vanjoki的战略工作不会浪费。 Vanjoki和诺基亚都面临着一个新时代。

到2010年9月10日,席位已经翻转。 毕竟,埃洛普(Elop)被任命为诺基亚新首席执行官。 这几周发生了什么?

赛事的主要推动力是斯卡迪诺。 她是外国股东,特别是美国养老基金投资者的董事会发言人。 作为任命委员会的成员,她是美国养老基金的自然联络点,这些养老基金对诺基亚所取得的进步感到不满意。 对于外国股东而言,Vanjoki不足以进行续约。 需要进行更大的调整,并且该调整器必须来自诺基亚组织外部。 斯卡迪诺告诉她的同事,只有与埃洛普(Elop)交谈后,她才意识到诺基亚在理解新时代方面存在差距。 斯卡迪诺(Scardino)是在最后一刻向埃洛普(Elop)倾斜的人,任命委员会将埃洛普(Elop)作为他们的首选人选。

一位研究诺基亚多年的分析师表示,诺基亚董事会处于艰难和艰难的境地。 他们被迫向美国投资者证明诺基亚不再只是一家芬兰公司。 尽管诺基亚的股东遍布全球,但从美国的角度来看,仍有太多诺基亚员工仍居住在芬兰。 只有采取重大举措才能确保投资者:要么将诺基亚总部迁至美国,要么任命非芬恩公司(最好是北美人)担任新首席执行官。 通过选择埃洛普,董事会可以将总部保留在芬兰。

另一位对诺基亚非常熟悉的分析师认为,埃洛普(Elop)出色的语言表达能力,以及他在微软看来令人印象深刻的背景,对他的工作也有利于他成为北美人。 那些任命他的人希望得到像史蒂夫·乔布斯这样有魅力的主唱。 谈判中,埃洛普(Elop)与Windows操作系统的连接不太可能受到影响。 这位分析师说,如果这是招聘过程中的一个因素,那么诺基亚操作系统战略将不会像最终那样发生太大变化。 但是他/她确实认为,美国股东可能会向董事会施加压力,要求他们从像微软这样的软件公司中选人。

据他/她说,在美国没有人考虑Elop的职位,因为他的简历不适合:他没有深入的移动能力,也没有消费者业务方面的了解。 通过任命埃洛普(Elop),诺基亚展示了自己的利润差距。 根本没有候选人名单。 分析师认为,如果没有合适的候选人具有软件背景,那么下一个最佳选择就是从芯片组公司,网络提供商或竞争对手那里任命具有电信背景的人员。


董事会对埃洛普的承诺表示关注。 他的家人会加入他吗? 芬兰很远,环境也不一样。 埃洛普(Elop)的回应是,已经与家人进行了讨论,这对于每个相关人员都是一个很好的解决方案。 埃洛普(Elop)被认为是真诚的,但是在他每年旅行200天几年之后,该怎么办? 提出了其他问题。 那他没有消费业务经验呢? 董事会的一些成员对他倾向于快速发言的趋势感到不安。 他会听吗,会吸引其他人加入,还是会成为一个独树一帜的艺术家?

董事会知道埃洛普跳槽的历史。 他们认为这是美国商业文化的正常特征,认为芬兰的商业文化更接近日本。 急剧变化的新时代要求敏捷性和新的思维方式。 董事会认为Elop具有这些功能。

最后,决定是一致的。 参与讨论的人说,范乔基被认为是热情,起泡和创新的人格,但即使在组织内部,他也被认为有些矛盾。 与埃洛普(Elop)不同,万乔基(Vanjoki)具有历史包bag,董事会认为最好强调续约。 回顾一下,无论选择是对还是错,在做出决定时都有明确的逻辑,指出了一位密切关注该过程的消息人士。 多年来,人们一直对诺基亚进入美国市场的策略存有疑问。


2010年8月,诺基亚董事会做出了最终决定。 结果,Vanjoki两天后辞职。 苹果的乔布斯打电话给Vanjoki要求他为Apple工作,但是Vanjoki拒绝了。 他将不再只是另一位受聘的高管。

埃洛普(Elop)被任命后的评论谨慎乐观。 他的功绩被认为是不错的,尤其是他的沟通能力,软件业务经验以及他是北美人。 新任首席执行官在接受芬兰最大报纸《 赫尔辛基·萨诺玛特》的采访时说,他完全了解诺基亚在芬兰社会中的主导作用。 埃洛普(Elop)继续列出了他通常认为的芬兰特色:开放,正直,透明的沟通,道德和对他人的尊重。 当然,也提到冰球以及咸甘草“ salmiakki”。

新闻主编MikaelPentikäinen第二天在他的文章中写道,根据他的背景和特征,埃洛普(Elop)很有可能成功完成他的任务:“芬兰的每个人都在想,埃洛普(Elop)是否会把诺基亚搬出芬兰,但没有迹象表明。 埃洛普(Elop)将移居芬兰,继续担任诺基亚董事会主席的奥利拉(Ollila)将继续保持诺基亚作为芬兰经济旗舰的地位。 芬兰人有充分的理由相信,诺基亚将在Elop的带领下取得一个强大的新起点。 诺基亚取得的成功越好,芬兰及其经济就会越强大。”

诺基亚媒体人员的评论是温和的,没有人想立即解雇新老板。

对冰球的热情以及他的软件能力对他有利。 由于首席执行官是非芬兰人,如果芬兰的关系要减弱,那么人们对芬兰地区的担忧就增加了。 当地报纸甚至更关注诺基亚在芬兰各地的各个站点。 例如, 奥卢卡莱瓦(Kaleva)报纸想知道诺基亚在芬兰的职能将如何发展,由加拿大领导该公司。 Kaleva问:“诺基亚在Salo和Oulu的站点会发生什么?”

更换诺基亚CEO的消息传到国际媒体。 根据德国《 法兰克福汇报》的报道,埃洛普是诺基亚的最后一次机会。 《英国金融时报》对埃洛普(Elop)和奥利拉(Ollila)进行了采访,他们拒绝了诺基亚将放弃自己的操作系统的想法。 奥利拉表示,尚未聘请埃洛普来更新诺基亚战略。

美国媒体对此表示了更多怀疑。 在埃洛普的家乡西雅图 ,《 西雅图时报》指出,埃洛普是微软在一年内离职的第三位高级官员。 该报对分析师罗伯·恩德勒(Rob Enderle)进行了采访,他认为微软失去了出色的人才。 根据Enderle的说法,埃洛普(Elop)对首席执行官的职位寄予厚望,但在微软,这样做的机会很小。 CNBC金融新闻频道“ 疯狂金钱”计划的主持人吉姆•克莱默(Jim Cramer)开玩笑说:“诺基亚聘用的人并不重要,除了史蒂夫(Steve)的职位,它仍然无法挽救公司的名气。 没有办法使手机市场卷土重来。 诺基亚最大的问题是,该公司并未掌握决定哪些手机将出售,哪些手机不会出售的美国主要人口统计信息。 我们的青少年不了解诺基亚,而微软的这个家伙也不会改变这一点。”

华尔街日报》认为,埃洛普的主要任务是确保有说服力的竞争对手与苹果的iPhone竞争,因为那是卡拉斯沃失败的地方。 根据《华尔街日报》的说法,软件主管将需要浏览“一群文化和制度性的水下岩石”,并且埃洛普被认为是务实而果断的领导者,可以将大型实体变成更小,更易管理的部分。 但是,这家美国报纸确实对诺基亚的行动是否足够大胆感到怀疑:微软业务部门负责人不是加快诺基亚业务整合或形象更新的最明显选择,也不曾是诺基亚的失败者。 《纽约时报》认为任命微软高管正在讲述诺基亚和微软比以往更加紧密合作的故事。 该报提醒微软与诺基亚有类似的创新问题,并提到诺基亚未能与美国四家最大的电信网络提供商建立有利可图的业务关系,后者在美国销售了90%以上的移动设备。


行动国家急切地等待着新任首席执行官是否会在宣布宣布后一周的9月14日在伦敦诺基亚世界(Nokia World)露面,这是诺基亚利益相关方最重要的活动之一。 该活动被认为对投资者而言特别令人兴奋。 听众很好奇Vanjoki宣布离开诺基亚。 他是一位受到投资者,客户和记者重视的高管,他们习惯于听取他的大胆言论。 在告别时,Vanjoki展示了诺基亚的新Communicator。 貌似很高兴,他感谢诺基亚世界(Nokia World)的观众20年的旅程,并在他们的鼓掌下退出了舞台。

除了新的Communicator,诺基亚还发布了四款新的智能手机。 高管们正在尽最大努力提高诺基亚的信誉。

由于首席执行官的接任,伦敦的主要发言人是Niklas Savander。 他向听众指出,诺基亚每天售出26万部新智能手机,这比苹果和Android的总和还多。 Savander承诺为伦敦展示的模型售出5000万台设备。 他还感谢Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo在诺基亚工作了30年的出色经历。

诺基亚首席开发官KaiÖistämö驳斥了因任命Microsoft员工而引起的担忧。 由于Öistämö以前很了解Elop,因此他确信Elop将很好地适应诺基亚。

一位大客户也在诺基亚世界上发表了讲话。 英国网络提供商沃达丰(Vodafone)首席执行官维托里奥·科劳(Vittorio Colao)认为,设备制造商和网络提供商所处的最佳市场在发展中国家。 Colao对诺基亚在智能手机战中的生存能力表示赞赏,并表示他对诺基亚所表现出的野心感到非常满意。

事件发生后的第二天,埃洛普(Elop)确实出现了。 他会见客户,但没有见媒体。 正式地,他的职责要到下周才开始。


返回目录

Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo留下了一个组织,由三个公司部门(智能手机,功能电话和服务)竞争资源,力量和关注。 智能手机部门本来需要服务部门的支持,但在外部付费客户之后仅排在第二位。

该公司的产品组合非常庞大。 尽管公司的庞大产品系列中只有一小部分获得成功,但该策略在业务蒸蒸日上的过程中仍然奏效,那些畅销书为业务成功带来了足够的资金。 到2010年,庞大的产品范围已成为一种负担。 几年来一直没有最畅销的产品,销售人员的情况尤其如此。 该公司手中有大量销售不佳的产品。 仍然很高的销量令人眼花。乱。 注意力集中在一个积极的事实上,即该公司每年销售4亿部手机,即使大部分销量来自30欧元的基本手机,对利润几乎没有影响。

电话投放市场计划的持续延迟增加了负担。 The prototypes of feature-rich lead products were developed fast, but the completion and testing for the mass market entry took too long. Management time was wasted in the meetings that focused on minor details such as a minor software adjustment. Sometimes more than ten vice presidents were present in such meetings. The product schedules were perpetually delayed until it became evident that demand for such products would no longer exist at market entry.

The situation was worst for the company’s biggest money maker, its smartphone operating system Symbian. With over 6 million lines of code, the software platform had become unmanageable. Hardware design and Symbian software development were almost in a state war and were at each other’s neck daily. Time, money and mental resources were wasted to tweak the outdated Symbian for each product. There were so many product lines that the product managers could not manage to keep up-to-date what was going on.

Although considerable strategic weight was given to the software development and services, Nokia, in essence, was a pure hardware manufacturer in regard to its profitability, money-making mechanisms and operating principles. After all, software and services accounted for less than 1% of its revenue.

Up to then, the company had managed to cover its costly software in the phone pricing, but now this strategy no longer worked as competitors had started to launch phones of superior quality.


During the Kallasvuo era, the confidence of investors and shareholders in Nokia’s management had waned from initial euphoria to next to nothing. A Nokia analyst at an American venture capital investment company remembers having a critical view on the capability of Nokia to switch over from basic phone business to smartphones. The analyst considered Nokia to be very vulnerable with its “institutional baggage” in the form of 130,000 employees together with Nokia Networks (NSN) and with the majority of the employees being located in Finland. The analyst also states that Nokia was focusing on the wrong technology platform and using billions of euros to its software development.

Nokia was more vulnerable compared to its competitors. Korean Samsung, as a conglomerate, manufactured computers and other electronic devices in addition to mobile phones, and was therefore not so susceptible to suffer from a slowdown in one of its product segments. Samsung was able to sell its mobile phones for retail businesses at a lower wholesale pricing, as their transactions also included other products than just mobile phones.

Apple secured their profitability with expensive Mac PCs and iPods at the time when iPhones were not yet bringing in much revenue.

According to many interviewees, Nokia as an organization had drifted into a state of inertia. Elop would soon find himself in the middle of a battlefield of middle-aged men. Instead of external competition, the competition was internal. Common interest had been replaced by the optimization of the vested interest. The famous Nokia-spirit was had begun to ebb away. Constant organizational changes confused the working environment as employees had to reapply for their positions. People were somewhat arbitrarily transferred to new positions. There were employees, whose projects had been ed, but they got to keep their jobs.

The matrix organization structure played a key role in the management problem: People were part of a project under different teams, but nobody had an overall responsibility of the end product. The team spirit killed any individual creative spirit. Ideological and innovative individuals were labeled as lone wolves. Yes-men with no opinions of their own would flourish. For example, the normal trial-and-error software development technique was no longer used in Symbian software development. A person who was in charge of software development says that the problem was in the management which adjusted and fine-tuned projects ad nauseam. Even according to Nokia’s internal evaluation, the projects with the least management level involvement were the ones best on schedule. When the engineers were left alone to do their work, the results came forth.

Mikko Kosonen, the former Senior Vice President of Strategy and Business Infrastructure in Nokia and currently the President of the Finnish Innovation Fund Sitra, wrote a book on strategic agility together with Professor Yves Doz of INSEAD, a top-rated European business school. [7] In principle, strategic agility existed, but in practice it was only a dream. The lack of strategic agility and rigidity resulted in playing safe. In the technology driven business, that marks the beginning of the end.

When talking about the working environment atmosphere, many mentioned the word ‘fear’. Fear of losing one’s job or position kept their mouths shut even when something should have been voiced. A sugar-coated picture was given to the management. An employee working in the strategy department resorted to check the true status of upcoming phone projects from a friend working in development, because the official status given could not be trusted. Nokia was the emperor with new clothes, but nobody dared to say it out loud.

The layoffs had started in 2008. When money was becoming an issue. The organization had been streamlined many times over, but the scope of the operations remained unchanged. At every decline of the financial outlook, streamlining continued. There were divisions which had been fully reorganized 3–4 times within a year.

The Group Executive Board was equally stagnated. Niklas Savander, Kai Öistämö and Tero Ojanperä had shuffled their roles several times, but nevertheless stayed in the company. According to an outdated Nokia principle, it was considered beneficial for the executives to hold several different positions to increase their competence. During the growth era the principle had worked.

But when the phone sales started to decline, new people and fresh ideas would have come in useful.


The company had gone to the dogs, at least partially. But what would the customers think of the situation? Elop knew that the feedback was not going to be good.

The customer base was divided into two. Network providers traditionally had long-term commitments with phone manufacturers and they continued selling Nokia phones like business as usual. For several years, European network providers had enjoyed economic growth in the wake of Nokia’s success and were therefore more inclined to overlook the problems their trusted business partner had started to experience. The feedback from the large electronics companies and other retail businesses with shorter order cycle was more hard-edged.

For example, the French retail chains Carrefour and Océan started to question Nokia’s famous customer orientation. The French retail chains were wondering why Nokia force-fed its own music applications and other applications to its phones even if the customers wanted iTunes or Spotify. Nokia had not entered into strategic alliances with service providers, because it believed that it can produce such services by itself. According to a former Nokia sales director, Nokia should have integrated popular services such as Spotify into its phones and advertised to its consumers how the services worked best in Nokia phones. Instead of doing this, a lot of money was spent to fight against such services. As a device manufacturer, Nokia was not as agile in the service segment as the service providers.

Network providers were also slowly awakening to reality. They were worried about the inflexibility of Symbian which meant that it was not a popular platform among application developers. That could not be overlooked as Apple’s iPhones and phones based on Google’s Android were now used as a new baseline for phones. Network providers compared the data usage of smartphone users. Users of Samsung Galaxy running on Google Android used ten times more data compared to the highest data users with Nokia phones. So the users of Galaxy, which offered a seamless user experience, stayed in the network using data applications for much longer periods of time. And the network providers started to be more insistent in demanding to know what Nokia was going to do to increase the data usage in their phones.

After the initial hiccups, the popularity of iPhones’ skyrocketed 2009. When Elop was looking at his Nokia playing field in the end of 2010, iPhone had already become Nokia’s biggest competitor. It caught Nokia off guard and happened unnoticed while Nokia had closely watched its traditional competitors, the phone manufacturers.

Nokia had lost a big chunk of its smartphone market share. According to Strategy Analytics, Nokia’s market share had shrunk to 34.4% by the summer of 2010 whereas in the beginning of that year its market share had still been at about 38%. Nokia had put a record number of 26.5 million smartphones on the market, a whooping 61% more than one year before, but it still was not enough to retain its market share in the skyrocketing smartphone market. 77 million smartphones were sold worldwide during the summer 2010. That was a record 78% more than year before.

Apple had started with low production volumes, but was increasing its volume quarter by quarter. In 2009, the production volume of Nokia was triple the volume of Apple, but in 2010 only double. It was exceptionally peculiar since Apple had only one smartphone in the market while Nokia had tens. During the summer of 2010, Apple reached the second market position with its 18.5% market share for the first time. Third market position was held by RIM whose Blackberry phone had 16% market share.

Nokia’s strongest market area was Europe where Nokia dominated the smartphone markets. Nokia’s strength in Asia and Latin America was its ability to launch durable and affordable feature phones. In these market areas, the Nokia brand was strong and Nokia’s distribution network seamless. In those markets, the status quo would be good enough. However, in the United States Nokia as a phone brand was practically non-existent. Elop realized that starting with a clean slate was the only option in the US. There was also a lot of baggage as Nokia had alienated the American network providers with its arrogance. American network providers were not dependent on Nokia to the same extent as their European counterparts, who had huge numbers of Symbian smartphone users as their customers. In an interview with Helsingin Sanomat in October 2012, Jorma Ollila admitted that Nokia’s strategy in Silicon Valley had proved to be a complete flop. “The Mobile Phones unit had 1,000 employees in Silicon Valley and their main task was to follow the latest trends in the software development. Google and Apple did a better job at it. It was Nokia’s biggest failure.”


Expenses were watched over carefully after Kallasvuo’s rein. The Financing and Purchasing departments had much leverage as it was the rigorous cost control policy that was behind Nokia’s initial success. During the low-yielding years, expenses were controlled even more rigorously. R&D costs had been cut heavy-handedly. The dominating role of Financing department had been established during the Ollila era and was further reinforced during Kallasvuo leadership.

This ideology of extreme efficacy was causing difficulties. According to the platform based R&D, devices and software utilized as many of the same mechanical and software components as possible. Ideally, hundreds of different smartphones were produced using only two to three different platforms. Software was also built based on software platforms and different features were added on top of the base platforms. This operating principle was both efficient and cost-effective. According to a manager working in the middle-management of the Symbian and MeeGo platforms, what was gained in cost-efficiency was lost in inflexibility. The overall budget was not to be exceeded even if using a slightly more expensive component would have been advantageous for a better end result.

According to a manager, too much attention was paid to small segment earnings instead of looking at the big picture. Costs were controlled by projects and units and some projects were terminated even if it had made sense to keep them up and running to be further developed in other units. Plenty of babies were thrown out with the bathwater.

Cost control was further intensified when the company started using more consultants. A manager formulated it like this: “A US-based consultant looking into saving a mere dime, was more occupied in optimizing his own business rather than that of Nokia”.


In all this gloom and doom mentality, the new CEO was about to find some positive surprises in Nokia. The challenger attitude was still alive and well within the company. It had been dormant and buried deep, but was brought back to life by the crisis. The Finnish work ethic can be characterized by the solicitous and pedantic work attitude. One manager in the company’s top-management described it as “manic fear of failure”: Every little detail was checked and rechecked over and over, and even after doing so there was still the shadow of doubt if everything possible had been done. According to this manager, this attitude was prevalent, irrelevant of the fact whether the company was doing well or not. This philosophy, allegedly dating back to Ollila, was deep-rooted.

Positive in the situation was also that the low-end phones were still yielding profits at a steady pace in the developing countries. The Nokia brand was strong in India. Nokia was still challenging the local cut-rate phone companies in China. The low-end low-cost phones seemed to be the lifesaver when the times were hard: The steady cash flow from their sales was to keep the profitability at a tolerable level.

Many were of the opinion that Nokia’s Ruoholahti Campus in Helsinki was the place to watch for. The MeeGo unit developing smartphones based on open-source software had 2,000 top software engineers developing something that could be the next big thing in software engineering. Great expectations were laid upon the first MeeGo phone and before the end of his leadership, Kallasvuo had removed many obstacles from MeeGo’s path.

In production and logistics Nokia was world-class. Nokia’s industrial engineering techniques had been synchronized in the beginning of the 21st century to the extent that Nokia could easily move production batches from one continent to another wherever production capacity was readily available. This operating method was based on the innovative dfm (design for manufacturing) process developed by Nokia. Engineers had designed the details of the manufacturing process with extreme care to avoid any unnecessary activities (/functions). This was of vital importance, especially during the peak years, when Nokia sold half a billion mobile phones requiring 120 billion components. In addition to the optimization of the logistics, Nokia’s mobile phone assembly was also tuned to perfection. Ideally, only 3–4 base units aka engines were used for all phone models in the manufacturing pipeline. During high demand, base units were always in stock, so the production could be started on the double. Some 150 types of covers, keyboards and other small components, and 300 types of sales packages were in use at a time. The components needed for the final stages of the phone production process were ordered with 24-hour lead time at its best. Suppliers were often located in the immediate vicinity of Nokia phone factories. There were no inventories as production runs were done to order.

Seamless cooperation with the companies supplying production equipment and machinery further increased the efficiency. In more critical areas of production line, eg as regards the component mounting equipment, there was strategic cooperation with 2–3 suppliers at a time. Cooperation with fewer suppliers would have made Nokia more vulnerable and with more suppliers, less efficient.

Citius, altius, fortius — faster, higher, stronger. This motto well described the everyday life at Nokia at the time. The efficiency of the engineering processes of the company was simply mind-blowing. Nokia also had world’s best know-how in the fields of radio technology, modem technology and hardware design.


Elop would soon come to realize that Nokia’s sales organization was lacking. The sales technique adopted from Asia was applied globally. In a mass market area like India, large sales staff was required as there were tens of thousands of points of sale. In India alone, Nokia had 5,000 salespersons at its peak, whose job was to present the new phone models to independent retail dealers. These retailers did not have inventories, so Nokia sales staff was continuously restocking the points of sale.

In Europe the wholesale market for mobile phones operated differently. Purchasing was done in a more centralized fashion. It was good enough, if the manufacturer had good relations with the purchasing directors of the largest network providers and consumer electronic retail chains. The sales staff in retail stores did not have influence on the retail selection. Nevertheless, Nokia still had a huge number of salespersons also in Europe. A member of sales staff visited 15 points of sale a day on average, mainly to do some chit chatting and to dust some retail phones. Bizarre performance evaluation metrics were applied to such sales staff: Visiting 15 points of sales a day constituted a job well done. A sales director earned the bonus by introducing the Asian sales model to the set number of countries even if the model was not viable in Europe.

A former Nokia sales director now working for a competitor says that it was precisely this close relationship with network providers that got the Nokia sales system into a rut. For 15 years Nokia sales more than doubled. The same happened with key customers ie with the network providers. Both parties only focused on the positive outcome ignoring the weak signals of brewing troubles. The network providers did not know how to tell Nokia that their phone models were no longer appealing to customers. In 2010–2012, many members of Nokia sales staff still believed that everything was just fine, and that the next phone model launch would come and save the day.

This sales director remembers proposing a sales technique change for two consecutive years. In his view, a more quality-based sales model would have been more viable in Europe. Instead of the army of phone-dusting sales staff, a smaller number of committed “sales reps” would have been used to visit retail dealers to organize well-planned and targeted sales campaigns and activities.

Sales, just like many other functions, were plagued by too much complexity. Salespersons with direct customer contact were good at their job and knew their customers well, but they were given too many additional tasks that took time and energy from the actual sales work. Their immediate managers understood and supported them, but the decision makers were located far away, sometimes even on another continent. Even if there had been wisdom and goodwill in the workforce, the organizational system had made everything insurmountably difficult. The situation was aggravated by the plummeting market.

The sales director mentioned that things are done differently by his/her current employer. When the head office gives marching orders, everybody follows suit. If the key product or product line sales are not up to par, feedback is given promptly. Additional funding for marketing is also allocated fast if needed. In a similar situation at Nokia, there was a lot of talk, but hardly any action. One’s money was not put where one’s mouth was.

Nokia controllers considered Sales merely as a necessary evil and salespeople as an unruly flock that needed constant watching. From the point of view of salespeople, there seemed to be no common sense in doing things and progress has become extremely sluggish. The finance department just wanted to wait out the problems. “Before Elop, there was nobody in the company who would have had the guts to say that enough is enough”, says the director.

Nokia had led the way in certain sales strategies, such as in online marketing. Nokia.com had grown exponentially during 2007–2009 when measured by the number of visitors. Online sales had doubled in six consecutive quarters. Right things had been done at the right time. This is substantiated by the fact that at the same time Apple reached the landmark of one billion online customers in its online store. E-commerce was a rapidly growing market. However, Nokia’s online sales had dried up as a result of the profitability issues that started in 2008. There were no resources to further develop the online sales and online marketing, even if the customer base had just started to move from brick-and-mortar stores to using online shopping and services.


Jyri Engeström, a long-time Silicon Valley resident, is one of the few Finns who have been involved both in the development of the Nokia operating system and the Google operating system. In 2007, Google bought the social networking and microblogging service Jaiku owned by Jyri Engeström and Petteri Koponen.

根据Engeström的说法,诺基亚和Google与白垩和奶酪一样。 诺基亚当时是由一个过时的组织开发Maemo软件,该组织由数百名人员组成,这些人员由各个办公地点之间的低级经理协调。 谷歌正在由一个充满魅力的小型公司开发Android,该公司由具有超凡魅力的安迪·鲁宾(Andy Rubin)领导,他在收购公司后就加入了谷歌,就像Engeström一样。 2007年,诺基亚与Google进行合作的机会之窗很窄,据Engeström称,诺基亚本应抓住时机。 Engeström表示,诺基亚对自己软件开发优势的信念体现在傲慢自大,并削弱了Google与诺基亚合作的兴趣,而无视Google认为诺基亚在硬件设计方面与现在被认为与苹果类似,是诺基亚的趋势。 当时的首席技术官TeroOjanperä决定在纽约怀特普莱恩斯郊区建立诺基亚美国总部,这具有重要的象征意义,并引起了美国软件开发界的关注。 问题是:为什么诺基亚不理会硅谷?

诺基亚智能手机产品开发部门的一位经理回忆说,当Android在2007–2008年刚刚出现时,诺基亚就一直在嘲笑这个小规模的美国项目。 Android并未受到重视,因为其在硅谷的开发团队很小。 人们认为,这样的小型团队不可能与诺基亚庞大的数千开发者团队竞争。


现在,埃洛普(Elop)的任务是优先考虑在卡拉什沃(Kallasvuo)la脚的遗产之后应采取的行动。 不得不削减开支。 将为智能手机选择一个明智的操作系统。 美国业务需要进行改造。


[7] 战略敏捷性的动态:诺基亚过山车经验,《加利福尼亚管理评论》,第50卷,第3期,2008年春季(Mikko Kosonen和Yves Doz)。


返回目录

风景如画的小镇安卡斯特(Ancaster)是加拿大安大略省最早的欧洲定居点之一。 该地区以其历史悠久的市区和良好的远足路径而闻名。 大约有3万居民。 天气就像赫尔辛基。 由于五大湖使冬季相对温暖,因此一月份的平均温度为-5ºC(23 F)。 7月的平均气温为22ºC(72 F)。 多年来,安卡斯特已成长为加拿大第九大城市汉密尔顿的一部分。 最近的城市是多伦多,距东北70公里(44英里)。 滑铁卢同样位于西部,距移动电话制造商RIM(后来的Blackberry)于1984年开始活动。在东南方向行驶100公里(62英里)之后,您最终到达了美国布法罗,尼亚加拉大瀑布。

斯蒂芬·安德鲁·埃洛普(Stephen Andrew Elop)于1963年12月31日出生在这种环境中。他的父亲在西屋电气公司设计变压器。 他的母亲是一名化学家。 作为家人中三个男孩的中间孩子,Stephen的童年时代正常。 他的第一份工作是在汉密尔顿高尔夫乡村俱乐部做球童,据传说,他学会了如何不嘲笑那些尽力而为的人。 同时,他对烟草产生了仇恨。 埃洛普(Elop)说,没有什么比有人在挥舞球时要求他拿着一支沾有口红的香烟更令人作呕的了。

他的业余时间主要是他对技术的兴趣。 甚至他的祖父也曾在第二次世界大战中当过无线电广播员。他选择了汉密尔顿麦克马斯特大学的汉密尔顿工程学院作为他的学习地点。 这所大学的名字来自创始人威廉·麦克马斯特(William McMaster),是加拿大中上层大学之一。 在全球QS大学排名中,2013年排名第140位,在加拿大排名第五。 赫尔辛基大学排名第69,阿尔托大学排名第196。

那是1981年,那位热心的新芽工程师开始了他的研究。 除了学习外,他还每周工作30小时。 计算机工程学教授戴维·卡普森(David Capson)记得埃洛普(Elop)是走进办公室并扛着梯子经过他的角色。 埃洛普(Elop)爬上梯子,在天花板之间偷看。 在他肮脏的手中是一卷线轴。 他正在构建一个新的令人兴奋的东西,一个覆盖整个校园的以太网。 根据新闻报道,使用了22公里的电缆。 卡普森曾经有数百名学生,但是他说埃洛普给他留下了深刻的印象。 卡普森回忆说,埃洛普(Elop)表现出色且专心致志,是当年最优秀的两个学生之一。

埃洛普(Elop)在大学做计算机工作时遇到了他的妻子。 他们两个对计算机的工作方式有不同的看法。 分歧导致了下注。

“这只是在调情:如果我是对的,我会带你去吃晚饭。 南希赢了,所以我们去了一家排骨餐厅。 不是很浪漫,但是一个好的开始。 这导致了婚姻”,埃洛普(Elop)在2005年对《 福布斯》杂志说。

埃洛普(Elop)于1986年毕业,成为其课程中的第二好的人。 与许多其他最高领导人相比,他受教育程度较低。 五年的努力使他获得了计算机工程和管理学士学位。 现在是时候过渡到工作生活了。

之后,事情开始发生。 埃洛普(Elop)成长为成功的以销售为导向的领导者,了解客户。 当埃洛普(Elop)涉足商业领域时,信息技术正在彻底改变工作场所。 苹果和微软是热门话题。 秘书将打字机换成台式PC,公司开始任命IT经理。 埃洛普(Elop)加入了一家名为Soma的小型软件公司。 他们的第一个成功很快就来了,当时以1-2-3电子表格程序而闻名的Lotus在1990年代初以高价购买了Soma。 埃洛普(Elop)继续在Lotus的咨询部门工作,直到1994年,他作为首席信息官移至快餐连锁店Boston Chicken。

作为一家上市公司的领导者,他迈出的第一步非常丰富多彩。 美国公司Boston Chicken在1990年代中期是美国一家时尚公司。 埃洛普(Elop)到来的前一年,股票发行后立即售罄,股价翻了三倍。 事情已经过热太多了,最后,债务和杂货店里出现的新养鸡场都迫使波士顿养鸡场根据美国破产法向债权人申请保护。 破产之前,有18,500名员工和1,100家餐厅。 欣喜若狂使公司陷入法律错误的一面。 下层管理者从沉没的船上跳下来。 做出正确结论的其中一位是埃洛普(Elop),“我们不喜欢公司正在发生的事情。 曾经有过好日子和不幸的日子,但至少食物很好,”埃洛普回忆道。

当时,诺基亚推出了首款Communicator,并将第二版推向市场。

波士顿鸡肉(Boston Chicken)如今以波士顿市场(Boston Market)的名字而闻名,从破产到2007年,麦当劳一直归其所有。 这家连锁店在波士顿马拉松比赛中脱颖而出。 一个人可以在不到一个小时的时间内吃掉三只整只鸡,两只土豆饼,八块玉米面包,六个配菜和两个甜点。


火车继续前进。 那是1998年。这位顽固,聪明,快速发展的工程师去加利福尼亚工作,并通过IT和销售部门升任旧金山软件公司Macromedia的首席执行官。 Macromedia向全世界提供了网页设计程序Dreamweaver,以及Flash(一种将图形和动画带入网页的多媒体技术)。 在那里,埃洛普(Elop)真正开始收集这种体验,他在诺基亚时代曾以此为魅力。 互联网泡沫刚刚破裂。 底部退出市场,新的竞争者威胁要夺走他们的生计。 报纸大声疾呼Macromedia如何走向灾难。

埃洛普(Elop)专注于他的命令。 他回顾了公司的优势,劣势,甚至似乎无关紧要的话题,并决定将Macromedia的所有芯片都投入Flash。 这种变化是巨大的,但是此后,Macromedia的利润比泡沫破裂之前的任何时候都要大。

在那段时间里,诺基亚与相机和Symbian搏斗。 两者均于2002年发布。第一款3G手机于同年发布,翻盖手机于2004年发布。

在Macromedia,埃洛普(Elop)怀着对重大变革的信念以及对选定策略的顽固专注。 种子已经播种。 即使是在困难的条件下,也可能会发生变化,只要选择了正确的产品,并且当人们可以看到世界前进的方向时,这就是他的理由。 这种联系很容易做到:Windows Phone成为了他的新Flash。

在2005年,合并开始了。 Macromedia被另一家美国软件公司Adobe收购,我们从其中包括PDF文档编辑程序Acrobat和专业照片编辑软件PhotoShop。 合并很困难。 由于反托拉斯官员的影响,完成这笔交易将需要七个月的时间。 员工感到困惑:他们会发生什么? 那产品呢? 埃洛普由此建立了第二种领导理念:每个人都支持其他所有人,没有人比任何人都重要。 双臂相连,大家在一起。

发生了什么? 在过去的七个月中,Macromedia的财务业绩是整个历史上最好的。

合并完成后,埃洛普(Elop)继续担任Adobe,并获得了WWFO(全球现场人员)的头衔。 他负责销售,特定国家/地区的营销,合作伙伴和客户服务。 他在Adobe的最后工作日距他在公司工作的时间正好一年。 他的年薪为500,000美元,奖金为315,000美元,遣散费为1,880,000美元。 在他离开的那一刻,他的股票期权价值22,500,000美元。 如果他的任期不到一年,他将不会获得额外的津贴。

在同一时期,诺基亚宣布了其最终成功的旗舰机型N95,Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo担任首席执行官。

在他的下一个雇主杜松(Juniper)处,埃洛普(Elop)的薪资安排看起来非常相似。 他的工作在同一天结束,价值近80万美元的期权可以自由兑现。埃洛普显然在赚钱。 下一站将是微软。

但首先是瞻博网络。 他们制造网络设备,即硬件。 除了软件,Elop还通过这种方式获得了硬件方面的经验。 他的头衔是首席运营官,首席运营官。 即使埃洛普(Elop)不是首席执行官,在猎头名单上,他已经是现阶段的绝对精英之一,并且肯定可以在任何大型IT公司的高级管理层中找到工作。 即使在Juniper任职期间未取得重大成就,跳槽到硬件制造也增加了他的价值。

在此期间,诺基亚处于领先地位。 它的市场份额首次超过40%。

埃洛普(Elop)在2007年感恩节前夕赢得了大奖。软件巨头微软的首席执行官史蒂夫·鲍尔默(Steve Ballmer)打电话给他,想见面。 他们相遇。 他们讨论了信息技术,手机,云服务和Google带来的变化。 如果有合适的职位空缺,埃洛普感觉到鲍尔默对他感兴趣。 可能只有一次开放,所以他们在几个月后再次见面。 微软的其他领导人也包括比尔·盖茨。

此后不久,埃洛普(Elop)在汉密尔顿附近的基奇纳-滑铁卢机场与鲍尔默会面。 这些人开车去埃洛普的家。 一家人仍然住在汉密尔顿。 他们都坐在楼下房间的壁炉旁。 他们整个下午都聊到晚上。 南希埃洛普对这次访问特别满意。 她能够问鲍尔默,他们在华盛顿州雷德蒙德有什么样的学校。

几天后,鲍尔默打电话给埃洛普,要求他上班。 埃洛普陷入困境。 他原本应该担任瞻博网络的首席执行官。 已经准备了有关提名的简报。 埃洛普(Elop)将这一决定描述为他一生中做出的最艰难的决定。 鲍尔默赢了。 2008年初,埃洛普(Elop)接管了微软业务部门的领导职务。

即使埃洛普(Elop)被任命为诺基亚公司时在芬兰完全不为人所知,但在北美他还是成了明星。 他领导着全球最大的软件公司的最大部门。 与普遍的看法相反,Windows操作系统不是Microsoft的最大收入来源。 它是Office软件,属于业务部。 Windows带来了27%的销售额,业务部门占31%的销售额。 业务部门的利润几乎是一半,即每年约70亿欧元(102亿美元)。 营业额为190亿欧元(277亿美元)。 估计当时有十亿用户。

但是,Microsoft面临的Office套件软件(包括Word,Excel,PowerPoint和其他一些程序)面临挑战。 Google已开始通过互联网免费提供相同的服务。 因此,用户无需付费即可制作文本,电子表格和幻灯片演示文稿。 这项工作是通过与Google服务器上软件的网络连接进行的。 这些文件也保存在那里。 埃洛普(Elop)开始致力于解决此问题。

他之前已经搬到雷德蒙德,这是一次真正的举动。 硅谷埃洛普乘飞机从汉密尔顿通勤。 Adobe在2006年期间为埃洛普(Elop)的家庭和工作旅行支付了$ 145,000。 瞻博网络每年为在家庭和工作之间的旅行预留20万美元。

这些年来,这个家庭已经成长为7个。 生孩子是一次冒险,需要很多的坚持。

埃洛普(Elop)在2010年秋天的一次采访中告诉《 科普帕莱蒂金融》杂志( Kauppalehti Optio) ,在1990年代的漫长挣扎之后,这个家庭如何能够生第二个孩子。 它要求致电美国参议院,加拿大议会和中国政府。 各国在一件事情上达成了共识:这行不通; 甚至不要尝试。 阵营推动,说服和谈判。 他们做了一些艰苦的工作,直到八个月后,天堂才开放。 报纸掌握在手中,而埃洛普夫妇得到了他们想要的东西:一个养女。 几周后,中国官员放任了他们和他们九个月大的捆绑包,使这个愿望实现了。 但是困难仍然存在:孩子需要公民身份。 如果孩子在国外居住,加拿大有一项不给予公民身份的政策。 埃洛普(Elop)因为波士顿鸡(Bocken Chicken)的缘故而在美国生活,他们的养女是中国人。 对于官僚而言,这种结合实在太多了。 最终,加拿大总理决定不这样做。 这个问题在他与加拿大总督访问旧金山期间得到了解决,换句话说,伊丽莎白女王的官方代表隆重地授予了考特尼·埃洛普(Courtney Elop)国籍。

考特尼(Courtney)在2014年撰写本文时,年仅18岁,而她的大哥哥(22岁)则为公司的三胞胎姐妹,现在已经14岁。父亲曾说过三胞胎的出生,这对夫妇已将其资本投入最大化进入生育治疗。

埃洛普(Elop)说,在2000年代中期,他如何度过周末时带着孩子们的爱好和打球。 他讲述了他如何鼓励孩子们的个性。 每个三胞胎都要举行自己的生日聚会。 他们在最近的星期六的早上举行生日聚会,晚上又举行一次生日聚会,第三次是在周日早晨举行。 每个人都邀请了自己的朋友,即使所有朋友都一样。

尽管通勤,埃洛普(Elop)还是在硅谷买了一栋神话般的房子。 当他开始在微软任职时,随后的销售成了丑闻。 在微软2009年的财务报表中,记者发现了一个脚注: 报表显示,埃洛普获得了搬家费,旅行,运送财物,获得临时公寓以及他必须自己负担的费用的帮助。报表显示费用为410万美元。 加利福尼亚的房价暴跌,但埃洛普获准弥补损失。 这笔钱应该与鲍尔默同期的薪水进行比较:他获得了130万美元。 微软股东大怒,该公司最终不得不改变其政策以支持其领导者。

埃洛普夫妇(Elops)于2008年在雷德蒙德(Redmond)买了一套房子,其中有8间卧室和1,100平方米(11,480平方英尺)的生活空间,价格不到400万美元。 房屋除其他外,还有一个网球场和一个酒窖。

在此期间,诺基亚制造了针对大众市场的首款触摸屏手机诺基亚5800 Xpress Music,该手机于2008年底开始销售。


谷歌文档。 挑战是巨大的。 人们认为微软注定要失败。 过去的恐龙如何与敏捷的互联网技术参与者竞争?

仅仅过了几年,这项安排就被搁置了。 埃洛普(Elop)建立了免费的Office版本,该版本由广告资助。 它们的功能更加有限,可以在Internet上使用,但是与商业版本一起使用时,体验要比使用Google Docs更好。 对Google的直接回应要求对Microsoft进行大规模的更改。 埃洛普的光环在增长。 埃洛普(Elop)的成就,Office 2010,像火车一样前进,甚至超越了期望。 他在不放弃商业版本的情况下赶上了Google,结果使微软成为云服务领域的领导者。

“可以打败谷歌,可以打败谷歌”,埃洛普在那段时期的媒体采访中像咒语一样重复着。 诺基亚的猎头与他联系并不奇怪。

诺基亚当时选择了什么样的人? 每个人都知道像史蒂夫·乔布斯这样的远见卓识不会出现。 埃洛普(Elop)是行动和变更经理。 他让火车准时运行,但不一定能激发任何人的兴趣。 办公室的人,铅笔推子,他的产品的代表。 将军,甚至他的头发都很短。 一个在书呆子中的人给他的衬衫加糖。 但是使用众所周知的术语24/7,充满活力并渴望工作。 大声

“斯蒂芬当然不会害羞。 根据一项评估,他肯定说出了他需要说的话。” 微软的一位同事说:“从来没有感觉到他害怕问愚蠢的问题。”

埃洛普(Elop)在那个时期将自己描述为充满热情,朝气,理性,果断和注重细节。 他说技术是他本人的一部分,他承认在充满工程师讨论编程策略的工程师的房间里,他感到宾至如归。 同时,他在说自己如何热情地投身于有关消费者感受的对话。

魅力呢? 他有吗? 本书的一位作者在埃洛普(Elop)被任命为诺基亚前一个月首次与他会面。 微软已经邀请记者到阿姆斯特丹炫耀他们在荷兰办公室的工作方式。 该活动围绕一个小型研讨会进行,该研讨会的主要发言者必须在最后一刻由来自美国的人员代替。 开始之前,演讲者聚集在礼堂前。 一个人的眼睛自然会被吸引到一个对他具有魅力的人,这个人显然是某种领导者。 他曾是微软荷兰公司的总监Theo Rinsema。 埃洛普(Elop)在Rinsema旁边。 即使他似乎在交流很多,他也属于“其他”类别。

当Elop上台时,他以技术性的方式谈论了云服务。 他说的很流利,但语气不佳。 演讲结束后,当他接受记者采访时,答案是“否”。 当然,部分原因是研讨会的目的是熟悉办公解决方案,而埃洛普(Elop)出乎意料地参加了该计划。 不过,主要原因是他的演讲很少提供可用作新闻报道的材料。

幸运的是,拍照。 它会在几个月后使用。

出于爱好,埃洛普提到飞行。 在宾夕法尼亚州沃顿商学院的在线出版物中,提到了两种类型的飞行员:一种类型的飞行员想要在空中滑行的体验,穿越云层飞行时的自由感。 另一方面,吸引力在于技术。 他们喜欢导航,仪表和背后的软件。 埃洛普(Elop)说他属于后者。

这个问题是不可避免的:毕竟,埃洛普(Elop)是否会因为诺基亚以工程为中心的文化困扰而成为诺基亚的正确选择? 不需要更具远见和超凡魅力的figure头吗? 虚拟世界距离领导者和管理媒体游戏还有很长的路要走。

这些考虑是不必要的。 埃洛普(Elop)被诺基亚选中。 是时候该上班了。


返回目录

在芬兰,我们一遍又一遍地听到诺基亚智能手机的心脏Symbian操作系统(OS)是平庸,老式且缓慢的。 其预定的继任者MeeGo被推迟了。 他们为什么不能让Symbian工作? MeeGo的阻碍因素是什么?

答案部分在于技术-本章对此进行了简要介绍。

首先,基础知识。 智能手机是一台小型计算机。 为了使其正常工作,它需要一台称为操作系统的软件,就像计算机一样。 Apple iPhone中的操作系统是iOS。 在三星最受欢迎的机型中,它是Android。 在诺基亚的智能手机上,埃洛普(Elop)加入诺基亚时是Symbian。

用户界面(UI)是用户在屏幕上看到的内容以及他们与手机的交互方式。 菜单,图标和键都是UI的一部分。

让我们简要回顾一下历史。 Symbian由电信公司爱立信,松下,摩托罗拉,诺基亚和Psion于1998年开发。在那时,Microsoft Windows在个人计算机(PC)操作系统中几乎垄断了市场。 戴尔,康柏等PC行业参与者看到利润受到挤压,因为实际上,市场上的每台计算机都必须运行Windows操作系统,而微软则为其定价。 这就是诺基亚及其合作伙伴希望将移动操作系统掌握在自己手中的原因。 结果,微软和诺基亚几乎成了主要敌人。 众所周知,诺基亚的乔尔玛·奥利拉(Jorma Ollila)与微软的比尔·盖茨(Bill Gates)之间的谈判已经以激烈的争端告终。

该策略获得了回报,Symbian取得了成功,微软的移动操作系统Windows Mobile变得微不足道。

同时,诺基亚出现问题的根本原因开始显现。 那些为其智能手机选择了Symbian OS的设备制造商能够构建自己的UI。 这个想法是使用通用基准,但允许每个手机品牌发布自己的外观。 当时的软件技术还不成熟。 例如,爱立信需要在其核心系统内部进行深度调整,以使爱立信智能手机看起来与诺基亚智能手机有所不同。 产生的派生称为UI平台。 诺基亚制造了两款手机:用于Communicator的S90和用于智能手机的S60。 [8]这样,很容易启动商务电话类别或多媒体电话类别中的设备。 这个技巧奏效了,Symbian成为了市场领导者。

从那里开始,应用程序开发人员成为其中的一部分。 应用开发人员对其他应用进行编码,例如在Apple的App Store和Google Play中出售的其他应用。 换句话说,应用程序是那些Instagram,WhatsApps和Angry Birds。 为Symbian创建应用程序具有挑战性,因为应用程序开发人员需要深入操作才能使其应用程序正常工作。 学习开发工具需要花费很多时间,每种诺基亚机型都需要自己的应用程序版本。

苹果有不同的想法。 它仅创建了将UI和OS结合在一起的一种电话模型。 这使应用程序开发人员的工作变得容易。 此外,苹果的App Store是一个独家市场,人们可以轻松购买他们的《愤怒的小鸟》和其他应用程序,这是一个革命性的想法。

Google在2005年通过收购一家名为Android的公司加入了行动。 传说中,其创始人安迪·鲁宾(Andy Rubin)开始开发软件的原因是Symbian如此复杂且其开发环境很差。 每个人都期望Google宣布自己的智能手机,而媒体对此进行了猜测。 2007年11月5日,Google为智能手机推出了免费操作系统,但没有设备。 这是一个很大的惊喜。 谷歌不想要谷歌智能手机,它想要整个手机行业。 收入将来自广告和服务。

Android在2007年初迈出了最重要的一步。iPhone推出后,Google放弃了以键盘为中心的原始用户界面。 这项工作从头开始并基于触摸屏。 对于其他应用程序,Google遵循Apple的示例:应用程序必须在每部Android手机中运行,而无需进行任何修改。

诺基亚在Keilaniemi总部的想法有所不同。 诺基亚对触摸屏的开发深信不疑。 Symbian的旧菜单结构被认为很复杂,并且有充分的理由,它位于核心系统内部,而诺基亚则坚持使用它们。 诺基亚的触摸屏让人感觉有些重叠,应用程序开发人员的痛苦仍在继续。 最后,诺基亚自己收购了Symbian,但这太少了,太晚了。 多年来,系统已经集成了许多层和附加功能,以至于它变得难以管理。 如果编码员改变了右臂的某些东西,她将不知道左脚趾会发生什么。 电话被卡住,突然死亡,并在没有警告的情况下自动重启。

三星于1989年推出了他们的第一款手机。起步很慢,因为那时摩托罗拉随心所欲地占领了韩国市场。 在1990年代中期,三星因产品质量低下而考虑放弃整个移动行业。 他们的主要产品是半导体,母板,存储电路和集成电路。 然而,在台湾HTC于2008年推出首款Android智能手机之后,三星又回来了。它在2009年4月推出了首款三星Android智能手机,距离埃洛普(Elop)进入诺基亚已经18个月了。 因此,Android生态系统很快就由三星主导。 当埃洛普(Elop)加入诺基亚时,Android的市场份额已经上升到25%。

诺基亚的替代Symbian诞生于幕后,部分原因是保密的。 它始于2000年初,当时一小群诺基亚人开始弄清Linux是否可以在智能手机中使用,Linux是由Finn Linus Torvalds创建的开源操作系统。 尽管使用开源软件增加了法律上的障碍,该项目还是得以最终完成,并于2005年推出了首个成果卓著的设备,即具有互联网功能的触摸屏平板电脑。该平板电脑缺乏电话功能,根据我们的采访,Symbian总监阻止了它。

该操作系统名为Maemo。 一旦允许将其安装在手机上,那第一台Maemo智能手机便取得了一定的成功。 它吸引了创建Maemo应用程序的开源开发人员社区。 它拥有12,000名成员,是世界上最大的移动开发者社区。

然后诺基亚做了一些了不起的事情。 它与芯片制造商英特尔合作,两家公司将Maemo更名为MeeGo。 [9]为了让我们理解为什么这种联合会造成灾难性的影响,让我们简要地研究一下技术。

创建手机最困难的部分之一就是将软件操作系统嵌入到硬件电子设备中。 诺基亚使用美国芯片制造商德州仪器(TI)的处理器制造了智能手机。 此外,诺基亚现在需要使MeeGo与英特尔的处理器保持一致。 这项工作很繁琐,特别是功耗非常困难。 英特尔的芯片组是为笔记本电脑设计的,因此在英特尔的世界里,功耗并不是问题。 但是,诺基亚的竞争对手使用的是高通公司的处理器,这些处理器是专门为低功耗的小型设备设计的。

软件开发人员花了几个月的时间精简诺基亚的Maemo和英特尔的相应软件Moblin。 如此大量的工作并没有延续到最终产品上,最终没有使客户体验受益。 现在,工作由两个人来代替,而不是一个大公司,而且过程甚至停滞不前。 MeeGo被推迟了。

这被证明是昂贵的。 最初的德州仪器(TI)芯片组已过时,并且英特尔的替代产品也不起作用。 同时,竞争正在转移到高通的第二代处理器上。 诺基亚当时正在驾驶螺旋桨飞机,而其他人则开始使用喷气机。

我们将在第14章中回顾诺基亚与英特尔之间的合作。

苹果和安卓为手机行业带来了一个神奇的术语:生态系统。

生态系统是一组彼此互惠互利的电子设备制造商,应用开发商,服务提供商和网络提供商。 一个平台拥有的应用程序越多,消费者就越会渴望购买这些智能手机。 销售的智能手机越多,使用的服务就越多,依此类推。这会产生积极的多米诺骨牌效应。

在战略层面上,诺基亚已经了解了生态系统和移动互联网的重要性,并于2008年决定将自己转变为一家互联网公司。 服务和软件部门由Niklas Savander领导。 起步很慢,以前服务是独立开发的,部分重叠。 计费机制,技术平台和框架,业务模型-每个部门都有自己解决这些问题的方式。 音乐是在英国创建的,在德国是地图,在奥卢是电子邮件。 这将决策带到了董事级别,并将其转变为政治。

2007年8月,Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo宣布诺基亚将以Ovi品牌收集其所有服务,从原则上来说听起来不错。 然而,这次发射是悲惨的。 在启动时,ovi.com没有链接到任何服务。 它只是一个带有图标集合的静态页面。

随着时间的流逝,服务开始有所协调,但是在2009–2010年左右,ovi.com甚至无法使用一组用户名和密码。 颜色,字体和一般外观都一团糟。 智能手机及其服务没有图形或功能上的相似之处。 从技术上讲,大多数问题本来可以很容易解决,但是诺基亚复杂的组织使其很难。 生态系统分散。

似乎还不够,那就是领导层的灾难。 在2009年,该公司决定将服务责任划分给Savander和TeroOjanperä。 该模型被称为“二合一”。 责任不明确,这种管理模式的引入恰恰说明了这一点。

2010年初,诺基亚面对音乐,并宣布其导航服务将免费。 这是一个重要的里程碑。 服务本身不会成为主要的收入来源,而是销售设备和吸引用户的一种手段。

情况很糟糕。 应用程序开发人员认为诺基亚是一个艰难的合作伙伴,他不了解应用程序商店对消费者的重要性。 诺基亚自己的服务无法正常运行,其软件平台已过时。 大约在那时,诺基亚自己的应用程序商店ovi.com拥有16,000个应用程序,而Apple App Store则有30万个应用程序。 维持功能性生态系统的手段很差。

但是:新完成的Symbian 3带来了更好的承诺。 MeeGo开始准备投入商业使用。


[8] 原始芬兰书中的S90参考可能是一个误解。 Series 90 UI平台 (S90)由诺基亚开发,用于运行Symbian OS的媒体电话,例如Nokia 7700和7710。它与 为Nokia Communicator设备如Nokia 9210开发 的Symbian Series 80 UI平台 (S80) 不同。 和9300。运行S90 UI平台的设备未能取得重大商业成功,最终平台开发被取消,而 诺基亚 仍将S90用户界面的元素保留在基于Linux的 Maemo 平台中。

[9] MeeGo 使用的是诺基亚Maemo的源代码和 英特尔的 Moblin 源代码


返回目录

斯蒂芬·埃洛普(Stephen Elop)在诺基亚的第一个工作日出国。 也许这是即将到来的迹象。 那是2010年9月21日星期二。他参加了为Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo预定的会议。

来到芬兰后,他立即开始认识工作人员。 他的初次露面获得了认可,人们感到非常着迷。 受访者说,他们感到欣喜若狂。 埃洛普(Elop)产生了令人信服的第一印象,以至于人们最终感到会有一些决定性的行动。 从一开始,他似乎就散发出能量。 乔玛·奥利拉(Jorma Ollila)的想法“与加拿大人相比,与美国人相比,加拿大人更适合诺基亚”的想法似乎奏效。 该公司有一位首席执行官,感觉像他一样,但显然他也能把事情做好。 他就像一个同父异母的兄弟,芬兰人很快就开始用一个更芬兰的名字来称呼他:Seppo Elo。

好消息开始在诺基亚之外泄漏。 根据这些泄漏的见解,埃洛普(Elop)在成千上万的诺基亚员工面前公开谈论了好事和坏事,这是闻所未闻的。 有人可以向新任首席执行官问任何事情。 他的门在实践和隐喻上都是敞开的。 在给奥卢人员的演说中,埃洛普告诉他们,他每天都听说有些人从来没有机会发表自己的意见。 在北美,他声称他只看到过一次或两次。 现在该停止阻止坏消息了。 现在是时候提高诺基亚的透明度了。

在他的第一个工作日,埃洛普(Elop)向每位诺基亚员工发送了一封电子邮件。 在那封电子邮件中,他要求人们回答三个问题:您想让我改变什么? 你不想让我改变什么? 您认为我可能会想念什么? 他承诺接受他的评论并进行处理,以构成他在诺基亚领导层的基础。 一位受访者说,她完全公开地回答了问题,没有退缩。 她告诉我们,当埃洛普(Elop)或他的一位助手回答时,她印象深刻。 根据答复,她进行了出色的观察,这些观察结果与埃洛普制定战略的基本原则十分吻合。 也有希望研究和解决所提到的任何和所有缺陷。 主要信息是诺基亚人只能作为一家公司获胜。 那些愿意参加比赛的人将得到奖励。 公平在议程上将是重要的。

一位受访者记得,这一信息非常适合公司。 “我感觉就像现在,终于可以卷起袖子,开始大获全胜了。”

根据埃洛普(Elop)后来的评论,大多数信息都是关于责任以及责任有多分散。 事情落在裂缝之间。 埃洛普(Elop)受到了他最初几周最喜欢的一句话的启发:在诺基亚,每个人都没有责任。

从很早开始,埃洛普(Elop)就与员工保持密切联系。 他将采访较低层级的管理人员,甚至采访蓝领,以弄清诺基亚真正的模样。 他想尽量减少对中层管理人员的筛选。 他在食堂见过。 在总部工作的诺基亚员工可以和CEO一起穿着电梯,穿着牛仔裤,背着背包在电梯里。 在最初的内部信息交流中,埃洛普(Elop)抱怨说,标记诺基亚手机上已读的电子邮件有多么困难。 根据他的经验,在不同的诺基亚机型上执行此操作的方式有所不同。 一位与会者声称埃洛普错了。 他被邀请登上舞台,在点击几下后,人们一致认为首席执行官是正确的。 信息很清楚。 与前任首席执行官不同,新任首席执行官将在产品层面发表意见。

人们很快注意到Elop是电子邮件用户。 许多受访者提到很难通过电话抓住他。 您必须与他见面,或发送电子邮件。 一位受访者表示,埃洛普(Elop)具有一种神奇的方式来立即回复电子邮件。 无论何时,都会发送电子邮件回复。 一些人开始怀疑,那个人是否睡过。 最重要的任务似乎是在诺基亚人之间建立信任和希望。 当时,仍然有65,000,其中不包括网络基础设施提供商NSN的员工。 埃洛普(Elop)向诺基亚人提供了他自己的专业历史故事:“在微软,我们击败了Google。 我们也可以击败苹果。 RIM可以被击败。 我们可以比任何人都更好。 我们在与诺基亚的第一轮合作中处于第一分钟,这是在与人员开会时一遍又一遍地传达的信息。

另一个Elop主义从Macromedia撤出。 埃洛普(Elop)喜欢分享Macromedia如何专注于Flash并取得成功的故事(在第5章中进行了介绍)。 诺基亚也可以这样做。

在最初几周的兴奋之后,董事会开始感到have:埃洛普什么时候在听? 他一直在旅行或谈话。 用英语。 学习甚至尝试学习芬兰语仅限于单个单词和发音。 但是,人员似乎认为这种担心是没有根据的。 埃洛普(Elop)非常讨人喜欢并且具有社交技巧,工人很容易摇晃到他的身边。 人们觉得这是他们时代以来的第一次,这显着提高了士气。 信息很明确:如果有问题,请执行一些操作! 如果不能,请告诉我为什么不这样做。

一位受访者说:“斯蒂芬是一位了不起的激励人”。

“他有着令人难以置信的扑克面孔,并且非常有说服力地向人们保证事情以后会变成完全不同的事情。 另一个人说,他看起来像一个非常注重目标并致力于工作的领导者。

许多人还提出了埃洛普人性化的一面带来的积极情感。 曾在Symbian工作的PetraSöderling记得在诺基亚之家食堂举办的市政厅人员会议上第一次见到埃洛普。 邀请了在埃斯波总部工作的每个人,他们急切地希望看到什么样的人会出现在舞台上。 埃洛普给人留下了深刻的印象:他热情,有主见,并且对付给他的任务表现出谦虚的态度。 他还谈到了自己的家人和孩子,并开了自己的玩笑,这对芬兰观众来说是新事物。

几个月后,Söderling在巴塞罗那举行的世界移动通信大会期间,有机会在Elop的陪同下度过了几天。 他再次在那里很热情,对所有人都很开放。 在早上和晚上闭门时,他与在诺基亚展台工作的人们握手。 他感谢人们的贡献,看着他们的眼神,看上去就像是团队的一员。 与他的前任乔尔玛·奥利拉(Jorma Ollila)和奥利·佩卡·卡拉斯沃(Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo)相比,新任首席执行官的热情似乎新鲜而友善。

一位与Elop一起访问过网络提供商的主管也对Elop如何处理诺基亚的利益相关者有很好的经验。 他很活跃,在客户面前显得聪明而博学,并与他们共度时光。

芬兰的至少一部分几乎处于埃洛普炒作状态。 在芬兰的头几天,埃洛普(Elop)去了赫尔辛基最大的百货公司斯托克曼(Stockmann’s)购买内衣。 年轻的销售助理在扫描条形码时询问是否可以给他一些诺基亚方面的建议。

当然,有些人并没有被加拿大人迷住。 一个诺基亚人记得他意识到大多数同事发现埃洛普(Elop)鼓舞人心并认为自己会提振诺基亚时感到困惑和惊讶。 对他来说,埃洛普只是平淡无奇,无色,仅此而已。

在第一次领导团队会议上,埃洛普(Elop)称自己为曲棍球教练,已经来领导一个新团队。 球队表现不错,但现在它的教练会比以前更好。 目的是使领导团队的工作环境平静,并减少成员对其职位的恐惧。

领导团队的工作方式迅速改变。 诺基亚移动电话(功能手机部门)总经理玛丽·麦克道威尔在接受彭博商业周刊采访时说,与2010年秋季相比,我的同事谈论的更多。 根据人力资源执行副总裁JuhaÄkräs的说法,埃洛普(Elop)迫使领导团队照照自己的镜子,并回顾自己的行动。 领导团队中每个人的目标,关键绩效指标和奖励计划有史以来第一次在成员之间共享。 “我们不再致力于实现相互矛盾的目标。 Äkräs对英国《金融时报》表示。

在所有谈话的背后,还有更深层次的事情发生。 领导团队的一位前成员说,埃洛普保持了距离。 新任首席执行官似乎是面向家庭的,不久就访问了芬兰。 感觉就像他宁愿在西雅图与家人共度时光。 这位领导团队的成员说,他想知道埃洛普(Elop)是否真的希望在西雅图工作,因为史蒂夫·鲍尔默(Steve Ballmer)继任者的竞争即将开始。 几位受访者重复的评论是,由于领导团队的每个成员都希望给CEO留下良好的印象,所以埃洛普(Elop)偶然获得了比他应有的更大的权力。 领导团队变成了狮子狗,而不是梗。 由于埃洛普(Elop)的提名,团队内部存在紧张关系。 没有人愿意谈论这个话题。 值得注意的是,埃洛普(Elop)在更换领导团队时非常谨慎。 新任首席执行官通常会从早期公司引进一些值得信赖的人,以加快新公司的更新。 跟随埃洛普(Elop)到诺基亚的人只有一个:苏珊·希恩(Susan Sheehan)。 Sheehan和Elop一起旅行,撰写或撰写了演讲,并照顾了Elop的个人信息。 Sheehan正式向诺基亚通信高级副总裁Arja Suominen汇报工作。 实际上,她直接为Elop工作,而没有向其他人报告自己的工作。 一位与通信部门合作的受访者表示,很明显,埃洛普(Elop)了解通信的重要性,并密切关注芬兰媒体关于他和诺基亚的文章。 这使部门很忙,因为有人不得不翻译和总结英文文章。 该人士说,随着时间的流逝,芬兰媒体的负面头条新闻给埃洛普带来的压力越来越大。 埃洛普(Elop)对他本人的兴趣也不满意。 通讯团队必须向埃洛普(Elop)解释为什么有时会在停车场内被芬兰黄色新闻出版物7Päivää的一名记者伏击。 在大多数情况下,沟通人员很高兴终于有了一位出色的演讲者。 但是,存在明显的文化差异,具有挑战性。 例如,埃洛普(Elop)在采访中很少听记者的话。 芬兰记者希望与受访者进行对话,而不是演讲。

中层管理者对埃洛普感到困惑。 一位董事说,在开会时他只会坐着听。 他唯一给出的反馈是“做得好”。


埃洛普(Elop)曾说过,在2010年秋季的头几周内,他与成千上万的诺基亚公司员工,公司客户以及合作伙伴见面并进行了互动。 有几十个,甚至数百个航班。 他会见了网络服务提供商,大型手机分销商,应用程序开发商,其他移动设备制造商以及分包商。 没有时间进行业余爱好了。 他自己的Cessna Turbo 182飞机已存放在美国。

在第一个秋天期间,埃洛普(Elop)甚至参观了硅谷的库比蒂诺(Cupertino)。 在这次访问中,埃洛普会见了乔布斯。 没有有关这两个人谈论的信息。 他拜访竞争对手听起来有些奇怪,但这是大公司的首席执行官的惯常做法:在拜访期间,一个人自我介绍,倾听另一方的想法,并试图感觉是否存在合作的可能性。 因此,这次与乔布斯的会晤与诺基亚平台的决定无关。

提名后,埃洛普(Elop)的第一条推文是在2010年11月下旬发送的。距离他上一条推文还有四个月的时间。

@selop 2010年11月26日

感恩节……感谢我们的个人好运和对未来的希望。

埃洛普(Elop)说他在芬兰喜欢它。 他说,他很容易了解他的新家乡。 芬兰与加拿大有着同样寒冷和黑暗的冬天。 温哥华卡纳克斯冰球队的支持者也已经成为埃斯波布鲁斯冰球队的支持者。 埃洛普说,冰上曲棍球是结识芬兰人的最好方式之一。 他还说,他曾尝试过很多关于桑拿浴和相关仪式的故事。 很愉快。 埃洛普(Elop)在食物方面面临更多挑战。 意大利面条和酱汁与鱼的组合尤其奇怪。 芬兰大型养老基金Ilmarinen的副首席执行官Timo Ritakallio记得他曾试图让Elop参加晚宴和活动中的演讲,但没有运气。 借口总是一样:埃洛普太忙了。

“我知道他打网球。 因此,自那以来,我要求他早上7点出庭,而在芬兰,他甚至会在早上5点发送电子邮件。 但是他说他没有时间”,Ritakallio说。

Ritakallio说,他是在2011年1月的冬季经典赛(Talviklassikko)冰球比赛中,由一位连续企业家Harry Harkimo组织的活动中认识埃洛普的。这场比赛是由赫尔辛基两支球队IFK和Jokerit进行的。 芬兰的许多企业领导人和决策者,包括通力公司的首席执行官Matti Alahuhta和国会发言人SauliNiinistö,试图结识被雇用挽救诺基亚的人。 [10] Ritakallio说,很明显,这项任务的规模在埃洛普(Elop)中可见:“他已经理解了公众对他的角色施加的压倒性压力和兴趣。”

埃洛普的家人住在加拿大。 埃洛普(Elop)说,他想更好地了解工作要求,以及在做出将家人移居芬兰的最终决定之前,他将需要旅行多少。 他说他的家人喜欢下雪,他认为他们会发现在冰球文化占很大比重的国家定居会更容易。

埃洛普主要通过电话与家人保持联系。 他说,他已经给他的孩子们赠送了几部诺基亚手机。 在作为诺基亚首席执行官的第二条推文中,埃洛普(Elop)谈到了儿子正在使用的电话:

@selop 2010年11月27日

Sim卡交换见面:与精通技术的儿子:N8,E7,C7讨论我们新智能手机的优缺点……暗示,他是一名摄影师。

几天后,故事继续进行。 那天,儿子背着N8,E7和X3。 但是,这些推文没有提及最重要的部分。 爸爸有一项重要的工作:他将不得不改变世界,这样他的儿子就不必在校园里为这些电话感到尴尬。


[10] 原始书籍出版后,Matti Alahuhta于2014年离开通力公司,SauliNiinistö当选为第十二任芬兰总统,自2012年起任职。


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从业务上讲,埃洛普(Elop)的诺基亚职业生涯开局令人不愉快。 关于智能手机旗舰机型N8的销售的坏消息是在他开始工作的当天到来的。 已预购电话的人被告知,直到十月份他们才会收到设备。 投资者之所以紧张,是因为最初承诺在6月开始销售该款手机,而现在这些销售将在7月至9月的收入中丢失。 股价下跌了近百分之五。

董事会已将Elop的职责定位为基本任务:增加收入(营业额),阻止市场份额侵蚀并确定利润(收益)。 但是,仅过了几天,加利福尼亚州的网站Venture Beat才知道,埃洛普(Elop)已获得批准,可以大大改变现有策略。 该授权还涵盖诺基亚手机使用的操作系统。 诺基亚董事会的可靠消息来源证实了该新闻报道是正确的。 因此,埃洛普(Elop)在加入诺基亚公司三周后,便启动了“海鹰计划”(Sea Eagle),以分析现有智能手机战略的各种选择。 同时,Venture Beat发布了另一个与诺基亚相关的预测新闻报道。 据该网站称,诺基亚将与其他诺基亚智能手机平台一起采用微软的Windows Phone平台。 但是,这是没有根据的。 在这一点上,甚至没有在内部适当地讨论过与微软的联盟。

董事会最担心埃洛普与奥利拉的关系。 他们担心,即使新任首席执行官需要自己的工作空间,奥利拉(Ollila)仍将继续担任霸主角色。 董事会的一位成员报告说,他注意到埃洛普(Elop)每次出席奥利拉(Ollila)时都会审查自己的言论,并抹平了他关于诺基亚的陈述及其当时的不良状况。

董事会在没有主席的情况下对其自身活动进行了年度内部评估之后,副董事长斯卡迪诺向奥利拉提供了反馈,并告诉他董事会对埃洛普的自由度感到担忧。


在埃洛普(Elop)成为诺基亚首席执行官后的一个月,隆隆声开始了。

是时候发布2010年7月至9月的收益报告了。 这些数字很好,令人愉快。 利润超过预期,净销售额比去年同期增长了5%。 智能手机销量同比增长61%,4月至6月增长10%。 N8已准备就绪,并已在商店中销售,这有望在年底前实现乐观的前景。 埃洛普说,他对零部件短缺而不是需求疲软限制了销售感到惊讶。 分析师对诺基亚的盈利能力表示赞赏,诺基亚已经开始以牺牲市场份额为代价来捍卫它的盈利能力。 甚至在两线之间也找不到关于严重危机的提示。 唯一的负面消息是市场份额下降。 金融杂志Arvopaperi的第一反应是“惊人的诺基亚”。 股价上涨了百分之七以上。 美国MKM Partners的诺基亚分析师Tero Kuittinen认为:令人震惊的收益报告。 欧洲良好的销售数字是关键因素。 收益好于预期,净销售额好于预期,移动电话部门的利润率以及平均电话价格均好于预期。

也许是惊人的,但是埃洛普对结果并没有动容。 新任首席执行官必须证明谁是老板。 他宣布将解雇1800人,其中850人来自芬兰。

“自加入诺基亚以来的五周时间里,我发现了一家拥有许多强大实力和成就历史的公司,这在业内是首屈一指的。 然而,我们公司在这个行业中正面临着巨大的颠覆性时期,最近的结果表明,我们必须重新评估我们在这个行业中的角色和方法。”埃洛普在新闻稿中表示。

信用评级机构表示同意。 穆迪依靠强劲的财务状况和净资产维持其A2评级,但表示如果昂贵的智能手机的市场地位没有回到先前的水平并且营业利润率不超过10%,它将考虑降低评级。 在7月至9月的季度中,该百分比为6.2。

最糟糕的裁员是针对Symbian产品开发和面向服务的服务部门,Elop指示他们着重于一致的用户体验,而不是单独的产品。 这些行动非常激烈:员工人数将减少至少10%,在产品开发人员中可能接近20%。 情绪既是震惊又是困惑之一。 诺基亚当时在芬兰大约有20,000名员工,其中包括诺基亚网络部门的员工。 Symbian产品开发在Salo,Oulu,Tampere和赫尔辛基都会区共雇用了4000名员工。 法定谈判[11]与所有这些都有关。 诺基亚向自愿离职的员工提供了遣散费。

当天下午,埃洛普(Elop)在电话会议中首次面对投资者。 他已经开始在演讲中嵌入深远的表情。

其中之一是美国。 埃洛普(Elop)承诺将大部分时间重新夺回美国市场。 据他介绍,诺基亚没有在美国取得成功的“系统性理由”。 这全都是关于执行力和专注于正确的事情。 埃洛普(Elop)提醒每个人,美国只有三到四个强大的网络提供商。 他们确切地知道他们想将哪种产品推向市场。

根据埃洛普(Elop)的说法,诺基亚将有一个“清晰阐述的战略”,该战略将解放“创新能力”。埃洛普(Elop)同意担心诺基亚无法完成工作,并发誓要改变它。 他说,他将诺基亚视为具有巨大优势的未抛光宝石。 诺基亚是市场领导者。 它在全球拥有数以千万计的智能手机。 与网络提供商的关系很好。 因此,诺基亚将使自己与竞争对手区分开来,并再次站在可持续的基础上。

埃洛普(Elop)谈到了MeeGo,该操作系统旨在成为昂贵智能手机的未来平台。 他说,他的第一印象给人以信心和很高的期望。 但是,他说很明显,第一款MeeGo设备要等到明年才能发布。

投资者致电非常成功。 新任首席执行官顺利,迅速地回答了问题。 记者和分析家对计划和愿景表示赞赏。 11月第二周, 《福布斯》走得最远,写了一篇非常积极的文章。 它说明埃洛普(Elop)对MeeGo的期望很高。 由于埃洛普(Elop)承诺将裁员3%,并计划提高产品发布的速度,因此福布斯(Forbes)估计诺基亚的股价应会上涨20%。 然后,股票价值将为10.20欧元(14.60美元)。 但是,该杂志指出,只有保持基本功能手机的盈利能力,才能实现这一预测。

除裁员外,埃洛普(Elop)做出了另一个重要决定。 2008年,诺基亚收购了一家有前途的挪威公司Trolltech。 应用程序开发人员将不得不花半天的时间来为诺基亚智能手机实施一个简单的应用程序,而挪威公司的工具将使他们在几分钟内完成相同的工作。 奇趣科技的奇迹产品被命名为Qt。 首字母缩写词的发音类似于英语单词“ cute”。 Qt将是诺基亚的生态系统。 它将挑战苹果和谷歌的Android。 诺基亚自己的内部软件开发也将在将来由Qt完成。

股票分析师萨米·萨卡米斯(Sami Sarkamies)说,他认为该战略很有希望。 Qt可以用来为诺基亚的所有智能手机创建统一的界面。 消费者不需要知道手机是基于Symbian,MeeGo还是Windows。 所有设备的用法或多或少都是相同的。 开发人员只需要实施一次该应用程序。

Sarkamies说:“可以说,只需进行最小的更改,所有应用程序就可以在我们所有的设备上运行,而剩下的工作就是我们的问题。”

一位经验丰富的应用程序开发人员也表达了类似的观点:新策略是可靠的,并且是值得欢迎的一步。 随着软件开发速度达到其竞争对手的水平,对诺基亚的兴趣与日俱增。 工具很好。 该策略显然是一项防御性举措,以支持计划成为智能手机未来平台的MeeGo平台。 Symbian和MeeGo之间将会自然过渡。 它们将共同形成一个不断发展的生态系统。 一个相关的问题是:诺基亚为什么不早些重划线? 主要原因很明显:作为局外人,埃洛普(Elop)能够做到迄今为止内部权力斗争所无法阻止的事情。 理性最终占上风,诺基亚所经历的最明显的荒谬之处可以消除。

同时,Elop将应用程序开发人员带到了手机开发的中心。 当他出人意料地访问诺基亚世界活动,向诺基亚的开发者赠送100万美元的奖金时,他一直在向他们求爱。 在演讲中,他从前任老板史蒂夫·鲍尔默(Steve Ballmer)那里借来了钱,他曾多年宣布:开发人员,开发人员,开发人员! 埃洛普(Elop)带着风格,判断力和没有影响地重复了同样的想法。 开发人员将对诺基亚产生重大影响。 该奖项授予肯尼亚约翰·威伯奇(John Waibochi)的virtualcity.co.ke移动服务,该服务解决了小企业的物流问题。

2010年11月,埃洛普(Elop)开始对执行领导团队进行变更。 根据公告,领导团队将在2011年1月开始时拥有更大的销售能力,届时Jerri DeVard将开始担任营销和传播主管。 DeVard在大型消费品牌方面拥有超过25年的经验。 例如,她曾为露华浓(Revlon)工作,并曾参加巴拉克·奥巴马(Barack Obama)的竞选活动。

希望新来者振作起来,让事情顺利进行。 尽管其中一名成员是女性,但灰色西装的领导班子似乎是高度“技术官僚”。 欢迎这位美国品牌专家的原因之一是,在美国耳边,母语为英语的声音比说英语的芬兰人更好。 此外,诺基亚品牌在国际比较中呈下降趋势。 品牌咨询公司Interbrand估计诺基亚是当时第8大最受尊敬的品牌。 这意味着比上一年减少了三个职位。 只有摩托车制造商哈雷戴维森的品牌价值损失超过诺基亚。


[11] 芬兰劳动法要求雇主在裁员之前进行法定谈判。 附录2中的词汇表附录中有 更多解释


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管理咨询公司麦肯锡公司(McKinsey&Company)的职位是有关诺基亚战略选择的最佳秘密之一。

总部位于美国的麦肯锡公司(McKinsey&Company)是该领域最知名的公司之一。 《纽约时报》杂志将其列为2011年该领域最负盛名的机构。麦肯锡以及另外两个美国的管理咨询公司波士顿咨询集团(BCG)和贝恩,从商学院和工程学院聘用了最有才华的学生。 他们将新员工派到国外接受培训。 麦肯锡在60个国家/地区拥有近一百个办事处。 它的保密协议和保密要求非常严格。 麦肯锡咨询公司不允许公开讨论个别客户的问题,因为麦肯锡业务是建立在客户信任基础上的。 这种职业保密性也约束前雇员。

麦肯锡是一家私有公司,不会公开分享其财务数据。 但是,据《福布斯》(Forbes)估计,2011年麦肯锡的营业额约为50亿欧元(70亿美元),拥有约9,000名顾问。 根据互联网上的估计,一个由一个经验丰富的团队和四个麦肯锡初级顾问组成的团队每月的费用约为50万欧元(700,000美元)。 每个顾问的费用超过100,000美元。 2014年出版的一本书将麦肯锡与奢侈品进行了比较。 当他们被召唤时,它会向其他人传达信息:我们负担得起麦肯锡!

多年来,麦肯锡最聪明的人提出了一些奇怪的建议。 麦肯锡(McKinsey)在1980年告诉AT&T,手机将仍然是边缘产品。 瑞士航空(Swissair)在遵循麦肯锡(McKinsey)制定的战略12年后破产。 经历了一场丑闻般崩溃的能源公司安然(Enron)是麦肯锡的最大客户之一。 更重要的是,安然(Enron)首席执行官杰夫·斯基林(Jeff Skilling)被判与安然倒闭有关的联邦重罪指控,是活跃的麦肯锡校友(前雇员)。 2000年,麦肯锡(McKinsey)建议媒体巨头时代华纳(Time Warner)与互联网服务提供商AOL合并。 几年后担任时代华纳公司首席执行官的杰夫·贝克斯(Jeff Bewkes)称这次合并是公司历史上最大的错误。 在这个恐怖的画廊中,我们还可以添加2009年的诺基亚手机。在Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo任职期间进行了组织更改。 这一变化在关键时刻使公司完全瘫痪。 更改是根据麦肯锡的建议进行的。

通过客户满意度可以抵消这些错误。 85%的客户再次使用麦肯锡。 当您选择麦肯锡公司时,您会知道顾问并不愚蠢,他们拥有一个高效的全球组织来为他们提供支持。

斯蒂芬·埃洛普(Stephen Elop)在加入诺基亚之前已经与麦肯锡建立了良好的关系。 他早在Juniper Networks时就已经使用了咨询服务,并继续在Microsoft与他们合作。 麦肯锡西雅图办事处的挪威人Endre Holen成为史蒂芬·埃洛普(Stephen Elop)值得信赖的人。 Holen最有可能是诺基亚战略和更新背后最有影响力的人之一。 埃洛普(Elop)被任命为诺基亚(Nokia)首席执行官后不久与他联系,并请他参与分析该公司应采取的措施。

根据麦肯锡西雅图办事处网站的说法,霍伦已经为该公司工作了20多年。 他拥有奥斯陆挪威皇家理工学院的结构工程理学硕士学位和伯克利的MBA学位。 他的客户主要包括高科技和电信客户。 他在从战略和产品开发到销售和市场营销的项目中经验丰富。 提到的行业包括软件,产品制造,服务和无线技术。 就像埃洛普(Elop)一样,飞行是霍伦(Holen)的爱好。

该网站列出了霍伦和一位同事在《 麦肯锡季刊 》上发表的文章。 这篇文章是关于凯文·约翰逊(Kevin Johnson)的,他是埃洛普(Elop)在最后一刻跳槽到微软之后成为瞻博网络(Juniper Networks)的首席执行官。 作者以及约翰逊都认为,在进入新公司后,新任首席执行官只有很短的时间来宣布他希望进行的变更。 如果他错过了机会之窗,则无法进行更改或执行起来会更加困难。 If the changes have not been put into action within 12–18 months of the entry, it is too late. According to Johnson, and most probably also the author Holen, a new CEO also has to have a basic understanding of the state of the company starting from the very first day. This could be something like “This is a good industry, but our company is in trouble”. Within a few months, the CEO needs to have figured out the long term goals, the strategy to achieve them, and the leadership changes necessary.

The article about Johnson was written in June 2010, only three months before Elop was nominated to lead Nokia. Johnson says that upon his arrival at Juniper, he posed four questions to the leadership team. It shouldn’t be a surprise that these four questions included the three questions that also Elop put to Nokia’s leadership. In an email sent to his direct reports, Elop had only omitted one question: What are you most proud about Juniper (Nokia)? There are also other interesting coincidences. Johnson came to Juniper from Microsoft, of all places.

Holen actually has surprisingly many ties with Microsoft. Elop’s ideas on leadership, on the other hand, seem to be inspired by Holen.

Following Holen’s arrival at Nokia headquarters in Keilalahti, Espoo in the fall of 2010, a steady stream of junior consultants from across the globe also began to arrive. This was usual practice at McKinsey: The best candidates for a project are invited to join, regardless of where they were based. The young employees of McKinsey’s Finnish office also started to commute between Keilaniemi and Helsinki city center. These consultants took over the strategy work, regardless of the fact that Nokia itself had an unusually large strategy department. McKinsey was tasked with building a “Winning Strategy” together with Nokians to turn Nokia around. Another Norwegian consultant, Trond Riiber Knudsen from the Oslo office of McKinsey took the position of Endre Holen’s right hand man. He specialized in sales and marketing.

The people who worked at Nokia strategy department around this time say that the situation was very confusing even prior to the McKinsey invasion. After the spring 2010 layoffs, the size of the department had gone down from 250 to under 200. In this environment, people acted as though they always had something important and urgent under way. It was very difficult to know what others were working on, as projects were classified confidential or secret. This was combined with a limited amount of teamwork and a culture of not questioning the common beliefs. Symbian was considered the sacred cow that all career-conscious employees supported at all costs. Of course it also made sense to speak favorably of MeeGo. According to the official documentation, the strategy department has invariably supported MeeGo. Windows Phone, on the other hand, was practically unknown to all analysis prior to Elop.

The Nokia strategy department had become a sort of a stepping stone for all young and aspiring wannabe-people. Outside the department there was also talk about the number of people whose last names were the same as those of several well known Finnish corporate leaders. There was a Halmesmäki, a Juusela, a Suila, and a Sundbäck to name a few.

These people were more or less closely related to their more famous namesakes, but according to one Nokian, to an outsider, it seemed like these people were eased into the department to get a line on their CV from world-class strategy work.

It seems understandable that Elop chose to use super-expensive external consultants despite the size of the internal strategy team at his disposal. Nokia needed to get a fresh outside-in view. Company profitability or market share didn’t give much reason to trust the work of the strategy department. The mission given to McKinsey was: “Make sure you challenge us”. Elop wanted to understand Nokia properly, and to make sure that nothing was overlooked. What were the strengths of the company? What sort of partnerships were needed? Could there be some hidden gems somewhere? That Elop allowed Holen to participate in Nokia leadership team meetings aptly reflects the nature of the assignment. Holen almost became an additional member of the leadership team.

The arrival of McKinsey marked the start of a countdown for Nokia strategy department. Elop continuously cut down its personnel. By spring 2011, the headcount in the department was down to a hundred. The explanation was that after Windows Phone was chosen as the new strategy, the main focus was on implementation, not planning. By 2012, the Nokia strategy department had shrunk down to 50 people. Replacing internal strategists with consultants caused conflicts. As one can guess, cultures collided. The external consultants were seen as invaders, especially as their personalities, most notably Riiber Knudsen’s, caused conflicts. Most junior consultants were still inexperienced in international business and their attitudes were, in the words of several interviewees, arrogant. Nokia engineers were honest and said things bluntly and openly, as is the Finnish way. Consultants experienced in the American culture however often assumed that they were embellishing the facts. PowerPoint presentations were made at an astonishing speed. McKinsey would make a 100-page presentation set out of thin air, said one interviewee. If you wanted to make sure that your initiative would get implemented, you should always engage McKinsey, said another. Many were also wondering what fresh insights and approaches the consultants could come up with.

There are varying estimates on the number of McKinsey consultants engaged with Nokia at this time. A total of 50 is an educated guess. Usually there were 5–10 of them on average working on site, at the busiest times there could be tens of consultants. The McKinsey consultants had their own assistant as well as their own premises with a “war room” at the Nokia House headquarters.

The massive size of this endeavor can be deduced from the sales numbers of the Finnish McKinsey. The common practice at McKinsey is that the local office does the invoicing on a case. The turnover of McKinsey Finland was a little under 13.9 million euros ($20 million) in 2009 and a bit above in the following year (14.2 million euros). However, in 2011 their turnover more than doubled surpassing 36.4 million euros ($50 million).

In the financial statements submitted to the Finnish trade register, there is a line called “other costs” after employee costs. These “other costs” were 8.3 million euros ($12 million) in 2010, and 28.7 million euros ($40 million) a year later. These figures most likely give a very reliable estimate on the pass-through billing. Considering that these “other costs” were 5.8 million euros ($8 million) in 2009, we can make the rough estimate that Nokia paid about 20 million euros ($30 million) for McKinsey consultants. Reading the financial statements of McKinsey Finland is almost amusing. The text on the action report stays the same word to word, year after year, only the numbers change. Sometimes not even that: Every one of the reports for the years 2010, 2011 and 2012 states that the ending fiscal year is the twentieth year of McKinsey’s Finnish subsidiary (actual numbers are 21st, 22nd, 23rd respectively). Even though the turnover more than doubled in 2011, there is hardly a mention of this increase in the report.

McKinsey was not the only consulting company that was interested in doing business with Nokia. All consultancies recognized that this was the perfect time to act. In large corporations, a new CEO very often starts to drive changes and needs help. At least one of these other consultancies raised Android as a clearly winning bet for Nokia. The capability to effectively distribute phones to the developing markets was considered as the strength of Nokia. Nokia, however stuck with only McKinsey.

Now we come to an important point of interest. What McKinsey and other consultancies sell, is not just recommendations, but also glory. The end result of their effort is owned by the client, never McKinsey. McKinsey helps large enterprises in making a great number of important choices. However an outsider still thinks that these are choices that the company and its leadership made.

The relationship between clients and consultants is symbiotic: Who pays tens of millions for recommendations they don’t implement? 没有人。 That is why people believe the consultants. And consultants tailor their recommendations to please their customers. McKinsey has such a high reputation that it is known to have been used also as a rubber stamp. On occasion, it has been invited merely to give rationales and supporting arguments for decisions that were already made before it entered.

We are not claiming that this is what happened with Nokia. Many of the people we interviewed thought that both Holen and McKinsey were objective and followed the appropriate hygiene rules. According to one estimate, a consultancy such as McKinsey cannot afford to enter a company as public as Nokia with a ready-made strategy. One leadership team level interviewee said that the analysis Holen presented them with was very convincing. McKinsey was dedicated to their work. Also, most of the corridor talk on Holen appears to have been rather positive than negative.

Regardless, the role of Holen raises questions. Why did Elop choose as his right hand man a consultant who had such strong ties with Microsoft? A man who was in an ongoing customer relationship with them? Why didn’t McKinsey consider him unfit for the project? Shouldn’t McKinsey make sure that there is a firewall between consultants that work with competing clients. There is no doubt that there has been a conflict of interest with Holen. For example, we do not know what his role has been when Microsoft decided to use Windows Phone 7 to increase its efforts on entering mobile phone markets.

According to one reliable source, Holen was or had at least been the account manager for Microsoft at McKinsey.

It looks like neither Elop nor Holen had fully thought through the implications of Holen’s role. How does it look like if a consultant who actively works with Microsoft, or at least is close to the company participates in Nokia leadership team meetings? The dual role of Holen is like adding fuel to the fire of conspiracy theories.

Holen’s own LinkedIn profile has minimal information. There are not too many recommendations from others, either. It is likely that Holen has limited the number of recommendations he wishes to show, but there are two themes on this list that catch one’s attention. The person who has been most active in giving recommendations to Holen is Niklas Savander. He gives a thumbs up for Holen on almost all aspects relating to strategy, change management, and mergers & acquisitions. Teemu Suila, who earlier worked in Nokia strategy and is now the Chief Operating Officer at Rovio praises Holen’s strategy skills. The third most-active recommender is Zig Searfin, who happens to be a vice president -level leader at Microsoft, according to LinkedIn.

It appears that the board of Nokia was unaware of the linkages of Holen and of the double role of McKinsey. We do not claim that these linkages would have directly affected the choices that Nokia made. However, we all know that it is easier to lean towards the more familiar option, the one that you can easily find supporting data on. Rather than towards something more unknown. In terms of appearances, it is indefensible that the strategy choices of Nokia and operative decisions relating to them were made by two people with such close linkages to Microsoft.

McKinsey continued to work closely together with Nokia also after Windows Phone was chosen. After the size of the strategy department stabilized to around 50 people, the consultants became more and more involved with regular, less strategic projects and participated in developing device sales strategies for Microsoft.


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Microsoft’s CEO Steve Ballmer was in a tight place in January 2011. He was flying with his staff on a private plane to Helsinki, when snow and fog prevented them landing in Helsinki. A decision was made in the Swedish airspace: The plane will land in Stockholm instead of Helsinki. Ballmer would continue from there on a scheduled flight, which were still able to land in Helsinki-Vantaa. Ballmer’s tall and stooping image would have been a topic of rumors on any flight, so he hid from the situation by quickly heading for the lounge in Arlanda, states Wall Street Journal. Suddenly, he hears his name on the intercom. There was something unclear with his ticket for the scheduled flight. They wanted him to check in at the desk.

Luckily for Ballmer, no one noticed him being paged. He took care of his ticket discreetly and snuck over to Helsinki to meet Stephen Elop, while avoiding the public eye.

The events leading up to Ballmer’s flight to Helsinki started in the end of October, when Elop had started mapping out the strategic options for Nokia. The Qt strategy, announced in October, was built up with great seriousness and the management, as well as the board, had accepted it. But when Elop had, over time, gotten familiar with the company better, he began to change his mind. According to one member of management, Elop started to view Nokia as too mixed up. With the smartphones, a clear choice had to be made: Either continue our own way, in other words put our effort into MeeGo, or go unequivocally in either the direction of Google or Microsoft. Apple was out of the picture, because it had shut out other manufacturers from its ecosystem.

Microsoft under Ballmer’s leadership had shown up in the smartphone world with new energy, when it announced its new operating system, Windows Phone 7, in February 2010. The first phones using it appeared in sales in November. The reception had been favorable. The graphic design had been considered fresh and original. The tile based start screen differentiated from competitors and pleased many. The way social media was integrated into the phone’s functionality was praised. In the middle, instead of separate services, were people and their messages. Windows Phone 7 was easier to use than Android and more modern than Apple’s iOS. The differences could be compared to a house. On the iPhone, one room led to another, for example from the kitchen to the dining room, always via the entrance way. Android was like a doll house. The user could jump into any room from the outside. Windows Phone, on the other hand, got rid of some of the walls between rooms. The usage of the phone was no longer based on silos formed by the different apps. The product was actually quite good, unlike Microsoft’s earlier concoctions.

The newcomer’s solution had its beginning in the latter half of 2000, when the company was thinking about a successor to its successful PC operating system, Windows 7. Microsoft’s design department was accused of copying, but without cause. Now they wanted something new. After dozens and dozens of brainstorming sessions, it was decided to go with tiles. The brilliant idea was to put tiles beside each other and on top of each other instead of icons. This is how the exciting layout got started; the content was alive and targets were easy to touch.

尤里卡! Now they only needed boldness at the management level. And boldness was found. The first incarnation of the system was in mobile phones. Windows Phone 7 was born as a test bed for Windows 8 for PCs, where there was also the intention of bringing in the tiles.

Thanks and praise for the freshness of Windows Phone 7 was received with joy at the end of fall in 2010, but the financial success was meager. During the first six weeks, Microsoft announced that they had delivered 1.5 million phones to retailers. The manufacturers at the time were Samsung, HTC, Dell, and LG. What was not shared was whether or not the phones were sold to consumers or if they were lying around in the stores. Microsoft wrestled with the same problem as Nokia. If the ecosystem is to succeed, it had to be large enough.

In the Nokia management in the fall of 2010, Windows Phone was shot down straight away. Choosing it as the only platform would be approaching madness was a common opinion heard. Guarantees of success against Google or Apple were not present. Elop was, from confirmed sources, thinking along the same lines. He considered the Microsoft choice unsure, but from sources in management he still continued to ensure it remained on the agenda.

In November 2010, when Nokia started actively researching external alternatives, Microsoft’s share prices had gone up. It was approached with the same seriousness as with Google. Elop had collected a close-knit group around himself at this point, who would back his decisions. Three leaders who had been with the company a long time were in this group. They were Kai Öistämö, Niklas Savander, and Timo Ihamuotila.


During those times, 46 year old Öistämö was one of Nokia’s most controversial characters. He started at Nokia almost directly from the school desk in 1991, after he did his dissertation in his hometown, in the Tampere University of Technology. The tall and slender doctor proceeded with big strides in his career in the mobile phones division, and in 2006 was in charge of the whole group. He was appointed to the board in 2005, and in 2008 he rose to leadership of the Devices division. In July of 2010 his title became Chief Development Officer.

As mentioned previously, Öistämö had done business with Elop already in the summer of 2009, when they negotiated bringing Microsoft Office to Nokia phones. The two of them got along well, and Elop started quickly confiding in Öistämö when he started at Nokia. His job description was to be responsible for strategy, business cooperation, business development, and joint ventures in the field.

Öistämö was a pleasant, modest, and easy-to-approach person. Interviews portray him as friendly and tell that he doesn’t carry an air of importance. One person described him as “terribly nice”. Öistämö is married with three children. His hobbies include tennis, skiing, and golf. His professional values, however, change the overall picture. According to many who have been interviewed, Öistämö is one of the top culprits of Nokia’s difficulties. The claim is based on the years 2008–2010, when Öistämö was in charge of the Devices division. He bloated up Symbian, defended it at every opportunity, and created tens of device versions. Öistämö had bloated MeeGo, together with Alberto Torres in the summer of 2010, to an organization of over 2,000 people.

As a leader, Öistämö is described as a yes-man. He is claimed to sniff out his own bosses’ opinions before sharing his own opinion. What ends up transpiring is always pleasant to his boss. He has another incomplete skill as a leader of people — he doesn’t give feedback, nor does he have a grasp on how to develop people. But he is fair and analytical, according to appraisals.

As a person, Niklas Savander gets different appraisals. He is described as distant and arrogant. He is, according to some, a typical salaried manager, who would rather protect his own position than come up with new ideas. One stock analyst tells us how colleagues actually shun Savander, because he seemed so full of himself.

One partial explanation for this might be found in the man’s family history. His father, Magnus Savander worked, among other things, as a CEO in the conglomerate Rosenlew, known for home appliances and harvesting combines. His mother Christina was born into the von Frenckell family, who owned Rosenlew. After school, Niklas left Pori to go study in Helsinki and graduated from Helsinki University of Technology’s mechanical engineering department in 1987. A year later, he had also gotten papers from the Helsinki Swedish-language Hanken School of Economics, with a degree in international marketing. Savander came to the marketing unit of Nokia Networks after working 9 years at Hewlett-Packard. The year was 1997. The road quickly led to assignments in enterprise devices, marketing, and technology platforms.

In 2009, the American magazine Business Week listed him as one of the hopes of the business world. According to the magazine, Savander was leading the Services division at that time, when Nokia had expanded from phones into mobile internet. He had gotten mobile phone users to buy music, games and navigation services. Under his leadership, Nokia had also developed services for feature phones used in developing countries.

Savander is married and he has two children. According to Wikipedia he plays and referees in ice hockey. His other hobbies are telemark skiing and golf.

Savander’s achievements at Nokia bring up conflicting comments. People who worked with him a lot say that the first impressions you get of Savander are wrong. He is described as a born leader, who concentrates on the big picture. On the other hand, his achievements with Nokia’s internet services, especially with ovi.com, remained only as promises. Colin Giles, who had been fired from his position as head of sales, was believed to have been used as a scapegoat, so that Savander would not need to leave due to Nokia’s loss of status in China.

Like Savander, Timo Ihamuotila belongs to a well-known business family. He is the son of the former CEO of the Neste oil company and the cousin of the CEO of the Marimekko fashion company, Mika Ihamuotila. Ihamuotila completed a licentiate degree in the Helsinki School of Economics in 1997. Only the PhD dissertation is missing from his doctoral degree.

During Elop’s time at Nokia, the 44-year-old Ihamuotila is described as precise and quick-witted. As a counterbalance to being somewhat colorless, he is considered a leader who knows his business. He is described as an upright, transparent, pleasant, and a very professional financial leader.

Ihamuotila started his career in assignments in finance, first in the Kansallis-Osake-Pankki bank and in 1993 as a risk analyst for Nokia. In 1996, he left to Citibank, but returned to Nokia to a leadership role in finance in 1999. Afterward, he was responsible for, among other things, Nokia’s CDMA business in the US, the mobile phone product portfolio, and from 2007, global sales. On the same year, he was appointed to the board. He started as the Chief Financial Officer in 2009.

Ihamuotila is married and has three children. In his free time, he plays tennis, skis, reads, and spends time with his family.


It was Monday, November 15, 2010, when Elop and his three soldiers headed to Microsoft’s control center in Redmond.

Elop had told about his first impression of the negotiations to Bloomberg Businessweek . When he, Öistämö, Savander and Ihamuotila were waiting together for a taxi in front of the Bellevue Hotel near Microsoft’s headquarters, Ballmer had sent a huge limousine to greet them. Elop said how he felt so awkward that he would have wanted to walk. A group of four received them in a small conference room. This group included, together with Ballmer, Qi Lu, who was responsible for internet services, the leader of the mobile unit Andy Lees, and the person responsible for the Windows Phone technology, Terry Myerson. After small talking about being back to the site of his former employer, Elop went straight to the point. Nokia had decided to either stay with its own software, or team up with Google or Microsoft. The decision would be made soon. He said that he would publicize the decision in the analyst meeting on February 11, 2011.

Myerson recalled that Elop has given a familiar impression at the meeting. This strength is again not from intuitive decision-making, but is a question of creating clear and quick processes, where a rational person feels comfortable. Microsoft was certainly interested in such things.

The next time they met was on December 6 in the W New York — Times Square hotel in New York. Jo Harlow, who was in charge of smartphones at Nokia, was also present at the meeting. The task of the conclave was to decide whether or not Windows Phone would be able to run on Nokia’s chipsets. The concrete technical analysis continued after a few weeks in Reykjavik, Iceland.

A source who was present in the Microsoft negotiations says that Elop was very neutral in the meetings. He often discussed with his team and made the members express their opinions. According to sources, decisions were made together, as opposed to Elop being a dictator and driving Nokia into the lap of Windows Phone. He really coaxed out the expertise of his team, the source says.


The first contact with Google came when Elop and Google’s CEO Eric Schmidt talked on the telephone, and Elop told Schmidt that Nokia was making some big decisions. Besides Schmidt, Andy Rubin also took part in the call.

It is good to clarify a couple of things at this point. Microsoft’s Windows Phone 7 was proprietary software. Only Microsoft could modify it. It charges license fees from phone manufacturers. Android by Google is open source software. Anyone can use it for free and modify it however they want.

Why did Nokia even need to negotiate with Google? If a manufacturer wants their devices to access the Google app store, they must use Google’s standardized version of Android. The manufacturer agrees to preload, among other things, Google’s maps and the Gmail email service. After fulfilling these requirements and many others, the manufacturer can fully enter the Google ecosystem. Google allows modification of the user interfaces, but only to a limited degree, so that using the device remains similar independent of what device is used.

Another option is to put Google’s standardized version to the side and download Android for free and create one’s own version. This is what the Amazon online store did with its Kindle tablet, and built services and an online store by itself. In 2010, however, this option was off the table for Nokia. Nokia was looking for a ready-made ecosystem.

Elop was as direct as he was in Redmond in his first contact with Google. Symbian was dying and MeeGo was late for its schedule. Nokia wanted to understand if Android would be a good replacement for these. At the same time, Nokia said they would also study Windows Phone and compare these two. The follow-up work was taken up by Öistämö and John Lagerling, a Swede who was in charge of Google’s Android partnerships. On November 11, 2010, in other words four days before Elop and his four-man-team made the trip to Redmond, Lagerling arrived in Finland. First there was dinner with Nokia’s American leaders, and on the next day there was a meeting with a delegation of about 10 people from Nokia in Keilalahti.

According to a source present, Google seemed to really want Nokia to join the Android world. The company assured that Android can be customized more than Nokia understood, especially compared with Windows Phone. Even if Google was criticized continuously for having Samsung, HTC and Sony Android phones differ from each other too much, Nokia would be given leeway to create its own user experience. Google saw that Nokia differentiated from these competitors in that it had a global area of operation. Nokia would be able to create better local services and user experiences for network providers and customers, one person present remembers being discussed. The Nokians also noticed that they had been living partially with misinformation. Nokia could continue with Android with its own maps side-by-side with Google’s maps. The same applied with the app store. Nokia’s music service as well as ovi.com could continue, as long as the phone had Google Play.

The discussions continued at a fast pace after the first visit. Google seemed to really want Nokia.

Some constraints were set by the Open Handset Alliance behind Android, OHA. Unlike Windows Phone, Android is not controlled by one company, rather by an alliance of 84 companies which is led by Google, where the members are able to use Android in an equal manner. Google was in a difficult position. By giving Nokia special privileges, it risked its relationship with other manufacturers. The reactions would be difficult to predict. Creativity was needed.

As the negotiations proceeded, a solution was found. Google offered Nokia, among other things, plenty of say in choosing the direction of Android development. By directing Android development to align with its own competitive goals, Nokia would gain some advantage, even if the changes would be available for everyone at the same time. Now Nokia was interested. Android and Nokia had an area where their interests converged in a brilliant way: Developing countries. If Android could be made to work on cheap hardware, Nokia would be best at getting in through in developing markets. The arrangement was enticing. Google would secure the position it was dreaming of in smartphones, and Nokia would become part of virgin Android markets. The precise details remained hidden, but Nokia was able to learn that Google worked Android into clearly cheaper models than Windows Phone.

Another flexible point of Android was in its predictability. Nokia wanted to publicize the new software features earlier than when the phones go into sales. The reason was brutal: Nokia was more solid than its Korean competitor and needed more time to build a phone. If the information about the new Android features was available earlier, Nokia would have enough time to get them in the first wave, like the others. Google was willing. It promised to make the publicizing of its plans earlier and to release the source code to its partners. The solution would have been useless for other Android manufacturers in relation to Nokia, but would not have broken the OHA rules.

Google made a substantial offer regarding distribution of income. Nokia would have gotten a portion of the income from Google’s search engine, app store, and other services which originate from Nokia phones, and the terms would be in relation to Nokia’s influence in the ecosystem. We don’t have information about precise percentages, but at any rate, Google’s promise was quite exceptional, considering that Nokia would still have been able to keep its own services in its phones.

Contrary to what Nokia has claimed, Google was ready for concessions. It was ready to flex as far as it could in the framework of OHA, and even then some more.

Then some big money stepped into the game, as well as the mysterious Nokia employee with the name Rahul Mewawalla.

According to his profile in the social media LinkedIn, Mewawa transferred to Nokia in 2010 from the television company NBC. Previously he had worked at Yahoo, among other places. During his time at Nokia, Mewawalla’s title was, according to LinkedIn, Global Head of the Business Division, Global P&L Leader, Global Vice President and General Manager.

Mewawalla had a simple task. He created pressure outside the official negotiations, and above all he tried to milk money from all the possible contract partners. Mewawalla’s thinking was based on the assumption, that MeeGo would succeed and produce Nokia a revenue stream of sum X. If Nokia were to choose some other platform, it would lose that sum. Sum X was therefore an alternative cost to choosing an external platform, and the sum was several billions of dollars. Many interviewed describe that reasoning as strange. Mewawalla’s role and methods of negotiating were considered strange in a Finnish company. The opponents had difficulties understanding which direction Nokia was going.

Nokia found understanding from Microsoft with relation to money, but Mewawalla ran into a wall with Google. Google notified Nokia that it would not be able to pay one cent for someone to use its free operating system. It definitely does not fit into Google’s way of doing things, was the answer.

Creativity was again needed.


The board of Nokia followed the progress of the Microsoft and Google negotiations calmly. In 2010, there was the normal number of meetings, 13, out of which a few were held by phone. In the fall there was no reason seen to speed up the pace. Three options, continue with our own software, Google and Microsoft, were all under consideration at the same level, and all were being researched with open hands. The information close to the board was under review. Also Elop seemed to be proceeding with his eyes open, and avoided sales pitches on behalf of Microsoft. Even if Elop became a board member only in spring 2011, he was in the meetings presenting the information expected of the CEO.

After some time, doubts began to gather around Google. Mostly the board grew wary of losing their own software work. As part of the Google camp, Nokia was expected to end up with huge numbers of layoffs, because the platform would come from outside, and the possibility of other software work was limited. The potential of the maps company, Navteq, would be weakened. Nokia had bought it four years prior for the huge price of 5.7 billion euros — the deal was one of the largest in Finnish business history. The board started asking if we are ready to make such big sacrifices. Another conclusion that had come up was, through Android, Nokia would become a slave of Google. In Elop’s speech, one would hear his familiar words of “our ability to differentiate from the competition” on the scale. Samsung had taken over the Android ecosystem, and they would be difficult to compete against, because, through its displays and semiconductors, it had a competitive edge in price, R&D, and logistics.

The choice of Android might increase sales, but what would happen to profitability? Nokia’s services team had doubts about Google’s trustworthiness: Would they dare to give them strategically important user data for their services without fear of misuse?

The arguments for Microsoft became better, day after day. Microsoft needed Nokia more than Google. They could not risk letting Nokia jump over to Google’s ship, because it would be the beginning of the end for Windows Phone. Microsoft promised Nokia its own app development as well as innovation. Doing things themselves was part of Nokia’s culture, so Microsoft assured that they would suit them better than Google. Nokia would be able to influence the end result. Both companies were challengers, and they both had a common enemy.

There were also certainly suspicions toward Microsoft. It was hard to imagine it as a cradle of innovative culture, and the Windows Phone ecosystem was only just getting started. The board was given working Windows Phone 7 phones, so that the members could get to know the possibilities of the platform. The relevant question remained in the air, nonetheless: What would a Windows Phone device be like? How would we make it competitive? How would it differentiate?

In the internal dynamics of the board, there were some strong characters besides Ollila — Henning Kagermann and Risto Siilasmaa. Only they had a background with software.

Siilasmaa is described as being active in the board and bringing in valuable input. He knew Microsoft — he is known to have admired the company during its greatness in the 1990’s, and on top of that Siilasmaa’s company, F-Secure, had made its business by patching the security holes in Microsoft Windows.


The third big hot potato was Nokia’s own hope, MeeGo. It was late. But it looked better. Anssi Vanjoki had, before he was let go, come to the conclusion that MeeGo had been turned in the right direction. Alberto Torres, who was often in disagreement with Vanjoki, was also in agreement. MeeGo would reach its goal, as soon as the leadership problems could be cleared out of the way. There were estimates in the management that the broad category of products would be ready by the end of the beginning half of 2013. At the end of the fall, Nokia’s most organic path, MeeGo, was the choice most supported by management.

The strategic lineup started looking like this:

MeeGo Nokia would continue with its own software, differentiate from its competitors, and its money would stay in its own pocket.

Google Success was clear. Nokia would become a mass producer. The risk is low and the profit expectation is low.

Microsoft Would it work? Nokia would have to get its software from outside, and they would need to pay licensing fees. The risk is high, and the profit expectations are low.

At around the end of 2010 and the beginning of 2011, the situation was getting tense. Elop had gone to Seattle before Christmas. When he came back to Finland, he continued the decisive conversations.

According to an estimate from the board, the fate of MeeGo would culminate during these weeks. Elop had expected more support from the network providers than what they had. A CEO from one of the world’s 10 largest network providers confirms the claim. He recalls Elop visiting for lunch and showing off MeeGo devices. The CEO remembers that he had been unimpressed. The picture he got of the phones was that they had appeared too late. He told Elop directly that Nokia would find it difficult to create a real ecosystem with them. It would have taken more money than what Nokia had, the CEO remembers.

According to a member of the Nokia leadership team, the lack of credibility that Torres had as leader of the MeeGo project also affected Elop’s considerations. An operating system is chosen based on its technology, but in an equal playing field, the option which shows the most credible plan gets picked, the CEO reminds us. It would be very difficult to push MeeGo to the side, if it had been led by someone more convincing than Torres.

On January 3, according to Wall Street Journal , Öistämö walked into his boss’s office and notified Elop that he was worried about the possibilities MeeGo had. The two of them calmly decided to talk with twenty MeeGo people, from programmers to managers. Before the first interview, Elop collected everything that was known about MeeGo on a whiteboard, according to the version described in Wall Street Journal . The products under development, their launch times, and the error level of the software. The news was bad. At that pace, Nokia would have three MeeGo devices in sales before the end of 2014.

Elop tried to call Öistämö, but Öistämö’s battery was empty. “He was probably trying out an Android phone”, Elop joked later. When they finally talked on the January 4, the truth was, according to Öistämö, a bitter pill to swallow.


Mewawalla kept at his tough push throughout the end of that year. The sources of money, nonetheless, remained dry. Google’s thinking was that it would not pay money for using Android, but it notified that it understood Nokia’s need to get cash to help with the cash problem caused by the platform change. The creativity appeared in the form of patents. Google offered to buy Nokia’s patents to be used for Android. In this way, Nokia would have gotten cash and Android, Nokia’s new platform, would get more power against its competitors. Nokia still kept its cool. It wanted cash and considered Google’s offer for the value of the patents too low. One possibility to take care of the cash flow would be to overcharge for the patents, but Google didn’t seem to be ready to do this. What was probably the most likely scenario, was that the parties’ price expectations were too far from each other.

Elop kept a physical distance from the negotiations. He and Schmidt had not met in a real negotiation even once. There were two or three phone negotiations, but there were only meetings at events, at the most. Elop was also not known to have met any of the other Google negotiators. This makes one wonder, when it is known that Elop met Microsoft’s Ballmer at least twice in direct negotiations.

In the beginning of January, something happened. The negotiations with Google stopped.

According to one version of the story, it started at the world’s largest consumer electronics fair in Las Vegas on January 6–9, 2011. The newest Android phones and tablets got a very good reception. So good, that Nokia’s value in the eyes of Google dropped decisively. According to this version of the story, Google understood that it could take over the world without Nokia, nor would it need to risk its relationships with other manufacturers by taking in Nokia with special conditions. Now Nokia only had the standard conditions, which are jokingly said to be: Welcome to Android, the source code can be found for free in the internet.

This version of events are not likely the real story. The deciding point in January was, according to a dependable source, that Nokia finally understood, that it would not get money directly from Google under any conditions. Nokia wanted a quick solutions and billions of cash. Google offered a position based on Nokia’s strengths in Android, but it would only have produced money in the long run.

When this was understood, the negotiations with Microsoft got a fire lit under them. They moved to questions about business activities and marketing. The meeting in London was with Öistämö’s Microsoft counterpart, Andy Lees. Someone who was closely following the negotiations told Wall Street Journal a few months later that at this point the contact almost broke. Nokia realized that Microsoft was, after all, offering the world’s largest phone manufacturer the standard agreement, even if Nokia was casting all its chips into the game. The Nokians showed their eye for the game. The Microsoft crew knew that Nokia was negotiating with Google. Nokia jumping ship to Android would ruin Microsoft’s chance of a century. Just because of this, Ballmer flew to Helsinki, to assure the Nokians that Redmond was serious.

On January 10, 2011, Öistämö, together with his colleagues spent the morning in a windowless room in the cellar of a London hotel. Nokia told Microsoft that it wanted freer rights than the competitors to innovate with Windows Phone. The Navteq maps had to be the basis for all Microsoft services. On top of that, Öistämö decided to ask a large sum of money. Öistämö had calculated correctly. Microsoft had come to the conclusion that it could not afford to let Nokia slip from its hands. According to Bloomberg Businessweek , the negotiations proceeded quickly after this. When the parties met for dinner in an Indian restaurant, the agreement was sorted out in time for dessert. The description in the magazine was partially a legend fed to the public. All the items, including the money, were negotiated throughout the fall, but they created a package out of all of them.

The contract was completely different from what Microsoft had made with other manufacturers. It included marketing money, reduced license fees, and special rights with regards to technology. The road appeared to be opening up. Nokia would get its ecosystem and the driver’s seat for Windows Phone. The special status was only achieved, according to Elop, because Nokia promised to do everything it can for the benefit of Windows Phone. The arrangement included a commitment not to use other smartphone platforms.

The board got the results put before them on the second week of January.

The reception was favorable. According to the information the board had, only three people presented questions that were even somewhat critical. Otherwise, the reaction was a poodle-like “sounds good”. The decision was, in the end, unanimous. No one voted against. Microsoft’s terms with its billions of euros were viewed as the best.

In our interviews some recounted how they actually thought differently.

One interviewee describes how he found the agreement directly unreasonable. Nokia took a risk, but Microsoft would take most of the profits. Another said how he suspected that Windows Phone was not ready as a product. Also, it was understood that Microsoft had a bad brand reputation. Elop’s activities caused bad feelings. One described how Elop borrowed from his ex-workmates, when talking about the details of the system. Elop seemed to be bypassing the normal communication channels with Microsoft, and gave an impression that he knew more about the product than what he told the board. He was thought to have insider information, which made the board think that he was making his decisions based on better information than the rest. One board member uses the word “blindsided”. Elop gave the understanding that Windows Phone was going strongly upward. In reality, looking back, Google benefited, he estimates.

One thing that was considered very brazen was Öistämö’s strong support for Windows Phone. MeeGo’s difficulties were, in many people’s opinion, the achievement of Öistämö. He had led the team for 18 months out of the last two years. Now he had become a turncoat and stood behind Elop.

The board had put forward a proposal, where Windows Phone would be used for the expensive smartphones, and Android for the cheap ones. According to a reliable source, Elop had said that Ballmer would not agree to any special terms, but that Microsoft demanded exclusive rights. The standard agreement for Windows Phone would always be available, but in this case there were billions of euros invested. Microsoft offered so much money in the short term, that the offer was difficult to refuse. When on the other side was Google’s zero-offer, the game started to be clear. Google started getting the message that Nokia was going with the competition.

The negotiations should have been confidential, so the Nokians were quite shocked when one of Google’s leaders, Vic Gundotra tweeted on February 9:

@vicgundotra#feb11 “Two turkeys do not make an Eagle”.

The date of the hashtag pointed at Nokia’s capital markets day, where it was promised that the new strategy would be announced. The hint was easy to understand. “I guess they did not like the decision”, Elop commented on the tweet later.


For senior managers in Nokia, the first four months of Elop’s leadership were a tough time. One picture of the period was a combination of confusion and self-defense. When survival through organizational changes was uncertain, everyone concentrated on making an impression on their new boss.

Before announcing the decision, Elop invited 200 people underneath the top management level for two days at Windsor, near London. Windows Phone 7 devices were handed out to the group, so that the managers could demonstrate the features to their subordinates. Windows Phone phones were sold out right away in Finland, when lower management started to familiarize themselves with their new area of work.

The board convened for their decisive meeting on February 10, 2011. There was nothing left to decide. The briefings for the morning were already ready or in progress. The board accepted Microsoft Windows Phone 7 smartphone as its only platform unanimously, out of formality. The most serious issue was the promise of Nokia’s own platform and development work. The board wanted to avoid the mass layoffs, which would have resulted from choosing Android. The board certainly affirmed that they would be sailing in unknown waters. The brand would get watered down, when they started selling Windows Phone 7 devices instead of Nokia. The atmosphere could be described like this: They would have wanted to make a decision, where they could say, “Wow, now this will really take off.” Microsoft gave so much money, but it still felt like they were between a rock and a hard place. Their thoughts went in the direction of hoping that the ecosystem would gradually take off.

The details of the contract are still mostly secret. It is known that Microsoft promised to pay Nokia $250 million a quarter to support the platform. Microsoft would buy licenses for Nokia’s patents and would put money into the marketing of Windows Phone. The sums to be used for marketing or the wishes regarding them were not detailed in the contract. They would be decided case-by-case. Nokia would pay royalties of about 10 euros ($15) per device to Microsoft for using Windows Phone. There was a minimum sum per year for royalties, which Nokia would be obliged to pay regardless of the sales volumes, and the sum would increase over time. The base fee would be, for a long time, bigger than the minimum royalties. The royalties would start running only when phones were in sales, so in the beginning, Nokia’s cash flow was strongly on the receiving end.

微软将开始在其所有服务中使用诺基亚的地图和导航平台,并且将从诺基亚与网络提供商的关系中受益,并可以向用户收取其自有服务以及电话费的费用。 诺基亚将在其设备上安装Bing搜索引擎。 来自服务的收入将被共享。 诺基亚将从必应搜索的广告收入和地图中的广告中获得自己的份额。

该合同很可能至少五年,甚至更长。 不允许诺基亚在其智能手机中使用竞争平台。 第一个以合理的罚款退出的机会可能在2013年底。


即使在诺基亚的战略计划中大部分时间都花在了智能手机上,董事会还是在同一次会议上就新战略的其他部分做出了决定。 除了Windows Phone,还将有两个支持列。

第一个的名称是“下一个十亿”。 诺基亚计算出,仍有32亿人没有手机。 该公司开始使用其旧功能电话平台(称为S40)吸引巴西,俄罗斯,印度,印度尼西亚,中国和非洲的潜在客户。 尽管名称,但它是Symbian和S60的独立产品。 他们承诺在其简单的功能手机中提供互联网,完整的QWERTY键盘和部分触摸显示屏。 由于巨大的销售量,S40被认为是Java应用程序开发人员的有吸引力的平台。 对于无法访问互联网的人们,将提供基于短信的服务。

为了以防万一,MeeGo被放在了后架上。 开发人员可以将一种产品推向市场。 之后,他们将开始寻找并嗅出下一个重大破坏。 实际上,服务门户网站ovi.com已告别。 它将加入Windows Phone应用商店。

诺基亚宣布将重组其管理和组织。 事先作出的估计是,集团执行委员会的所有芬兰成员都将保留其职位。 内部发现了新血。 新成员包括Colin Giles(销售),Rich Green(技术),Jo Harlow(智能手机)和Louise Pentland,他们是负责法律事务的人,将专利问题带到了集团执行委员会。 由于负责MeeGo的托雷斯(Torres)立即离开了集团执行董事会,因此成员人数增加到13人。

在2011年4月上旬,有两个业务部门:智能设备(专门研究智能手机),由乔·哈洛(Jo Harlow)领导,以及移动电话,由玛丽·麦克道威尔(Mary McDowell)领导。 负责产品销售的市场部门将由Niklas Savander领导,而服务部门将由TeroOjanperä领导。 在Windows Phone谈判中发挥重要作用的KaiÖistämö将负责开发。


当2月11日终于到来时,埃洛普(Elop)向Google的贡多特拉(Gundotra)发了一条推文:

@ selop @ cheureux或者这样:来自俄亥俄州代顿市的两家自行车制造商决定飞翔。
#NokMsft#feb11

这句话是指赖特兄弟,第一架飞机的设计者。 1903年12月17日,奥维尔·赖特(Orville Wright)升空时,飞行持续12秒,时长36米。 威尔伯·赖特(Wilbur Wright)在同一天飞行了259米,飞行持续了59秒。 埃洛普短暂的寓言中令人放心的是,与许多飞行先驱不同,两个兄弟都经受住了考验。 威尔伯(Wilbur)在修理房屋的门铃时死于伤寒,享年45岁,而奥维尔(Orville)在心脏病发作时享年76岁。


返回目录

埃洛普(Elop)繁忙的秋天和初冬在2011年2月11日在伦敦的洲际酒店达到顶峰。有关诺基亚选择Windows Phone平台的消息已经发布。 介绍之后,埃洛普(Elop)身着深灰色西服和领带走上舞台。 看着他的演讲,没有人会想到投资者已经表达了对这一策略的看法-诺基亚股价下跌了14%。

埃洛普(Elop)首先简要介绍了手机市场的变化方式,设备之间的竞争如何成为生态系统之战以及诺基亚如何赢得这场战争。 然后埃洛普引用温斯顿·丘吉尔的话:

悲观主义者看到每一个机会都有困难。 乐观主义者会在各种困难中看到机会。

根据埃洛普(Elop)的说法,整个技术行业都基于这种乐观态度。 他说,他对诺基亚与微软之间的合作伙伴关系感到非常兴奋。 两家公司在一起将有机会改变生态系统战争的方向。

然后埃洛普(Elop)邀请微软首席执行官史蒂夫·鲍尔默(Steve Ballmer)登台。 鲍尔默吹嘘Windows Phone用户对该平台非常满意,以及应用程序数量迅速增加。 与诺基亚的合作将进一步促进生态系统的发展。 例如,诺基亚的地图服务和卓越的相机技术将成为生态系统的关键部分。

鲍尔默认为,首批诺基亚Windows Phone设备的计划已经在向前发展,包括与网络提供商和芯片组供应商的谈判。

两人,前下属和老板,来到舞台中央,握手照片。 他们俩坐在两个高脚凳上回答问题。 第一个问题是关于日程安排; 这些手机什么时候会上市? 埃洛普(Elop)说,当时他们不会提供任何时间表的估计。 但是,他保证Windows Phone可以使诺基亚更快地发布手机。 下一个问题询问有关与Windows Phone生态系统上其他电话制造商的关系的更改。 鲍尔默回答说,微软将继续与他们合作。 诺基亚将获得特殊地位,但没有专有权。 Elop补充说,目标是确保Windows Phone生态系统的成功。 在该生态系统中,诺基亚可以独树一帜,因为它将享有特殊的地位。

埃洛普(Elop)表示,与基于Microsoft的手机合作,诺基亚将比与Google竞争更有利于在欧元以下的价格类别中竞争。


诺基亚新闻发布会是当今全球的科技新闻。 互联网出版物立即开始对该公告发表评论。

对于大多数人来说,第一反应是震惊。 预计诺基亚将宣布与微软合作,但据认为仅将Windows Phone引入少数国家的市场。 没有人预料到诺基亚会在没有其他选择的情况下全部使用Windows Phone。

在本书的采访中,甚至诺基亚的一些主要股东也对选择感到惊讶。 他们曾期望基于多种平台的战略。

“我期望采用多平台策略。 MeeGo是一个大胆的举动,我希望公司继续坚持下去。 一位业主说:“我看到Windows的业务潜力,主要是因为诺基亚拥有如此众多的企业客户。”

“仅选择Windows是一个非凡的策略选择。 没有透露财务细节,目标,条款和条件。 这使投资者完全陷入了黑暗。 这是一个强有力的信号,表明这些条款仍未解决。 显然,这是匆忙完成的,”另一位业主说。

甚至三年后,阅读公众已经分享的反应仍然令人困惑。 记者和业内人士似乎对未来的预测最为准确。

其中一位评论员,名为About Mobility的博客的编辑恩里克·奥尔蒂斯(C. Enrique Ortiz)在2月11日发布的帖子中指出,诺基亚未能正确识别出真正的威胁是什么。 真正的竞争对手是拥有iPhone的苹果电脑和Android手机的制造商。 制造商-不是Google或Android。

“与Microsoft的关系将帮助在Windows Phone的正面隔离HTC和其他人,但这只是很小的一个正面。 而且,如果您问我,这看起来像是一段关系的开端,最终可能会被微软吸收诺基亚的影响。” Ortiz估计。

根据MKM Partners的Tero Kuittinen的说法,埃洛普(Elop)决定通过推进Windows Phone来冒险在今年下半年的Symbian销售中冒险。 “诺基亚仅凭借3%的市场份额跳入冰冷的水域,” Kuittinen说道。

许多人认为,微软与诺基亚的合并是双赢的局面。 诺基亚免费出售自己。 Aviate Global LLP经纪公司的尼尔·坎普林(Neil Campling)分析说,谷歌和苹果在通往双头垄断的道路上欢呼雀跃。

一位开发人员在诺基亚论坛上分享了他的无奈:“哇,我能说什么! 诺基亚再次失去了我再次在其平台上开发任何东西的兴趣。”

“我感到震惊! 微软公司历史上最大的胜利之一。 技术顾问Tomi Ahonen评论道,这是领先的技术品牌有史以来第一次拒绝其最小竞争对手的平台。

摩托罗拉的反应也很明显。 诺基亚的竞争对手表示,这种合作没有兴趣,几乎没有任何意义。 摩托罗拉移动业务负责人Alain Mutricy表示,此次合作充分表明诺基亚短期内将不会具有竞争力。

但是反应并非全都是负面的。 在最初的震惊之后,一些积极的评论开始出现。 许多人认为合作仍然可以成为各方的胜利。

“我很兴奋。 诺基亚生产出色的设备,而Windows Phone 7确实是一个出色的操作系统。 为美丽的合作伙伴敬酒! 这种联合是在天堂完成的”,来自Techradar的 Gary Marshall表示祝贺。

从战略上讲,这是非常明智的举动,双方都赢了。 为什么不早做呢?”来自网络提供商O2的Rene Schuster问。

“这项交易将使诺基亚重新回到智能手机制造商的最前沿”,Carphone Warehouse的安德鲁·哈里森(Andrew Harrison)喜出望外。

芬兰报纸做了一些有趣的解释。 在其中一个小报上,有一个标题声称埃洛普(Elop)说是诺基亚“该死”的时候了 。 小报进一步说,埃洛普(Elop)称这为芬兰谚语,这很正确。 翻译中失去了意义。 埃洛普(Elop)曾用谚语说: “先下手为强” ,这是为了表明诺基亚现在该变得更加专注于感知和预测移动行业的变化了。 小报记者以前从未听过这句谚语,因此被误译了。


在2月11日的宣布中,股市做出了最重的判决。 经过两天的市场活动,诺基亚损失了57亿欧元(80亿美元)的市值。 给出一些观点:微软后来以54亿欧元(合75亿美元)的价格收购了诺基亚的手机业务。

受Windows平台选择影响最大的各方大声疾呼。 公告当天,下午2点,千人离开办公室来到坦佩雷,这是Symbian开发的中心之一(在该网站工作的3,000名员工中,有一半从事了Symbian开发)。 工会发言人卡勒·基利(Kalle Kiili)告诉芬兰新闻社(STT,Suomen Tietotoimisto) ,实际上很多人在提早离开办公室时都会利用弹性工作时间。 员工仍然非常忠于诺基亚。 Kiili希望获得更多有关节省成本的信息并明确说明,并计划提高效率。 据Kiili称,即使人们演示了,该人员也认为Windows是Google更好的伴侣。

MeeGo营地的反应更强烈。 在Ruoholahti的主要开发站点中,赫尔辛基人通过网络广播观看了伦敦的活动。 一位目击者描述了现场:

“几乎每个人都直接去了酒吧,好几天没回来了。 最好的Linux开发人员在下周开始离开诺基亚。 英特尔提供报价的速度特别快。”

社交媒体沸腾了。 Betanews的 Joe Wilcox总结了这种感觉:第一突尼斯。 然后是埃及。 现在是诺基亚。 整个Twitter上都爆发了抗议该决定的抗议活动。


2011年2月11日是星期五。 两天后,每年一度的大型活动世界移动大会在巴塞罗那拉开帷幕。 在诺基亚于周日晚上组织的新闻发布会上,最大的问题终于公开发表。 听众中有人喊道:“你是特洛伊木马吗?”埃洛普的回答很平静。 他说他显然不是特洛伊木马。 诺基亚一直谨慎地将整个领导团队纳入战略制定流程。 他保证,只有诺基亚董事会才能做出对公司如此巨大影响的决定。

埃洛普提醒听众,尽管诺基亚必须为使用Windows Phone支付使用费,但它们将减少产品开发的成本。 埃洛普没有回答有关这些储蓄额的问题。

在巴塞罗那赛事的第三天,当埃洛普(Elop)在新闻发布会上与鲍尔默(Balmer)一起登台演出时,发生了意外。 他们共同向群众保证,诺基亚和微软的生态系统将是所有网络提供商的最佳选择。 埃洛普答应听取那些担心苹果和谷歌的力量的服务提供商。 向网络提供商承诺了通过其自己的应用程序和服务增加收入的新方法。 鲍尔默承诺,诺基亚-微软的首要任务是为网络提供商创造创造价值的最佳平台。


鲍尔默回答了伦敦新闻发布会上的最后一个问题。 他讲述了自己在11月与Elop首次谈论诺基亚战略选择的方式。 然后埃洛普告诉他,决定将在短短几个月内作出。

“对我来说,听起来应该很快。 我们到了。 我认为这太不可思议了。”

鲍尔默是全球经验最丰富的企业领导人之一。 他曾在IT部门工作,是整个职业发展最快的业务。 他仍然认为诺基亚的决策过程非常快。 实际上,如此之快,以至于他公开发表了评论。

在短短三个月内,诺基亚做出了决定其命运的决定。 这个决定是由一个只在公司工作了五个月的人(一个来自行业以外的首席执行官)准备的。

问题是不可避免的:埃洛普(Elop)和他的团队有足够的时间看完整张照片吗?

他们怎么知道微软是否开放和诚实? 遗漏一些东西并不愚蠢。 不问真是愚蠢的。 固守在伦敦的资本市场日发布公告的举动让人有些eye异-似乎做出决定比做出一个好的决定更为重要。

这些诺基亚战略发展计划中有趣的细节与命理有关。 Kallasvuo从Anssi Vanjoki订购的战略工作被称为10-10-10,因为该工作将于2010年10月10日宣布。如前所述,伦敦资本市场日是2011年2月11日。 欧洲人通常将该日期写为2011年2月11日。 这是一个回文,无论您从哪一端阅读,都使用相同的数字。


返回目录

有人想知道,在选择诺基亚战略时,如何几乎没有对原因的批评。 专栏,社论和一些分析师解释了诺基亚如何无法与Android脱颖而出,诺基亚如何与微软进行创新,诺基亚-微软生态系统最适合网络提供商,以及配备MeeGo OS的手机如何进入市场太晚了。 所有人都喜欢直接从埃洛普的嘴里走出来。

接受本书采访的许多人都出奇地抨击了埃洛普的推理。 印象从“胡说八道”到“歪曲”不等。

在本章中,我们将逐点研究主要论点。 这项审查在一定程度上是不公平的,因为事后看来总是20/20。 仍然是有效的:时间证明错误的说法仍然是错误的。 目标是在决策时考虑情况,而不是从此后发生的事情出发。

埃洛普的推理可以用三个词来描述:虚张声势。

据受访者说,在最初的几个月中,他沉浸于与移动业务相关的一切。 他了解平台及其生态系统,并对这些设备一直到最小的细节感到兴奋。 这方面的一个很好的例子是接受《 金融时报》一位程序员的采访,作为抗议,他在2011年2月11日后辞职。他描述了与埃洛普的面对面会谈。 埃洛普(Elop)展示了对这一主题的深入了解,提出了许多与技术和功能有关的出色而详尽的问题。 根据这位程序员的说法,基于错误的信息做出他的决定是不可能的。 Ergo,他歪曲了事实。 诺基亚内部和外部的访谈得出的结论都与这种想法是一致的。

在2011年初,Android,MeeGo和Windows Phone就像是三个冲刺选手并肩作战。 任何人都可以成为赢家。 所有人都有其优点和缺点。 一旦一个人被选为比其他人更好,就自然会屈服于支持获胜者的论点。 埃洛普的某些论点是正确的。 有些被迫装配模具。 有些只是空话。

诺基亚无法与Android脱颖而出

这是埃洛普最常使用的论点。 据他介绍,三星已经接管了Android。 诺基亚将成为一家简单的硬件制造商,没有适当的武器就为自己的生存而战。 埃洛普(Elop)和西拉斯玛(Siilasmaa)表示,HTC,LG和索尼爱立信等公司的命运此后证实了这一论点。

一家欧洲网络提供商的首席执行官对此有所不同。 他认为诺基亚本身证明了这一说法是错误的。 这位首席执行官表示,在首款也是唯一一款MeeGo手机N9推出之后,诺基亚宣布微软战略不到半年,诺基亚显然在工业设计领域与众不同。 任何持有N9或Lumia手机的人都知道这是诺基亚,而不是三星。 诺基亚本来可以为Google生态系统带来一种现代的,屡获殊荣的设计语言,从而在客户甚至打开设备之前就与竞争对手脱颖而出。

除了摩托罗拉之外,所有Android制造商都来自远东地区,这给这一论点带来了更多的影响。 由于亚洲文化强调权威,因此业内人士认为,那里的设计常常处于后座。 设计师宁愿取悦上司,也不愿拥有强硬的见解或野心勃勃的想法,因此,诺基亚将拥有优势。 他说,斯堪的纳维亚的设计原则强调清晰的线条和实用性。

诺基亚本可以在Android世界中充分利用其品牌。 诺基亚Windows品牌消除了Windows Phone的负面氛围以及缺乏影响图像的应用程序,因此将取代三星。 它本来可以区分。

诺基亚拥有从MeeGo发布的功能强大的开源编码器,里面准备好在Android之上创建自己的UI。 诺基亚地图比Google更好。 摄像头的功能比竞争对手的要好。 您还需要什么?

但是,人们有理由担心,对于Android,诺基亚将只是另一个硬件制造商。 最终不管发生什么。

苹果和惠普前高管让·路易·加塞(Jean-LouisGassée)出色地讲了这一点。 在他看来,诺基亚会为Android带来华丽的手机设计,并且通过将ovi.com应用程序和服务与现有的Android产品相结合,人们会说诺基亚已经加入了赢家。 考虑将自己绑定到一个受到广泛憎恶的软件巨头的替代方法,这完全不同。

一位诺基亚董事会高管表示,从未对Android进行过适当的研究。 它本来可以比Elop所定义的更多地进行定制。 该主管还正确地指出,实际上没有办法在Windows Phone用户界面之上进行任何自定义。 令人发指的是,在2014年6月,手机业务已经出售给微软之后,诺基亚发布了一款名为Z Launcher的软件。 在Android之上,这基本上是诺基亚自己的UI和用户体验。 “为什么要这样做?”这个问题的答案很明显,因为这是可能的。

MeeGo手机上市太慢了

一位对这件事有第一手了解的受访者说,这种说法很愚蠢。 很多人都同意。 您启动和执行的产品程序数量与产品一样多。

埃洛普(Elop)采纳了KaiÖistämö和Jo Harlow的想法。 在2011年1月初与Elop的通讯中,诺基亚表示“以目前的速度”,到2014年诺基亚将推出三款MeeGo手机。毫无疑问,这是事实。 但是您必须考虑短语“以当前速度”。 实际上,与Lumia产品相比,诺基亚本来可以更快,更广泛地将MeeGo手机推向市场。

为什么?

我们回到技术。 如前所述,MeeGo已在两个芯片组之上实现。 此外,在2010年夏天,与芯片组供应商ST-Ericsson取得了联系。 目标是为MeeGo开发廉价但功能强大的基础。 参与该项目的一名员工确信所产生的功能和可用性与Android相当。 那将意味着MeeGo的三个芯片组供应商。 Windows Phone只限于一个芯片组,这限制了产品种类。

与Elop相比,最有力的反驳是运行MeeGo OS的N9手机。 创建变体会很容易。 毕竟,前两部Lumia手机基本上都是基于N9芯片组的相同设备,但具有两个不同的外壳。

根据金融分析师萨米·萨卡米斯(Sami Sarkamies)的说法,目前尚不清楚是否客观地选择了Windows。 理由很难验证,论据在六个月之内就改变了。 例如,错误的假设包括认为与Lumia相比,六个月的MeeGo升级发布周期太慢。 还有一个错误的假设是,MeeGo将使用更少的语言。 根据MeeGo小组成员的说法,从第一天起就有42种语言可用。 Windows较少。

在谈到MeeGo时,经常被遗忘的是它还可以在笔记本电脑,车载控制台,智能手机和闹钟中使用,因此使生态系统不仅限于电话。 MeeGo与多个游戏平台兼容。 还与Android兼容。

由于Windows的缺点,Lumia手机与MeeGo相比有更多的限制。 使用Windows Phone,您将无法拥有与Android一样大的显示屏。 这也限制了相机的最大像素数量。 正如您将在以下各章中发现的那样,只有在与新策略相关的情况下,诺基亚才发现Windows Phone半生不熟。 根据一个估计,它比MeeGo落后了一年。 例如:MeeGo在具有完整QWERTY键盘的设备上工作。 Windows Phone仍然不支持该功能。

与Lumia相比,有了MeeGo,您将拥有更多的手机选择。 绝对。 交付给客户的速度至少与Lumia手机一样快。 当然,MeeGo迟到了。 但是,假设它永远不会准备就绪是错误的。

诺基亚与微软有特殊关系

如果您在2011年2月11日问英国人休·布鲁根(Hugh Brogan),诺基亚做出的是好是坏,那么答案就会很快。 坏。

布罗根当时是他的时代 他在2001年从微软那里获得了一个不错的建议。Windows手机正在推向市场,微软希望Brogan的公司Sendo来制造它们。 Brogan感到很兴奋:在Microsoft的营销预算支持下,用于手机的Windows。 这些手机将在2001年8月专门与Sendo一起发售。 他们与Microsoft有特殊关系。 辉煌!

微软很快宣布该软件尚未准备就绪。 为了加快速度,Sendo介入实施并从Microsoft借了一笔钱。

公开发行的两周前,布罗根(Brogan)和仙多(Sendo)的世界崩溃了。 移动网络提供商Orange宣布了由台湾制造商HTC制造的Windows手机。 Brogan知道Microsoft已为HTC提供了Sendo所做的所有修复和其他实现。 根据布罗根的说法,微软只是想让Sendo破产,并劫持根据合同将成为他们财产的专有技术。 Sendo求助于诺基亚,开始制造Symbian手机,但在2005年申请破产。

与诺基亚的新合作伙伴相比,声誉不佳的公司并不多。 微软(Microsoft)由比尔·盖茨(Bill Gates)和保罗·艾伦(Paul Allen)于1975年创立。它在1980年代占领了个人计算机操作系统市场,从而声名claimed起。 MS-DOS,后来演变为具有不同版本的Windows,已成为个人计算机的事实上的标准。 微软于1986年上市,其员工中创造了3位新的亿万富翁和12,000位百万富翁。 1990年代是Microsoft扩张的时代,并且在此过程中已进行了多次大型收购。

盖茨仍然是最大的个人股东,拥有约5%的所有权。 史蒂夫·鲍尔默(Steve Ballmer)于2000年1月开始担任首席执行官,紧随其后,持有约4%的股份。 鲍尔默(Ballmer)于1980年加入微软,是加入公司的第30位员工。

当微软在市场上的地位接近垄断时,他们利用了这一地位。 强迫Windows OS用户使用Microsoft自己的Internet浏览器和媒体播放器是政府正在调查的问题之一,并且已经受到指控,诉讼和判决。 微软无视法律,甚至在与公平竞争有关的案件中,因违反欧盟裁决而被欧盟委员会处以罚款。 Wikipedia拥有自己的页面,专门用于批评Microsoft。 他们受到性少数群体待遇,不公平的执照做法和不正当收购行为的批评。

在购买诺基亚之后,互联网上出现了标题为“纪念:微软前战略电信合作伙伴名单”的清单。 2006年7月,史蒂夫·鲍尔默(Steve Ballmer)与北电(Nortel)首席执行官迈克·扎维罗夫斯基(Mike Zavirovski)坐在新闻界前,嘲笑iPhone。 两家公司将共同为移动网络创建业务解决方案。 两年后,北电破产。 韩国LG于2009年签署了一项多年协议,承诺使用Windows Phone OS作为其主要平台。 市场上共有50种不同型号的手机。 他们很快放弃了,转而使用Android。 2000年,微软与爱立信建立了类似的联盟,并取得了类似的结果。

微软当然有时也会采取积极的行动。 当史蒂夫·乔布斯(Steve Jobs)在1997年回到领导苹果的时候,公司陷入了混乱。 他们在浪费金钱,产品是捣蛋糊,没有重点。 盖茨介入帮助。 他向苹果公司投资了1.5亿美元,两家公司宣布了广泛的合作伙伴计划。 Microsoft Explorer成为Macintosh的默认Internet浏览器。 Microsoft Office可用于Mac,Microsoft也承诺将开发其他程序。 现金的注入使乔布斯省心了,剩下的就是历史了:2010年5月,按市值衡量,苹果超过了微软。 当然,还有一些其他与投资有关的动机。 微软解决了一些专利分歧,并扩大了Microsoft Office的市场。 此后,微软出售了其在苹果公司的股份。

在做出与诺基亚有关的决定时,微软似乎是一个不值得信任和自私的合作伙伴。 埃洛普(Elop)提倡的特殊关系更多的是恐惧而不是喜悦。 诺基亚无法保证这种特殊关系的正常进行。 一点数字运算没有帮助。 两家公司在2010年的收入相等,但微软的利润为152亿欧元(204亿美元),而诺基亚为23亿欧元(31亿美元)。 诺基亚的市值为260亿欧元(合35美元),是微软的15%。 微软在银行拥有300亿欧元(400亿美元)的现金,在Wi​​ndows的背景下,Windows Phone只是一场杂耍。 这种特殊关系只有一种保证:斯蒂芬·埃洛普(Stephen Elop)。

与微软的早期合作怎么样? 我们可以从历史中看出什么?

首先,具有Microsoft Office支持的Symbian手机应该在2010年上市。该项目充满了沉默。 Elop和Öistämö未能如期进行合作。 当时没人知道,但是Office直到2012年4月才首次出现在Symbian手机中。

借助Windows Phone,诺基亚可以创新

在这一点上,我们唤起事后的帮助。 在与微软合作期间,诺基亚有什么创新之处?

比竞争对手更好的相机? 不。 42百万像素的怪兽相机是由Symbian完成的。

先进的相机和照片应用程序? 是。 为什么不在Android中创建它们呢?

无线充电? 是。 在Lumia 920中,诺基亚是第一个将具有无线充电功能的正常工作版本推向市场的手机。它基于行业标准,因此竞争很快赶上了竞争。 作为一种销售论点,无线充电被证明是不好的,因此诺基亚自此开始将其作为配件而不是手机本身的一部分来提供。

位置服务? 是。 有了这个,埃洛普绝对可以赚钱。 但是您也可以使用Android拥有自己的地图。

那么其他诺基亚特定的应用程序和系统更新又如何呢? 这些都是Symbian曾经做过的事情。 不完全是创新。

还要别的吗?

并不是的。 创新仅限于导航,而这些结果是免费提供给最终客户的。 是的,这是一个与众不同的因素。

诺基亚前董事克里斯蒂安·林德霍尔姆(Christian Lindholm)于2013年夏天在在线出版物Digitoday上做了很好的总结。据他说,由于一家名为诺基亚的创新工厂的消失,整个手机行业处于停滞状态。 Android阵营保持沉默,产品销售时不需要太多新发明。 我们接受采访的人是这样说的:微软所做的所有创新也可以借助Android完成。

诺基亚-微软是面向网络提供商的最佳生态系统

考虑到这一说法,诺基亚适逢其时。 第三个生态系统有一个市场。 网络提供商喜欢诺基亚-微软,当诺基亚根据自己的喜好调整其运营时,即使事后看来,这种观点也依然存在。

埃洛普(Elop)在选择Windows Phone之前一直在与网络提供商进行交流,并且如前所述,MeeGo得不到任何支持。 根据来自诺基亚董事会的消息来源提供的信息,对于Windows Phone的态度是相似的。 欢迎第三个生态系统,但网络提供商不愿意帮助它成功。 这取决于诺基亚和微软。

在本书的后面,我们将发现许多国际网络提供商从一开始就反对Windows Phone。 它被认为是从竞争中脱颖而出。 怀疑主义正在接管。 由于苹果和谷歌已经掌握了客户的信用卡信息,因此埃洛普(Elop)吹捧的运营商计费功能已经失去了价值。 在信用卡不太普及的发展中国家,这种说法更为有效。

至于网络提供商是否可以在Microsoft应用程序商店中拥有自己的部门,则没关系。 赚钱的机会几乎没有。

事后看来,大多数网络提供商都同意他们从一开始就是妄想。 确实不需要第三个生态系统。 为什么? 我们稍后再讨论。

别误会。 一些网络提供商确实在经济上支持了第三生态系统的诞生。 但是,大多数国际网络提供商虽然希望诺基亚获得成功,但并不认为这是可信的。 多家制造商已经尝试过Windows Phone,它已经广为人知,但不再被看作是一个不错的差异化因素。


返回目录

2011年2月3日是芬兰南部的雨天。 快要冻结了。 傍晚,源源不断的冰雨逐渐减弱。 自斯蒂芬·埃洛普(Stephen Elop)上任以来已经快四个半月了。

人力资源经理SallaJämsä很好地记得如何邀请员工参加诺基亚之家的AB自助餐厅[12],以及电子邮件如何说明该活动对所有被邀请者都是强制性的。 自助餐厅全天关闭,并在大厅西侧专门搭建了一个舞台供活动使用。 快到下午一点了。 在诺基亚之家工作的5,000名员工中,并不是所有的人都在那儿,但是即使如此,似乎所有人的空气中氧气也不够。 车门被安全保护所覆盖,每个人都被反复提醒要关闭相机-不允许记录该事件。

詹姆士清楚地记得讲话。 “他首先建立在如何覆盖所有大洲的基础上。 与数百人交谈。 他似乎讲的很诚实,但是我觉得他很挑衅。 事情突然变得如此糟糕。 我不知道他在贬低我们,贬低我们的工作。 他一直在指市场情况。”

雅姆斯(Jämsä)认为,埃洛普(Elop)作了认真而直率的介绍。 没有眼泪,没有笑声。 非常中立。 “当他介绍燃烧平台的寓言时,我认为他可能会跳上舞台。 我想,也许这就是他们建造舞台的原因。 好吧,他没有跳。”

大约半小时后,演讲结束了,活动也结束了。 我告诉过你,贾斯(Jämsä)回想起一个对埃洛普(Elop)计划有很大反感的人。 否则,没人会感觉到如此短暂事件的后果将是多么巨大。 当内部发表的演讲备忘录泄露时,雪崩开始了。

备忘录的主要部分如下。 [13]

你好,

有一个有关在北海的一个石油平台上工作的男人的故事。 一天晚上,他从一声巨响中醒来,这突然使整个石油平台着火。 片刻之间,他被火焰包围了。 通过烟雾和热量,他几乎没有从混乱中走出平台的边缘。 当他低头看着边缘时,他只能看到黑暗,寒冷,不祥的大西洋水域。

当大火逼近他时,那个人只有几秒钟的反应。 他可以站在平台上,不可避免地被燃烧的火焰吞噬。 或者,他可以跳入30米的冰冻水域。 该名男子正站在一个“燃烧的平台”上,他需要做出选择。

他决定跳。 真是出乎意料。 在通常情况下,该人永远不会考虑跳入冰冷的水域。 但这不是平常的时期-他的平台着火了。 那人在秋天和水里幸存下来。 获救后,他指出,“燃烧平台”使他的行为发生了根本变化。

我们也站在一个“燃烧的平台”上,我们必须决定如何改变我们的行为。

在过去的几个月中,我与您分享了我从股东,运营商,开发商,供应商和您那里听到的信息。 今天,我将分享我所学到的以及我所相信的。

我了解到我们正站在燃烧的平台上。

[…]例如,竞争对手的热度比预期的要快。 苹果通过重新定义智能手机并吸引开发人员进入封闭但功能强大的生态系统来扰乱市场。

在2008年,价格在$ 300美元以上的苹果的市场份额为25%; 到2010年,这一比例上升到61%。 他们正享受着巨大的增长轨迹,2010年第四季度的收入同比增长了78%。苹果公司证明,如果设计得当,消费者将购买具有丰富经验的高价手机,而开发人员将构建应用程序。 他们改变了游戏规则,今天,苹果拥有高端产品。

然后是Android。 在大约两年的时间里,Android创建了一个吸引应用程序开发人员,服务提供商和硬件制造商的平台。 Android进入了高端市场,他们现在赢得了中端市场,并迅速向100欧元以下的手机进军。 Google已成为一种引力,将行业的许多创新吸引到了其核心。

我们不要忘记低端价格范围。 2008年,联发科技为手机芯片组提供了完整的参考设计,这使中国深圳地区的制造商能够以惊人的速度生产手机。 从某些方面来看,这种生态系统现在生产了全球售出手机的三分之一以上,从而在新兴市场中占据了我们的份额。

在竞争对手争夺市场份额的同时,诺基亚发生了什么? 我们落后了,错过了大趋势,并且浪费了时间。 […]首款iPhone于2007年问世,但我们仍然没有一款与其体验相近的产品。 Android仅在2年前问世,而本周他们在智能手机销量中占据了我们的领导地位。 难以置信的。

我们在诺基亚内部拥有一些出色的创新资源,但是我们还没有足够快地将其推向市场。 我们认为MeeGo将成为赢得高端智能手机的平台。 但是,以这种速度,到2011年底,我们市场上可能只有一种MeeGo产品。

在中端,我们有Symbian。 事实证明,它在北美等主要市场上没有竞争力。 此外,事实证明,Symbian的环境越来越困难,无法满足不断增长的消费者需求,这会导致产品开发缓慢,并且在我们尝试利用新的硬件平台时也会造成不利影响。 […]中国OEM厂商推出设备的速度要比诺基亚一位员工仅开玩笑地说的“要完善PowerPoint演示文稿的时间”要快得多。

[…]

设备之战现已成为生态系统之战,其中生态系统不仅包括设备的硬件和软件,还包括开发人员,应用程序,电子商务,广告,搜索,社交应用程序,基于位置的服务,统一通信和许多其他事物。

[…]

我们如何到达这一点? 当我们周围的世界不断演变时,为什么我们落后?

这就是我一直试图理解的。 我相信至少其中部分原因是我们对诺基亚的态度。 我们在自己的燃烧平台上倒汽油。 我相信我们缺乏责任感和领导能力,无法在这些颠覆性时期调整和指导公司。 我们有一系列的失误。 我们一直没有足够快地提供创新。 我们不是内部合作。

诺基亚,我们的平台正在燃烧。

我们正在努力前进—重建我们的市场领导地位。 当我们在2月11日分享新策略时,将为改造我们的公司付出巨大的努力。 但是,我相信,我们可以共同面对面前的挑战。 在一起,我们可以选择定义我们的未来。

该人发现自己身处的燃烧平台使该人改变了自己的行为,并朝着不确定的未来迈出了大胆而勇敢的一步。 他能够讲出他的故事。 现在,我们有很大的机会做同样的事情。

史蒂芬

这个寓言是古老的,经常被使用。 它是由变更管理专家Daryl Conner在1992年的《以变化的速度进行管理》一书中创建的。1988年,他一直在寻找隐喻来表示您管理变更所需的那种承诺。 这消息在电视上播出。 发生事故了 苏格兰沿海的石油钻探平台Piper Alfa发生爆炸,有167人死亡。

其中一名幸存者(61人)在医院接受了采访。 他们问警司安德鲁·莫尚(Andrew Mochan),为什么他要把那致命的100英尺(30米)跳入大海。 他毫不犹豫地回答:“要么是跳跃,要么是鱼苗。”康纳了解到莫肯已经在某些死亡和可能死亡之间做出了选择。 变更经理需要以类似的决心来做出决定。 没有回头路了。 重大变革需要在他们身后的某些死亡力量的推动下进行。 无论变化有多可怕。

这个故事传到了哈佛商学院和麦肯锡的经典著作中,并以此为生。 顾问使用它来描述开始情况的严重性。 最著名的用途是哈佛大学教授约翰·科特(John P. Kotter)领导变革的8个步骤。 第一步是要知道需要更改,并产生一种紧迫感-您的平台着火了。 如果人们相信有可能回到过去,那么变革将永远不会发生。 实际上,在埃洛皮亚范围内营造一种紧急状态并不是康纳最初思想的一部分。 康纳(Conner)说,他已经学会了忍受这一点-只要情况没有变得比现在更糟。 康纳还表示,确保承诺不会造成灾难性后果。 今天,他们说,谨慎使用平台隐喻。 您跳入大海的动机是恐惧和焦虑,而恐惧和焦虑是公司文化中的负面特征。 基本规则是:不要点燃火焰,只是注意它们是否在那里。

关于埃洛普演说的关键问题是,他所描绘的诺基亚情况的图片是否准确,还是夸大其词? 演讲结束后,无论如何火焰都在咆哮-从这个意义上讲,演讲开始之前是否在那里都没有关系。

演讲的时间安排非常戏剧化。 埃洛普(Elop)在董事会会议前几天发表演讲,将就未来的智能手机平台做出决定。 由于首席执行官刚刚破坏了诺基亚的主要产品,因此似乎没有回头路可走。 而且由于演讲将平台上的火焰煽动到了新的高度,因此没有时间重新启动与Google的谈判。 尽管该董事会实际上已经选择使用Windows Phone,但事后看来,该首席执行官还是扮演了愚人的角色,并束手无策。 在Burning Platform演讲之后,切换到Windows Phone是董事会可以做出的唯一选择。

董事会认为该备忘录严重错误。 在埃洛普(Elop)担任首席执行官的最初几个月中,这并不是唯一的摩擦源。 许多董事会成员认为,埃洛普(Elop)过于独立地做出决策,没有及时告知董事会。 CEO不需要与董事会清除内部消息,但是在这种情况下,消息过于不稳定,以致在没有董事会输入的情况下就无法传递。 主席约尔玛·奥利拉(Jorma Ollila)在这一成绩上给埃洛普(Elop)传递了许多痛苦的反馈。

那给他靴子怎么样? 他们应该解雇埃洛普吗? 在这一点上没有认真的讨论。 时机将是不可能的。 新任首席执行官只是改变了诺基亚的路线,并且是与微软达成交易的担保人。 他们已经开始并且正在进行巨大的变革。 每个人都是可以更换的,但是解雇埃洛普将导致不可预知的骚动和公司发展方向的巨大不确定性。 换任首席执行官也不会拒绝发表讲话。 产品被扔了,就是这样。 木已成舟,覆水难收。

董事会中的演讲也得到了一些支持。 该公司应该意识到当前的危机。此外,奥利拉(Ollila)为外部人士辩护埃洛普(Elop)。 “备忘录对我们的工作人员是一次极好的提醒。 我也用过这个比喻”,奥利拉在芬兰电视频道Yle播出的金融电视节目A-Plus中说。

一位著名的公司治理专家认为,Ollila在事情是否按照芬兰的最佳实践前进方面起着关键作用。 诸如“燃烧平台”之类的有争议的演讲应该首先获得董事会的批准。 由于这显然没有发生,因此我们的专家指出了关键的问题,即埃洛普是否就该演讲咨询过奥利拉。

“董事会主席扮演着至关重要的角色,因为他负责在实践中执行决策。 如果埃洛普(Elop)有奥利拉(Ollila)的支持,那么即使董事会的其他成员都处于黑暗之中,也可以说它遵循了公司治理准则。”我们的专家评估了这种情况。

目前尚无定论,但演讲似乎令奥利拉感到惊讶。 如果真是这样,埃洛普(Elop)当然会违反芬兰的善治准则。 根据我们的专家的说法,董事会在公告发布的前一天就将平台作为橡皮戳形式做出最终决定,这是正常的,但前提是该过程必须在公开讨论和良好指导下进行。 诺基亚显然就是这种情况。

几天后董事会再次感到惊讶。 当宣布选择Windows Phone作为智能手机平台时,埃洛普(Elop)还表示,过渡几年后,Symbian将被取消。 董事会中有关如何发布此新闻的讨论很多。 埃洛普(Elop)明确表示,他们应该发表这样的事实,即诺基亚将来将仅使用一个智能手机平台Windows Phone。 许多其他人提出异议,认为交流一个平台的选择要冒险。 网络提供商可能会得出有关Symbian命运的一些结论。

甚至董事会之外的人都试图改变埃洛普的想法。 看到新闻稿草稿的人告诉我们,他们试图进行一些更改。 They felt that the role of Symbian living side-by-side with Windows Phone should have been played up. There should have been a strong message of how Symbian will be developed further and that it will continue to be competitive while the other platform is being driven in. The crucial message, according to our source, was that the platforms were to co-exist, that a continuum was being built, with complementing parts.

When the shutdown of Symbian was finally reported, part of the board was surprised at how it was done. A person involved tells us that there had been an intense exchange about the contents of the press conference. The drafts that he saw had no mention of the shutdown of Symbian, or the goal of selling 150 million more Symbian devices. “The final call about how the message would be communicated, was probably made by Stephen alone”, was his judgement as an insider.

The situation was infernal. Elop had vilified the current Nokia offering. Almost in the same breath, he had reported that they would be driven down, but that no replacement models were yet forthcoming. According to Salla Jämsä, the personnel realized within a few weeks, that a horrible error had been made in their corporate communications. Symbian was done for. Panic did not set in, according to her, but disappointment and depression became the reigning emotions. A quiet grief, a very Finnish reaction. “In some other country, there might have been riots. On the other hand, everyone had believed that we had to take on an outsider. That no Finn, say Vanjoki, could’ve done that, when they’d have so much heart in it. We did think that this solution was the only possible one.”

The sales team realized they’d run up against the challenge of their lives. They had to sell 150 million outdated phones. The number caused some raised eyebrows, as the forecasts of devices to be sold had been reasonably accurate before. The responsible department had perhaps been blinded. The numbers had perhaps been crunched based on the old, growth period methods, even though the market share had been dwindling rapidly. A new theory started to take over: Perhaps it wasn’t a forecast, so much as a goal. When you tell a salesman to sell a hundred phones, he’ll do his best to sell a hundred phones. If you tell him, sell 150 phones, he’ll try even harder. This is what was guessed to be Elop’s logic.

The company tried to soothe those who doubted them. Jo Harlow, in charge of the Smartphones unit, opined that consumers don’t really follow the news. Change would be slow. Decisions would be made based on what’s available in the store.

Harlow hit the nail on its head, but it was the wrong nail. Retailers make the call on who’s king in the stores. And they stopped buying Symbian. The CEO of a European network provider describes how Nokia salespeople came around a few weeks after the speech, and tried to convince them that business would continue as usual.

“We wondered, what bush these guys have stuck their heads in. Elop’s mistake was completely obvious and ate billions of euros from Nokia. Nobody wanted Symbian phones anymore”, the CEO said.

Another director of a European telecoms network provider described meeting a Nokia sales team a few days after Elop’s speech. “They looked completely lost. I’ve never been in such a horrible meeting. Some were late, some may be hung over. They showed the new models unveiled at the congress, but joked about whether they were any good. They didn’t even try to hide their disappointment. I said, we’d better just go, that’s how bad it was”, the director told us. “All of the network providers had large purchase commitments and the plans were laid based on them. The commitments were immediately opened for re-negotiation. That we’re not going to buy these, even though we did commit to buying. Everybody backed out, which of course destroyed the revenues.”

A well-known stock analyst told us of several discussions he had during that spring with various sales managers from Nokia. They described their emotions as deep shock. Symbian died within a week due to the top global network providers getting scared. Any normal CEO would have said that the company will continue to back Symbian heavily, that it will be a part of the low-end range of devices, that we have a host of wonderful plans for Symbian. The normal sales pitch, that nobody necessarily believes, but that is a mandatory part of business as usual.

The leadership did what they could. Elop gave his assurance that investments would continue, and that the phone upgrades would be available up until 2016. In April, the new version of the platform, called Symbian Anna, was released, in addition to two new phone models. In August, the struggle continued. The platform’s new Belle version was released, without the word Symbian in its name. Finally, the platform started to look like it should have looked years ago. There were three new phone models, too. After the network providers withdrew their orders, the sales team started focusing on business clients. The story was that businesses would prefer to stay with their old systems, as long as Nokia kept up the support for updates.

Time passed Nokia by, in any case. In January–March 2011, the Nokia market share in smartphones dropped by 5 percentage points to 27.7%. In the final quarter of that year, when the first Lumia device came on the market, the Symbian share in smartphones was 11.7%. It took only a year for the market leader to drop to third place in market share. The Android market share had jumped to 50.9 percent.

Nokia’s own actions played a part in the dramatic drop. A well-known stock analyst’s evaluation of the situation was, “Symbian wasn’t given a fighting chance to keep up sales, because they made only a few different devices on it. In a way, they were trying to force Nokia enthusiasts to wait for the Windows phones”.

In April 2011, Nokia announced that they were letting 4,000 people go and at the same outsourcing the development and maintenance of the Symbian platform to Accenture. 2,800 people would move to Accenture. Harlow used flowery language in describing their reasoning. According to her, the collaboration served to demonstrate “our ongoing investment to serve our Symbian customers” and “also shows our commitment to provide our Symbian employees with potential new career opportunities”.

Accenture and Nokia described how they would chart the possibilities for training and new career opportunities for the employees. In June 2011 the transfer size was still estimated at 2,800 people. In the end, the transfer included 2,300 employees, 1,200 of which worked in Finland. The rest had found other positions within Nokia or had resigned. Four months after starting the work, Accenture confirmed that they would wish to let go a large amount of the former Nokians. They were offered voluntary severance packages. A package could amount to 15 months of pay.

The Union of Professional Engineers in Finland was quick to find fault with the outsourcing deal. It was thought that Nokia had transferred their social responsibilities to Accenture. In June 2012 the union estimated that about half of the employees transferred to Accenture had left. The consulting firm, according to the union, treated its employees unfairly and was pressuring them to accept worse terms for their work contracts. At the same time Accenture was looking for new employees and bragging about how much work they had available. The union described the situation as oddly strange.

In October 2012, Accenture announced that they were firing over 300 employees and that they were re-evaluating the future of their Oulu office. Pertti Porokari from the Union of Professional Engineers in Finland wondered whether Nokia hadn’t just outsourced the firing of these employees to Accenture. A few months later, the Oulu office was doomed. 275 people were fired, and 46 were sent on unpaid leave. The remnants of Nokians were slowly weeded out, and Accenture has announced layoffs afterward, too.

A source outside of Accenture believed that the company had tarnished their reputation against their will. They were in earnest, and truly believed they’d have work for these engineers. Nokia had promised them contracts on Symbian and also Windows Phone, and the IT industry was constantly calling for more employees. Accenture was banking on getting high-performing resources for their own massive IT projects, too. Symbian engineers would be used to the appropriate tools, and would be reasonably suited to the upcoming projects. So as the need for Symbian resources would dwindle, people would move to other tasks, and also naturally some employees would leave of their own accord or retire.

The cost of the Nokia-Accenture deal was never published. The Finnish branch of Accenture doubled their turnover in 2012 to half a billion euros ($670 million), and more than doubled their profit to 15.5 million euros ($20 million). In the following year, their turnover shrank by several dozen percent. The deal with Nokia had taken several scenarios into consideration, so it was never renegotiated.

The impact on Accenture’s income remains unclear, because as a multinational corporation they transfer gains between countries.


After the Lumias hit the stores, Nokia continued to struggle ahead with the Symbian line-up. The results were depressing. In February 2012, the market share of Symbian was 8.7 percent. By the end of the year, it was 1.2 percent. Nokia’s blindness to what people were looking for at the time can be seen for instance in the release of the Nokia 700 in August 2011. They marketed it as the smallest device ever released with a full touch screen. Only a few months later, Samsung came out with the huge screened Samsung Note and was pushing Galaxy models with ever increasing screen sizes.

Nokia’s old work horse was able to leave the stage with style. The last Symbian model was the Nokia 808 PureView, that had a 41-megapixel camera.

Immediately, the device was dubbed ‘the monster camera phone’. Engineers Eero Salmelin and Juha Alakarhu had been working on it for five years. The device revolutionized imaging technology. With a massive number of pixels, you could digitally zoom the image without loss in image quality. The resolution of the images was shocking. To keep the file size of the pictures reasonable, the camera combined pixels, further improving picture quality.

The device was a sensation when it was launched at the Barcelona Mobile World Congress in February 2011, and was rewarded as the best new release of the congress.

Why put the monster camera on a Symbian device?

The PureView had a chipset selected by Nokia, a Nokia-built sensor for taking photos, and Nokia’s own software, that couldn’t be just embedded in a Windows Phone. Microsoft did start thinking of the required changes immediately after the cooperation was announced, but the amount of work needed turned out to be greater than anticipated. Nokia decided to release the PureView first on a Symbian phone to create positive hype for future devices. They succeeded: Nokia was making headlines across the world, and in a positive light for a change.

The last Symbian phones left Nokia factories in the summer of 2013.

The goal of 150 million devices sold was not met. The real number ended up as just under 100 million. Now, Symbian is dead and buried. Stores have no Symbian devices on their shelves, and Nokia has not accepted new Symbian apps in their app store since the beginning of 2014. Any existing Symbian apps may not be updated.

For Salla Jämsä, the effects of Elop’s speech became concrete quickly. She moved to a new position supporting the people being laid off. In the fall of 2011 Jämsä knew that her time at Nokia was coming to an end. There would have been work to do in HR, but she was rapidly losing interest. In September 2012, she made her decision: She would leave Nokia to start her own business by making use of the support Nokia was offering to departing employees proposing to start new companies, and is now a partner at the executive search company Transearch.


Our interviewees told us how they had often wondered why Elop made this mistake. Some think that he was naïve enough to believe the speech would remain a secret. Others think he leaked it on purpose.

The former is hard to believe. From a company the size of Nokia, soured by bitterness due to layoffs, the memo was inevitably leaked. Elop could not be stupid enough to imagine that it would stay internal, and it didn’t seem as if there was any serious attempt to keep it internal, either. Even though employees were forbidden to record the speech, one Nokian described seeing a video of the speech where someone in the front row was obviously videoing the speech on their mobile. Obviously, the ban was not enforced.

The most likely explanations center around inexperience. Elop’s work history was from sales of enterprise devices and software. Business-to-business sales have long cycles. Clients can be told that we are working on a new product that will be ready in a year or two. Network business works like that. In consumer businesses, the buyer needs to be convinced of the superiority of the product every day. Elop underestimated or was completely unaware of the strength of consumer rejection of a product.

“I ran into the speech first in an online discussion, and assumed it was a hoax. I thought it couldn’t be true”, recounts a representative of a major shareholder of Nokia.

An often-recounted explanation of the Burning Platform is Microsoft. According to that theory, Microsoft forced Nokia to reveal the full extent of the cooperation immediately, so that Windows Phone would fix its reputation. The wildest speculations suggest that Nokia got a promise of payment for this. We’ve not received any confirmation to these rumors, but neither do we have information that would discount them. Some offer the explanation that Nokia needed to get their Symbian expenses down quickly. Elop might also have wanted to disperse a Symbian clique within Nokia, that would have been resisting renewal.

The best guess is likely the simplest, though. Elop wanted to push for speed. He was forcing decisions forward with his characteristic need for progress toward a goal rather than stopping to consider barriers or consequences. Elop himself defended his speech in the spring of 2012. The transformation caused by the new strategy was huge, and would touch thousands of employees. It had to be published with a bang, as the story would have leaked in any case, when job descriptions started changing. He said that he had understood that there was no other option than a rapid change of course. The personnel needed to understand the depth of the crisis.

The speech also reflected Elop’s goal to open the culture of Nokia. He wanted to tell it like it is. He has wondered whether the breadth of the publicity caused by his speech wasn’t due to this. For once, a leader of a corporation was brave enough to speak without the gloss of marketing speak. For many, the speech was proof that Elop was able to look at things as they are, and was ready to make drastic changes. Some feel that the memo was proof that Elop was the right man to save Nokia from the sea.

“The message really hit home for me. I thought, now we finally have a clear direction, and finally a leader, that takes responsibility for the whole mess.”, recalls a former salesman.

One developer working in R&D describes having been thrilled after reading the memo on the intranet. “The text was absolutely spot on. Only after my buddy, at the coffee table, pointed out the possibility of the memo leaking to the press, I realized the risk. My guess is that Elop didn’t realize that the memo might spread outside the company. He told us, in this other event, how he always believed the best of everyone. I think he just trusted people too much.”

The same goes, according to this developer, for an internal video where Elop was showing off the first Lumia phone. Only after that, too, was leaked, did Elop stop telling the employees about new things.

A member of the board doesn’t agree. He believes that Elop leaked the speech on purpose. The board had gone over the basic elements of the speech, and agreed on the analysis of the situation. He didn’t think it was naïve to suppose the speech would stay internal. Any leaks from Nokia were usually about new phone models. The culture was to have discussions with the personnel on even the most sensitive issues. Based on this, he finds it to be unlikely that the Burning Platform memo had been leaked against Elop’s will.

The majority of the speech was undeniably true, and the memo was only one factor in the Symbian catastrophe. This point of view is supported by looking at the relative changes in market share. The memo’s effects can be seen only in the numbers of April–June 2011. The market share dropped by 33% (so not percentage points) during that period. Before that, the share had been dropping by about 15 percent per quarter. By the last two quarters of 2012, the percentage drop had gone back to usual, at first 13% and then 7%.

Most of the analysts and Nokia’s highest leadership still agree. The Burning Platform was a huge mistake. It would have been possible to reveal the shutdown of Symbian once there was an option on the market, when the Lumia phones were already available in stores. The speech and information released on the Capital Markets Day removed all possibility for a reasonable transition period. Nearing on the grotesque, in July 2013, the European Association of Communication Directors (EACD) gave Elop the European Communication Award for “outstanding communications achievements on a European level”. The argument was that Stephen Elop is recognized for his direct and transparent communication style, and the proof was the Burning Platform memo.

In 2011, that award was in the unforeseeable future, and cut no ice with anyone, but everyone in Finland knew what the Burning Platform had achieved: The Lumias were needed fast. And they needed to be good.


[12] 位于埃斯波(Espoo)的Keilaniemi区的诺基亚总部校园,当时称为 诺基亚之家 ,包括三栋建筑,分别称为AB,CD和FG。

[13] 完整的Burning Platform备忘录最初在诺基亚Intranet上发布,很快被包括 Engagdget 在内的多个来源 发布


返回目录

尽管许多人都知道该设备将成为诺基亚的唯一一款MeeGo手机,但最高级人士还是比比皆是。 2011年6月推出的诺基亚N9确实提高了人们对全新水平的期望。

一位知名分析师说:“过去五年来,诺基亚的任何新产品都给我留下了深刻的印象。”

救济是引进后的总体感觉。 尽管存在所有问题,诺基亚仍然能够创建具有竞争力的设备。 如此优雅,以至于可以想象这款新手机与iPhone竞争。 该设计是诺基亚设计主管Marko Ahtisaari的胜利。 Ahtisaari于2009年开始担任产品设计主管,员工感到他在设计工作中引入了新的精神。 作为芬兰人,Ahtisaari知道诺基亚公司,可以在整个公司内部和自己的团队内部进行有效的沟通,因此与过去相比,现在更经常实现设计团队的设计愿望。 尽管N9设计是在他到来之前诞生的,但设计团队也感觉到了埃洛普的到来。 Kallasvuo时代的诺基亚一直专注于互联网和导航服务设计,现在由Elop负责,设计工作和品牌建设的重点重新回到了手机上。

许多人认为N9是有史以来最漂亮的诺​​基亚手机,并且总体印象是它彻底更新了诺基亚设备的外观和感觉。

N9的设计工作是首次从用户体验而不是技术规格开始的。 诺基亚此前曾基于工程和技术能力开发新手机。 最后,该设计已添加到该技术之上。 MeeGo的目标是修改这种工作方式,因为诺基亚知道它绝对必须与竞争对手区分开来。 市场上几乎有无数的黑色触摸屏智能手机。

芬兰的一位高级设计主管认为这是成功的。 设备的锋利边缘和和谐的长宽比强调了优美的设计语言。 N9的设计优雅,设备比例和修饰细节使人感觉很好。 感觉就像是第一次持有者自己的手机。 设计负责人特别欣赏色彩设计的选择。 装置的外壳是通过聚碳酸酯上色的,既有黑色的颜色,也有较激进的青色和品红色的颜色。

色彩设计也受到非美学原因的影响。 N9的设计语言和颜色选择很难大量复制。 手机机身是用一块聚碳酸酯制成的,而不是用传统的方式从分开的前盖和后盖组装而成。 这使诺基亚可以将N9制作成如此坚固且外观精美的设备,而且也更薄。

引入前的哇效果被强调,因为引入前没有任何泄漏。 项目团队的成员介绍了所有内部测试用户如何将其测试电话的可见识别码报告到内部系统中,从而使诺基亚能够将任何可能泄漏的图像与测试电话用户进行匹配。 在埃洛普(Elop)概述了缩短新手机发布到正式面市之间的时间的冲动之后,自上而下地决定了这一非常严格的纪律。

在诺基亚工作的一位董事对埃洛普(Elop)的改变表示赞赏,因为埃洛普(Elop)改变了公司的工程驱动型思维,并将设计问题提出到执行董事会一级。 以前,用户体验已因技术问题而受到损害。 无论是否需要,所有可能的技术功能都已添加到新手机型号中。 相比之下,像Apple这样的以设计为主导的公司始终了解用户体验以及纤薄时尚的设计的重要性。

后来,N9设计语言被全面复制到Lumia手机中。 诺基亚希望廉价和高端的Lumia型号都采用统一的设计语言,以提高消费者的兴趣去尝试一种新的陌生的移动操作系统。

但是软件呢? 最后,它也与软件有关。 MeeGo是否比Android更好? 是否有机会击败Windows Phone?

至少N9软件是有前途的。 N9是纯触摸屏设备,因为前面根本没有物理按键。 都是用手指轻扫。 当您在屏幕边缘滑动手指时,便从应用程序移至桌面。 在设备上运行的应用程序在一个桌面上可以看到为打开的窗口,这使得从一个应用程序切换到另一个应用程序更加容易。 三个桌面之一被保留用于社交媒体和与联系人的消息传递。 MeeGo中提供了很多好的创意和创新。

该软件也很强大。 它没有像最后的Symbian那样崩溃或挂起。

对N9和MeeGo的接待仍然是矛盾的。 花了一些时间来学习如何使用手机。 一个人可以拿起新的iPhone并立即开始使用它。 MeeGo并非如此直观,通常人们并不只是用手指在屏幕上滑动。 学习曲线是否足够短或太长? 意见四处流传。 有人认为MeeGo对于新手而言比Windows Phone复杂得多。 一位分析师的判决总结了N9,指出它只会吸引狭窄的细分市场。

但是,乐于助人:这将是诺基亚未来智能手机的正确基准。


N9的历史说明了Elop出现之前诺基亚在决策方面的真空。在Elop宣布将完成一个MeeGo设备项目之后,该设备的创建速度相对较快。 属于该项目的开发人员说,既然这项工作有一个明确的目标,那么来回立即停止。

MeeGo几年来一直在诺基亚内部不清楚方向。 这是由于Symbian团队具有内部权力发挥作用,以及人员变更造成的延误。 诺基亚集团执行委员会的一位成员表示,MeeGo是“一个非常了不起的项目,但它被Symbian污染了,MeeGo注入了旧的工作方式。”开发人员被束之高阁,并在该项目中增加了更多的人。 更好的选择是继续聘请一个较小的开发团队,因为众所周知这是创建新事物的最佳方法。 诺基亚高管认为,最严重的错误是在2008年发生的,当时将Symbian和MeeGo放在了同一个组织中,并成立了一个庞大的设备和服务部门。 从Kallasvuo时代开始,诺基亚就有多个重叠的用户界面开发项目。 在工作于商务电话的企业部门和工作于其他昂贵电话的多媒体部门中,正在开发类似的解决方案。

MeeGo用户界面的开发始于高飞的理论,这些理论试图对人类行为,不同的个性和社会以及两者之间的联系进行建模。 目标是支持自然的人类行为模式,而不是强迫人们遵守该技术。 最初的计划是仅开发一款一流的MeeGo智能手机,然后像苹果公司在iPhone上所做的那样每年进行更新。 结果令人失望。 用户界面非常复杂,看起来像Symbian。

2009年底,当Ahtisaari开始担任新的设计负责人时,开发商被告知,新领导人不了解高飞的概念,因此被废弃了。 简洁成为新的口头禅。 新的MeeGo主视图是一个简单的启动板,并强制简化了应用程序用户界面。 最终结果又是令人失望的。 人们认为它太像主要竞争对手Android和iOS。 对MeeGo的竞争力的信心正在减弱,人们认为Linux和开放源代码对于消费者而言将不是相关的销售论点。

2010年8月取得了突破。新概念的想法是基于滑动手势,并且在几天之内构建了一个有效的原型。 从最初的概念图像开始,人们开始相信自己手中拥有制胜法宝。 唯一缺少的是制造产品并尽快将其交付消费者手中。 与此同时,安西·范乔基(Anssi Vanjoki)正在制定自己的战略,而MeeGo发挥了关键作用。 在Vanjoki的愿景中,MeeGo将成为新诺基亚的旗舰。 诺基亚领导层对MeeGo怀有强烈的信念,八月在芬兰奥卢举行的一次媒体活动进一步放大了这种信念。 Rich Green,诺基亚CTO和英特尔高管在向媒体代表们展示了MeeGo合作的成果。

但是,诺基亚犯了一个重大错误。 仍然不清楚是谁做的,为什么做。 这与前面提到的与英特尔的合作有关。 新的操作系统需要整个行业中强大的生态系统合作伙伴。 此外,诺基亚希望引导微处理器硬件技术的发展,因为竞争对手三星拥有自己的专业知识,诺基亚认为这是关键的竞争优势。 尽管英特尔从PC领域继承了电源管理问题,但诺基亚的技术人员认为这些问题可以解决。 后来有人说英特尔真的很想开始合作。 德州仪器(TI)的竞争对手情况更糟,与高通(Qualcomm)的谈判没有进展。 因此,英特尔。

但是,英特尔芯片组存在很大的障碍。 新型LTE(长期演进)蜂窝技术在美国发展迅速,英特尔芯片尚未支持该技术。 LTE是第四代蜂窝技术之一,通常称为4G。 4G和LTE允许更快的通信速度,因此在移动时提供更好的互联网体验。

这种延迟和4G的缺乏使MeeGo脱轨。 诺基亚最初选择在MeeGo中使用德州仪器(TI)的芯片组,而竞争对手开始使用高通公司的下一代芯片组时,诺基亚已经过时了。 英特尔也缺乏与廉价的Android设备竞争的廉价技术平台。

埃洛普(Elop)来到诺基亚时,他被告知英特尔是一个难以应对的合作伙伴。 尽管受到英特尔方面的压力,他仍然不相信MeeGo,所以在网络提供商的担忧以及MeeGo生态系统周围的不确定性的支持下,他做出了著名的决定。 无论产品或用户界面多么出色,N9都将成为MeeGo swansong。

谁才是英特尔合作决定的幕后推手? 对此有两种看法。 有人说是诺基亚集团执行委员会MeeGo负责人Alberto Torres。 有人说,最活跃的人是安西·范乔基(Anssi Vanjoki)支持的KaiÖistämö。 反对合作的人认为,诺基亚将不得不以MeeGo进展缓慢的形式付出巨大的代价。 Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo参加了亲Intel阵营,因为他想向全世界介绍MeeGo取得的进展的好消息。 感觉到MeeGo在英特尔支持下获得了更高的信誉。


当N9于2011年6月21日在诺基亚总部推出时,许多人认为该手机已经被中止。 流产已在销售渠道完成。 诺基亚处于财务危机中,没有电话营销预算。 几乎没有给电话成功的机会。

首批N9手机于10月到达商店。 因为计划是在一两个月内开始销售第一批Lumia手机,所以N9的作用就是填补这一空白。 第一批Lumias是为最重要的客户和最大的网络提供商保留的,因此N9成为了其余客户的产品。 N9和首批Lumia手机在不同的国家销售,因为首批Lumias仅支持30种语言。 例如,Lumias中没有俄语支持,因此诺基亚在俄罗斯出售N9。 同样,芬兰(最忠诚的诺基亚市场)也首先出售了N9。 在不同国家/地区销售手机的策略是一项计划中的策略,因此消费者无法将手机彼此比较。 营销和沟通也不同。 卢米亚人尽一切可能得到提升,而N9几乎被静音了。

直到2011年2月初,IDC分析师Ramon T. Llamas才建议诺基亚开始在全球最重要的智能手机市场上销售MeeGo智能手机。

N9成为Elop的尴尬痛点。 评论家喜欢这款手机,但诺基亚无法推广它,因为有人担心它会削弱Lumia手机的成功。 看起来N9的成功让Elop感到惊讶。 很难想象消费者会对一款应用程序有限的死胡同的设备感兴趣。 当埃洛普(Elop)在伦敦被问到为什么有人会买第一个和最后一个MeeGo手机时,那个感冒的人回答:“我想你只是回答了自己的问题。”

为什么埃洛普随后推出了N9? 可能有两个原因。 首先,有必要填补Lumias仅在以后才上市所造成的空白,也许与Intel达成的协议可能要求诺基亚完成一种产品。 可能还存在一些更人性化的理由。 他想奖励多年来致力于该平台和产品的MeeGo团队。 有人说,该计划是为了证明MeeGo与Lumia相比有多糟糕,但是这种猜测很容易被驳回。 在MeeGo工作的一位董事认为,Elop希望让MeeGo保持活力,以保留为诺基亚工作的最佳人才,而不是让他们立即逃到竞争对手那里从事类似产品的开发。

根据MeeGo的预设命运,它实际上卖得不错。 由于营销工作量很小,因此在二线国家/地区销售了几百万套。 购买N9的人比普通消费者更喜欢开源爱好者或技术爱好者。 第一批Lumias显然卖得更好。

诸如波罗的海国家之类的某些市场使用N9替代了即时营销活动中丢失的Lumias。 当当地的诺基亚团队意识到他们不会像承诺的那样在2011年获得Lumia手机时,而只是在2012年初,针对本地网络提供商的营销信息就从Windows梦幻世界的承诺变为了MeeGo和“未来颠覆”那是N9的口号。

在芬兰,N9成功地创造了狂潮。 这是关于技术和商业的爱国主义,诺基亚很高兴在很长一段时间后推出了一款现代且具有竞争力的智能手机。 在芬兰以外的许多国家也表示N9是诺基亚有史以来最好的手机。 芬兰网络提供商DNA的执行官萨米·阿维科(Sami Aavikko)说,N9周围存在“明显的麻烦”。 他进一步表示,如果诺基亚决定继续与MeeGo合作并投资其营销和进一步发展,那么智能手机世界现在可能会有所不同。

Robin Lindahl负责诺基亚的全球网络提供商销售。 他说,网络提供商有兴趣在其智能手机范围内使用MeeGo手机,而没有真正证据表明新平台的潜力。 N9得到了包括印度和中国在内的全球合作伙伴的好评。 网络提供商仍然信任诺基亚,并相信可以围绕MeeGo建立第三个智能手机生态系统。 内置的Linux令人着迷,手机的设计和功能极具竞争力。 但是,在宣布Windows Phone策略之后,网络提供商对MeeGo的兴趣并没有下降。 一些网络提供商确实在他们的商店中使用了N9,但这仅仅是因为产品质量高并且有需求。 即使在芬兰,当人们意识到这将是唯一的MeeGo手机时,围绕手机的烦恼也消失了。 对于普通消费者来说,从一种操作系统到另一种操作系统的过渡是一个巨大的变化,需要大量学习。

回顾过去,总是很容易说明所选路径应该是什么。 根据其拥有的东西,MeeGo将会具有重新启动诺基亚业务的能力-这是我们从数十名与MeeGo以及网络提供商等合作伙伴一起工作的前诺基亚人那里听到的。 最明显的证明是N9的热情。 与Lumia手机相比,它在业界和舆论领导者中受到了更多肯定主义的欢迎。 设计是新的,开放式操作系统是新的,并且对于开发人员来说,该操作系统似乎比Symbian以前的版本或Windows将来的版本更易于使用。

“诺基亚应该把MeeGo牌打到底”,一位较早的MeeGo主管说。 “在诺基亚,通常一次一次执行一种策略是先执行Symbian,然后再执行Windows Phone。 因此,MeeGo从未被视为真正可行的替代方案。”

MeeGo主管说,在诺基亚范围内,对MeeGo的总投资如此之小,以至于埃洛普(Elop)并未因资金问题而关闭该业务。 从本质上讲,这种削减是具有战略意义的。 在微软看来,由于英特尔的合作,MeeGo是不可能的。 诺基亚与另一家大型技术公司进行战略合作是不可接受的。 导演认为,MeeGo被以最大的负面方式描绘给了埃洛普(Elop)。

根据一位在MeeGo中工作的经理的说法,Elop被告知有关MeeGo可扩展性功能的虚假信息。 虚假信息的一个例子是,MeeGo无法提供网络提供商所要求的多种电话变体。 这位经理指出,由于Symbian的历史,新模型推出的时间表估算存在偏差。 他继续说,Symbian的进一步开发要比MeeGo的情况慢得多。 MeeGo主管还认为MeeGo具有足够的可扩展性,可以支持与Windows一样多的手机型号。 他认为,这与开发团队无关。 考虑到标准的诺基亚不可能完成的任务,营销预算是三倍,还需要一年,所以他们至少会尝试。

根据另一位MeeGo主管Jussi Hurmola的说法,如果诺基亚决定投资MeeGo并围绕新战略进行自我改革,则没有发现阻止MeeGo的障碍。


在诺基亚宣布切换到Windows之后,MeeGo合作伙伴生态系统停止了。 开发人员,其他设备制造商,网络提供商和媒体内容生产商纷纷逃离。 诺基亚前MeeGo团队成立了一家名为Jolla的新智能手机和软件公司。

为MeeGo工作的一位主管认为,MeeGo手机将会有市场。 例如,他认为,如果获得独家代理权,一些中国网络提供商将渴望分发MeeGo手机。 由于长期互利的业务历史,网络提供商对诺基亚非常有利。

一位前MeeGo经理说,诺基亚计划到2013年使MeeGo成为该公司的主要智能手机平台,并因此在某些价格较低的设备中使用Symbian。 但是,诺基亚自己的Asha设备系列和价格低于100欧元的Android手机确实占据了这一细分市场。 经理指出,Symbian在几年的过程中进行了顺序更新,以留出足够的时间使MeeGo变得足够成熟。 但是时间不多了。 作为新任首席执行官的埃洛普(Elop)在MeeGo中没有看到足够的业务潜力,尤其是在没有哪个网络提供商愿意将其作为旗舰产品进行营销时。 对于决定扩展N9的网络提供商而言,启动N9是一项昂贵的工作。 当网络提供商决定投资销售带有新操作系统的电话,并且其网络中具有相关的产品和技术适应性时,它就会期望产品范围的连续性。

卡罗莱纳·米兰内西(Carolina Milanesi)是位分析师,一直关注诺基亚已有数年。 她认为诺基亚的关键错误是坚持Symbian时间太长。 如果Symbian在2010年初就开始逐步缩减规模,并且所有开发和营销投资都转移到了MeeGo,最终结果可能会有所不同。 她认为,通过这一发展,MeeGo生态系统在2011年可能拥有大量应用程序。接受本书采访的许多人都提醒MeeGo可能也提供了Android应用程序支持,即使后来的MeeGo的Jolla化身也已经能够运行Android应用程序。 具有Android兼容性的MeeGo可以解决诺基亚面临的主要问题:应用程序太少。

MeeGo中层管理人员认为N9的发展势头非常强劲,以至于诺基亚应该将MeeGo的营销预算提高一倍,而应该忘记Windows。 前诺基亚人士Jukka Taskinen表示,N9未能实现大批量销售,因为该产品未在德国和英国等大型市场上销售。Taskinen认为N9被故意与大多数重要国家隔离开来。诺基亚集团执行委员会的一位成员认为,N9将于2010年冬季上市,这对于诺基亚来说是一个不错的选择。 长期追踪诺基亚的分析师没有发现MeeGo被杀背后的合理原因。 埃洛普(Elop)创立之初,诺基亚的研发预算如此之大,以至于MeeGo投资本来可以继续下去。 分析师进一步指出,MeeGo是一次“成功的成功”:它拥有一群热情的追随者。 一位为MeeGo工作的经理认为,通用技术平台可以缓解诺基亚一直以来遇到的问题:“如果与另一家设备制造商合作,MeeGo将会获得完全不同的成功。 Android增长背后的一个重要原因是它是建立在参考硬件平台之上的。 几乎所有提供摄像头,显示器和其他组件的硬件供应商都是Android生态系统的一部分。 默认情况下,它们适用于Android。 而且,如果您拥有经过良好测试的Android操作系统,则可以轻松构建手机。 MeeGo也可能发生同样的情况。”

但是,并非每个人都是信徒。 分析师罗斯·鲁宾(Ross Rubin)表示,建立MeeGo生态系统将既困难又巨大。 作为证明,他指出了惠普和黑莓公司在建立其生态系统时经历了非常困难的时期。 接受本书采访的大多数人都说,杀死MeeGo的原因是,不可能在合理的时间内建立一个可以与Android和iOS竞争的引人注目的生态系统。 热情的开发人员和消费者的确存在,但还远远不够。

一位人士说,埃洛普(Elop)在与MeeGo团队会面以阐明他决定停止该项目的原因时非常紧张。 埃洛普(Elop)像往常一样讲一口流利的讲话,但是他的声音在颤抖-也许他知道技术论点对这个听众不起作用。 但是,MeeGo团队并没有让首席执行官感到尴尬。 他们以坚忍的镇定自若地聆听信息共享。

对于英特尔来说,意识到诺基亚将退出MeeGo救助是一个巨大的损失。 2011年11月,董事Patrick Bliemer在一次采访中谈到了失望的消息,并表示英特尔将继续与三星将MeeGo进一步发展成Tizen。

N9 swansong之后,诺基亚的MeeGo开发人员相对乐观。 一些人正在转而从事Meltemi的工作(请参阅第15章),另一些人则希望在诺基亚之外找到新工作。 在传达Windows策略后,竞争对手立即雇用了最佳专家。 5月,英特尔宣布将在芬兰的埃斯波和坦佩雷建立研发中心。 英特尔正在全速招募MeeGo专家。 芬兰经济事务和就业部预期英特尔将雇用数百名开发人员。 显然,这并不能弥补即将失业的1400 Symbian和MeeGo开发人员诺基亚计划开除的费用。

除了诺基亚计划的大规模裁员计划外,还有约2000名软件工程师将从曾为诺基亚工作的分包商公司开除。 这些公司之一就是Ixonos。

2011年5月,赫尔辛基东部郊区Herttoniemi的一间办公室里坐着一个紧张的人。 Ixonos的首席执行官Kari Happonen似乎在过去的几个月中经历了一段艰难的旅程。 诺基亚曾经是Ixonos的最大单一客户。 法定谈判正在进行中,估计裁员将影响约100人。 Ixonos共有1200名员工,其中800名在芬兰。 Ixonos已经减少了一些工作,该公司现在拥​​有空的办公设施。 Happonen没想到微软会像诺基亚那样投资开发前诺基亚生态系统。 在芬兰东部,一家名为Weego的软件工程公司已经过优化,可以满足诺基亚MeeGo的需求。 公司员工中有80%在诺基亚项目中工作。 一些Weego员工甚至在诺基亚办公场所工作。 Weego的首席执行官Pasi Ollikainen在接受采访时说,Windows战略决策使诺基亚感到意外,而且没有多少人能够预料到这一点。 Weego的救星是他们的Android和iPhone专业知识。 这家小型的芬兰软件工程公司通过为三星开发智能电视应用程序找到了新的增长来源。


MeeGo的血统一直延续到2011年成立的Jolla。Jolla是由前诺基亚首席软件工程师Marc Dillon和来自N9开发团队的其他前诺基亚人组成的公司。 由于MeeGo软件的开源特性,Jolla能够免费开始使用MeeGo的主要组件。 事情进展很快。 Jolla开始使用Jolla品牌开发自己的智能手机。 2011年11月,Jolla宣布了Sailfish操作系统。

Jolla电话显示MeeGo可能会变成什么样。 用户界面得到了进一步的开发,它比N9更具逻辑性。 Jolla电话是由数十名软件开发人员开发的,人们可以想象,如果没有永无止境的麻烦,优柔寡断和Intel放慢脚步,MeeGo将会变成什么样。

Jolla也在某种程度上回应了困扰MeeGo的生态系统担忧。 与Google控制的Android相邻的免费Android生态系统可能是MeeGo的生命线。 可以通过合理的努力使N9移植到Android应用程序中,这将保证有足够的应用程序。 因此,纯独立的MeeGo生态系统的可能性仍然是个谜。 不能说这是完全不可能的,因为例如中国的中兴通讯和韩国的LG对MeeGo感兴趣。


在所有的猜测性赞扬中,人们必须承认一些事实。 首先,英特尔一直在为其4G芯片组解决电源管理问题。 等待有效解决方案的时间会很长。

MeeGo最著名的继承人Tizen仍然接近广场一。 它已用于诸如Google Gear之类的配件中,但基于Tizen的智能手机很少发布。 最后但并非最不重要的一点是,如果市场过于拥挤,以至于无法由微软和诺基亚共同驱动一个新平台,诺基亚如何才能自己建立一个新平台?


返回目录

那是2011年6月,在芬兰北部城市奥卢(Oulu)。 Elektroniikkatie 10研究与开发中心充满了等待的气氛。 移动电话部门的一位高管安蒂·瓦萨拉(Antti Vasara)来自总部,谈论奥卢即将发生的变化。

瓦萨拉(Vasara)从好消息开始,奥卢的研发中心将不会关闭。 在场的人开始鼓掌,脸上洋溢着欢快的表情。 然后是坏消息。 奥卢(Oulu)的Symbian和MeeGo开发将完全停止。 喜悦被震惊所取代。 突然,奥卢(Oulu)的1100名员工面临被解雇的威胁。 然后,瓦萨拉继续传出一些令人惊讶的消息。 将在奥卢建立一个新单位,这将挽救大多数受到威胁的人。

该部门成为埃洛普(Elop)时代诺基亚最大的秘密之一。 诺基亚从未确认它是否存在,现在仍然不存在。 获得有关该项目的任何信息都非常困难,因为许多相关人士拒绝发表评论。 我们给人的印象是,诺基亚仍然希望保持员工的口吻。

为什么会这样呢? 首先,让我们看看名为Meltemi的项目背后的内容。

在Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo的管理期间,Meltemi于2010年作为研究项目开始。 随着旧的主力机S40变得过时,该想法是建立一个新的基本电话平台。 当史蒂芬·埃洛普(Stephen Elop)介入时,该项目,或者至少是它的前身,已经在进行中,大约有70名员工正在与之搏斗。 在2011年春季末,该项目像Elop的议程上的火箭一样迅速升起,因为管理层意识到Windows手机的制造成本不足以与廉价的Android型号竞争。

负责移动电话部门的Mary McDowell负责这项工作。 目标是在Asha基本手机和Lumia智能手机之间建立一个新的类别。 该类别的价格约为100欧元(140美元),当时比Android设备便宜,并最终取代了S40。 目标是在一年内达到目标。

首先,奥卢的250名员工被转移到Meltemi项目。 他们中有些人以前曾与Symbian合作,另一些人曾与MeeGo合作。 该小组热切地开始处理他们的新任务。 新工程师一点一点地加入了工作,最终有500人在奥卢进行了该项目。 In addition to Oulu, the R&D centre in Ulm, Germany was enlisted to the project. 这个想法很简单。 The goal was to create a device that could be classified as a smartphone, but which had as its key selling point an attractive user experience, instead of relying on an ecosystem. The focus was on social media and a few preinstalled applications. Of course, one should also be able to install additional applications. The N9 applications should work on Meltemi as such, and thus would be part of the Qt ecosystem.

But what was Elop’s logic? Why did he kill MeeGo — the pillar holding up Qt strategy — in 2011, but continue developing Meltemi?

Meltemi was the foundation of the “Next Billion” strategy, to get the next billion people to use the mobile internet, by conquering people still without a mobile phone in emerging markets. According to an extreme interpretation N9 was just a prologue to Meltemi, created to generate the applications that Meltemi required. However, this time Elop advanced in radio silence. He had learned his lesson after the Burning Platform speech. The sales of Asha devices would not be cannibalized by saying that something better was on the way. The project was kept secret even within the company.

As the work proceeded, a few technical decisions were made quickly. The phones would be built upon new hardware, including graphics acceleration, and that 128 MB of memory would need to be sufficient. As opposed to the N9 there would not be multitasking, with only one application running at a time. Applications would need to start up in less than one second.

Meltemi needed to succeed at almost any cost. An employee from the project said that even traveling was less tightly regulated, compared to the rest of the company. It was calculated that a day trip to Oslo or a couple of days in Ulm would save a week’s worth of e-mail negotiations.

The schedule still started to break down in the fall of 2011. One cause to that was the design team being located in London. One developer described how the design department was able to generate user interface ideas that were graphically attractive, but at the same time the direction kept continuously changing. At the end of 2011, the first version of user interface resembled the graphical looks of Windows Phone. The font was white and thin on a black background, and the elements on the display were text, rather than buttons to be pressed. The lower left hand corner had a “back” arrow, similar to Windows Phone. N9-like icons replaced the Windows tiles. In the spring, N9-like swipes were added to the user interface. This version didn’t live for long either. The third draft was very similar to the user interface of N9. The interface was touch based, with no hard keys. One could open notifications (such as incoming messages) from the upper edge, similar to Android. Nokia’s maps, music service and video calls would be included. At that stage product development told the design team that this had be the final plan, if they wanted anything to be finished, said one person involved with the assignment.

Another aspect delaying the project was the new hardware. There were issues adapting the software to it. Calls, browsing and WiFi started to work on the device only in the beginning of 2012. Not at the same time in multitasking mode, but overall on the same device.

At the end of 2011, management understood that development needed to gain speed. The most crucial people working on Meltemi in different cities flew to Nokia’s R&D center in Ulm, Germany. The goal was to make a giant leap, to pull people together, to have communications flowing without breaks. Nokia had booked an entire hotel in Ulm to accommodate the people involved. Approximately 50 people were continuously present, with participants changing all the time. The intermediate goals of the three-month camp at the end of January and February were just about reached, and Mary McDowell was seen onsite encouraging employees. At the end of March, when the camp ended, a tough fact had to be faced. Even though many aspects had advanced, such as the delay when launching applications, the readiness target had not been reached.

The first phone model, codenamed Clipper, had been cancelled during the project. It was designed as a sibling to the cheapest Lumia, the 610. The devices resembled each other, but Clipper and its display were smaller. Clipper was replaced by codenames Goa and Zhora. Their role models were Lumia 820 and 920, and they also were smaller than their role models.


In addition to Meltemi being a secret, there was even a bigger secret inside the project, one that has been kept unrevealed to the public until these days.

The idea was splendid. As the iPad conquered developed markets, Nokia would take the corresponding market in developing countries. A small but high quality tablet would be built, and it would endure dust and moisture. The main markets would be Russia and China. Instead of small phone stores, the tablet would be sold in the giant electronic stores in China.

The Meltemi tablet advanced far. The display was 7 inches, and the price was planned to be 250 euros ($330). The consumer reaction was tested with a half-ready demo device. The device was given to test consumers, and it was revealed little by little that the device would come out with the Nokia brand name. How much would they pay for the device? Consumers were so tired with cheap Androids that they replied they would pay 350 euros ($465) for the device. The reception compared to the price planned for the device was so good that the tablet would have been a shock to the Chinese low cost manufacturers, estimated one person involved. The tablet would have run all Android applications. Even some iPad applications would have worked. In addition, country specific applications would have been built for Russia and China.

Within the Nokia organization the Meltemi tablet project took a different path than the phones. Chief Technology Officer Henry Tirri led the project, to ensure a time-to-market as fast as possible. The project was due to be transferred to Mary McDowell in the fall of 2012, when it was time for discussions with the sales channel.

However, the days of Meltemi came to an end already before that. The unfortunate project became squeezed, when the pricing of Android phones dropped ultra low in the hands of Chinese low-cost manufacturers, and a Lumia close to the price range of Meltemi was created in cooperation with Microsoft. Teams were asked, in the beginning of May 2012, whether they could promise Meltemi to be ready by the end of the year. One developer tells us that their team’s response was that it is possible, but do not expect anything before that.

Meltemi means a dry wind blowing from the North across the Aegean Sea during the summer. The group was hit by it in June 2012. One morning, when people came to work, they noticed the Meltemi wikis and source code were closed. Some realized that executives had been absent from project meetings for a couple of weeks.

“We concluded that only bad interpretations can be made in this situation”, a software developer recalls.

During the day, head office informed that the project was going to be killed. They gave three reasons.

The product did not come out fast enough.

Lumia phones could soon be built cheap enough.

There was no marketing budget. All the investments will be focused to Lumia.

The final stroke was Nokia’s financial collapse. The Meltemi teams were told that Nokia did not have the financial means to do marketing for S40, Lumia, and Meltemi devices at the same time. According to one employee, waking up to the need of marketing funds excessively late illustrates the panic mode and shortsightedness of the Meltemi assignment. The reason is likely simple: The costs of bringing Meltemi to market, and especially the required marketing investments, would have hit Nokia’s cash assets too hard.

As Meltemi did not officially exist, it could not be officially cancelled. Nokia formulated in their release, that going forward, they would focus on S30 and S40 basic phones, and Lumia and Asha smartphones. You had to read between the lines that a third option had been dropped. In a press conference, when asked about Meltemi, Elop replied that he has never confirmed a project with such a name, but that Nokia has had to cease some development initiatives. It was said that the R&D center in Ulm, Germany, would be closed down, which gave the final confirmation that Meltemi was dead. “This was a slap in the face. Nobody assumed that the entire center with 730 people would be closed down. At the end of last year, new employees were still hired to the R&D center”, said Ulrike Kleinebrahm from the workers’ union IG Metall.

The Meltemi people were devastated. The project was in the final stretch, the completion was in sight. The products were far in development, and had been presented to the distribution channels. Elop said one of the reasons for stopping development was that they had received bad feedback from the target customers. One employee involved assures that it was in fact the opposite. Employees would have understood if the closure had taken place three months earlier, when rearrangements were done in Ulm, and the phones had technical issues. Three months later those problems had been overcome. It was difficult to understand the slaughtering of a nearly ready product. The frustration burst out in a LinkedIn group. The group carried the name MPD Alumni (Meltemi Product Development).

“I thought we mattered. What a naïve thought! Trust — melted. Joy — melted. Passion towards Nokia — melted. I have no clue how to get it back”, one commented.

However, the opinions on the Meltemi readiness stage varied. Many used the expression: “Almost ready”. According to them, the products could have been brought to the market very quickly. These views appear colored by bitterness. According to one reliable view, Meltemi was two to three weeks away from a phase where it would have been eligible for “use on a daily basis”. The term means that Nokia employees could have tested using Meltemi phones as their main devices. The stage is reached when the phone stays on in most cases for the entire day, and the most important functionalities are available. It is still a long way to sales readiness. Meltemi devices used to cut calls after approximately one minute when the project was halted. The application startup time was on average three seconds, a long way from the one second target.

The internal ending event of Meltemi was on June 14, 2012. The event was streamed to Nokia sites across the globe. Elop revealed what the development of Meltemi cost per month.

“I wish I had taken some notes”, recalls one who was there. “The sum was most likely many millions of euros per month. The project had grown into psychotic dimensions. For example, when a team was released from MeeGo we may have been asked that here’s a team, would you have some use for it?”

Some think that the goal of the Meltemi project was impossible to attain from the beginning. Even though Meltemi was built upon some assets from MeeGo, at the end the Meltemi team had to build a new operating system from scratch. Thus, it was not a slimmer version of MeeGo, but rather its own platform, built on the Android core. There was so much work involved that the original estimate turned out to be too small.

Still, the timing for Nokia to obtain low-cost smartphones to compete with Android phones was only half a year away. It is a completely different story how consumers would have reacted to them. Carolina Milanesi, an analyst that has followed Nokia for a long time, thinks that the prices of Meltemi devices, 70–140 euros ($94–188) for smartphones and 250 euros ($335) for tablets, would have been too high for developing markets. Android had got Asians accustomed to ultra-low-cost devices.

According to Daniel Chung, who was responsible for Nokia’s network provider relationships in China, the Chinese network providers took the stance that Meltemi pricing could not have competed with local Android devices, which gave consumers more functionality and applications against a smaller financial investment.

Meltemi development swallowed 50–100 million euros ($63–126 million) according to a rough estimate. At the same time, employees were taken through a rough ride. Only a few months before Meltemi, Elop had announced that MeeGo people would be transferred to reinvent the future disruption of the mobile device world. The MeeGo people that were expecting shiny new assignments were driven into a dead end for a second time. Maybe that is why the project is still officially a secret. Meltemi is difficult for its former employees as well. If you search the keywords Meltemi and Nokia on LinkedIn you can find approximately twenty hits. The rest use euphemisms for that stage of their career.

Had the project succeeded, the name Meltemi would have remained unknown to the wider public. It had a new Asian name under work, like Asha, as the markets were assumed to be in Asia. Meltemi belongs to the group of working names such as MeeGo’s two versions Harmattan and Fremantle. Harmattan is a trade wind present in Western Africa. Fremantle — or more specifically Fremantle Doctor — occurs in the western coastal regions of Australia during the summer, and cools down the heat in afternoons.


Back to Table of contents

The cooperation between Nokia and the new partner began with traveling, partying, and presents. Microsoft’s Windows Phone employees gathered at Daman’s Tavern in Redmond to celebrate the most important deal of their history. The AllThingsD website, focusing on digital technology news, reported that toasts were made with a drink called “The Noble Finn”. Ingredients: Finlandia vodka, Chartreuse liqueur, soda water, sugar, and lemon juice drained with reindeer antlers.

In March 2011, Windows Phone engineers arrived in Finland, led by Terry Myerson. The teams got to know each other by snowshoeing and in the sauna, after which the Yanks were made to roll in the snow naked. The next day they transitioned to business at the Salo factory.

Within weeks and months, the cooperation settled to its established ways. One of these involved Iceland. The direct flight to Reykjavik is about the same from Redmond as it is from Helsinki. The leaders met often at the state-owned Culture House, a stone’s throw from Höfði, where Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev had met for their famous meeting of 1986.

At the Nokia end, Jo Harlow, who had been nominated to lead the smartphone business, bore the greatest responsibility for the cooperation. She had been given ten months — the first Nokia Windows phone was to be on the market before the year’s end. The schedule was twice as fast as what was customary at Nokia.

Harlow had arrived at Nokia in 2003. Before taking the responsibility for smartphones, she had led the marketing of mobile phones in North America, marketing worldwide, and she was the responsible for the Symbian phone business. She had made it through two organizational changes under Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo. This trusted player, also under Elop, had captained the Duke University basketball team in North Carolina in the 1980s, and had graduated with a bachelor’s degree majoring in psychology. Before Nokia, she had held leading positions in sales and marketing at Reebok, known for their sports products, and at Procter & Gamble, famous for their consumer goods.

Some twenty work pairs were created as the basis of cooperation. The idea was to make people working in similar roles at either company responsible for progress.These work pairs were set up in sales, product development, and marketing, among others.

Harlow was paired with Myerson. The common denominator was found quickly. Myerson had graduated from Duke seven years after Harlow. Nokia employees presented each with an E7 phone decorated with the Duke logo.

Kai Öistämö’s counterpart was Andy Lees. Öistämö has recounted how he virtually lived with Lees as the deal was taking shape. At that time, the contacts might come any time of the day, because Lees was vacationing in Hawaii and Öistämö in Italy. As the deal progressed, the contacts became only weekly.

Marko Ahtisaari’s partner in Redmond was Albert Shum. Shum, having started at Microsoft after Nike, created the basic features of the Windows Phone user interface, among others the appearance based on tiles.The pair exchanged ideas, and started to focus on future product launches. The target was to make the device and the software work together as if they were one and the same.

Teamwork was made easier by video conferences that were held 5 to 10 times a week. In addition, Nokia transferred a director, Waldemar Sakalus, to Seattle to handle the Microsoft relationship and to divide the product development tasks among five Nokia locations: San Diego, Beijing, Salo, Tampere, and Taiwan. A Microsoft alum Kevin Shields was hired to investigate what Nokia could, on its own, build on top of Windows Phone.

Based on information leaked to public domain, the alliance started to resemble a match made in heaven. The world’s best phone hardware manufacturer and the world’s best software house were working together. Network providers, developers, and technology buffs were keen to see what this common effort would produce. Belief in success started to arise.


The reality behind celebratory speeches and common acquiescence presented another face. A Nokia employee belonging to the Markets unit remembers the shock he experienced two weeks after the public launch of the cooperation, as he saw the list of the features of Windows Phone 7. The list looked much different than he had anticipated. The most drastic surprise was in the language support. The engineer remembers thinking that pages were missing in the document when he saw the languages supported. But they weren’t missing. Microsoft had concentrated on North America and Europe with Windows Phone, where the expectation was to elevate the status to that of an expensive enterprise phone. Nokia, on the other hand, was working globally. It wanted the phones everywhere. The engineer also understood that in addition to the languages, leading network providers such as Vodafone, Orange, Telefonica, and T-Mobile required more than what the list of features had on offer. Windows Phone was very closed. Application interfaces, with which network providers could integrate their music services into the system, for example, were missing. There was a new problem facing Nokia that already had been called condescending: They would need to respond to network providers saying “thank you for your wishlist, but Microsoft does what it does and the feature will come when it will”.

They had gone from the frying pan to the fire, to the curse of a closed software platform.

Microsoft’s interest in adding languages was minuscule at first, and Redmond balked at offers to help. According to Microsoft, language support was so deep within the code that letting Nokians to work on it would have revealed too much of the code.

New inadequacies emerged continually. There was no support for the front camera that was necessary for video calls. Multimedia (MMS) messages did not work according to standard, and when a Nokian called about this to the US, it was felt as if the other end did not even understand what an MMS message is and why it should conform to standard. It was difficult to create custom ringtones. There was work to do in country-specific requirements. Many countries set very detailed requirements on phones. If these weren’t met, it was futile to even try.

“We began to wonder whether anyone had researched the Windows Phone on a practical level before the agreement was signed — and realized that nobody had,” one Nokian recounts his team’s thoughts.

The board woke up quickly to notice the same problems. Windows Phone turned out to be less complete than what had been understood. A person present in the first workshops between Microsoft and Nokia top leadership teams tells us how only at this stage it was realized that it was simply difficult to integrate a camera with Windows Phone. The pixel count allowed by Windows Phone was limited.

Only at this stage it was also revealed that the Windows Phone could not be adapted to an entry phone category in the manner that Nokia had envisioned. When making the operating system choice, there had been estimates to be able to reach about a hundred euro ($130) price range.

It began to strongly look as if the contract had been reached hastily — and the homework had been done skimpily. In addition to languages, the Nokia leadership team was surprised by the deficiencies in multitasking. And, how would it be with Microsoft’s widespread business applications, such as the text processing program Word, and the presentation software PowerPoint: Would they be integrable into Nokia’s upcoming phones?

There were at least some improvements on the way. There was a new version of Windows Phone in the works that would be known as Mango, or Windows Phone 7.5.

Even with the deficiencies in the platform, Microsoft reassured Nokia quickly about their software skills. An employee from the Markets unit recalls how quickly in the corridor chatter people started to comment that now they were in fact dealing with a software house. The software was of high quality, it was ready, made with care, and there were fewer bugs as compared to Nokia’s own products. The code was even revered. Versions appeared on time, and their content corresponded to the promises made.

Windows Phone only accepted one chipset as its basis, but luckily it happened to be the same on which Nokia was building the American version of its N9 model. Within a couple of months, Windows Phone had been made to run on Nokia hardware, and under three months of making the cooperation public, Elop was bragging about walking around with a phone in his pocket. The development was running, according to Elop, faster than ever before in Nokia.

The worrying was, however, continuing among the operatives. A Nokian remembers how fast he had realized that it was difficult to get requests through with Microsoft, because the Windows Phone team was so small. He estimated that when Symbian had six times the number of people as compared to S40, the Windows Phone team had fewer people than the S40 team.

A member of the leadership team reiterates this: “The cooperation was sold to us with the argument that Nokia has a strong position and that it can influence the development. This proved to be hard. The requests never got through. Microsoft had their own ways of working. Flexibility wasn’t one of their strong points.”

There was shared understanding at least on a more general level. Microsoft alleged to have changed their priorities to serve Nokia over other Windows Phone manufacturers. Myerson wasn’t shy to say that the workload was weighted in Nokia’s favor in relation to Nokia’s effort on the Windows Phone.

If Nokia had faced surprises in the beginning of the cooperation, these also came Microsoft’s way. Nokia had been silent in the negotiations on their camera innovations. When the Microsoft team heard about the 41 megapixel PureView technology, its importance was understood immediately: “Wow, what a cool thing!”


About a month after making the cooperation public, Elop told the news agency Reuters that the phones were progressing at a good pace. At the same time, he responded to the speculations that Microsoft might purchase Nokia.

“To the extent that a partnership has been formed around what they’re really interested in, then what would an acquisition bring other than a good year of antitrust investigation, huge turmoil, delays?? We didn’t even broach the possibility of an acquisition with Steve (Ballmer),” he said.

On April 21, 2011, Nokia and Microsoft finally announced that the cooperation agreement had been signed. The contract, hundreds of pages in length, spelled out, in addition to financial matters, which individual technical items belonged to which party. There were very few changes made to the guidelines drawn in February. According to Öistämö, the signing was a great milestone, but even more than this, he was glad of the concrete progress made by the cooperation. The Windows Phone Mango version was already being tested on Nokia devices. Mango was too far along for Nokia to have any influence on it before the agreement. The new version seemed set to bring about many improvements Nokia had requested. Lees concurred and stated that the companies now knew very accurately which part of the code belonged to Microsoft and which to Nokia. It was said that the cooperation was more about having agreed on common ways of working than about what Nokia can or cannot require from Windows Phone.

The sales of the upcoming phones to the network providers was in a good shape during this time. Typically, a network provider needs to know the future plans of the manufacturers about 12 months ahead of time, which means that in the case of the Windows phones, the timescale had to be scrunched. Thanks to N9, Nokia had a likeness mockup to show already at a very early phase, and the Windows Phone screen grid appearance was also widely known. A leader involved in the sales says that the reception was entirely different than if Microsoft had been selling their phones by themselves. “Network providers knew, in fact, that when Nokia is involved, the possibilities are completely different. They believed in Nokia’s capabilities in hardware. They thought that if Nokia gets free hands on the hardware side, and the platform is made to work as it had been made to believe, it’s now or never that Windows will make a breakthrough in phones.”


On May 10, 2011, Nokia received a blow under the belt from its new partner. Microsoft announced the purchase of the internet phone company Skype for almost six billion euros ($8.5 billion).

The deal was poison to Nokia’s dreams about a network-provider-friendly ecosystem and showed where they stood with respect to their relationship with Microsoft. Nokia’s interests did not weigh when bigger wheels started to turn. Skype was a thorn in the flesh for network providers, because internet phone calls ate into their voice call revenue. Providers weren’t making a profit selling Windows Phones if it was too easy to make internet-based phone calls on them.

Network providers did understand that internet-based phone calls were the future. That is why they were developing their own services to compete with Skype. There was even a new kind of a phone call in the works, multimedia phone call (IMS) that differed from internet phone calls at least in one respect; the standard had a built-in possibility for billing calls.

Nokia had to hold back in dealing with network providers after the Skype deal. “We cannot tailor your call solutions as part of our operating system. This role is reserved for and only for Skype.” According to someone who had worked for the Markets unit, the world’s second largest network provider, Vodafone, in particular sent a clear message along the lines of “if our solution cannot be configured on equal terms with others, we will not sell these devices.”

Nokia was careful not to criticize its partner in public. Elop admitted the problem only a year later when he revealed that network providers shunned Lumias because of Skype.


However, the journey of these two companies on two sides of a fence with different company cultures gradually started to progress. During the spring and summer they communicated that they were ahead of schedules. At least the launch of one common phone model within the year was still within the timeline. The communiqués given in conjunction of the signing of the agreement led one to believe that the first priority would be in the speed of market entry. The device would be very similar to other Windows Phones.

This emphasis felt more correct, day by day. While Nokia and Microsoft were dancing their mutual minuets, the smartphone market was forging fast ahead. The Symbian catastrophe had wrecked the value chain of many distributors. The biggest network provider customers were Vodafone, Telefonica, T-Mobile, and China Mobile. Especially the Europeans reacted quickly. A director who liaised with network providers admits directly that Nokia had to stomp the prices and network providers were required to subsidize the sales of phones. A phone languishing in the warehouse needed to sell within two months, and half a year was a long time in this fast-paced market.

A dirty wake was forming also in Asia. One Nokia salesperson says that for instance in India Nokia had been selling about 10 million phones quarterly. The average stock was for about 45 days, ie five million phones. As one phone was priced around $50, the remaining supply in the hands of the distributors was substantial. Many distributors suffered great losses in forced sale events, and many of these were wholly dependent on Nokia. Many felt betrayed.

Independent retailers in China quickly abandoned Symbian. Network providers reacted more slowly. According to a director from the sales unit, China declined slower than the rest of Asia because the local network technology deviated from the standard. Foreign competitors had a harder time entering this market, especially since the two largest network providers were Nokia-friendly. But when the train started rolling, it was difficult to stop. “China Mobile is the world’s largest network provider and it was the most important seller of Symbian. It started to support Chinese manufacturers. Device makers such as Huawei, ZTE, and Lenovo got a head start to an immense growth. The situation was changing incredibly fast after this,” says a respected stock market analyst.

The sinking Symbian started to become a real problem. Nokia issued a startling market warning on the last day in May. The revenue in April–June would be substantially lower than expected. The formulation of the reasons for this was interesting. According to the release “the situation has been made weaker by the competitive dynamics and market trends across multiple price categories, particularly in China and Europe, as well as a product mix shift towards devices with lower average selling prices and lower gross margins. In addition, pricing tactics by Nokia and certain competitors have made the situation more difficult.”

The word ‘Symbian’ was not even mentioned. [14] On top of everything, Nokia announced that because the forecast of the second quarter had changed substantially, it will no longer publish targets for the whole year.

At least there were savings in the making. Layoffs would result in savings of about a billion euros ($1.35 billion) annually from 2013 and onwards. Elop estimated that these savings had materialized faster and more than expected. If it qualifies as a merit, Elop had in fact gotten rid of personnel from the company effectively.

Analysts made quick calculations: The entire Nokia group had become loss-making, also the cash flow had turned negative. The market panicked. The share price went down 18 percent. At the same time, Nokia lost its top spot in the Helsinki stock exchange to Nordea. Investors described Nokia’s situation as incomprehensible, because the beginning of the year had developed reasonably well, and the annual meeting in the beginning of May had had a positive vibe to it. The release of the day got the nickname “the horrendous Nokia upset”.

The reason for this upset was very visible on the retail shelves around the world. Android phones filled the shelves vacated by Symbian phones that retailers had moved aside. Network providers were fond of Android, because it was available for a variety of price categories. For example in India and in China, a sizable chunk of buyers look for phones costing below a hundred euros ($135). The range of Android phones just made this mark, and they offered so many features for such a price that their demand skyrocketed. The Chinese budget device manufacturers and Samsung captured the game.

Operators still wanted to remain in touch with Nokia. Nokia still wanted to stay in the game because the position of Apple was evoking fear.

A leader with a Finnish network provider says that Apple was much more arrogant toward network providers than what Nokia had been. It was not uncommon for heated calls at odd hours to come from Apple’s London office. The topics were such as the missing helicopter at an iPhone launch event. The network providers had no say in the pricing of iPhones or in the sales and marketing actions. Apple only offered “take it or leave it” deals.

The difference with regard to other vendors was huge. Nokia was, compared to Apple, a domesticated business partner. Even Google was not as irritating as Apple, although it was the sovereign leader in the Android world.

But: The network providers feared Google. It had begun to tighten the contract terms. Google had become the unknown card in the phone game, so there was goodwill toward Nokia despite the Symbian catastrophe. Many network providers had a long track record of making good business with Nokia, which still dominated the feature phone market.


The choice of Windows Phone as the platform resulted in a mass exodus among developers, at first. This choice upset many, as Nokia had been an eager advocate of open source software. Nokia had recently marketed Qt, and many had invested in Qt training and certifications. A strong community had formed around MeeGo, and Symbian had been changed into an open source platform.

The credibility vanished. Developers were faced with a dilemma: Why build Symbian applications when the market fell from under the platform? Why build Windows Phone applications when there was no market? Microsoft was also burdened by old sins. Developers had been required to change their tools during the last ten years many times over. “The experience was much more bitter than that with Symbian developers,” estimated a renowned stock analyst. “Among Symbian developers, the work was a continuous uphill battle, but a developer working with Microsoft’s mobile platform often fell flat hard. In addition to having to learn the new tools, they had to rewrite their programs.”

In the light of the past with Microsoft, and due to the prevailing uncertainty, the solution was obvious: They moved elsewhere. The number one choice so far had been Apple. While the second choice had previously been either Symbian or Android, it was now Android. A developer is usually able to port their application to two or three platforms, so Windows Phone was sidelined.

An experienced Finnish developer recalls that this hangover had, however, passed quickly. “The cold hard truth was that the Windows Phone tools were even better than Qt. And the code was brilliant. What you could do worked like a charm, and the set had been chosen so that all essential functions were there,” he told us.

The sandbox was, however, crowded, the developer recounts. There were a lot of things missing that you could have realized with Apple or Android. For example game engines could not be ported from the outside, they had to be coded anew. The investment expected from developers was remarkably high compared to expected revenue. “The platform was not incomplete, as much as insufficient. What was there was excellent, but half of what was supposed to be there, was missing,” the developer describes.

The grand picture was as follows. Passionate Symbian and MeeGo developers switched en masse over to Android. But Windows Phone received increasing interest. New entrants from among PC and enterprise developers embraced it. Only those who didn’t understand the need to jump ship continued with Symbian.


Elop performed a cunning trick in August 2011. He appeared in Singapore Communasia Communications Symposium and instructed the audience to put down their cameras and not to take pictures with their phones, as he was about to show something confidential. From his pocket emerged a device which, despite everything, was the prototype of the first Nokia Windows Phone. The British newspaper Guardian remarked aptly: Elop could not have asked the audience any more clearly to photograph at that moment. Guardian also wondered how it was possible that a photo from the event that began to circulate was apparently professionally shot, on a tripod.

The prototype had in fact been named: Sea Ray. The appearance was observed to be a direct copy of the N9. A camera button, mandated by Windows Phone, had appeared at the side, and the flash on the rear cover had been placed differently. The camera was identical to that in the N9, and it would have eight megapixels. The operating system was the new Microsoft Phone Mango version. There were no Nokia-specific apps visible in the prototype devices.

In August, Elop met with the board. Elop drove his train with continually more steam, and announced that the phone family should get a name. The groundwork had been done, two hundred suggestions had been sifted, and a shortlist of the best options was presented to the board to review. Elop told Reuters how the board had been about to fall into a familiar trap once again, asking for more time, as there seemed to be no common favorite. Elop had wondered why they should wait until the following week, or the next month. The decision could just as well be made on the spot.

And so the name was born. In one day.

Lumia. A Latin-sounding play on the Finnish word for snow. Had been in use as a Finnish surname since the end of the 1600s. Evokes impressions of light in English. As to whence and by whom the name was brought to the board, the etymology is silent.

Before the choice, it emerged that in Spanish — the language in the important South American market for Nokia — the word “lumia” had an esoteric slang meaning of “prostitute”, but only in archaic forms of Spanish influenced by Roman languages. This was not a hindrance. According to consumer studies, 60 percent of Spanish speakers took the name positively. The first impressions were more related to light and style . Of course, the media had a field day when the reference to the side meaning was found in Spanish dictionaries. They neglected to mention that this meaning was archaic, rare and only used in slang to begin with.

Besides, it was in good company. In South China, “Peugeot” translates to the same meaning as “Lumia” in Spanish.

Many Finns in those days wanted to believe in Nokia. The always positive foreign minister Alexander Stubb tweeted on August 12, 2011:

@alexstubb August 12

Meeting w/ #Nokia CEO #StephenElop this morning. A fantastic guy. Watch Nokia bounce back with his energy and commitment. Exciting stuff!


The great news in the beginning of the fall was the Google-Motorola deal. In mid August, the Android powerhouse announced that it would purchase Motorola’s phone business for 8.8 billion euros ($12.5 billion). The rationale, according to Google, was the patent portfolio. This did not prevent disquiet: It was feared that Google would start to favor Motorola within Android.

According to Elop, his first reaction to this was relief. “The very first reaction I had was very clearly the importance of the third ecosystem and the importance of the partnership that we announced on February 11, it is more clear than ever before” Elop said referring to the Microsoft-Nokia alliance in competition against Android.

“My second thought was that If I happened to be someone who was an Android manufacturer or an operator, or anyone with a stake in that environment, I would be picking up my phone and calling certain executives at Google and say ‘I see signs of danger ahead,’” Elop said anticipating the disbanding of the Android camp.

In the beginning of September, the Windows Phone started to be a reality. Joe Marini, working at Microsoft, tweeted that he had received Nokia’s Mango phone to try out. He described it as handy, having a solid feel, good camera, and responsive UI. He said he would have liked a larger screen. He gave an overall rating of 8/10.

This was all promising. But: Nokia’s market share in smartphones had dropped to 15 percent.


[14] Looking at the May 31 stock exchange release by Nokia, this statement is wrong, as the release states: “Nokia is continuing to invest to bring new innovative capabilities to its Symbian line up.”


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October 26, 2011. This was the day the mobile phone business had been waiting for already a long while. Nokia was to launch their new Lumia smartphones. The London congress center was packed with hundreds of technology reporters, bloggers, and analysts. The screens of laptops and iPads glowed in the dark, the sense of anticipation was palpable. Soon they would see what Nokia’s Windows strategy meant in practice.

Elop stepped on the stage. When the picture of the Lumia 800 smartphone was projected on the screen, the three thousand strong audience burst into applause. The reaction illustrated the feelings: Nokia finally brought forward something that might bring the top position back. Elop was like a fresh father emerging from the birth ward, saying: “I am so excited to introduce you to the new Nokia Lumia 800.”

The applause quieted down, the listeners waited for the lowdown. Elop said that the Lumia 800 was “a simply elegant phone that brings a gentler structure to mobility.” According to him, every detail of the design was paid attention to. Every detail left out received just as much consideration as those included.

After the speeches, the audience was allowed to try out the new devices. The event hall was full of tables with new Lumias. Nokia employees clad in blue shirts presented the features of the devices with smiling faces. Lumia 800 drew the biggest buzz. Bloggers and reporters stood in line to be able to try out and photograph the novelty and to publish their verdicts as fast as possible. Apart from the design, the price of the new Nokias were of interest. Lumia 800 cost 420 euros ($580), whereas the newest iPhone was double that. The cheaper Lumia 720 was only 270 euros ($375): It was meant to compete with Android. The most striking feature of Lumias was their color. They were available in blue, red, and black, when the competition was in black, white, or grey. Lumias did not have really new features. Nokia Drive car navigation was an old Nokia application, but the music service had new features.

A patriotic wave of pride filled the chest of the Finnish reporter. At last, Nokia had a phone with a working operating system for the mass market. With a device like this, it was possible to start reaching the customer abreast with iPhones and Android phones.


Initial comments in the media were cautiously enthusiastic. The design and features of the Lumias, such as the camera and maps, were praised. According to analyst Carolina Milanesi, this was a top achievement within 8 months. She was not convinced with the name, but as a product, the Lumia was positive. Especially interesting, to Milanesi, was the price. Another British analyst, Ben Wood, described the situation as follows: “From a complete catastrophe to a real change in strategy, resulting in two fine products.”

At the press conference, it was announced that in October the Lumias would go on sale in six big European countries. After this, the sales would be extended to India, Russia, and Indonesia. The actual gauntlet would be faced the next year, when the Lumia would be launched on the American market. The analysts reminded that to make a breakthrough with Lumias, Nokia had to make it in the United States. There resided the most important financiers, innovators, and opinion makers in the mobile business. The fare presented in London was still pretty light. Milanesi remarked that before going to the United States, Nokia needed to improve, because the full support of American network providers was a necessity.

Sales of the phones started in the most important countries in Europe in November 2011. From January to March, the sales exceeded two million.

This number was not too bad considering the numbers available from similar competitors. Apple launched the first iPhone in the summer of 2007. Within the first three months, it sold about three million units. The robust growth in sales only began a year later, in the fall of 2008. Samsung also had about a year’s delay before the demand of their Android phone started to climb.

Nokia thus had hope. They only needed to get more Lumia models to sell and to evangelize Windows to customers. For Lumias, the difficulty factor was in the explosive growth in the sales of smartphones. The market research company Strategy Analytics estimated that in 2012 the sales of smartphones would grow 33 percent, to 650 million units. Nokia had to hurry up if it were to retain its market share.


On January 10, 2012, Nokians prepared to show their best effort at CES (Consumer Electronics Show) in Las Vegas. This giant consumer electronics fair was an annual event where vendors presented their wares aimed at the American market. The day was important for Nokia. Winning at CES was a must to open the American market. On Monday night Finnish time, Nokia organized a press conference where the new top model Lumia 900 was shown. The phone was for sale exclusively by AT&T. On the outside, the phone resembled the Lumia 800 sold in Europe, but it had a larger display, a better battery, and a camera on both sides of the phone for video calls. Lumia 900 was the first 4G phone from Nokia in the US.

After a couple of weeks, Microsoft published their annual figures. CEO Steve Ballmer bragged about the “company’s own phones”. Ballmer meant the Lumia 900 that was chosen as the best phone in CES. The CEO never even mentioned Nokia by name.

The march of the Lumias moved on. On February 27, Nokia presented another smartphone. This was the cheapest Lumia so far, 610, with the price tag of 189 euros ($250). Jo Harlow, in charge of the smartphones, believed that the company to reach a wider market with a more affordable device. To make this possible, Microsoft had relinquished the Windows Phone hardware requirements. This model had half the memory of former Lumias and a new version of Windows Phone called Tango that was aimed at cheaper hardware. Because of the reduced memory, only a part of Microsoft Marketplace applications worked on the phone.

It was still a fact that a smartphone costing almost 200 euros ($270) was an impossibility for the greater part of people on the globe. Nokia was facing a big problem: It would need to launch phones at below 100 euros ($130), fast. This was not possible because of Microsoft’s hardware requirements. Nokia was permitted, by Microsoft, to equip only the most expensive Lumias with Windows Phone. The software company wanted to ensure that the consumers would see Windows phones as equals to iPhone and Samsung Galaxy top models. Microsoft believed that this image would not have formed if Nokia were to sell hundred-euro Lumias. Windows would not have, in the beginning, worked technically in the cheapest models. For Nokia, this limitation was bad. With only the most expensive smart phones, it was not possible to generate enough sales to replace the Symbian business.

On Nokia’s biggest market, in China, Elop put all his personal charm at stake. According to a person having worked in a top position in marketing in China, Elop’s relationships with Chinese network providers were good. These were also grounded in former successful Symbian business in China. In March 2012, Elop shook hands with China Telecom CEO Wang in a flashy ceremony. With this handshake, the sales push began to get the first Nokia Windows Phone on the world’s largest growth phone market. The Chinese government supported the transformation to use the local standards TD-SCDMA and TD-LTE. Symbian phones did not use these technologies, but Nokia was able to compensate the dwindling Symbian market with TD-SCDMA-based Windows Phones. Elop admitted that it would take time to launch Lumias with Chinese technology. The Chinese government had another goal: Network providers were encouraged to develop their pricing models as well as their profitability targets in the direction to make the Chinese start using low-cost smartphones. This goal did not align with Nokia’s interests.

In March, Nokia also signed a Lumia deal with China Mobile. The state-owned China Mobile is the world’s largest network provider while China Telecom China’s third-largest. Lumia had already a presence on China Telecom’s website, even though the sales had not yet begun. At the end of March there were more news on cooperation: China Unicom would also start selling Lumias. Elop believed Lumias will be able to differentiate, because the groundwork with Chinese partners had been long in the works. The spearheads were maps and Microsoft’s software which would differentiate Lumias from iPhones and Androids. The situation looked good from Nokia’s standpoint: It was still ahead of Samsung in China. Even though Nokia’s turnover in the world’s most populous country had dropped 18 percent due to Androids, its market share was still 12.7 percent, whereas Samsung’s was 12.2 percent.

In April 2012, the news threw cold water on the enthusiasm. Nokia issued a profit warning and published shocking figures from the first quarter: The loss was 260 million euros ($347 million). According to the media, Chinese network providers’ interest in Lumias was slim. The reason was Android.

At the end of the month, Nokia published the quarterly report and concurrently announced that the sales in China had collapsed. At the beginning of the year, only 9.2 million phones had been sold, compared to the 23.9 million in the previous year. Elop defended by pointing out that the Chinese government had a strong home preference. The Chinese network providers bundled local manufacturers’ phones with low-cost call plans. According to Elop, during the last few weeks, every feature phone sold in China had been domestic. He also mentioned pressure from another direction: The Chinese bulk manufacturers such as ZTE had started to sell their brand worldwide. They would bring competition outside of China as well.

There were setbacks in the United States as well. Nokia had to disclose a software bug in Lumia 900 that can cut off data transfer. The company offered a $100 rebate to the affected customers via their phone bill. This bug was a blow to Nokia’s campaign in such a vulnerable stage.

By the summer of 2012 Elop had had enough. The leaders responsible for the Lumia launch, Niklas Savander and Jerri DeVard had to go. Elop was, however, happy with the actions taken in the United States. This was manifested in the region lead Chris Weber’s promotion to be the executive responsible for sales and marketing, and a member of the group executive board. Elop considered Weber to have done well, despite the difficult starting position.

Nokia had been highly popular in North America during 1999–2000. Nokia mobiles had been forerunners in technology and design. Owners of the Nokia candy bar phones with their embedded antennas had received looks of admiration from Americans with their old fashioned whip antenna Motorolas. Nokia’s phones had sold like hotcakes at the turn of the century and the its market share had been over 50 percent. In 2001, the market share had started to decline. The reason was that Nokia could not offer CDMA phones to network providers because Nokia had become fallen out with Qualcomm.

Qualcomm was a thorn on Nokia’s side. Almost a four-letter word, if you asked the Nokians.

高通公司的总部位于加利福尼亚州圣地亚哥,成立于1985年。 它的主要产品是手机配件,数据传输标准和卫星定位系统。 高通公司已经将其自己的手机生产基地出售给了日本京瓷,并专注于利用其拥有的技术来赚钱。 这家美国公司的经营方式是不道德的。 它拥有已开发的CDMA技术的专有权。 该技术已成为美国流行的移动数据通信技术。 在欧洲,选择的标准是GSM。

诺基亚曾一次使用高通的芯片组,但该合同于2005年终止。[15]续订许可合同的谈判使两家巨头相互竞争:诺基亚处于成功的顶峰,高通获得了明确的坚实基础在美国移动生态系统中的位置。 合同没有续签,两家公司陷入了三年的专利战。 纠纷在2008年10月解决后,诺基亚向高通公司支付了22.9亿美元的专利合同一次性费用。

还要更大的一笔钱。 与高通争吵之后,诺基亚从根本上减慢了其进入美国4G市场的速度。 Verizon是该国最大的网络提供商之一,已在CDMA网络上进行了大量投资,并与高通公司密切合作。 诺基亚被排除在这场游戏之外,而CDMA设备制造商的位置已被三星夺走。 现在已经奠定了韩国公司在美国取得成功的基础。 诺基亚还成功破坏了与另一家美国大型提供商的关系。 诺基亚曾经是AT&T的主要供应商,但搞砸了双方的关系。 AT&T曾经希望诺基亚通过实现AT&T专有的功能来定制其产品。 诺基亚之所以拒绝,是因为它希望手机明确地成为诺基亚,并且因为裁缝的成本增加了。 其他制造商屈服于美国网络提供商的需求。

2011年,诺基亚在美国的市场份额为零。 网络提供商在数年前就保留了其滑稽动作。 它以明显的逆风进入4G业务,美国消费者甚至没有听说过诺基亚。 在世界所有操作系统中,选择Windows Phone会使情况变得更糟。 在过去的十年中,网络提供商已经厌倦了Microsoft强制提供的Windows。

现实情况是,在美国,仅在网络提供商的要求下,新的手机型号才进入市场。

2012年春季,诺基亚与AT&T发起了一项针对Lumia 900的大型广告活动。AT&T在该活动中的投资达到创纪录的1.6亿美元。 在黄金时段,美国电视观众被30秒的Lumia点所淹没。 广告点已从所有大型网络购买:NBC,CBS和ABC。 在世界范围内,没有比这更昂贵的手机广告方法了。 而且,在美国人心中的印象是无情的:说唱歌手尼基·米娜(Nicki Minaj)在纽约时代广场站起来宣传Lumia900。后来,另一个有问题的大型品牌使用米娜(Minaj)进行救援,这是美国软饮料市场的输家,百事可乐。 竞选确实有效果。 2013年的销售数字看起来更漂亮。 与前一年相比,三个月的销量几乎翻了一番,从110万增至210万。

这是埃洛普(Elop)的重要里程碑。 他必须能够向诺基亚董事会以及股东们展示在美国成功的可能性。

然而,这种命运是短暂的。 美国供应商并不以其耐心而闻名。 网络提供商最多允许六个月使用一部新手机。 如果该设备不销售,则将从选择中删除该设备,或者降低其销售价格。 从起始点为零开始,从芬兰的角度来看,Lumia在美国的销售可能看起来不错。 从网络提供商的角度来看,两百万件的销售额不高。 索尼和京瓷等边缘公司也取得了相同的数字。 7月,《华尔街日报》报道说,AT&T已开始以一半的价格出售Lumia 900。 现在,您可以在两年通话计划中以$ 44.90的价格购买手机,而之前的价格为$ 99.90。 有问题的通话计划是美国的一种正常销售策略,网络提供商会诱使消费者使用数据密集型智能手机。

此举破坏了Lumia的价格形象:将来,以高价出售它们会更加困难。

尽管诺基亚在其轻量级产品的销售上苦苦挣扎,但它有几个主要的王牌。 它曾被誉为手机业务的前国王,并且仍然具有作为设备制造商的能力。 从网络提供商的角度来看,与软件业务之王Microsoft一起,它可以作为对苹果和Android的强大支持而发展壮大。 这是2012年与美国运营商的推理路线。


Windows合作中的一项合同项目是营销投资。 据估计,诺基亚和微软正在计划一个约。 5亿欧元(6.67亿美元)推动Lumia手机在美国的营销。 微软向诺基亚提供了一个所谓的主要设备制造商的位置。 然而,这家软件公司坚持认为,即将面世的Lumia 920手机将在美国以“ Windows”而不是“ Lumia”的形式销售。 埃洛普没有让步。 Lumia的名字不会被牺牲。 诺基亚为打造该品牌付出了长期的努力,并且该名称与许多良好的特性有关。 诺基亚拒绝一起竞选,微软则将HTC放在一边。 在2012年秋天,美国市场见证了Windows Phone的推广,但其发布者是HTC手机。

9月5日,诺基亚在纽约举行了新闻发布会。 展出了最新的Lumias 920和820,它们在Windows 8操作系统上运行。 埃洛普(Elop)在新闻报道和电视节目中热情地介绍了920的摄像头技术。 根据埃洛普(Elop)的说法,用手机拍摄的照片质量要好于使用三星Galaxy S3拍摄的照片。 诺基亚强调了其最大的资产,它已经投资了数千万美元进行开发。

诺基亚也对他们的地图大声疾呼。 然而,消费者并不是根据照相机或地图来购买电话。 购买的决定通常是基于品牌的。 在2012年,iPhone的热潮达到了顶峰。

诺基亚Lumia 920的最大差距仍然存在于应用程序中。 您无法在其上运行Spotify,Hipstamatic或最新的Rovio游戏。 Lumia 920受到媒体的热烈欢迎。 评论称,尽管这款手机在技术规格和可用性方面与竞争对手相当,但它的革命性不足以使其脱颖而出。 买家的期望变得不合理。 没有比革命还少的东西。

在Lumia 920在纽约发布的同一天,诺基亚在Youtube上发布了一段视频,其中包含新手机的光学图像稳定器。 录像显示一名年轻女子骑自行车。 在视频的一个场景中,使用了Lumia的光学图像稳定技术,而另一场景是在没有稳定器的情况下拍摄的。 该视频给人的印象是它是用新的Lumia设备拍摄的。 科技博客作者对此产生了兴趣并开始深入研究。事实证明,骑自行车的那个女人是由专业的乘车摄影人员摄制的。 第二天,诺基亚发表了道歉:“这不是用Lumia 920拍摄的。至少现在还没有。 对于造成的混乱,我们深表歉意。”据诺基亚通讯部门介绍,该视频的想法是模拟图像稳定如何改善图像质量。

对于诺基亚来说,这种情况极为尴尬。

诺基亚自身的营销失误破坏了这款新旗舰智能手机最重要的销售主张。 必须找到一个替罪羊。 埃洛普(Elop)对发生的事情进行了内部调查。 负责智能手机战略和市场营销的Ilari Nurmi被选为有罪。 Nurmi离开公司时没有发出任何声音,就像这种情况下的正常情况一样。 他在给路透社的电子邮件中确认自己已离开诺基亚,但没有提及这是否是出于他的主动性。 诺基亚对此没有发表评论。

令人担忧的消息是九月份从中国传来的。 中国移动选择了其范围内的Lumia手机,现在他们表示还将开始销售iPhone。 中国电信和中国联通已经销售iPhone一年了,现在他们即将开始销售三星旗舰手机Galaxy S3。 现在,中国的智能手机竞争正在全速进行。

诺基亚在中国的电话业务持续下滑。 收入同比下降近80%,减少了约10亿欧元(13亿美元)。 下降的原因是Symbian智能手机销售下滑,以及对Lumia手机的需求低于预期。 一年前,中国一直是诺基亚的最佳市场。 现在它已经跌至仅次于北美的倒数第二位。 同样在10月,美国宣布了新的降价措施。 产品上架之前,价格已经降低。 百思买已经以115欧元(149美元)的价格预订了Lumia 920。 该电话由AT&T捆绑了无线计划。 Lumia 920于10月开始在欧洲主要市场上销售:法国,英国和德国。 11月,销售开始在澳大利亚,亚洲,中东和美国。

看起来Lumia的销售是连续的过山车。 当数亿美元用于营销活动时,销售数字持续了几个月。 推出六个月后,这种势头通常消失了,卢米亚斯从消费者的心中消失了。 特别是在美国,由于网络提供商的广告活动影响了消费者的购买决定,因此Lumia的销售出现了一些重大波动。 这种波动没有显示降温的迹象。 到2012年底,一批新的Windows Phone 8手机即将投放市场。 HTC的Windows Phone 8X已经上市,三星的Ativ S即将上市。 Lumia 920在这些方面并没有太多优势:它拥有出色的相机和低廉的价格。 新的Lumia比最新的iPhone 5便宜200欧元(250美元)。

然后,最后:脚下坚实的地面。 或者至少看起来像那样。

11月,Lumia 920在中国的亚马逊在线商店开始预售-手机在半小时内就售罄! 对于计划在圣诞节后开始的实际发货,这非常令人鼓舞。 Lumia 920的价格在中国为450欧元(580美元),比芬兰低200欧元(258美元)。 尽管中国人的价格仍然很高,但人们对该产品还是有兴趣的。 Lumia 920的不同颜色版本在大型在线商店Expansys China的预购列表中也位居前四名。 三星Galaxy Note II在列表中排名第五,该列表表明有多少消费者想要购买产品。 12月,更多好消息传来:中国移动开始销售TD-SCDMA版本的Lumia 920。

美国也传来了好消息。 Lumia 920的黑白变种是AT&T最受欢迎的手机。 AT&T前十名的手机实际上有四种Lumia 920颜色变体。 诺基亚的股价在赫尔辛基上升了9%,在美国上升了6%。

同样在德国,Lumia 920也卖得很好。 看来德国人已经忘记了2008年诺基亚在波鸿的工厂倒闭。

埃洛普(Elop)在接受芬兰报纸赫尔辛金萨诺玛特的采访时充满了希望。 他说,手机行业正在经历重大变革,这将有助于改善诺基亚的地位。 越来越多的消费者开始寻找Android的替代品。 首席执行官说:“我们目前正处于更新战略的非常重要的阶段。 我们正在向市场推出重要的功能手机和智能手机。 我可以向您保证,诺基亚在很长一段时间内都在做最好的工作。”

这只是暂时的疯狂还是智能手机业务终于取得了可持续发展?

该公司的股价表明了后者-在过去六个月中,股价翻了一番。

微软公司的史蒂夫·鲍尔默在微软年度股东大会上宣布Windows手机的销量是一年前的四倍时,正在分享更多的好消息。 尽管Windows仍然仅占全球智能手机市场的百分之几,但方向是正确的。 陷入困境的竞争对手也不是一件坏事。 由于部件短缺,三星在提升自己的Windows Phone Ativ S方面遇到困难。 iPhone 5在欧洲遭受重创,因为该手机仅在两个LTE网络中运行。 Lumia手机在20多个欧洲LTE网络中运行。 对于那些欣赏最快的网络速度的客户来说,4G兼容性是决定性因素。

一些网络提供商的代表也加入了Lumia支持者的人群。 据说诺基亚已经重返移动行业的先驱,并从追随者转变为创新者。 除了相机创新之外,人们还指出了Lumia手机中结合了地图和虚拟成像功能的增强现实功能。


2013年1月。

天冷又黑。 诺基亚宣布了其年度财务业绩。 尽管在所有最受欢迎的手机上都有不错的估计和提及,但Lumia的销售最终还是令人失望:从10月到12月,仅售出了440万部手机。 在同一时期,苹果售出了4,780万部iPhone。 诺基亚智能手机部门去年全年一直在亏损。 同样令人担忧的是,分销商的仓库中有大量的诺基亚手机。 根据市场份额数据,诺基亚的情况是灾难性的。 研究公司Strategy Analytics表示,诺基亚在智能手机市场的份额仅为6%。 苹果和安卓已经占领了92%的市场。

北京街头的广告牌敦促消费者使用Lumia 920T庆祝新年。 但是,许多中国零售商一无所有。 中国最大的网络提供商中国移动(China Mobile)指责诺基亚缺乏设备:他们只收到了订购量的三分之一。 彭博社援引中国移动的话说,诺基亚的生产速度很慢,不能满足需求。 诺基亚错过了农历新年这一一年中最好的购物季节,这是诺基亚在中国智能手机市场上的市场份额已经不足1%的情况下的一个关键错误。

2013年2月25日,全球流动人群在巴塞罗那举行了年度贸易展。

诺基亚在世界移动大会上推出了四款新手机。 市场营销主管克里斯·韦伯(Chris Weber)首次大赞诺基亚,拥有完整的运行Windows Phone 8的手机产品。WindowsPhone智能手机的全球市场份额为3%,但韦伯勇敢地捍卫了所选择的道路。 比制造大型广告活动更重要的是制造不会让消费者失望的手机。 他之所以这样说,是因为营销预算已经消失了。 银行里没有钱了。 绝望开始显现。 韦伯说:“许多人问今年是否将成为我们的转折点。 我们的回答是,现在最重要的是保持专注并把握未来的机会。”

考虑到埃洛普(Elop)两年来一直在说诺基亚正在经历一年的转型,这一评论很有趣。 现在听起来,对转变的信念在公司中动摇了。 难怪,随着市场份额持续下降,市场上仍然没有足够便宜的智能手机。 诺基亚在巴塞罗那推出了Lumia 520,虽然它是该系列中最便宜的机型,价格为139欧元(180美元),但它与最便宜的Android手机无法匹敌。

媒体马戏团还在继续。 2013年7月11日,诺基亚邀请记者和博主前往纽约。 熟悉的人物走上舞台。 信息已经在互联网上泄露,诺基亚将推出一款新的照相手机。 微软工程师终于能够在Windows Phone中集成Symbian PureView怪兽相机。 Lumia 1020不仅拥有41百万像素的相机,还具有光学防抖功能和蔡司的广角光学系统。 埃洛普(Elop)吹嘘诺基亚重新发明了相机变焦。 首席执行官及其助手在大海捞针上演示了一根针的照片,这是SLR级[16]的长时间曝光,并展示了在海上拍摄的航行视频。 AT&T将开始在美国销售手机。

另一台功能完善的相机。

手机的购买者会欣赏这种完美主义吗? 诺基亚是唯一制造大量高端相机的电话制造商。 三星和苹果没有投资超级相机。

研究公司IDC的分析师亚瑟·克拉克(Arthur C. Clarke)对Lumia 1020的图像和声音质量赞不绝口:“该设备正在打破魔法的界限。”但是,克拉克也指出,智能手机竞赛将不会赢得高质量的图像和声音:“诺基亚在消费者眼中的领先优势还不足以击败竞争对手。”趋势也不支持诺基亚-新的即时摄影热潮根本不是关于图像质量的。 诸如Instagram之类的流行成像应用程序故意降低了图像质量。 尤其是年轻人喜欢在Twitter和Facebook上发布的模糊和棕褐色图像。 而且Lumia没有Instagram。

媒体想知道为什么需要超级相机。 在线杂志《 商业内幕 》( Business Insider)写道,Lumia 1020将“几乎肯定会被淘汰”。 Business Insider指出,新手机在很大程度上与已经上市的Lumia 920相同。 该网站写道,该电话“仅对需要处理巨型海报尺寸图像的人有用。”

经济不景气也阻碍了Lumia 1020的销售。 消费者推迟购买新手机或选择便宜的智能手机。 许多人认为Lumia 1020的价格过高。 带有两年服务合同的价格为300美元,约合230欧元。 同时iPhone和Galaxy S的售价为199美元。 iPhone 5的最低价格为128美元。 CNET的记者Marguerite Reardon总结道:“如果摄像机的质量确实优于市面上的其他设备,那我想考虑一下Lumia1020。请记住,即使使用了两年的AT&T,它的价格也要贵100美元左右。服务合同,而不是其他最畅销的智能手机。”

一百美元是经济不景气时的巨大差价。

2013年7月18日,诺基亚发布了中期报告。 埃洛普(Elop)说,低端Lumia 520在中国,法国,印度,泰国,英国,美国和越南起步强劲。 在4月至6月期间,Lumia的销售额为740万,是有史以来最高的季度Lumia销售额。 埃洛普(Elop)说,销售量表明Windows Phone生态系统正在积极发展。 另一个好消息是,西班牙大型网络提供商Telefónica已在其设备范围内选择了Lumia 1020。

尽管首席执行官的话很好听,但现实是严酷的。 智能手机部门刚刚亏损3200万欧元(4200万美元)。 但是,情况在一年中得到了改善-12个月前,电话部门同期亏损了3.64亿欧元(4.44亿美元)。 现在,电话业务已经成为推动诺基亚盈利的主要因素。 埃洛普(Elop)承认,卢米亚(Lumia)的定价是一个非常紧张的电话。 三星等竞争对手通过积极的促销活动来销售其旗舰机型。 诺基亚智能手机的平均售价已经从年初的191欧元(252美元)降至157欧元(206美元)。 这表明Lumia销售的大部分是价格较低的型号。

GSMArena网站于7月底发布了他们最有趣的手机清单。 Lumia 1020仅次于三星Galaxy S4。 该列表是根据手机收到的在线搜索命中次数得出的。 一个有趣的细节是廉价的诺基亚Asha 501位居第三。

7月底,诺基亚发布了另一款Lumia设备。 配备4.7英寸大屏幕的Lumia 625售价220欧元(合292美元)。 该设备似乎可以解决Lumia系列中的两个痛点:消费者希望以更便宜的价格购买大型显示器。 该设备专门针对新兴市场。 Lumia 625在全球媒体上的吸引力不及Lumia 1020,但研究公司Strategy Analytics表示,由于价格合适,因此625的销售情况良好。

夏末宣布了更多的好消息。 Windows Phone在智能手机市场上正在取得进展。

在一些国家,市场份额已经达​​到两位数。 增长最快的是法国和英国,市场份额为9%。 但是,南欧仍在经济衰退中挣扎,Lumia市场份额正在下降。 Windows Phone的份额在意大利和西班牙有所下降。 在这些国家/地区,由于价格高昂,Android手机已牢牢掌握了市场。 Android手机在欧洲占有70%的市场份额,而苹果则占18.5%。 在美国,尽管进行了所有的营销努力,Windows Phone仍未取得任何进展-它仅占美国智能手机市场的4%。 Android占51.5%,Apple占42.5%。 但是在美国,Windows的速度仍在加速。 产品的发布速度比以前更快。 Lumia手机开始提供多种价格类别。 新的Windows Phone 8软件升级支持制造更便宜但功能更强大的手机。 诺基亚人还认为,营销要比以前更好:微软和AT&T的广告活动都符合诺基亚自己的营销信息。

8月,科技新闻网站TechCrunch写道,诺基亚在Windows Phone设备中的市场份额已增加到87%。 三星和HTC被遗忘了。 TechCrunch预测,其他Windows手机制造商将很快退出市场。

垄断局面从来不是诺基亚的目标。 自从宣布Windows Phone策略以来,埃洛普(Elop)一直强调诺基亚希望推广整个生态系统。 其他制造商的消亡与该计划不符。 最糟糕的是,Lumia战略现在似乎像Symbian一样在发展:它是作为行业标准推出的,但诺基亚的主导地位正在将其他竞争对手赶走,最终整个Symbian都落入了诺基亚的怀抱。 TechCrunch还指出,诺基亚对微软的立场正变得危险。 平台供应商可以轻松地收购唯一的设备制造商。 通过购买诺基亚,微软将获得对整个生态系统的控制权。

诺基亚尚未发布Lumia的总销售量,也未汇总任何单独的销售量。

综合多种来源,我们得出的结论是,在2011年11月至2014年4月23日之间,售出了约5200万运行Windows Phone操作系统的Lumia智能手机。

三星要销售两个月的智能手机需要两个月的时间。


[15] 据前加利福尼亚州圣地亚哥的诺基亚CDMA团队成员称,诺基亚在2005年高通合同纠纷之前开发的所有CDMA手机(IS95和CDMA2000)都使用诺基亚开发的,由德州仪器制造的诺基亚芯片组。 一些带有高通芯片组的CDMA手机是由原始设备制造商(ODM)为诺基亚开发的,并在某些市场上出售,但是这些是由ODM合作伙伴完全设计和开发的,上面带有诺基亚徽标。

[16] 单镜头反光照相机。


返回目录

一直以来,诺基亚与微软合作的想法一直延伸到手机以外。 iPad平板电脑的革命使微软不寒而栗 双方都看到了这种情况的优势。 如果微软即将进行的反击成功,诺基亚将可以继续前进。 斯蒂芬·埃洛普(Stephen Elop)在选择Windows Phone操作系统后不久就开始暗示平板电脑。 2011年4月,他向公众通报了他的计划。 “目前市场上有200多种不同的平板电脑,只有其中一款做得非常好。 我不想成为市场上第201个无法从其他所有产品中分辨出来的平板电脑。 我们必须采取诺基亚独特的观点。 我们可以利用Microsoft的技术和软件,构建面向Windows的平板电脑,也可以使用我们拥有的其他一些软件资产来做事。 我们的团队目前正在评估诺基亚的正确平板电脑策略。”

媒体很快得出结论。 Windows 7的? 不太可能。 MeeGo? 不太可能。 据传适用于触摸的下一个Windows版本。 可能。

微软和诺基亚以前在计算机上进行过合作。 2008年,当人们想购买更小,更便宜的便携式设备时,计算机市场被一种新现象动摇了。 上网本成为增长最快的细分市场。 他们的产品理念是小屏幕和精简的裸露骨头结构。 重点是使用互联网-因此,通常没有硬盘,CD或DVD驱动器。

最常见的操作系统是Linux。 在2008年上半年,只有10%的上网本使用Windows。

与此同时,市场出现了爆炸式增长:2008年期间,售出了1,140万本上网本,是前一年的30倍。 PC操作系统巨头处在艰难险阻之间。 上网本正在吞噬Windows笔记本电脑的销售。 他们应该保护旧的收入来源还是追逐新的收入来源?

秉承其历史,微软追求保护主义。 它拒绝将Windows XP出售给所有上网本,或者拒绝将许可价格保持在昂贵水平。 但是,上网本的屏幕迅速变大,要求更多的功能,微软也很快拥有了自己的功能。

诺基亚在2009年涉足这一领域。它宣布了将基于Windows的上网本称为诺基亚Booklet 3G的计划。 该设备从一开始就引起混乱。 诺基亚为什么突然追逐计算机市场? 为什么它基于手机的竞争对手Windows? 毕竟:诺基亚将使用该设备实现什么目标?

诺基亚Booklet既美观又方便,但价格昂贵且性能中等。 如预期的那样,销售不佳。 时机也很差。 上网本的市场份额在2010年初达到顶峰,随着平板电脑的革命而开始迅速萎缩。 简而言之:该设备无法与其他设备区分开来,并且在错误的时间出现了。

根据埃洛普(Elop)在2011年的声明,诺基亚3G手册的错误不会在新的微软合作中重演。 但是如何?

与诺基亚设计公司合作的一位主管说,有几个平板电脑项目正在发行中。 其中包括先前提到的Meltemi平板电脑,Elop在提到诺基亚自己的软件资产时可能会提到它。 他暗示,围绕Windows本身(即Windows 7)也正在进行中的工作。

但是,从一开始最自然的选择是Windows 8,微软对iPad的回应。 有了它,诺基亚可以重新发明平板电脑,围绕它创建一种全新的设备。 产品设计负责人Marko Ahtisaari在2012年春季说,他在平板电脑上花费了约三分之一的工作时间。 Ahtisaari说,埃洛普(Elop)要求的独特设备正在开发中。 咒语是抬头的 。 在智能手机和平板电脑上的使用都应该比点击图标,将眼睛粘在屏幕上更容易。 根据Ahtisaari所说,声音将在其中发挥作用。

与诺基亚设计部门合作的一位主管说, 抬头的标语被误解为突破性的东西,例如Google Glass这样的用户界面。 在他看来,这是关于大屏幕的一般原理,大型且易于点击的Windows 8磁贴,使用设备上的按钮控制音乐播放器而不必将设备从口袋里拿出来的,以及类似的小型设备。改进后,无需斜视屏幕。

因此,埃洛普暗示即将推出的平板电脑。 2012年3月,宣布将于今年最后一个季度推出基于Windows 8的平板电脑,台湾公司仁宝电子被选为制造商。 甚至第一批的大小都是已知的:200,000个单位。

2012年6月,诺基亚的屋顶坍塌了。 微软宣布了计划推出自己的两款平板电脑,称为Surface RT和Surface Pro。

诺基亚董事会消息人士称,这一宣布对诺基亚和所有其他微软合作伙伴来说都是一个巨大的惊喜。 在诺基亚的未来计划中,它将与首款Windows Phone 8大约同时推出Windows 8平板电脑,然后将重点放在Meltemi平板电脑上。

微软发布Surface公告后,Windows平板电脑迅速从诺基亚的计划中消失了。

要了解这一打击的严峻性,需要记住当时的微软策略。 它几乎完全基于软件。 微软品牌最重要的硬件是游戏机Xbox。 其余的都是配件,例如电脑键盘。 策略的改变震惊了PC制造商,因为微软突然成为他们的竞争对手。 那诺基亚呢? 更糟。 如果微软开始基于自己的软件生产平板电脑,那么手机将在多久之前出现这种情况?

此外,在2012年夏季,诺基亚作为微软合作伙伴的特殊地位只是纸上书写。 平板电脑策略必须从头开始构建。

诺基亚决定等待。 由于他们有机会这样做,因此他们首先将等待观察Surface平板电脑和其他制造商的Windows平板电脑的销售情况。 在2012年秋天,等待的决定似乎是明智之举。 Surface平板电脑很快被证明对微软来说是一场灾难。 他们的销售从2012年10月底开始,从一开始就很差。 基于自己的Windows 8应用程序的Surface RT特别令人失望。 The basic reason was familiar: There were few Windows 8 applications, even fewer than Windows Phone applications.

In June 2013, Microsoft had to make a $900 million write-off for its Surface stock, which was one of the reasons for Steve Ballmer’s resignation/dismissal. According to market rumors, 3–5 million Surface tablets were stocked, and during the eight month period, only 1.7 million had been sold. For comparison: In November, Apple had sold 3 million iPads in 3 days, and 57 million during the whole time that Surface was on the market. However, the runaway winner was Android tablets. During July–September 2012, iPad’s market share dropped for the first time below 50%.

Nokia continued to wait.

In October 2013, the waiting came to an end. The phones division had been sold to Microsoft a couple of months earlier, but now the time was seen to be right. One could think the timing strange, because Surface and the Lumia tablet would compete fiercely against each other, despite the fact that soon, they would both be under the same roof.

According to Elop, Microsoft had nevertheless approved the launch and knew about it before the purchase of the phone business. Microsoft had seen — and still saw — that the device would differentiate itself enough from Surface tablets.

The Lumia 2520 tablet was based on the second generation of Windows 8. Elop’s hyperbole turned out to be just empty rhetoric. In reality, only three things distinguished Lumia 2520 from Surface tablets: LTE connectivity, a better processor and an additional battery in one keyboard version.

Analysis is easy in hindsight. Microsoft was the worst option for Nokia’s tablet strategy. As it stepped into the world of the Windows Phone, Nokia was the last of the large mobile phone manufacturers without a tablet. And above all: Application development for Windows phones and Windows tablets were two different worlds. Microsoft had, in fact, chosen a different strategy than its competitors. For Apple and Google, smartphones and tablets were cut from the same tree. They had the same operating system, the only difference was screen size. An application created for the phone was used in the tablet as such. And if one knew how to use the phone, using the tablet was child’s play. Microsoft drew the line in a different place. The crowning idea of Windows 8 was unifying the user experience on PCs and tablets. As explained in the beginning of this chapter with netbooks, the most important thing for the company was to protect its old bread and butter. PC users had to find it easy to switch to tablets — or even better, PCs and tablets could be morphed into the same device.

Because it chose Microsoft, Nokia was dropped off from this game. Tablets became a lost opportunity for Nokia, and a big one at that. During 2012, 116 million tablets were sold. 46 percent of those ran on Android. In 2013, 195 million devices were sold, meaning a 68 percent growth. Android’s market share had increased to 62 percent. The share of Windows tablets was a meager 2.1 percent.

Similarly, the response to Samsung’s large screen Note smartphones came late. The first two large screen Lumias were launched in Abu Dhabi at the same time as the first tablet — a couple of months after the decision to sell off the phones business.

Why so late? Because at first, Windows Phone 8 didn’t support large enough screens. And even if it did, tile sizes were uncomfortable. The third row of tiles and support for large screens became available for Windows Phone 8 with its third update in October 2013.

To top this all off, Nokia had to recall 30,000 Lumia tablet chargers for repair or replacement. The charger, manufactured by a subcontractor and sold with the device in eight countries, could give its user an electric shock. Using of the charger was to be stopped immediately.


Back to Table of contents

Mary McDowell had a difficult task ahead of her at the ExCel exhibition center in London. It was September 14, 2010. During the next thirty minutes she had to convince journalists, analysts and bloggers on the awesome future of Nokia feature phones, while they were distracted by other topics: The recently appointed Chief Executive Officer Stephen Elop, who had not shown up yet; Anssi Vanjoki, who was set to leave the company, but had once again captivated his audience like a rock star; MeeGo, which had not been mentioned at all; and Symbian and its potential improvements.

McDowell had the responsibility for leading Nokia’s cash cow: Feature phones. They were supporting Nokia, even as smartphones were underperforming. She talked about Nokia’s tough new goal: Mobile internet would be brought within the reach of the next billion consumers. McDowell said: “Nokia is proud of bringing the internet and mobile devices to people in every corner of the world. If the internet is the great equalizer, mobile is the great enabler.”

In 2010, the foundation of Nokia’s business consisted of devices priced at a few tens of euros ($30–50), with which one could make calls, send text messages, and use simple web services. Thanks to efficient production, feature phones yielded larger profit margins to Nokia than smartphones. The amazing efficiency was based on the S40 operating system, which had been introduced in 1999. Nokia conquered the world with S40. It was made possible because the system could be tailored at a low cost to mobile network providers operating in different regions. By 2012, Nokia sold 1.5 billion S40 devices across the world.

McDowell, a 46 year old American, had studied computer science at the University of Illinois. She had worked at Compaq and Hewlett-Packard before joining Nokia in 2004. She was appointed directly to the Group Executive Board, where she was the only woman. First, she led the Enterprise Solutions unit, responsible for phones targeted at business customers. In 2008, McDowell was appointed Chief Development Officer, and in summer 2010, Executive Vice President of Mobile Phones. McDowell retained her position as the leader of the Mobile Phones unit also when Elop started as CEO. Even though the market share of Nokia’s feature phones had slightly declined, McDowell’s unit was making a reasonable profit, and had promising growth opportunities. When Elop announced his new strategy in February 2011, bringing the mobile internet to a billion new users was an important part of it.

The race among the giants was, however, tightening. In January 2011, Eric Schmidt, the CEO of Google, wrote in Harvard Business Review : “As I think about Google’s strategic initiatives in 2011, I realize they’re all about mobile… But to realize that vision, Google needs to do some serious spadework on three fronts. First, we must focus on developing the underlying fast networks (generally called LTE)… Second, we must attend to the development of mobile money… Third, we want to increase the availability of inexpensive smartphones in the poorest parts of the world”

Fast networks. Mobile money. Inexpensive smartphones. The article was a direct provocation aimed at Nokia.

Speculations on the restructuring in the mobile phone business landscape heated up. Would Google buy Nokia’s mobile phone business, or even the entire company? When Nokia gave a profit warning in May 2011, due to the Symbian catastrophe, feature phones were still making a profit. In August, Nokia’s mobile phone market share had collapsed from 30.3% to 22.8%. Nokia was still the largest manufacturer in the world, in terms of volume. It had shipped 97.9 million units in the second half, whereas Samsung had shipped 69.8 million phones.

In September, Nokia announced that its feature phone production in Europe would come to its end. The factory in Cluj, Romania, would be closed down by the end of the year. Henceforth, inexpensive phones would be manufactured in Asia, as their markets were there. In addition to the factories in China and India, a new factory would be built in Vietnam. A person who worked in Nokia Communications remembers having seen Elop unusually nervous in Cluj. Elop spoke to the factory staff via an interpreter. The audience, who had heard about the termination, were naturally hostile. The mobile phones business still looked promising: In the same month Niklas Savander, the executive responsible for the sales and marketing of devices, estimated that the demand for feature phones was on the rise.

The most significant markets for Nokia’s mobile phones were in India. Nokia made a critical mistake in bringing dual-SIM phones late to the market. According to Ramashish Ray, who was responsible for retail sales in India, Nokia was two years late: “Slow reaction to market reality, leadership bureaucracy and the diffusion of the decision making to too many forums”, Ray lists the reasons for the delay of the dual-SIM phones.

Dual-SIM devices became wildly popular in India, as they allowed several people to share a single device. In addition, patchy network coverage could be improved by using SIM cards of two different network providers. Nokia announced its first dual-SIM phone in August 2010, and shipped 18 million of them to sales points during the third quarter of 2011. This was larger than Apple’s global iPhone sales during the same period. Typical to Nokia, volumes were great, but competitors moved even faster. Samsung had time to fill the Indian market with its own dual-SIM phones right under Nokia’s nose.

Nokia Money was also popular in India. The project began when Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo was at the helm. The goal was to develop a simple payment solution to inexpensive mobile phones, and thus enable the disadvantaged in developing countries to become users of financial services. Out of the 6.6 billion people in the world, only one billion had bank accounts back then, whereas four billion were mobile phone users. In the Indian countryside, for example, cash transfers were made through couriers carrying piles of cash. Payments using mobile phones would bring money transfers to the present day. Mary McDowell had acted as the godmother for the project, which raised great expectations. More than a hundred people were developing the service. Obopay, an American company developing mobile payment applications, was involved in the project. Nokia Money was one of the fastest growing mobile services at Nokia. Tens of thousands of financial service agents were selling it to consumers.

Elop spoke about Nokia Money in excited tones still in the beginning of 2011. A person who worked with Nokia Money in Oulu in Northern Finland remembers how feelings were conflicted when other Oulu Nokians were brought to the slaughterhouse at the former premises of the butcher house Atria to be notified about their layoffs, while at the same time, Nokia Money was presented as exemplary.

The hype was short-lived. The interviewee was negotiating the launch of the service in South-East Asia in summer 2011, when he got a call from the headquarters: Come home. Nokia Money would be ramped down. According to the interviewee, Nokia Money became a victim of a strategic choice, ie focusing on smartphones and shortsighted cost cuts. The added value from Nokia Money could not be proven as fast as Elop’s penny-watching watchdogs would have liked. He reminds that it is easy to calculate that WiFi adds 25 cents of value to the mobile phone, but determining the value-add for a service is much more complicated.

Later, Nokia Money continued its life in a company called Mobile Mistral Oyj. Sports Tracker, an application that later became a success, had been carved out in the same way earlier.

London, October 26, 2011. Asha phones were presented to the audience at Nokia World. Asha is a Sanskrit word for hope. Asha was indeed the planned means to get to the next billion mobile internet users. Asha was supposed to have all the goodies that a consumer in developing markets could want: A five-megapixel camera, touch screen and full QWERTY keyboard. Dual-SIM. Music player and a battery lasting 52 hours.

The price of an Asha varied between 60 and 115 euros ($75–150). They were more expensive than the cheapest Nokia feature phones, but clearly more affordable than smartphones. In terms of features, they were similar to smartphones. Nokia again tried its recipe for success: Slightly more reliable and more stylish phones compared to competitors, and features that should appeal to an Indian or Chinese consumer.

At the same event, Nokia also announced their cooperation with Rovio. It was an attempt to inject some strength into the flagging S40 platform with the Angry Birds game. It was also included on Asha devices. Rovio’s marketing director Peter Vesterbacka said he believed that the growth of Angry Birds will accelerate along with S40. At the London press conference, Elop emphasized how hard it was to implement a sophisticated design at massive volumes. It certainly was, but could the consumer appreciate the effort?

Nokia had had a strong foothold in India for a long time. Hopping on to a bus at Delhi airport in the early 2000s, the most common ringtone one heard was the Nokia tune. Nokia leaders got an audience with the minister of telecommunications with one phone call. Nokia had been one of the best-known foreign brands in India. The situation started to change in 2010. Nokia tune became increasingly rare in Delhi each year. Nokia offered Asha feature phones at the price of a cheap Android smartphone, which was a lost cause from the beginning. Samsung’s Rex basic phones were disrupting from the other end of the price range, as their price-quality ratio was perceived to be better than Asha’s. Until then, Nokia’s low-end devices had brought retailers large volumes and commissions. But now the rising Android manufacturers one-upped them. Samsung spent significantly more on marketing and lubricating retailers. Indian phone manufacturers saved on components and software, and the quality varied a lot, whereas Nokia emphasized quality to the bitter end. When the going got tough, the nice kid did not make the grade anymore.

February 27, 2012. At Mobile World Congress in Barcelona, Nokia presented three new Asha models and two new Lumia smartphones. Nokia’s share price dropped almost six percent on the Helsinki stock exchange. Nokia’s new models did not convince investors.

In April of the same year, Nokia announced the results of the first quarter. It was a sad read. The most crushing news came from China: The revenue of mobile phones had dropped by 70%. The S40 models did not please the Chinese too much.

Magnus Rehle, a former analyst with the Nordic network provider Telia-Sonera, said that the problem in China was the inability to attract small application developers. The phone must have global services such as Facebook and Twitter, but also needs local apps. The game is lost without them. Another mistake in China, according to Rehle, was spreading the efforts over too many fronts. There was demand for affordable smartphones, but Nokia pushed feature phones to the market. Nokia brand as such still had a lot of value in China. Rehle believes that had Nokia sold affordable smartphones equipped with relevant applications under its brand, and not Ashas disguised as smartphones, there would have been a guaranteed demand.

On an investor call related to the quarterly review, Elop bravely reiterated that experiences with Asha were encouraging. He promised that Nokia would invest significantly in the research and development of feature phones. Chief Financial Officer Timo Ihamuotila assured that Nokia’s profitability in feature phones would remain competitive. The management did what they could to reassure investors, who were losing their last hope with Nokia.

June 2012. Layoff of 10,000 Nokia employees. Mary McDowell had to leave, too. Her role as head of Mobile Phones was filled by Timo Toikkanen, 46. Toikkanen, a lawyer by education, had led Nokia’s business in Hong Kong, China, Middle East and Africa. Previously, he had been responsible for strategic operations and business development. In Hong Kong, he had served as the chairman of the Finnish Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong, as the vice-chairman of the European Chamber of Commerce, and as a member of the Executive Committee of the Hong Kong Wireless Technology Industry Association. He was networked deep into the Asian business elite.

Operational leaders had now been changed. However, more radical measures were needed, as the situation had become unbearable.

Nokia was still missing a smartphone priced at under 100 euros ($130). 必须要做些事情。 In September 2012, Nokia presented a new model: The Asha 309. At the same time, Nokia announced that Ashas equipped with a touch screen were smartphones from then onwards. Nokia’s official Conversations blog said: “The new devices offer a fluid ‘swipe’ user interface and an open environment for third-party app development — characteristics that have earned the complete Asha Touch range full smartphone classification from global market research companies and analysts such as GfK and IDC.”

The view was well justified from a technical point-of-view: The new Asha models had maps, a touch screen, WiFi, internet radio, an improved browser and Facebook and Twitter applications. If the popular Ashas would really be considered as smartphones, it would revolutionize the market shares. The smart Ashas could get Nokia back into the major league, at least on paper.

The announcement still smelled fishy. Would consumers buy it?

In October 2012, Nokia announced its third quarter results. Asha sales were strong. Sales of feature phones had increased by three million units in three months, even though Wall Street had expected a decline. The position in developing markets looked good, for a change. Many old competitors, such as Motorola and Sony Ericsson, had entirely abandoned the production of cheap mobile phones. Nokia faced local competitors, such as Spice and Micromax in India, which had products of lower quality than Nokia had. Nokia was bringing its maps services to cheaper models, which could squeeze competitors even further. Even Europeans suffering from a downturn were buying Nokia’s cheap models, which was positive as well. The ten percent increase in Nokia’s European sales volumes was a testament to this.

“Nokia is back in the game in feature phones”, estimated the British analyst Neil Mawston in the Finnish newspaper Helsingin Sanomat in November 2012. In the same article, Elop said that Nokia had sold 6.5 million Asha devices during the previous summer. According to Gartner, Nokia was still the second largest mobile phone manufacturer after Samsung. Samsung’s market share was 22.9% and Nokia’s 19.2%, taking smartphones and feature phones together. The difference was not that great. However, profitability separated Samsung from Nokia. The Korean giant sold both smartphones and cheaper devices evenly, whereas Nokia’s sales were mostly cheap phones. Nokia had dropped to a marginal seventh position in smartphones. From July to September, out of the nearly 200 million smartphones sold globally, less than 3 million were Lumia devices. The industry at large did not go along with Nokia’s self-imposed decision to classify the more expensive Ashas as smartphones,. As Ashas were built on top of the S40 feature phone platform, most industry analysts had decided to classify them as feature phones.

Worse still, the growth of the mobile phone market had stopped. In the fall, 428 million units were sold, compared to 441 million a year earlier. On top of that, a growing share of the phones sold were cheap smartphones. Those, which Nokia did not have. The price level of phones was declining across the board. If a smartphone would cost 70–100 euros ($90–130) going forward, Nokia would need to lower the price of its feature phones to 30–60 euros ($40–80). It would be the final blow to the profit margins.

The Nokia wagon was hurtling down the slope, but Nokians tried to find joy in the smallest achievements. Christmas sales had gone well — in Finland. Asha had become a hit. In addition to the flagship devices, such as iPhone and Lumia, Santa carried cheap phones designed for the Indian market, in his bag. Asha appealed to the youth, because it was preloaded with Angry Birds.


The tenth of January 2013 was a happy day for the Finnish economy. Nokia issued a positive profit warning. Big headlines made a reappearance in the reports of business journalists. They were truly enjoying being finally able to write positive news on Nokia. The Mobile Phones unit and the Lumia range had beaten expectations. More than 14 million Ashas and Lumias had been sold. Nokia’s share price price rose by a stunning 16 percent. In a BBC interview, Ian Fogg, an analyst with IHS, estimated that Asha would be one of the winners in the future. Fogg reminded that as much as a third of all phones sold in the world in 2016 would be affordable smartphones. Access to e-mail and internet would be sufficient for a growing segment of the world’s population. Only those wanting great gaming capabilities and fast internet connectivity would opt for an expensive smartphone.

The good fortune lasted for two weeks. On January 25, 2013, Nokia reported a barely profitable 2012. The income was entirely due to Nokia Siemens Networks. The device business reported a loss that was nearly as large — 700 million euros ($920 million). Phone sales volumes were still large, 336 million units in the previous year, but profitability had evaporated. The former ruler of the mobile device business still pushed out large volumes, as in the old days, but was no longer bringing money in. The business had turned into a fool’s game, which undeniably showed up in the bottom line.

In the days following, the market research firm Strategy Analytics published information on mobile phone producers’ market shares. Nokia’s share had decreased significantly in both smartphones and feature phones. Samsung had extended its lead as the largest phone maker in the world. The Korean company put on a fantastic performance with their phones: In three months, almost four billion euros ($5.3 billion). Nokia’s phones were loss-making. The leadership of the phone business had moved from Espoo to Seoul, South Korea. There was also a worrying rumor about Apple’s affordable iPhone. Bloomberg and Wall Street Journal wrote that Apple was seriously planning a sub-$200 iPhone. There was a common belief in the industry, that if this were to happen, there would be severe consequences especially to Nokia, which had a tight cost control, as well as to RIM and HTC. Gartner estimated that the mobile phone game during the ongoing year would be tighter than it had been earlier. Gartner still believed that Nokia would be able to raise the number of applications and the prices of devices, which would help the company back on the path of growth. Nokia was after all, still the second largest device manufacturer.

In February 2013, at the Mobile World Congress in Barcelona, Nokia announced Asha 105, priced at 15 euros ($20). Its predecessor, Nokia 1280, had sold 120 million units worldwide. The low price was a surprise. In terms of quality, Asha would easily beat its similarly priced Chinese competitors. Elop reminded that there were still 2.7 billion people in the world, who did not have a mobile phone. Asha 305, which had been launched the previous summer, was chosen as the best mobile phone of the show. Two other Nokia phones were also candidates to win the prize. Nokia’s expertise in feature phones was still valued.

In February, Nokia launched a new dual-SIM device. Asha 310, priced at 100 euros ($137), would start to sell during the first quarter in Asia, India, Middle East, Africa and Brazil. However, the dual-SIM market was lost. In March, the newspaper Hindu Business Line reported that D. Shivakumar was let go. He had been responsible for Nokia’s operations in India from 2006 to 2011. In April, market research firm GfK-Nielsen revealed that Samsung had surpassed Nokia in India. Psychologically, it was a heavy piece of news. At its highest, Nokia’s market share had been 80 percent. The newspaper Economic Times of India estimated that Samsung’s overtaking was due to its strong reinforcement of the product portfolio. The Samsung Rex phone had become tremendously popular in India. In the news article, Nokia’s former sales director Sunil Dutt wondered how Nokia’s fall by the wayside was possible in just six years.

India caused other problems as well. During early 2013, the Indian tax authorities had taken the bookkeeping of the Chennai factory under their magnifying glass. They suspected that Nokia had been avoiding taxes. The newspaper Hindu Business Line reported that the unpaid taxes in question amounted to a hundred million euros ($140 million). The Sriperumbudur factory was located close to the city of Chennai, and for instance, Asha devices were manufactured there. Telecom companies had come under close scrutiny of Indian tax inspectors. For example, the giant network provider Vodafone faced tax payment demands in the range of a billion dollars, based on an acquisition completed years earlier.

April 2013. The first quarterly review threw cold water on shareholders. The profitability in feature phones had finally collapsed. Nokia had sold 55 million mobile phones in the three-month period from January to March, compared to 70 million a year earlier. The forward-looking statements by the management indicated that the problems in feature phones were expected to continue. The sales in China had collapsed already at the beginning of the year, and it seemed that Middle East and Africa would follow. One reason was that the feature phone stock of Asian network providers had grown too large. Consumers increasingly shied away from buying cheap feature phones, instead opting to buy affordable smartphones. Network providers emptied their stock more slowly than before, and did not purchase new devices from Nokia.

Despite everything, Elop was smiling his famous smile in May 2013 in Delhi. Nothing in his appearance revealed the crisis. India was going under. Samsung had invested $1 billion for marketing Rex in India. Nokia did not have the weapons to respond to such a strike. According to Ramashish Ray, Asha was a decent product, but its fate was to lack the kind of partners in India that Symbian had had. With Symbian volumes, Nokia had been able to get the best players in the business as partners. Along with the collapse in volumes, Nokia had now lost these partners.

Nokia still had an ace up their sleeve. In Delhi, Nokia’s gospel was that Asha was not just a phone, but also an operating system that would replace S40. Improving Asha was possible thanks to an acquisition Nokia had made. In November 2011, Nokia had half-secretly acquired the Norwegian software company Smarterphone, which had a product of the same name. According to their marketing, it made all phones smart. The acquisition had become public in the first half of 2012. Now that Ashas had touch screens, they would start to resemble smartphones even more, with the help of Smarterphone. The most important innovation was the swiping technique, which meant that one could use Ashas with the convenient swipe movement familiar from smartphones. The new Asha operating system, based on Smarterphone, became the replacement for both S40 and Meltemi at the same time. Peter Skillman, who had worked on MeeGo and N9, had designed the user interface.

Asha, Nokia’s last hope.

In July, Nokia reported their quarterly results as usual. The Nokia group had made a profit of 243 million euros ($316 million) during the second quarter. The result was clearly better than what the analysts expected. A year earlier, the company had floundered in a loss of 377 million euros ($479 million). The phone business still looked sad. It had made a loss of 32 million euros ($42 million), even though the situation had improved from the previous year, which was in the red by 364 million euros ($462 million). Smartphones were losing money, feature phones barely breaking even. Even though the volumes had not significantly declined, the revenue had collapsed. Phones were dumped at rock-bottom prices.

Elop announced that the Mobile Phones unit would start the statutory negotiations for reducing jobs. Layoffs threatened 440 people working for the unit of which 160 in Finland. The remaining 500 people in Oulu were most afraid. Nokia had tried to move feature phone software development from Oulu to China already for years. Everything else had been transferred already: Mechanics, production and component manufacturing. S40 development had stayed in Oulu for the reason that no programmer in Nokia’s R&D site in China wanted to work with an antiquated operating system.

In the investor call, Elop repeated the familiar refrain like a parrot: Significant measures had been taken, stock levels had been lowered, further statutory negotiations for personnel reductions are on the way. The next Ashas would offer a completely new customer experience. But at that stage, it was all too late.

The fall of feature phones was the final nail in the coffin to Nokia’s phone business. After that, the only option left was selling the business. Feature phones had supported Nokia through the difficult years, and prevented a complete crisis. As late as in 2011, feature phones brought profits of 1.5 billion euros ($2 billion). In 2012, it had dropped to half a billion ($0.7 billion). In 2013, the feature phones barely made a profit, and in 2014, according to estimates, the business will result in heavy losses for Microsoft.

Many interviewees said that Nokia left S40 adrift, despite many efforts. When it still had money to spend, the management focused on smartphones, and under-invested in S40. When the bad years started, the cost cuts were applied first to the feature phone platform. The interviewees thought that the opposite should have been done: Put all the effort on feature phones once it was noticed that the smartphone game was lost.

Another problem was the price level of affordable devices, which had reached unprecedentedly low levels. According to the Swedish analyst Helena Nordman-Knutson, Nokia was unable to get involved in the fiercest price war, due to its heavy cost structure. The Mobile Phone organization was too expensive to sell phones at a bargain.

Looking at the offering from the point of view of an Indian or Chinese buyer, it was easy to see why Nokia could not compete. In 2012, it was possible to get an Android device by a local manufacturer for even under $50. With $50–150 one could purchase a Samsung-like branded Android device with a five-inch high-resolution display, eight megapixel camera, dual-core processor and the versatile Android ecosystem. Nokia’s response was the Asha construction built on top of S40, at almost the same price, but with a smaller display, no dual-core processor, and fewer megapixels and applications.


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The news was devastating. Two out of three would lose their jobs. The personnel at Salo factory were invited to an internal info session on February 8, 2012. Production personnel numbering 1,600 were requested to join the session. Everyone had been anxiously waiting for news since the previous fall, and now it was happening. A chapter of Finnish industrial history was about to close: The factory at Salo would cease to manufacture phones and the production would be transferred to Asia. Only a limited crew involved with research and development, as well as smartphone customization would remain in Salo. Ready-made Windows phones would be brought in, onto which Finnish workers would install the software and package the phones.

The announcement was downright humiliating to Salo personnel. Salo was the place where Fjalar Nordell and Lauri Koskinen had launched radio receiver production in 1928. This was where Salora had started the production of black and white television sets. This was where Mobira had developed and manufactured the first car phones, and Salo had given birth to Cityman, Nokia’s first handheld mobile device in 1987. Not to mention the millions and millions of NMT and GSM phones manufactured there.

The info session was understood to be exceptionally grave. After the session, which started at 10 o’clock, the rest of the day was announced to be paid leave, which was totally unheard of.


What put an end to the Salo factory? Why was Salo no longer profitable?

Salo was the most modern of Nokia’s production facilities. The equipment and the production process were top notch. The true strength, however, were the people who had manufactured mobile phones for 25 years. The knowhow and the integrity of the personnel were unparalleled on a global scale. The efficiency of the production was world class. For example, when Lumia 800 and 900 phones were manufactured, there were never any factory-related problems.

According to a director who knew the Salo factory intimately, the problem was the process for designing the production of phones, which was outdated. Salo simply got going with the production slower than the competition. Apple could get started with a production batch of one million phones in one day. In Salo, it took 8 to 12 weeks before similar production figures could be reached. This was not because of the factory, though, according to the director, but because of Nokia’s production process was initially planned in 2003–2005 period when it was sufficient to get phones out in smaller batches. The first batch was sold in Europe and then onto Asia.

When Elop joined in 2010, the mentality was largely the same, and Salo was Nokia’s Golden Child. The head of production and logistics, Juha Putkiranta, had referred to a new way of working in February 2010. This was piloted in Salo, because the factory was a forerunner in all inventions related to Nokia’s material flow. He explained how the market and Nokia’s strategy had changed. Smartphones were to be delivered, ready and tailored, to the network providers and large distributors. The software package would already contain applications and market-specific content, for example, maps. Salo concentrated on manufacturing phones, fast and efficiently, in small batches. Generic large-scale manufacturing, producing components and the setting of the printed circuit boards was centralized to the large factories in Asia. The production cycle needed to be sped up, because customers’ plans kept changing all the time.

In September 2010, the future of Salo looked bright. A month earlier, the temporary layoffs for the fall had been called off, and the factory was hiring new staff, because the N8 smartphones were being produced for the Christmas market. The deputy chief employee representative, Marjo Kallio, announced how satisfied she was because the remaining staff in Salo was fully occupied.


Elop had a major chip on his shoulder with Salo. He understood the symbolic value of the factory and wanted to avoid, to the very end, upsetting Finns in their home territory. After having spent half a year at Nokia, in an internal personnel meeting he assured that Salo factory would remain. Nokia needed more production capacity. The employees were satisfied with the news. Many said Elop’s speech had strengthened their faith in the future. Union representatives said they had interpreted the overall sentiment to be such that the personnel could look forward with relative confidence to keeping their jobs.

In April 2011, when Nokia announced the massive layoffs as a result of the Windows strategy, the 3,800 staff at Salo sighed in relief. Executive Vice President of Markets Niklas Savander, announced that manufacturing is a critical competitive advantage in the future business. Salo would remain as a factory manufacturing smartphones, even if the new factory in Vietnam was already in the planning.

When the hammer fell in February 2012 and the layoffs were announced, Elop still highlighted how important the Salo factory was for Nokia: “Despite the reductions that are underway, the Salo factory and the product development done in Salo will continue to play a significant role”, he formulated. In hindsight, the statement cannot be said to have been very honest. Internally, Elop had begun to make it clear that phone manufacturing must be made faster. If he had announced publicly that phone manufacturing in developed countries is no longer profitable, he could have saved face. With the path he took, he managed to both anger the Finns and got a label of goal-oriented, foreign, restructuring man.

All it took was four months before the whole Salo factory was on the kill list. The last 870 workers were made redundant, and the only thing remaining in Salo was the research and development of Lumia phones.

According to a director who knew the factory well, June 14, 2012 was the saddest day of his life. He also remembers the head of production Juha Putkiranta to have been thrown off by the news. “Still, from a purely business angle, it was the right decision. If the phones are not selling, how can you keep up the factory?” The director also estimates that if Nokia had been just a little better off, financially — not even profitable, but if the losses were smaller — and taking into account the strengths of the factory, Salo would have remained a part of the production chain. But the whole production model of Nokia had become old-fashioned. There was simply no money left to keep the factory running. It was Nokia’s largest asset.

The last mobile phone manufactured in Salo was made on Wednesday, July 25, 2012. It was either an N9 or Lumia 800, the chief union representative could not publicly say exactly which.

The city of Salo, once the symbol of Nokia’s growth, had taken its crown jewel for granted all these years. The city elders had built town halls, daycare centers and schools with the tax money, and the influx of people into Salo had been downright chronic. On top of the municipal services, the city had also invested in housing. The tables, however, had already turned a few years earlier, and problems had started to accumulate. Nokia’s downfall manifested itself as increasing health problems. Temporary and permanent layoffs were clearly taking their toll in the demand for health services. Increasing alcohol abuse was visible in the extent of support families needed. Child welfare services could no longer handle all the cases within the statutory time limits.

In January 2012, the city’s Chief Financial Officer, Seppo Juntti, took a very grim view in the local newspaper Salon Seudun Sanomat , and stated that he believed the tax income would not turn into a growth path ever again. Nokia’s gradual disappearance was even visible in the amount of waste. When Nokia Salo factory’s waste compactor had been emptied at least daily, now it was emptied only once per month.

In February, Salo town hall hosted a low-spirited information sharing session. Smartphone production at Salo factory would cease. In the information sharing session, there were Finnish minister of economic affairs, Jyri Häkämies, minister of labor, Lauri Ihalainen and city mayor, Antti Rantakokko present. Both Nokia and representatives of the Finnish state expressed their wishes that the mostly female labour force, now made redundant at the Salo factory, could find new employment in social and health services. Häkämies saw potential in bringing IT knowhow into the health and the energy sector. The chances of finding new employment were slim, however. Most of the 500-odd people to be laid off, had no qualifications. The city planned to start a business park into the factory premises left empty by Nokia, in the same way as forestry company UPM had done in Kajaani.

Salo was already identified as a city impacted by industry restructuring. The minister of economic affairs, Jyri Häkämies, said that the Finnish government would start a rescue programme during the same spring to save the Finnish IT sector, because altogether 5,000 IT jobs were disappearing from Finland within the time span of one year, and on top, 1,000 people were made redundant from Nokia Salo factory. As engines to drive the rescue mission, the Finnish state had requested that Nokia, Nokia Siemens Networks and Accenture would join in.

Nokia tried to encourage the people made redundant by saying that on previous rounds, the people who were made redundant had already given birth to 100 new enterprises. This time the situation was different: The majority of people made redundant from Salo factory were women who had no or very little qualifications. Many had worked nowhere else than Nokia.

Nokia, the city of Salo, local work and economic development office, and Yrityssalo, a business incubator owned by the city of Salo, launched an information sharing office in Nokia premises. Regional Centre for Economic Development, ELY-keskus, estimated that most of the people made redundant from Salo, would have to refresh their skills and even retrain into a new profession.

For the mayor Antti Rantakokko, the summer and early fall were spent extinguishing flames in the smoking ruins. After the factory had permanently closed its doors, the city council came together in a crisis meeting at the town hall. At that time, the unemployment rate was estimated to rise to 20 percent. The goal was to create 1,000 new jobs to replace the 2,000 lost Nokia jobs.

It took an additional six months to bring the whole production down. Nokia started selling the Meriniitty facilities in Salo and in October, a pharmaceutical company Orion announced that they would purchase a part of the facilities and start a packaging and logistics center in the premises.

Lumia research and development continued to employ 1,500 staff. In May 2013, the Nokia Conversations blog wrote that for example, the new model Lumia 925 was largely designed by them.

The demise of the Nokia factory was a huge blow to Salo. The unemployment rate was 11.3% at the end of 2012. Temporary layoff numbers were up to 3,500. The local work and employment center estimated that unemployment figures would rise to 15.5%. In September 2013, when Nokia announced that they would sell the mobile phones business to Microsoft, Salo representative of senior salaried employers, Mika Paukkeri, frankly stated he was afraid the decision would deliver a death blow to the entire city. At that point in time, Salo had 1,200 employers left. It sounded a bit grotesque when Paukkeri continued to say that the Nokians in Salo still had trust in soon-to-be former CEO Elop.


Nokia did not manage to bring down Oulu as profoundly as Salo, because the people who were laid off there had higher education levels. When the engine started coughing and finally stopped running, almost completely, the northern university city of Oulu was faced with a different kind of problem: Where and what is the new road to success? Nokia had started a research program together with Oulu University in the beginning of the millennium and the growth had been phenomenal. The northern Shangri-La had experienced the first crack in the veneer only in July 2010, when Nokia announced the sales of the wireless modems business to Japanese Renesas Electronics. 1,100 former Nokians moved to Renesas, 450 of which worked in Oulu. The personnel information sharing session was held in one of the university lecture halls, and the Chief Operations Officer of Renesas, Shinichi Yoshioka, came to the session in person. People transferring from Nokia to Renesas were in shock, but the overall sentiment was relief: Operations would continue with familiar people and nobody would be laid off.

In August 2010, Nokia and Intel established a joint research centre in Oulu. A few dozen researchers were employed there, and this was seen as a sign of Finland still being a potential incubator of high technology. The centre developed 3D mobile applications, and, for example, games, and holograms which were aimed to improve the usability and the user experience of mobile phones. The CTO of Intel, Justin Rattner, and Nokia’s CTO, Rich Green, praised the 3D knowhow of the personnel in Oulu. They both saw big potential for this skill in, for example, the clothing industry.

In February 2011, Oulu saw not only a record-breaking cold spell, but also the advisor to Microsoft CEO, Orlando Ayla. The event was held, apparently by chance, a day after Elop had said that Nokia had chosen Windows. In Oulu, people thought that the local IT coalition had a million dollar opportunity to start jointly developing software with Microsoft. The American company was interested in the 3D and cloud applications developed in Oulu. Microsoft hoped that Nokians would train their staff quickly in these fields.

Nokia employed approximately 2,000 staff in Oulu at that point and additionally, 300 IT companies in the region were dependent on Nokia.

On February 21, 2011 Elop made appeasing visits to Tampere and Oulu. The visits were shrouded in secrecy. Elop quickly slipped away from the press in both places. Elop took a private jet to Oulu in the afternoon, quickly got out of the cab and went in by the side door to Nokia’s premises in Peltola. Those present in the information sharing session got very little out of the man.

At the end of April, 2011 the big bang came. Symbian and MeeGo development in Oulu would cease, and hundreds of people would be laid off. The development of the basic S30 and S40 phones would remain. Oulu mayor Matti Pennanen bravely commented on Nokia’s decision to outsource Symbian development to Accenture. Pennanen said that the decision would give a chance to develop new business. He emphasized that the knowhow had not disappeared anywhere and now would be the chance to make room for new business.

In June, the next wave of crushing news hit. 500 to 600 jobs would be at risk. The executive vice president of human resources, Juha Äkräs, calmed down Nokians by ensuring that Salo, Oulu, Tampere and capital region would have strategic significance, also in the future.

在国外,埃洛普(Elop)的死亡打击与芬兰一样严重。 第一位受害者是罗马尼亚的克卢日工厂。 关闭工厂使2200名工人多余。 2011年9月,诺基亚表示,诺基亚正在重新评估萨罗工厂以及匈牙利的Komarom和墨西哥的雷诺萨的长期未来作用,因为销售不佳意味着即使在关闭罗马尼亚之后,诺基亚仍然有产能过剩的情况。在生产中。 墨西哥的工厂服务于美洲大陆,匈牙利的工厂与萨洛服务于欧洲。 两家工厂都被裁员,裁员3000人,其中2300人在匈牙利。 裁员对匈牙利和斯洛伐克的劳动力市场都产生了重大影响,诺基亚匈牙利约有1/3的劳动力来自斯洛伐克。

在德国,关闭了雇用700名员工的Meltemi部门,这使当地人感到愤怒。 诺基亚仅在三个月前就向乌尔姆承诺提供更多工作。 诺基亚艰难的决策令人惊讶。

埃洛普还重组了研发部门。 他认为,该研究网络在地理上分布得太广且介于两者之间。 因为已经在多个地方开发了一种产品或软件,所以斧头又被摆动了。 哥本哈根产品开发中心关闭。 在英国,网站的数量被削减了。 在美国,怀特普莱恩斯(White Plains)办事处被关闭,并且业务集中在加利福尼亚的桑尼维尔。 Windows Phone产品开发集中在坦佩雷,萨洛,北京和圣地亚哥。

这份清单很长,人类遭受的痛苦无法估量。 诺基亚可能是近年来负责世界经济裁员最多的公司之一。

与在美国上市的公司或中国血汗工厂相比,诺基亚仍然以堪称典范的方式解决了裁员问题。 2011年,诺基亚启动了一项名为“桥梁”的全球计划,为被解雇的人们寻找新作品。 该计划的倡议来自负责公司关系和责任的执行副总裁埃斯科·阿霍(Esko Aho)。 埃洛普立即支持这个想法。 想法是减轻打击,这被认为是诺基亚价值观的一部分,以支持被裁员的人员。

人员可以采取五种路径之一。 他们是在诺基亚内部进行再就业,在诺基亚以外进行再就业,成为企业家,接受培训或“创造自己的道路”。

那些选择成立一家初创企业的人可以获得诺基亚资助的未来股东最多25,000欧元(36,500美元)的支持,每个初创企业的最高支持金额定为100,000欧元(146,000美元)。 被解雇的人可获得额外的1-1.5年的遣散费。 诺基亚还将为公司在银行的信用帐户提供担保。 该程序在商业领域异常利他。 在接受芬兰报纸Taloussanomat的采访时,各种员工代表组织都不记得有哪家公司会尽可能支持下岗人员创办的新公司。

培训包括在寻找新工作,变更教练和新职业培训方面的咨询。 诺基亚人还获得了自己的招聘服务,该服务为外部公司的下岗人员寻求合适的工作,并为其他公司提供专家。

桥梁计划花费了数千万欧元。

2014年2月发布的一项关于Bridge计划的研究表明,该计划是成功的。 该计划的范围内总共有18,000个诺基亚人,其中有5,000个在芬兰。 在一年半的时间里,其中70%找到了新工作。 已经创建了约400家创业公司,其中有550名诺基亚人参与其中。 阿尔托大学进行了一项研究,根据该研究,有43%的人同意以下说法:“我很长时间以来一直想创办自己的公司,现在我有机会。”首都有170家新公司成立。在奥卢(Oulu)超过100,在坦佩雷(Tampere)超过80,在萨洛(Salo)超过65。 最知名的初创公司是Jolla,如果没有Bridge计划的资金,就无法诞生。 一半的新公司在软件行业中运营。

诺基亚不仅因其财务支持而获得赞誉,而且因被裁员的人的灵活态度而获得赞誉。

“最重要的是,他们鼓励了我们,没有试图阻止我们。 他们可以通过参考有关非竞争条款的法律或类似的条款来停止新公司的成立。 但是,它们对我们开放,我们也对它们开放,这就是我们能够继续使用MeeGo的方式。”荷拉的创始人之一马克·狄龙(Marc Dillon)说。

某些选择创业的人无疑会利用这种可能性来获得优势,并花了更多时间思考自己的未来。 到2013年底,当财务支持终止时,大多数公司只雇用了1-3名员工,并且其中一些公司无疑已经停止营业。 这不会降低Bridge程序的应有的价值。 在最初的三年中,约有一半的芬兰初创企业会倒闭。

桥梁计划在国外享有盛名。 欧盟委员会开始基于Bridge计划,研究是否可以将类似的模型应用于在IT和通信行业运营的欧洲其他公司解雇人员的情况,以及劳动力供求问题。 。 Esko Aho将Bridge计划带入了哈佛大学的课程,后来又去了那里。 桥梁计划是大型公司如何在大规模裁员中履行社会责任的一个例子。


返回目录

斯蒂芬·埃洛普(Stephen Elop)来自一个工作可以为您提供财务安全和地位的世界-但除此之外,还没有其他。 如果您厌倦了硅谷的雇主,则只需走在街对面并加入另一家初创公司或高科技公司。 相比之下,诺基亚对诺基亚人的影响更大,因为芬兰的就业市场要小得多。 芬兰只有少数几家全球性的上市公司,而且几乎所有的上市公司都是在企业对企业市场上运作的。 如果您对诺基亚的工作感到厌倦,那么埃斯波只有一家成功的国际公司可以利用您的才能,这就是电梯制造商通力。 在2010年,将诺基亚留给Outotec,美卓或UPM-Kymmene等工业公司的心理障碍很高,许多人仍然相信诺基亚会反弹。

萨罗和奥卢等小城市的情况甚至更糟。 由于该地区的任何人才都涌向诺基亚拥有5000名员工的园区,因此诺基亚几乎消除了萨罗的所有其他制造工作。 同样,诺基亚是迄今为止奥卢最大的雇主,奥卢是拥有一所主要技术大学的北部经济中心,而且在诺基亚开始工作的新的大学毕业生将继续在那里工作超过十年并不少见。

Mikko Merihaara就是其中一位毕业生。 “对于许多人来说,奥卢(Oulu)没有诺基亚以外的其他实际就业选择。 明确的重点是确保奥卢站点不会因其他站点之间的竞争而丢失,并且始终希望确保奥卢是芬兰最好的站点。”

在2000年代初期,年轻的诺基亚人的生活很美好。 大多数员工都在20多岁左右,没有自己的家人,因此下班后与同事一起出去很自然。 诺基亚为其员工组织了一系列持续的聚会和社交活动,以至于您可以挑选最适合参加的活动。 该公司发展迅速,在商务舱或休息室的Playstation上的花费并不是问题。 年轻的专业人​​士还能期望什么?

人力资源资深人士SallaJämsä在诺基亚的许多不同部门工作过,他认为诺基亚的良好团队合作精神是成功招聘的结果,并且只能回想起诺基亚职业生涯中确实很难与之共事的几个人。 诺基亚的同事相处得很好,下班后一起度过时光也是很自然的。 诺基亚是第二家-人们会工作,结婚,生孩子,然后返回诺基亚工作。 最重要的是,当您在诺基亚工作时,这是民族自豪感。 普通的中产阶级芬兰人正在设计和制造在世界各地使用的电话。 来自芬兰的人与人之间的联系。

诺基亚芬兰人力资源主管Ville Valtonen解释了诺基亚成长过程中的管理风格如何赋予了许多自由和责任感,并且大多数员工都全心全意地拥护它。 年轻的专业人​​员被赋予了很多责任和切实的目标,他们将为实现这些目标而努力工作。 工作感到有意义。

梅里哈拉(Merihaara)也是奥卢(Oulu)网站的首席店长,他解释了诺基亚如何受到那些快速完成学业并渴望在世界上留下自己的烙印的学生的青睐-不需要进一步的动机或奖励计划。 诺基亚是面向新兵的世界一流商学院,因为国际消费类电子产品市场瞬息万变,很少有公司能在高层中生存很长时间。 与其他芬兰国际成功案例相反,诺基亚从事消费者业务。 美国和英国的营销专家敬畏地看着遥远的芬兰:现在,这就是您建立手机品牌的方式。

诺基亚人已经学会了如何与困难的伙伴合作。 网络提供商众所周知是强硬的客户和谈判者。 在竞争全球消费电子产品时,有效地管理主要是亚洲分包业务是一项绝对必要的技能。 结果是,诺基亚人受到猎头的积极追捧-但由于对提供给他们太多东西的公司的忠诚,大多数人选择留下来。

埃洛普慢慢意识到了这一点。 扭转步履蹒跚的电话业务还远远不够。 他将不得不挽救整个国家。


随着诺基亚财务业绩的疲软,许多人都试图生存。 对于许多人来说,找到动力并不容易。 早在2010年,车间里的人们就知道变革正在快速进行中。

关于裁员的法定谈判已变得司空见惯。 节约成本的努力始于2008年,当时公司的财务业绩在2007年创下历史新高后骤降。投资者喜欢减少人员。 对于Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo而言,就像在他之前的Jorma Ollila一样,股价一直是最重要的成功因素,因此人员必须适应不断裁员的威胁。 这对习惯了高收入的公司来说是一个巨大的变化。 法定谈判阻碍了员工精神和执行力。 任何人都可以想象如果一个组织每年重新启动4至5次,那么该组织将有多有效。

重复的工作也损害了人员的积极性。 突然,人们可能已经意识到即将同时发布两种类似的产品。 奥卢(Oulu)的智能手机开发部门一直在开发新产品,由于某种原因,该计划被推迟了9个月。 同时,哥本哈根开发团队正在开发类似的产品,并且他们的进度更快。 其中一个程序必须被杀死,通常斧子会击中较晚的程序。 奥卢(Oulu)的一名印刷电路板设计师回忆起五年来他们所有的产品计划是如何被杀死的。 可以想象这如何影响工作动机。

Merihaara说,计划的放缓和取消最终导致工作动机的严重丧失。 员工之间的态度转变为感觉到没有理由再加班了或没有工作压力。 您之所以只能这样做,是因为该程序很可能很快就会被杀死。

感觉像埃斯波的大老板们很遥远。 公司总部可以很容易地居住在美国。 Kallasvuo和Ollila都是遥不可及的人物,因此Elop的提名听起来并没有太大不同。 CEO说什么语言并不重要。

但实际上,埃洛普却与众不同。 他迅速跳上飞机到达奥卢,来到研发部门,并从测试工程师手中接了电话:我也可以测试吗? 听起来埃洛普(Elop)正在听取改进建议,实际上是在处理人们抱怨的话题。 Merihaara为此感谢Elop。 “诺基亚拥有强大的自上而下的文化。 即使我们看到了车间的状况,也没有任何渠道可以向高层报告。 埃洛普(Elop)试图改变这一点。 他组建了一支由10至20名普通工程师组成的团队。 他们告诉他组织中正在发生什么。”

几乎所有接受这本书采访的诺基亚人士都说,埃洛普(Elop)的上述风格给他们迅速,个性化地回复电子邮件留下了深刻的印象。 许多人说这感觉特别好,因为Kallasvuo和Ollila已经撤回了他们的象牙塔。 听起来好像中层管理人员是最独立的,所以当新任首席执行官到来时,鼓舞人们并记住他们的名字,他们感到很兴奋。 诺基亚人喜欢新任首席执行官的风格,埃洛普(Elop)保持沟通渠道畅通,几乎是快乐的。


在2009-2013年期间,Merihaara担任商店管理员期间曾收到15,000封来自诺基亚人士的电子邮件。 他对电子邮件进行了统计分析,最常出现的单个主题是减少员工人数的持续法定谈判。 在这四年中,奥卢研发部门进行了30次法定谈判。 “当Symbian裁员真正开始时,我们正在进行五次平行的人员谈判。 我想那也不合法。”

持续的法定谈判终止了产品开发。 这位前商店店员说,从宣布谈判的那天起,项目停滞了至少两个月。 首先,人们等了两周才开始正式谈判,然后谈判期花费了六个星期,然后花了两个星期来计划如何执行裁员。 产品开发一直无所事事。 由于不断的人事谈判,一年中可能会有六个月的生产时间。 “以防万一,宣布法定谈判真是愚蠢。 据了解,即使发生组织变更而无需进行法定谈判的情况,我们也必须启动谈判。”

奥卢(Oulu)的诺基亚人学会了认识即将进行法定谈判的迹象:停止了外部招聘,未来的计划变得更加无聊,取消了项目进度信息会议,施加了旅行限制,并冻结了项目时间表。

人们来到工作场所,但只做了很少的工作。 他们转动了一两个旋钮,或者编写了一段代码,以便保证下个月的工资。 人们不再提交内部改进想法或提交专利申请。 经理们花费大量时间寻找激励团队成员的方法:让我们尝试完成此任务,因为这是唯一给我们带来希望的事物。 梅里哈拉(Merihaara)强调,这并不是要降低工作士气:“我们确实想改善这种状况,我们正在研究如何做到这一点。 有些人每天花费五个小时。 我们向上级管理层发送了大约10,000封电子邮件。 也许其中有一百个产生了一些影响。”

当项目徘徊时,人们享受了漫长的午餐时间和咖啡休息时间。 坐在办公桌前的人们正在浏览职位空缺或查看其失业救济金。 人们忙于计算失业的影响对家庭财务状况的影响。 许多人正在建造新房,并有孩子去日托。

有时,节省成本和追求运营效率的要求过高。 芬兰人力资源部门前负责人Ville Valtonen认为,寻求效率通常会低估运营变更所需的工作量。 目的是好的,但是操作更改的最终结果通常包括工作量增加,因此成本也更高。 还计划了一些裁员。 恐慌始于埃洛普(Elop)宣布需要将研发成本削减10亿欧元(13亿美元)。 团队被解雇,职能被杀。 专家被解雇,后来剩下的组织意识到公司完全缺乏这种专业知识。 几个月后,被解雇的人被重新雇用。 有些人经历了多次解雇和雇用周期。 裁员是根据数字进行的,没有考虑新诺基亚将需要什么样的能力。 当必须在员工之间做出艰难的选择时,个人喜好或组织裙带关系也开始发挥作用。 人际关系很重要,最亲密的朋友能够保留他们的工作。


在成长的早期,诺基亚的文化一直建立在拥有强大领导者的团队的基础上,但员工有很大的执行自由。 团队负责人通常来自芬兰,并且团队成员在很长一段时间内彼此认识。 关键的进度指标很明确:更多的销售,更多的新产品。

Windows策略宣布后,管理层对远程工作的态度变得更加严格。 个人和小团队开始在相同的物理位置集中在一起。 两个地点的大型团队合并为一个地点的更大团队。 由于这些变化,有些人因为不想搬到德国的奥卢或乌尔姆而辞职。 北京办事处在招聘方面存在严重问题,因为很少有人愿意搬到那里。

中层管理人员是最早注意到工作环境变得更加艰难的人之一。 有大量的Symbian开发人员,因为每台新的Symbian手机都需要新定制的Symbian软件变体,如前所述。 当预算趋紧时,硬件和软件开发人员之间的传统鸿沟变得更加严重。 Oulu的Symbian开发人员羡慕MeeGo的人们能够为其智能手机选择12欧元(17美元)的麦克风组件,而Symbian团队则被要求将其0.40欧元(0.56美元)的麦克风改为另一种便宜5美分的组件。 痛苦在组织中蔓延。

一位中层经理描述了平庸如何在管理层之间蔓延。 经理们正在向上管理:“他们能够在自己的经理眼中看起来不错,但他们无法有效地管理自己的组织。 该公司本来可以与更有能力的经理一起走完全不同的道路。”

服务业务的一位中层经理回忆起在组织中进行裁员阶段的感觉如何。 您看到了同事必须走的路,并且您对自己继续工作感到满意和高兴。 人们感到自己在做正确的事情,直到断头台落在自己身上。 一位在战略部门工作的人形容2010年的诺基亚为朝鲜。 宣传很多。 根据内部笑话,一个人能读到的最准确的HR新闻分别来自赫尔辛基和萨洛地区的报纸Helsingin SanomatSalon Seudun Sanomat

人们对埃洛普也有矛盾的感觉。 一位前任董事描述了当CEO在建筑物中走来走去并要求人们振作起来时,人们如何感到惊讶-而他周围的燃烧平台正在蔓延。 一位在交流团队工作的人说,人们也对埃洛普(Elop)带来用美国人和英国人系统地取代芬兰经理人的新风格不满意。

2007年至2012年在诺基亚工作的莱斯利·中岛(Leslie Nakajima)介绍了诺基亚公司文化的巨大变化。 她加入了一家充满自信的公司,这家公司比老板更像一个家庭。 巨大的裁员破坏了以人道,团结和乐观闻名的公司精神。 当埃洛普(Elop)解雇诺基亚员工,分割公司并最终获得巨额个人奖金时,苦涩是一致的感觉。 在诺基亚的最后几年中,大多数车间员工都没有收到任何奖金。 更可耻的是,像杰里·德瓦德(Jerri DeVard)这样短暂的诺基亚高管如何获得7位数的奖金。


一家电信网络提供商的一位高管描述了诺基亚公司的文化正在发展为极具竞争力的产品。 每个人都在与其他人竞争,尽力反刺对方。 许多人注意到,离开一家“更普通的组织”或一家初创公司后,文化是多么扭曲。 网络主管认为过度的内部竞争已不再是正常现象:如果您再也无法信任同事,而每个人都在忙于制定自己的议程,那么有效执行的先决条件就不存在了。

诺基亚的员工保留率曾经很高,这有助于树立诺基亚精神。 但是,随着行业的变化,这很快成为一个问题。 Mikko Merihaara认为,当诺基亚在业务仍然强劲的情况下没有雇用更多新员工时,诺基亚犯了一个大错误。 那些在2000年代初期加入诺基亚公司的,年龄不到30岁的团队在十年后就开始了工作。 梅里哈拉(Merihaara)的统计数据表明,在奥卢(Oulu)的1000名诺基亚员工中,只有大约百分之二是主动离开公司的。 对于需要连续更新的公司而言,该比率太低。

“我们应该一直雇用10%的新人。 更新完全停止,这只是没有发生。 当世界变迁时,那些在2000年代初设计手机的人仍在设计手机。 我们团队的平均年龄接近40岁,但我们应该让年轻人为年轻人设计手机。 我们经常想知道为什么我们停止从外部聘用人员,以便我们可以轮换公司中更多的高级员工,或者-店员不应该这样说-离开公司。

同时,新人们加入而老年人离开了苹果和谷歌-硅谷拥有世界上最有才华的劳动力。 在诺基亚Oulu办公室中,人们确实也有才能,但他们没有改变。 管理层也没有改变,这也引起了员工的注意:“只是改变了这些高管的职务,以免除他们先前的职责或启动了新的计划。 通常,诺基亚人是从该组织中提名的。 它总是来自同一个拼图游戏。 这就是我们人民所抱怨的。”

管理轮换的确也引入了它的问题。 在五年中,Merihaara在七个不同的组织工作。 “在进行了两次更改之后,我不知道我的经理是谁。 一旦与一位从未见过的经理进行年度发展讨论,就可以了。”

在工厂车间水平上还注意到了许多其他事情。 员工担心诺基亚对待公司最重要的客户(网络提供商)的方式。 Merihaara说,这种担忧源自诺基亚渴望从每种产品中获得最大利润的渴望。 视市场情况而定,三星等竞争对手被认为以较低的利润向网络提供商提供某些产品。 Merihaara表示,在Oulu的走廊讨论中,不断追求最大化成本效率是一个反复出现的话题,但薪资状况也造成了团队与人员之间的不良血液。 MeeGo项目在2011年夏天结束,当最好的开发商离开公司时,一些人获得了双倍的薪水,以使他们留下来并开始开发Meltemi。 人们正式转向了薪水更高的计划。 双倍薪水通常会削弱工作士气:“看起来像是双倍薪水的人是随机挑选的。 并不是说公司为那些计划带来更高收入的计划中的工作支付了更高的费用。 当您从事相同工作时,您应该平等对待他们。 当您在公司食堂与与您工作相同但薪水加倍的人共进午餐时,您的动力就会崩溃。”

诺基亚奖金系统在好几年中按计划工作。 当公司财务状况发生变化时,系统也陷入困境。 人们开始从被取消的计划中获得最好的奖金。 次优奖金是在被严重延迟的计划中支付的。 及时发货且没有缺陷的电话不一定会为其工程师和设计师带来任何好处。 根据梅里哈拉(Merihaara)的说法,管理者错误地设定了目标。 即使在艰难时期,目标仍然是使每个程序都成功。 由于对奖金制度的定义不正确,被猎取了许多计划的顶尖人才的员工可能会错过所有潜在的奖金,而新来者只是因为幸运地从事其他项目而获得了丰厚的奖金。

一个在坦佩雷延迟的Symbian计划曾经夺走了奥卢团队的所有奖金。 由于诺基亚资金因素(NFF),经常减少奖金的方式。 NFF是从公司整体财务绩效中计算得出的一个因素,尽管辛勤工作,良好的反馈以及在个人或团队层面上取得的巨大成就,但不良的NFF可能会使奖金支付无效。 诺基亚前一位经理回忆说,错误地设定了激励目标导致了次优的结果:“许多人有错误的激励目标。 他们只看着自己的工资单,看看如何达到最高奖金。 对他们而言,从事对公司而言并非最佳的任务更为有益。”

在一个项目中,人们已经计算出通过支持设备业务的新服务可以提高总销售额。 然后进行下一次重组,将承担预算和损益责任的项目移至新部门,但新领导人无法将原来在旧部门中开发的服务添加到自己的底线数据中。 该服务被杀。 许多其他优质产品在不断重组中落入错误的部门后被终止。

最具讽刺意味的是,在组织被告知将要终止后,工作变得容易得多。 一位MeeGo主管回忆起MeeGo中的情况:“当人们被一人一人开除时,我们不断失去他们。 停止所有更改后,我们的工作变得轻松而高效。 与该组织还有一些未来之时相比,情况完全不同,并且每周都会宣布更改。 很明显,当您需要更改计划时,您会面临延误。 您需要将人们从一项任务转移到新任务。 此外,新人们还不知道他们的新工作,因此您需要针对新环境进行培训。”


当埃洛普(Elop)加入诺基亚时,诺基亚在萨洛(Salo),坦佩雷(Tampere)和奥卢(Oulu)等城市的旧站点一直在漂泊。 他们在精神上与Espoo市的公司总部分开。 在萨洛(Salo),奥卢(Oulu)和坦佩雷(Tampere)工作的人们常常在其他地点甚至在其他国家/地区拥有团队经理。 首席人力资源总监瓦尔顿宁(Valtonen)说,实际位置逐渐变得不那么重要:报告结构不再主要是本地的,而是全球的。 失去对社区的归属感。 不再有共同的目标,也不再有地方领导人告诉他们的部队什么和为什么。

“当PekkaAla-Pietilä在2000年代初告诉我们的团队我们计划成为世界领导者时,这是一个明确的目标。 在随后的几年中,方向的确定和以身作则是特别重要的。 现在已经不存在了,您自己与员工之间达成的心理契约就消失了。”

失败的诺基亚公司价值观更新加剧了这种脱节的感觉。 诺基亚于1990年代引入的旧价值观- 客户满意度对个人的尊重持续学习成就 -于2007年进行了更改,以更好地反映现代时代。 根据Valtonen的说法,1990年代的价值观产生了巨大的影响。 人们通过流程,领导力和培训来实施它们。 例如,尊重个人确实意味着团队成员受到尊重。 旧的价值观成为诺基亚人民的指南针。

新的价值观正在吸引您一起实现对创新的热情 。 [17]精致,崇高的思想蕴含着许多智慧。根据瓦尔顿宁(Valtonen)的观点,重新确立价值观的依据是好的,但指南针不见了,大海也变得更加风雨如磐。 许多受访者说,新价值观并没有真正对他们说话。 当出现问题时,提出辞职要约并离开公司的动机就增加了。


这家移动电话公司在销售和市场营销方面都有自己的实力,在研究和产品开发方面拥有自己的头脑。 当研究人员受到适当的激励时,就会诞生新的发明。

R&D模式在2005年发生了根本性的变化。TeroOjanperä承担了诺基亚研究中心(NRC)的职责,并且他承受着巨大的压力,要求将向下旋转的创新曲线再次向上转化。 在诺基亚,人们已经了解到手机业务不可能永远盈利。 研究中心受命向诺基亚其他组织展示去向。

在以前的诺基亚架构中,研究中心是一个长期的研究部门,与手机产品开发部门保持日常沟通。 合作是持续而富有成果的。 研发部门提出的倡议比研究人员拥有的知识更了解消费者的偏好和技术约束。

更改后,研究人员被要求向诺基亚展示方向。 与组织的其他部分断开连接,这很困难,即使不是不可能。 引入了诸如“技术转让”和“将创新带入产品”之类的措辞。 建立了一个新的多方面的组织来实现良好的目标。 诺基亚研究中心受托开发创新产品。 它由一个新成立的部门支持,该部门的任务是生产潜在的发明。

在研究中心工作的一位研究人员说,这一变化是朝着更糟糕的方向迈出的一步。 “我认为它从未真正开始起作用。 确定了创新,但我们尝试用绳索将其推向前进。 在业务方面没有吸引力。 而且,当人们开始怀疑他们在新的设置中有多么有用时,NRC的动机就恶化了。”

到车间的链接(设计和开发电话的人员)已断开。 激励计划已更改,因此目标不再来自产品开发,而是来自研究中心的管理层。 内向感增强。 官僚阶层增加了一层。

“从事研究工作的我们没有自己的职责或创造产品的能力。 我们必须寻找可以创造产品的人。 通常,我们甚至被告知没有时间去研究这些无关紧要的想法,这让我们感到非常兴奋。”

研究人员认为,研究中心的重组是诺基亚开始失去潜力的可能原因之一。


对于剩下的最后一个人来说,这是最困难的。 一位刚加入公司的高级销售人员回忆说:“ 2010年是情况开始发生变化的一年。 我被评为世界领导者的许多受信任的人都离开了公司。 在2000年至2009年之间,没有一支这样的机能离开,现在一口气剩下了十个人。 某些东西必须改变了。 对我来说,要成为最后的莫希干人很难。”

“我确实是个小镇男孩,我相信拿着诺基亚徽章会给我多一英寸或两英寸的距离。 突然,我们遇到了没有合理原因的障碍。 当您应该修理某些东西时,未获得任何旅行授权。 指标随时变化。”

诺基亚的另一位长期雇员回忆说,当发现Lumia的销售未达到预期时,诺基亚许多人的积极性如何下降。 由于Lumias在技术博客和产品评论中获得了良好的评价,因此重返胜利之路之所以成为可能,是有可能的。 现在,即使是最顽固地信奉诺基亚风格的信徒也瘫痪了。 做事和执行的文化在诺基亚幸存了很长时间,但是现在人们站在了边缘。

对于销售主管来说,最后一滴下降是诺基亚快速增长的在线业务结束。 他也感到困惑,因为尽管埃洛普(Elop)在公开场合抱怨零售商如何没有足够积极地向消费者出售Lumia手机,但从未启动为零售商开发的销售支持工具。 “那是一场政治游戏。 但我认为埃洛普(Elop)对此没有作用。 相反,他是在要求正确的事情。 埃洛普和我之间有些人禁止我参加特定的决策会议。 他们阻止了我们取得成功。 这非常令人遗憾。 那就是我终于失去信心的时候。”

销售主管说,许多海外招聘失败了:“诺基亚是芬兰人的骄傲,但没有类似的驱动力来吸引来自海外的人。 从欧洲大国聘请的领导者并不十分在意诺基亚和芬兰的利益,而许多芬兰高级管理人员却衷心希望诺基亚和芬兰获得成功。”

一如既往,表现出色的人最受关注。 诺基亚中层人士说,管理风格通常是“谁喊得最大声”。 即使没有商业理由,具有良好议论能力的人也可以在内部会议上凌驾于他人之上,并通过议程。 大气问题的共同点是领导能力。 许多人认为,自2000年代初加入公司以来,领导文化已经恶化。 中层管理人员回忆说:“当我进入诺基亚时,我认为这是一家管理完善的公司。 梦之队虽然已经开始崩溃,但仍然存在。 我之所以加入诺基亚,是因为它是一个拥有良好领导才能的组织。”


2010年,诺基亚MeeGo的员工认为他们拥有最好的诺基亚精神。 尽管单位已发展到两千人,但气氛却像是一家初创公司。 埃斯波的Keilaniemi总部的人们穿着西装打扮,而赫尔辛基Ruoholahti的MeeGo屋子里的人们穿着凉鞋。 经理人数减少了,顶级编码员也很多。 至少在员工心中,该比率对于工作满意度和效率是正确的。

一位在Symbian和MeeGo中都曾工作过的经理说,最重要的产品开发人员无疑是在MeeGo方面:“其他团队花了几个月或一年的时间才能实现对手机的更改。 在Symbian中,我什至无法直接与程序员交谈。 当我与MeeGo开发人员交谈时,第二天就完成了更改。”

一位MeeGo主管说,诺基亚团队和单位中的其他地方都在遭受着沸腾青蛙综合症的困扰:水越来越热,但是您已经习惯了,直到为时已晚。 “当然,我也可以用拳头砸桌子,说我们会这样做,否则我就出局了。 情况很疯狂。 在2010年的一次活动中,我们被告知我们拥有60-70种手机型号。 我们当中有人可能说这完全荒谬,我们必须结束这一点。 但是,到那时,有两个不同的真理:金钱正在四面八方涌入,尽管每个人都一定已经看到有一天这将结束。 在这一点上,我们应该承担起打击,并冒着赚钱机器的风险。 选择埃洛普来结束这种疯狂。 暂停游戏,做出必要的艰难决定。”

前人力资源主管瓦尔顿宁(Valtonen)说,责任感和真诚帮助的渴望在必须解雇团队成员的经理中普遍存在。 中层管理人员处于最艰难的境地。 中层管理人员必须执行高层管理人员作出的裁员决定,而没有任何机会影响全局或对未来的了解。 为中层领导者安排了同行指导,以减轻他们的压力并评估他们的经验。

萨洛生产部门进行了最强有力的联合努力,以帮助重新安置下岗人员。 据前人事主管称,决定关闭萨洛生产部门的人们有真诚的愿望,要保留萨洛的职能,直到最后。 埃洛普(Elop)出任新任首席执行官后,他坚决驳斥了有关萨洛命运已被封杀的任何指控。 根据Valtonen所说,萨罗工厂的作用和附加值被非常仔细地考虑了。 经过长期考虑,决定将Salo工厂重新定位为高端产品定制中心。 Valtonen提醒当时世界瞬息万变,旧计划必须在2012年夏天取消。


[17] 后来又添加了“非常人性化”作为第四个值。


返回目录

斯蒂芬·埃洛普(Stephen Elop)不知道将在2011年2月做出决定后产生的巨大后果。诺基亚董事会曾深深地相信Windows的选择,但他并不完全知道电话业务的生命线将完全取决于Lumia的销售。

诺基亚为什么不成功使用Lumia? 在本章中,我们收集了这样做的原因。

死亡谷拖延

“死亡谷”是指公司在业务停滞且新业务增长速度不足以弥补损失时进入的状态。 没有其他移动电话制造商尝试过类似的规模,从一个长期存在的旧操作系统过渡到新的操作系统。 这是一个关于死亡之谷的深度和广度的问题。

不幸的是,《财富》杂志拒绝了诺基亚。 Windows Phone的选择时间很短,因为已经在开发新版本。 Windows Phone 7.5在一两年内将被Windows 8取代。在客户接触到全新的Lumias之后不久,他们了解到他们的设备无法更新到最新版本。 尤其是当许多新应用仅针对Windows Phone 8出现时。

潜在的买家选择等待新版本的发布,这放慢了关键市场的增长。

诺基亚是否事先知道这种不连续性? 我们的消息来源提供了相互矛盾的信息。 根据一个可靠的消息来源,诺基亚和Elop在选择Windows Phone时已经知道Windows Phone 7.5和Windows Phone 8基于不同的技术,因此不可能从较旧的版本更新到较新的版本。 另一个同样可靠的消息来源则持不同意见。 消息人士称,这甚至对于微软都不清楚。

在某种程度上,这就是微软想要的。 只有通过大量编程工作才能进行更新。 分配资源后,诺基亚的价值和希望就落在了后面。

这恰好发生在诺基亚本应与微软一起创建可信的生态系统的那个脆弱时刻。 根据Nordea分析师Sami Sarkamies的说法,更新失败给诺基亚长期蒙上了阴影。 消费者开始怀疑诺基亚将可行且持久的智能手机推向市场的能力。

Lumias迟到的一个重要原因是零件短缺。

零部件行业是一个无情的世界,旧时的价值微乎其微。 当诺基亚成为市场领导者时,分包商以微乎其微的利润跳到诺基亚的鼓上,因此他们可以获得大量订单。 诺基亚首先获得了手机零件和原材料,而且价格很高。

在分包商眼中,当Lumia刚开始成立时,诺基亚已沦为二流客户。

在诺基亚的鼎盛时期,大量交易也吸引了网络提供商。 他们准备同意接受更差的条款,以使诺基亚型号进入其产品组合。 由于诺基亚的地位,它能够以负资本运营。 资金进入帐户的速度快于资金进入的速度。 组件制造商在三个月的付款期内获得付款,而网络提供商则在一个月内向诺基亚付款。 不需要外部资金。

在2011年,该职位已经丢失,诺基亚只能梦想能够以负资本运营。 当零部件短缺时,韩国人和美国人首先要交付产品。 苹果利用金钱的力量:提前半年用现金购买了所需的组件。 三星之所以能够插队,是因为它可以保证大批量生产。 由于财务削减,诺基亚的地位也被削弱,因此需要与分包商达成非常精确的协议。 组件制造商更愿意为三星和苹果服务,他们可以从中更轻松,更可靠地获利。 高通尤其是Lumia的瓶颈。 该公司的芯片组一直短缺,而Lumia引起的需求无法以令人满意的速度满足。 其他较小的制造商,例如HTC和Sony,则在同一条船上。 他们不得不为组件等待太久,火车在智能手机市场飞速发展。

当埃洛普选择Windows Phone时,肯定会想到死亡之谷的可能性。 增强对成功的希望的是,最好的电话制造商和最好的软件公司联手进行了这项工作。

但是,据推测,埃洛普没有足够认真地考虑死亡谷的可能性,因为埃洛普以前的经验是在企业对企业环境中进行的。 无需担心后果,因为客户已投入多年。

微软没有兑现诺言

微软在移动市场上失败了很多次,因此与诺基亚开始合作至关重要。 他们描绘了Windows Phone功能和开发速度的美好前景。 在达成协议的过程中,他们向诺基亚许诺了超出其预期的范围。

签署后的几个月,诺基亚意识到了事实。 例如,第一批Lumias缺少商业应用程序和足够的数据安全性。 负责诺基亚网络提供商关系的罗宾·林达尔(Robin Lindahl)想知道,为什么微软在开发Windows Phone时更专注于与苹果和用户体验的竞争,例如增加应用程序的数量,而不是去那些本来就很容易的客户得到它们-在商业世界中与Blackberry竞争。

我们的受访者中没有一个相信微软通过夸大Windows Phone的功能故意欺骗了诺基亚。 这是组织不良和资源不足的问题。 诺基亚和微软是大型技术公司,它们以重叠的方式或并行进行。 微软凭借其巨大的资源并行开发了X-Box,Windows和Windows Phone。 在诺基亚,过渡时期导致工作重复。 许多受访者声称,在Windows合作期间,两家公司都进行了大量重复工作并浪费了资源。 诺基亚太多的稀缺资源被用来弥补Windows Phone的不足,微软的资源也不能满足所承诺的一切。

廉价的Lumias没有及时到达

如本书前面所述,一开始,诺基亚仅获准在最昂贵的手机型号上安装Windows Phone。 微软希望确保Windows Phone与iPhone和Samsung Galaxy在相同的价格类别中竞争。 从技术上讲,甚至不可能在廉价的机型上运行Windows Phone。 当诺基亚将廉价的Lumia 520和Lumia 620推向市场时,为时已晚。 Lumias太少了,来不及了。

网络提供商将该产品与Android进行了比较,Android带有一个操作系统,其设备的价格从100欧元(135美元)以下到700欧元(950美元)不等。 诺基亚拥有一些价格昂贵的Lumia手机,这些手机的应用程序数量有限,而功能手机的功能,用户界面和设计则与Lumia完全不同。

怀疑减缓了合作

埃洛普(Elop)对内部活动中不良的Symbian合作感到困惑,有一次甚至以名字起誓对球队发誓。

当微软进入沙盒时,游戏变得更加复杂。 弄清楚可以向另一家公司披露多少信息是每天不确定的问题。 对于诺基亚员工而言显而易见的事情对于微软员工而言并非显而易见。 例如,芬兰用户习惯的日历中的周视图在Microsoft中是一个陌生的概念。 首批Lumia手机没有日历周视图。

有时合作是如此困难,以致于细节由律师进行谈判。

分发无效

对于许多人来说,Windows意味着他们的工作环境,它作为电话品牌并没有吸引力。 当缺少自然吸引力时,将强调分销网络的重要性。 如果网络提供商补贴价格,则可以出售吸引力较小的产品。

美国最大的网络提供商AT&T,Verizon和T-Mobile当然是诺基亚的纸上合作伙伴。 实际上,销售努力仍然很弱。 电话店的地面销售人员对Lumia几乎不关心。 他们推荐了iPhone和Samsung,它们从中获得了丰厚的佣金,并且很容易向客户展示。 从事诺基亚销售工作的人将其归结为:iPhone在30秒内售出,因为消费者想要它。 Android在10分钟内售出,因为消费者必须选择型号。 Lumia用了30分钟,因为必须告知消费者Windows Phone是什么,并且必须克服他们的偏见。

在埃洛普(Elop)时期,网络供应商和其他经销商可以与诺基亚进行实时联系的信息系统已被缩减。 通过这个数字系统,零售商将能够快速获得有关Lumia的问题以及支持销售和营销的材料的答案。 据开发该系统的人称,埃洛普在最糟糕的时间停止了该解决方案。 自2000年以来,诺基亚已经能够在美国成功使用相同的想法。

在中国,与美国一样,中国移动也将Lumia纳入了他们的产品组合,但仅用于展示。 埃洛普(Elop)从与全球最大网络提供商的交易中获得了所有可能的宣传,但实际上,该交易仅产生了微薄的成果。 如果网络提供商没有将钱用于营销,补贴价格并指示销售人员出售手机,那么它在中国移动庞大的产品组合中的存在就没有任何意义。

诺基亚也没有任何可以与买家互动的直销渠道。 埃洛普(Elop)时期曾竭尽全力建立的在线商店也已停止营业。 埃洛普(Elop)担心,拥有诺基亚自己的在线商店会令网络提供商感到不安。 在网上购物成为主要分销渠道的时代,这一决定似乎很奇怪。

总结:在Lumia的销售活动中,诺基亚与消费者失去了直接联系,价值链也不再由诺基亚掌握。

研发工作做错了

2011年,诺基亚在研发投资方面是世界顶级公司之一。 即使获利能力大幅下降,R&D预算也保持与上一年相同的水平。 诺基亚在研发方面投入了60亿欧元(合81亿美元)。

只有丰田,三星,英特尔,微软,通用汽车和制药公司诺华,罗氏,辉瑞和默克公司在研发方面投入了更多资金。 福布斯》杂志的一项比较提醒我们,这些巨大的投资者中没有一个以创新产品闻名。 金钱是天文数字,没有突破性的发明。 福布斯还提醒我们,在《快速公司》杂志的“ 2012年最具创新力50强”名单中,这些公司都没有列出,所有这些公司都被列出。 苹果,Facebook,谷歌和亚马逊等“快速公司”榜单上的领先者在研发方面投入的资金更多。 他们没有为历史计划辩护,例如维持长期的研究计划。 相反,他们即时投资于他们认为会改变市场的解决方案。 据《福布斯》报道,诺基亚和其他研究大投资者在收益递减的逻辑上遇到了问题:当在某个领域花费更多的钱时,那么在那个领域需要更多的钱来寻找新的东西。

克莱顿·克里斯滕森(Clayton Christensen)在他的《创新者的困境》一书中也提到了同样的现象。 曾经在某个地区成功的公司很容易成为该地区先前被发现获利的囚徒。 有能力以新思维方式超越竞争对手的竞争者。

应用程序开发人员未能获得启发

当智能手机客户改变品牌或向他人推荐设备时,媒体内容和服务在手机中起着决定性的作用。 对于许多人来说,使用Facebook,Twitter,LinkedIn,Instagram和其他知名应用程序就足够了,但早期采用者还需要更专业的应用程序。 到2011年底,应用程序的数量已成为生态系统之间竞争的内在指标。 苹果的App Store和Android Market拥有其中的50万,每月每个下载约10亿。

在同一时期,Windows Phone Marketplace拥有50,​​000个应用程序。 这也是一个巨大的数字,但与竞争对手相比却算是什么。 这是鸡蛋现象。 应用开发人员希望为应用市场下载量很大的手机制作应用。 买家想要具有很多应用程序的手机。 在这两者之间是网络提供商,他们希望最大限度地提高数据流量。

Lumia最令人尴尬的不足是没有Instagram。 在2012年秋天宣布Lumia时,Instragram是美国发展最快的社交媒体。

诺基亚拼命想让应用程序开发人员兴奋。 Windows Phone没有足够的吸引力。 诺基亚甚至向开发人员付费。 Windows Phone仍然无法吸引。 就像试图从石头上取血。

营销超出目标

在许多人看来,即使最大和增长最快的智能手机市场在中国,诺基亚却专注于在美国销售Lumia犯了一个错误。 对于埃洛普(Elop)来说,在美国取得成功是一种痴迷。 很难理解为什么在美国投资了一些钱,而同时中国却发生了彻底的崩溃。

Lumia旗舰产品首先进入美国市场,在那里诺基亚几乎不为人所知,其差异化的可能性很小。 同时,诺基亚在欧洲和亚洲最忠实的客户不得不继续等待他们的Lumias。

即使这不是客户的购买标准,这款先进的相机也受到了很多好评。 地图已经成为智能手机的一部分。 在首席营销官Jerri DeVard任职期间,Lumia被推销为“诺基亚的回归”。 当消费者想知道诺基亚是否可以做正确的事情时,从零开始也许不是您想强调的。

三星每年花费140亿美元用于营销。 那是一个小国的国内生产总值。 根据欧洲大型网络提供商的领导者所说,三星的市场力量是压倒性的。 根据许多评估,三星还使用可疑的方法来巩固其市场地位。 有一种现象称为扩散。 它是指给零售商的钱。 这被认为是不道德的,例如,不知道诺基亚和苹果公司已使用此方法。

据估计,三星智能手机销售价格的五分之一是差劲的支持。 但是,这是一个非常保密的秘密,因此找不到太多的公共信息。 在智能手机领域,人们还谈论“软钱”,实际上是给手机零售商的贿赂:T恤,优惠券,设备折扣。 在发展中市场中,这些好处可以对卖方,博客和其他意见影响者产生决定性影响。 在印度,有传言称三星贿赂了手机销售商,从而将诺基亚排除在产品组合之外。

诺基亚没有花足够的钱进行营销,因为没有钱。 在诺基亚的内部活动中,首席财务官Timo Ihamuotila将诺基亚与西班牙进行了比较。 诺基亚人被告知,诺基亚获得合理定价的贷款的机会要弱于西班牙,因为西班牙国民经济崩溃了。 在为Lumia进行全面营销的过程中,诺基亚得以从微薄的资金中刮出足够的资金,总计达数亿美元。 考虑到售出了数以百万计的Lumias,这笔投资是不合理的。 例如,在美国Lumia 900手机的销售量少于其营销所用的资金。

杰里·德瓦德(Jerri DeVard)担任首席营销官时完全失败了,许多诺基亚人都见证了这本书的写作。 聘用DeVard是因为她与美国网络提供商Verizon有着良好的关系,并且拥有其他应聘的简历,但在芬兰很远的地方,她的工作频率与员工不同。

钱用完了

诺基亚在将公司的主要思维模式缩小为较小规模方面遇到了很大的困难。

诺基亚已从台湾制造商仁宝公司订购了Lumia 900的大量组件和组装服务,因为人们认为Lumia 900的售价将与Lumia 800相同。尽管如此,新的Lumia并没有引起人们的兴趣,并且未来有一个大问题:即使手机销售不佳,也需要从仁宝购买大量材料。 仁宝是按照约定支付的,诺基亚不得不以低得离谱的价格出售Lumia 900,这样它才能摆脱它们。 上一年以500欧元(680美元)购买了Lumia 800的消费者注意到,Lumia 900现在的售价为200欧元(270美元)。

在资本方面,诺基亚是错的。 苹果是一个赚钱的机器:它在手机业务上赚了三分之二的利润。 三星取得了20%的超高利润,换句话说,售出的每部手机中有五分之一留在了这家韩国公司。 诺基亚当时的智能手机毛利率为20%。 固定成本从毛利率中扣除。 因此进来的钱比竞争对手少,但是成本是相同的。

即使诺基亚最终在2012年推出了价格更低的Lumia 520和620机型,现金流仍然保持不变。 2013年,当廉价的Lumia型号发售时,现金流量大致保持不变,为10亿欧元(13.5亿美元)。 廉价电话的推出也没有帮助电话业务摆脱盈利危机。 廉价的Lumias是如此便宜,以至于每部手机带给诺基亚保险箱的钱要比昂贵的Lumias少得多。

Windows 8失败

商业客户被认为是微软和诺基亚的领土,因为该领域的前任领导者黑莓遇到了困难。 但是,尚未意识到商业世界中的竞争优势。 这些问题是由业务中广泛使用的PC操作系统Windows 7在实践中与Windows Phone不兼容引起的。 在开始的几年中,企业设备之间的Windows链的愿景仍然是Elop和Steve Ballmer的白日梦。

最大的失望是PC上的新Windows。 由于Windows 8基于“平铺”思想,因此被认为可以使消费者和企业用户更轻松地切换到Windows Phone。

特别是Risto Siilasmaa称赞了这种结合。 据他介绍,Windows Phone和Windows 8将使PC和电话用户体验相同。

新的PC Windows普及带走了所有希望。 Windows 8失败。 Windows 7的前身占据了PC使用量的20%。 Windows 8上市一年后,它的份额​​为10%。 对于决定性的2013年末诺基亚来说,统计数据显示了一些令人震惊的事实。 Windows 8的市场份额仅增长了0.05%,而Windows 7的增长了0.22%。 因此,Windows 8失去了其四年前的市场份额。

Siilasmaa的推理很容易受到批评。 Windows Phone和新PC Windows中的磁贴在不同的方向上工作,使用逻辑也有所不同,例如在滑动方向上有所不同。 相反,Windows 7和带有其图标的Android桌面彼此之间更接近。

市场是世界上最困难的

智能手机市场可以比作风暴或沙漠。 艰难的国际竞争领域很难描述。 在工厂,人员,零件和材料上的投资巨大,因此需要根据趋势和周期正确预测。 几乎所有PC制造商都尝试过,但很少成功:Acer,Dell,Hewlett-Packard,Asus等,证明了这一市场的困难。 他们所有人都尝试过,但即使如此,也只有记忆。 许多Android制造商已经消失在历史的阴霾中。

市场是如此紧张,以至于网络提供商抱怨诺基亚向微软支付的专利使用费。 一家欧洲大型网络提供商的负责人表示,他多次向微软投诉其使用费惯例。 这位领导人认为,微软认为自己就像苹果一样,当谷歌免费向制造商提供软件时,由于它的可取性收取了很高的价格。 与使用许可证的Windows手机相比,免版税的Android手机为网络提供商带来了更多的收入。

毕竟,Lumia手机受到了决定性的打击。 他们不想要Windows手机。 所有的花招和跳舞都没有帮助。 买了一部充满情感的电话。


返回目录

2013年9月的一天,芬兰国家广播公司YLE的早上电视上,屏幕上方显示了一个新闻报道。 一位刚醒来的金融记者停下来观看。 这种时刻在一个人的一生中只会发生一次,例如在1994年9月,伴随着爱沙尼亚号客轮沉没的更为戏剧性和悲惨的消息。

这则新闻也让悲伤成为了焦点。 对两件事感到悲伤。 赢得冰上曲棍球世界冠军带来的芬兰自尊心以及该公司的手机业务走到了尽头。 记者一直在跟踪诺基亚手机近20年,但此刻却失去了他的专业身份。 2013年9月3日将永远记住他的余生。

最糟糕的是,似乎在黑暗中开始出现光明。 在7月至9月期间,Windows Phone在欧洲最重要的国家/地区的市场份额超过10%,并且在一年内翻了一番。 在意大利,iPhone被抛在了后面。 在拉丁美洲,夏天之前也发生过同样的事情。 第三个生态系统是在几个月前黑莓被抛弃时出现的。 夏季,推出了新的快速销售车型,Lumia阵容全面。 为什么现在呢? 为什么这么便宜?

事后看来,很容易注意到某些事实,而这些事实在所有的如意算盘中都变得模糊了。 在全球范围内,Windows Phone的市场份额仍不到5%。 诺基亚的钱用光了,亏损继续。

当市场在9月早上开盘,股价从三欧元(3.95美元)跃升至四欧元(5.25美元)时,终于睁开了眼睛。 诺基亚遇到了偶然的运气。 还是两个。

转折点发生在2012年春天。乔马·奥利拉(Jorma Ollila)担任主席一职已有13年,他辞职了(许多人认为, 最终还是辞职了)。 尤其是国内大股东希望奥利拉出局。 奥利拉原本应该在2010年离开,但由于公司的困难,他被要求继续。 在2011年春季,他宣布这将是他的最后任期。

确定Ollila担任董事会主席一职的替代考虑非常激烈。 由于首席执行官来自海外,因此甚至只考虑了国内候选人担任董事会主席,特别是因为外国股东对此提名没有压力。 董事会中可能的候选人包括Risto Siilasmaa,造纸和纸浆公司Stora Enso的Jouko Karvinen,以及芬兰Sampo银行的Kari Stadigh。

芬兰商业报纸Kauppalehti的总编辑汉努· 莱农宁 (Hannu Leinonen)可能已经在2011年9月告诉人们,名字叫Risto Siilasmaa。 根据Leinonen的说法,公司外部关于提名委员会将做出真正决定的猜测不再成立。 根据莱农宁的说法,夏天过后,很明显,奥利拉选择了他的王储。 “如果诺基亚将如此重大的事情留给其他人思考,诺基亚将不再是奥利拉的诺基亚”,列侬嫩说。

Ollila与Siilasmaa的联系是众所周知的-他们共享的业务至少包括在线市场Fruugo。 提名并不简单。 Siilasmaa是一位企业家和商业天使。 有人怀疑他是否能填补大公司管理机构的大本领。 他的强项是他的技术背景和在董事会工作的经验。 从一开始,他就与诺基亚一起经历了巨大的变化,并且了解了诺基亚的背景。

当2012年1月宣布董事会主席候选人时,反应大多是积极的。 Siilasmaa的选择被解释为强调诺基亚在芬兰的定位。 也有批评的声音。 投资银行野村证券(Nomura)的诺基亚著名分析师理查德·温莎(Richard Windsor)认为Siilasmaa可以胜任,但不一定是最好的。 温莎认为,诺基亚的问题是巨大的。 他们应该增加销售额,改善业绩,接管新的智能手机市场,争取自己在发展中国家的地位,捍卫与微软的关系等等。 Siilasmaa在这些领域的经验存在差距。 他的技能尚未在这些比赛领域得到检验。

该测试于5月3日在2012年春季的股东大会上开始。即将离开公司的奥利拉(Ollila)向全体赫尔辛基·梅苏基斯克斯会议中心的所有人说,这一刻对他来说很特别。 他希望自己可以留下一家繁荣的公司。 尽管遇到了困难,奥利拉表示,董事会毫不动摇地完全支持首席执行官埃洛普,并将继续支持他。 演讲结束后,奥利拉祝愿继任者好运,并正式宣布会员大会开幕。

继任者曾经登上舞台。 他代表审核委员会介绍了审核员的selection选。 董事会仅在股东大会之后的组织会议上选择主席。

新任主席很快就明确表示,他的工作方式与前任不同。 Ollila工作的四楼办公室被撤职。 Siilasmaa在没有自己的办公室的情况下开始工作。 他在一个开放式办公室有一张桌子。

当人们走过时,他们总是可以交换几句话。 这是一种出色的工作方式。 他告诉芬兰人Kuvalehti说

Risto Kalevi Siilasmaa出生于1966年,年轻时在赫尔辛基度过。 据说在学校里,Siilasmaa没有在其他学生中脱颖而出。 早在高中之前,他就在埃斯波(Aspoo)的塔皮奥拉(Tapiola)的Valintatalo百货商店工作了晚上,后来又在赫尔辛基(Lautsaari)的洛塔萨里(Lattasaari)的塞斯托(Sesto)杂货店工作。 1982年12月,当Commodore 64台计算机开始在芬兰销售时,Siilasmaa和他的朋友Ismo Bergroth知道他们想要一台。 障碍是价格。 他们节省了几个月的薪水,购买了一部设备,并轮流使用它。

在高中时,Siilasmaa在计算机上花费了越来越多的时间。 他曾在Bittileiri计算机营中担任过顾问。 当其他人咒骂语法错误时,Siilasmaa保持镇定。 许多人记得他的脸。 黑暗,乐于助人的家伙,后来成功了。

尽管他的业余爱好和他在计算机杂志上的帮助,他的学业仍然步入正轨。 高中毕业后,Siilasmaa进入赫尔辛基工业大学学习工业工程和管理。 这个专业的绰号是“ vuorineuvos line”。 [18]与其他工程领域不同,很难进入研究领域并且可以将研究应用于各种不同领域。 例如,应用领域包括如何缩短主题公园的路线,提高手术室的效率,管理产品分配以及生产更便宜,更可靠的汽车。 酒吧不包括在年轻人的学习计划中。 他更喜欢在跆拳道工作室。

不过,直到2009年他才毕业。1988年5月16日,年仅22岁的他与学生朋友Petri Allas一起创办了一家公司。 他们将公司命名为Data Fellows。 该公司开始逐渐将重点从提供计算机培训转向网络安全。 产品包括防病毒软件和加密数据流量的软件。 最后的幸运是互联网的到来,这导致对网络安全需求的爆炸性增长。 1996年11月,Data Fellows赢得了欧盟IT大奖,这最终使该公司进入了芬兰新闻的最前沿。 该奖项的价值为200,000欧元(234,000美元)。 有趣的是,诺基亚Communicator在同一个竞赛中,成绩很差。

当Data Fellows幸运地在1999年互联网泡沫破裂之前在赫尔辛基证券交易所上市时,Siilasmaa突然注意到他是芬兰第二富有的人。 他仍然是该公司的最大所有者,此后更名为F-Secure。 他于2006年离开首席执行官一职,并于2008年应邀加入诺基亚董事会。

Siilasmaa被描述为分析性的。 他非常深入地研究并质疑领导层的观点。 他被称为敏锐,平衡,善于听众。 评价者认为他的性格是腐的。 当Siilasmaa开始做某事时,他会继续努力直到完成。 做出决定后,他全力支持董事会。 据说他也很好地爱国。 他在诺基亚的议程一直比仅诺基亚利益的狭view观点要宽一些。

他倾向于内向而不是外向的趋势是一种平衡。 他的魅力可以被称为弱者。 许多人会提醒您,尽管他具有F-Secure的背景,但他并不是真正的软件专家。 他没有动手编程的经验。


Siilasmaa在他的Keilaniemi四楼开放式办公室里迅速开始质疑他已经开始制定的策略。 有什么不同的方法可以做? 我们可以放弃什么? 除了微软,智能手机还有其他可能性吗? 专注于战略的工作最晚于去年夏天微软宣布其Surface平板电脑时开始。 它踩踏了使用Microsoft软件的计算机制造商的脚步。 如果这发生在计算机上,那么电话就可以解决任何问题。 尤其是现在,Microsoft在其战略中提出了硬件制造。

诺基亚董事会开始考虑各种情况。 微软这样做时会发生什么? 它将如何影响我们和Google? 如果微软真的做到了该怎么办? 或者,如果Google的下一步行动是这样,我们如何才能为我们成功提供可能性? 我们应该出售NSN,以便为Lumia买更多时间吗? 我们可以找到要购买的公司吗? 我们可以出售Navteq吗? 专利呢?我们可以从专利中获利来缓解现金流危机吗? 这项工作包括对诺基亚与微软协议的公正评估,以及通过谈判进行更改的可能性。

Android一直在讨论。 它已安装在诺基亚设备中,并被证明可以正常工作。 但是,金库会承受微软支持付款的损失和违反合同的罚款吗? 而员工,是否从头开始使用新平台重新开始?

这项分析持续了数月之久,据称如此详尽,以至于事后没有任何惊喜。

决定将电话业务出售给微软的特别股东大会的材料包含对导致出售的谈判如何开始以及如何进行的详细说明。 该案文经过律师的专栏讨论,因此其真实性是可信的。 诺基亚几乎不会冒险认为出售决定是基于会议材料的错误。 另外,记者伊娜·弗里德(Ina Fried)在AllThingsD网站上进行了如此详细的解释,以至于消息来源必须是鲍尔默,锡拉斯玛或两者。 锡拉斯玛(Siilasmaa)显然想淡化有关埃洛普(Elop)达成交易的指控。

2013年2月,鲍尔默给Siilasmaa打了个电话,用三个词表达了他的关切:“我们可以说话吗?”鲍尔默打来电话,尽管他知道芬兰的夜晚已经变成了晚上。 对他来说,是早晨。 西雅图和芬兰的时区交叉,使得在相同的正常工作时间内永远不会完成工作。 在五分钟的通话中,两人同意很快在巴塞罗那移动世界大会上见面。 该主题被设置为“战略伙伴关系”。

现在是暂停片刻的好时机。 锡拉斯玛(Siilasmaa)担任董事长,鲍尔默(Ballmer)担任首席执行官。 鲍尔默为何联系Siilasmaa,而不是现任董事长比尔·盖茨? 诺基亚是否被视为二级目标?

Siilasmaa从未对这种不匹配发表评论。 通常的做法是在感觉到某个业务部门而不是整个业务的可能销售额时,与CEO取得联系。 Siilasmaa可能从一开始就知道鲍尔默很聪明,可以避免卫生问题。 如果他直接与对方的埃洛普(Elop)接触,由于他们的共同背景,这似乎令人怀疑。 另一方面,两家公司董事会主席的角色是不同的。 Siilasmaa全职工作。 盖茨已经开始专注于他的同名基金会和他的家人,并退出了实际领导。

锡拉斯玛(Siilasmaa)接受了邀请,但没有因为这种情况而被冒犯。 在会议开始之前,他们俩都审查了在伙伴关系中哪些方面运作良好,哪些方面却没有。

他们两个在以西班牙国王命名的雷伊·胡安·卡洛斯饭店里聊了一个小时。 各种选择在没有偏见的情况下进行了梳理。 终止参与的选项与加深参与的选项具有相同的前台状态。 鲍尔默将基本安排放在桌上,即微软必须从售出的每部手机中获得更多收益。 如果微软将每台Windows Phone设备的市场营销投入20美元,那么10美元的回报就太少了。 鲍尔默认为,营销资金被无效地用于两个品牌-Lumia和Windows Phone。 软件工程师正在做双重工作。 在其他领域,合作进展顺利。 鲍尔默估计,如果将手机制造商完全转移给微软,这项工作将会进行得更好。

微软真的开始担心诺基亚的财务状况。 有充分的理由担心诺基亚会跳到Android。

Siilasmaa宣布诺基亚无意出售。 是否应该进一步研究合作可以做什么?

这项宣布使列车开动了几乎多次,经常朝着奇怪的方向行驶,需要很多运气,八个月后,这导致了芬兰商业史上最戏剧性的收购之一。 第一步是评估合作的状况,在同意进行具体讨论之前,Siilasmaa要求进行合作。 例如,诺基亚花费了大量时间来研究从微软的角度看事情。 董事会还同意Siilasmaa将负责谈判。 由于他的Microsoft背景,Elop可能不适合这份工作。

董事会消息人士称,谈判很可能导致公司重组,因此诺基亚开始扫描微软以外的选择。 在几个月的时间里,他们考虑是继续朝同一方向发展,还是尝试更改与Microsoft的协议。 智能手机应该采用新平台吗? 出售整个手机业务还是仅出售一部分业务更好? 应该在这里出售定位服务业务吗? 全部还是部分?

在评估的早期阶段,诺基亚认为与微软进行谈判将是一个不错的选择。 按照约定,第一次会议是在2013年3月底巴塞罗那移动世界大会之后的一个月。4月底,双方在诺基亚纽约法律办公室所在地举行了会议。 诺基亚由Siilasmaa和Elop代表,后者是董事会成员兼首席执行官,而Louise Pentland和Timo Ihamuotila也参加了会议。 桌子的另一边是鲍尔默,以及已经调任Windows Phone部门负责人的特里·迈尔森(Terry Myerson),首席财务官Peter Klein和首席法律官Brad Smith。

讨论进行时,微软打开了游戏。 他们开始谈论购买优惠。 诺基亚听到建议后,他们撤回了准备答案。

当他们聚会时,Siilasmaa发表了十分钟的演讲,他冷静而礼貌地解释说,各方对电话业务的价格评估来自不同的星球。 鲍尔默回答说,很高兴知道我们要去哪里。 新的会议被认为是不必要的。

这项计划后来被称为Project Gold Medal(微软计划金牌),微软使用的名称比埃德温·摩西(Edwin Moses)更名,诺基亚使用Paavo Nurmi的名称。

第二天早上,Siilasmaa向鲍尔默发送了一条短信,并建议两家公司探讨是否应继续进行分析。 也许关于金钱的话题来得太早了。 也许微软不了解诺基亚的许多部分,也不了解它们的价值。 也许两家公司之间的距离比他们想象的要近。

随后进行了一系列电话谈判。 它促成了2013年5月在伦敦的Microsoft法律办公室举行的会议。AllThingsD描述了24日晚间发生的重大事件。 来自诺基亚和微软的团队是唯一的参加者。 当大楼在巨大的轰鸣声中摇摇欲坠时,各方都在考虑战术的不同侧面。 如此巨大的吼声,只能来自微软首席执行官的巨大肺气。 诺基亚团队感到震惊,并猜测鲍尔默对他们的建议的反应与他们希望的有所不同。 在微软会议室,他们想知道发生了什么事,因为鲍尔默刚刚离开会议室。

片刻之后,他们听到有人在奔跑,这加剧了躁动。 渐渐地,很明显鲍尔默没有注意到玻璃咖啡桌并绊倒了。 他打了个头,额头上打了个结。 迈尔森(Myerson)向诺基亚发送了一条短信,并解释了发生了什么。 即使鲍尔默被固定下来,他仍继续与西拉斯玛(Siilasmaa)和埃洛普(Elop)进行谈判。 傍晚时分,他们去吃饭,鲍尔默用绷带包着头到达。

第二天早上,茶几被移到了窗户旁边地板休息区的中间,到了下午,茶几被完全移走了。

诺基亚的地图服务Navteq(在这里被称为HERE)在这场讨论中成为争论的焦点。 Siilasmaa坚不可摧。 这对于诺基亚的未来而言是必不可少的。 鲍尔默认为,如果不控制地图和导航平台,微软将无法在移动世界取得成功。 2013年6月14日,他与首席法律官一起飞往芬兰。 这次飞行没有任何问题,他们在诺基亚拥有的Kirkkonummi的Båtvik庄园内遇到了诺基亚人。 结果令人印象深刻。 尽管如此,他们得出的结论是他们希望继续进行谈判。

在此期间,Siilasmaa有一个特殊的理由继续谈判。 诺基亚经过了很长一段时间才走运。 恰恰在适当的时候,两个重大的发展融为一体。 Siilasmaa知道德国西门子在其共享网络公司NSN中的股份已被出售。 他们感到非常幸运,因为他们的谈判仍然没有受到公众的关注。 Siilasmaa和首席财务官Timo Ihamuotila开始发展一些彻头彻尾的辉煌业务。

锡拉斯玛(Siilasmaa)通知鲍尔默(Ballmer),诺基亚有一系列先决条件,必须进行有关手机销售的任何认真谈判才能进行。 第一个是可转换债券。 诺基亚必须掌握电话业务的销售情况。 另一个涉及地图。 这里必须从协商表中删除。 诺基亚会保留它。

合作伙伴开始进行花样滑冰。 向诺基亚承诺了15亿欧元(合22亿美元)的可转换债券。 诺基亚现在有钱收购西门子,而没有微软能够将其用作手机业务销售的杠杆。 另一方面,西门子认为诺基亚的金库很空,因此同意为部分销售价格制定付款计划。 分析师们估计NSN的价值为6–90亿欧元(8–120亿美元)。 Nokia got half at 1.7 billion euros ($2.2 billion). The price probably would have risen had Siemens known that Nokia was getting money from Microsoft. The NSN deal was announced on July 1, 2013.

Nokia’s second stroke of luck occurred during 2009, when Nokia Siemens Networks had appointed Indian Rajeev Suri as CEO. Suri had trimmed the joint venture’s workforce with a heavy hand, and concentrated on mobile broadband, especially LTE technology. The company, which had been facing losses, recovered and so quickly turned profitable in 2012 that Nokia gave a positive profit warning. Because of Suri, Nokia was able to get its other support pillar in shape. The future could possibly be built on something other than phones.

Suri was born in 1967. He has a bachelor’s in electronics and communications engineering from the Mangalore University.

He came to work for Nokia in 1995 in Singapore. When Simon Beresford-Wylie transferred to head Nokia Networks in 2005, Suri moved to his place. Suri was later responsible for NSN’s services business activities and worked in India, Britain, West Africa, and Singapore.

Suri followed Beresford-Wylie to lead NSN, and moved from New Delhi to Finland in the fall of 2009. Suri is married and has two children. He is living in Finland once again. His family previously followed him, but now the two boys are studying, and his wife lives mainly in Singapore, where one of the boys is studying.

Suri’s goal has been to raise NSN to be the world’s second largest networks manufacturer after the Swedish Ericsson. The goal has remained just a dream. In 2013, Ericsson’s market share, according to the market research company Dell’Oro, was 36 percent. In second place was Chinese Huawei, which had 23 percent. NSN’s market share had shrunk to 17 percent. In the fourth place was Alcatel-Lucent at 13 percent. NSN’s profitability had nonetheless remained good. It concentrated on money-making projects at the cost of market share. NSN had, on average, 64,000 employees in 2012. Nokia had 48,000 in the other units.

According to a source from the board, in summer 2013, they arrived at the conclusion that Nokia had good reason to sell off the phones business completely. It would get the accounts in shape and get rid of the uncertain future of the nest of losses and would be able to build a nice support pillar, thanks to the NSN deal. The board was continuously active. They had meetings at a furious pace in 2013. The meetings added up to 34, and including the committee meetings, 60.

David J. Cord explains in his book that Nokia used the Huawei card during those times. According to Cord, Huawei and Lenovo expressed interest in buying Nokia, after Wall Street Journal had hinted that there were discussions underway. If Huawei was interested, it would have constituted a good weapon for Nokia, because Huawei might be interested in both phones and networks, because it was succeeding on both sides, and was targeting aggressive growth. When Nokia presented this possibility with Microsoft, the answer was blunt. Microsoft reminded them that they had 55 billion euros ($70 billion) as liquid cash. They had enough to buy any phone manufacturer, if things don’t work out with Nokia.

The breakthrough occurred at the end of July in New York. The maps question was solved. The deciding factor was that since it is a question of software, the source code could be shared. The intellectual property rights would stay with Nokia, but Microsoft would get a special license which gave it equal rights with Nokia to modify the map services, and permission to do with the source code as it pleased. The road opened. After the meeting, Siilasmaa and Ballmer shook hands. A PowerPoint presentation with the main points had been collected together, which would be fleshed out.

During the following weeks, the lawyers created contracts from the PowerPoint presentation, and the companies started a due diligence process, where they would check the points of the deal. The date for sealing the deal was agreed to be September 3, 2013. The business sale would become very demanding. From Microsoft’s perspective, it could only succeed if the company cultures were suitably close to each other. The decision to buy could be interpreted that, in Microsoft’s opinion, the cooperation had gone well.

In a few interviews, Siilasmaa and Ihamuotila were congratulated that they succeeded in selling the feature phones in the same package with the smartphones. It is true that Microsoft expressed interest in buying only the smartphones, and that was what they were primarily interested in. The negotiators quite quickly concluded that the parts could not be separated. They had so much in common, among other things sales, logistics and management, that separating them would have given birth to two lame ducks.

On the first Sunday of September, Ballmer finally flew to Finland, and on Monday the deal was finalized and the papers were signed. Risto Siilasmaa called Jorma Ollila and the Finnish prime minister Jyrki Katainen that evening to convey the news. Nokia employees got news the next morning via text message, and after a few moments, the morning TV was able to report their news.

The press conference was called together at Dipoli in Espoo at 11:00. Siilasmaa took 9 minutes to tell how the decision was the most demanding and complicated in his life. He described it as rationally correct, but emotionally difficult. Nokia’s board had gone through all the options, and had come to the conclusion that the deal was in the best interest of Nokia shareholders.

Next, Ballmer stepped up on stage. He concentrated on calming the Finns. Siilasmaa had obviously told him that how Microsoft is viewed in Finland is important for the continuation of the phones business. Microsoft would start a data center in Finland and invest at least 190 million euros ($250 million) in it. Microsoft promised to be a good corporate citizen in Finland, and assured that the development of mobile phones would continue in Finland. According to Ballmer, the deal was a win-win. The time it took for him to say all this was five minutes.

After the details from Siilasmaa and Ihamuotila had been handled, Siilasmaa invited Elop up on stage. Elop waited a short moment, and climbed the few steps onto the stage with familiarity, and started.

His expression was serious. One could see in his face that he was troubled. Instead of waving around, his hands stayed at his sides or clasped in front of his stomach. The presentation was colorless and subdued, even if the content was supposed to appeal to people’s emotions. According to Elop, Nokians had every reason to be proud of their work and achievements. He told them that he was proud of them, even if he was frustrated at being left behind in market share by the competitors. He said he was also sad, because the word Nokia in its former form had meant so much to so many people.

Finally, Elop addressed the people of Finland. The pride felt by Finns toward Nokia has been an inspiration to him and a source of strength. He thanked the people for the support he had. Now a new chapter was beginning in Nokia’s life, according to him. Some things would still not change. “As you see the bright yellow Lumias in peoples’ hands overseas, continue to be proud. The phone is still made by your friend, colleague, or even family member. We will stay in Finland to win.”

Ballmer didn’t want to stay and answer the questions from reporters. Ihamuotila, Siilasmaa, and Elop stood up in a row. Elop stood next to Siilasmaa like an ice hockey coach that had just lost his game. It seems his hands had difficulties finding a place. One’s attention shifted to the sleeves on his suit, which were too long. He was a defeated man.

The winners stood next to him. Siilasmaa’s radical decision garnered thanks where it was important. The share price had risen over 40 percent, even if many thought the sales price was too cheap. Nokia had become a real company. One whose cash flow was transparent, which was predictable, and whose future looked bright and with whom one could expect new business.

One representative from a large shareholder was satisfied with the result. “We had high expectations for Siilasmaa, and they were fulfilled. His board met unbelievably often. The alpha and omega of everything was that Siilasmaa could use his time for Nokia. From our point of view, Siilasmaa is the hero of this story.”


The Nokia–Microsoft agreement was multifaceted and complicated. The most relevant parts and the changes that were announced in Nokia were the following:

  • Microsoft pays the sum of 5.44 billion euros ($7.2 billion) in cash for the sale. From the sum, 3.79 billion euros ($5 billion) are for the mobile phones division (Devices and Services). 1.55 billion ($2 billion) are for the licensing of patents for 10 years. On top comes 100 million euros ($130 million) for the exclusive right to modify the license agreements to be continued. Money for the patents therefore comes continuously when ten years are up.
  • Microsoft makes convertible bonds to Nokia for 1.5 billion euros ($2 billion).
  • The Nokia brand remains under the control of Nokia. Microsoft receives a license to use it in its feature phones for 10 years.
  • Nokia can use the Nokia brand on its mobile devices at earliest on December 31, 2015.
  • The Lumia brand is transferred to Microsoft.
  • Microsoft becomes a strategic license holder of Here. It will pay separately for the license to Nokia.
  • Around 32,000 employees are transferred to Microsoft, out of which 4,700 are in Finland.
  • Elop will step down immediately from his responsibilities as CEO and will transfer to Microsoft when the deal is confirmed. Until then, he is responsible for the Nokia mobile phones division.
  • Siilasmaa will become temporary head of Nokia, and Ihamuotila will become temporary CEO.
  • Elop will be paid the amount specified in his CEO contract in case of the sale of the business.
  • The purchasing cash flow was about 15 billion euros ($19.8 billion) in 2012, which was nearly half of Nokia’s cash flow.
  • The deal is finalized by the end of March, 2014.

On September 3, in Keilaniemi and Redmond, the difficult job of finalizing the deal was begun. This period was one of the most difficult in the history of business. What made it especially difficult was that a part of a large company was being split off, instead of selling an independent unit. Information systems, business services, bookkeeping, and so on — everything had to be rethought. The new Nokia needed a new strategy, organizational structure, leadership, and capital structure. The unit had to still be able to start its activities immediately when the deal was finalized. The part that was being split off needed to sit well in the buying organization. And everything needed to be reversible in case the deal fell through.

The biggest stumbling block was seen in the approvals of the antitrust officials. In the US and the EU, they came in the beginning of December 2013, but in Asia, especially in China the decision was drawn out. The local manufacturers, Google and Samsung told the officials that they were concerned about their patent licenses. They feared that Nokia would start to be a patent troll.

Patent disputes had been everyday life for years in the mobile device world. What has kept the prices down is that many patents are based in reciprocity, and the owners of the patents are themselves mobile phone manufacturers. When Nokia was giving up its mobile phone manufacturing, it was reasoned that it might raise the prices of its patents and terms. In South Korea, the organization of electronics manufacturers made a similar complaint to the antitrust officials. Even the European Union warned that it would be following the patent licensing practices when it accepted the Nokia sale.

In India, tax disputes chafed at the deal. The dispute was about license fees that needed to be paid based on software development. Nokia had paid taxes to Finland, so the worst that was ahead was double taxation of billions of euros. The Indian officials told that they would block the transfer of the Chennai factory to Microsoft until the mess was sorted out. The dispute took on absurd characteristics, when the Tamil Nadu state tax officials claimed that during 2009–2011 Nokia had sold 275 million mobile phones without paying value added tax on them. According to acting CEO [19] Ihamuotila, the phones had been exported overseas. “If the phones had been sold in Tamil Nadu, every resident of of the state would have bought four phones in three years. We certainly don’t have a 100 percent market share there”, Ihamuotila said publicly.

While waiting for the final signature for the deal, the circle was closed with the three year old events in a surprising way. Nokia unveiled three phones which were based on Android. It was as if Nokia acknowledged its mistakes, even though the phones were based on free Android, and remained outside the Google ecosystem.

“Hell freezes over, Nokia unveils an Android Phone”, rattled the web publication Mashable. Freely translated, cows had begun to fly. It was asked whether Nokia was pushing Microsoft with the Android project? Or was Android plan B if the Lumias failed?

Or was it after all what Nokia said it was, a gateway from Asha to Lumia?

The best answer is probably a combination of everything. The phones certainly caused Microsoft a scare: If the phones known as Nokia X would start to fly, Nokia might pull out of the Windows Phone deal, despite the penalties. The X series was, in that way, used as a price leverage for selling the phones. Microsoft had to buy Nokia’s phones if they wanted to get a decent life expectancy for Windows Phone at all. This idea is supported by how the head of Windows Phone, Joe Belfiore, made some sour statements about Nokia’s move. The X series might have also been a way to force Microsoft to buy the feature phone business along with the smartphones in the same package.

The gate theory also has credibility. Nokia had built their own operating system for the X series, which combined the Windows Phone tiles together with features from the Ashas. The most important applications were Microsoft Skype, Outlook, OneDrive, as well as Nokia’s Music, Maps, and Drive. Apps could also be downloaded from app stores that were independent of Google. The bundle led Asha users into the world of Lumia and Nokia, as well as Microsoft services.

Why was the X series unveiled, even if the phones business had already been sold to Microsoft?

Nokia needed to be prepared for the possibility that the deal might fall through. The companies needed to act as if the deal was not even going to happen until the time the antitrust officials had approved it.

On March 24, 2014, Nokia announced that the deal with Microsoft would be moved to April. They had not received all the approvals from the antitrust officials. Those with weak nerves began to have doubts: Was the deal in danger of falling through? The penalty for the deal was 700 million euros ($922 million). It is a big sum, but it would have still left a big hole in Nokia’s finances with the loans included in the deal.

It was finally ready on Friday, April 25. The price of the deal rose slightly from the original. The Chennai factory remained outside the deal. According to Nokia, this had no real effect on the terms of the transaction, and Nokia would receive compensation from Microsoft for responsibilities that were not transferred. Furthermore, Nokia notified that it would be closing its factory in South Korea, therefore it would not be transferred to Microsoft.

When the deal was delayed, it looked month by month better for Nokia. In 2013 during the last quarter, Samsung’s and Apple’s profitability decreased. HTC and LG were fighting for their lives. Lumias were selling poorly, and in January of 2014 they had clearly plummeted. The phone markets were heading for bloodier competition, where Nokia had no reserves to work with.

Friday, April 25, 2014 was still a sad day. Jorma Ollila had hired, with great expectations, a foreign CEO in 2010 to lead Nokia. A CEO with a software background. A CEO, who combined Finnishness and Americanness. A CEO who was supposed to save Ollila’s life’s work. A CEO who was supposed to lift the crown jewel of Finland to a new level of prosperity.

Three and a half years. Only three and a half years and that operation — which we call Operation Elop on the cover of the book — had ended in a perfect belly flop.


[18] ‘Vuorineuvos’ is an honorary title granted to leading lights in Finnish industry by the President of Finland.

[19] This is presumably a mistake. Ihamuotila was the acting CFO.


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Risto Siilasmaa has said he just knew that Stephen Elop’s payoff would cause a brouhaha. A clause in the Microsoft-Nokia agreement requires Elop to have his stock compensation vested in an accelerated manner along with a 4.2 million euros ($5.5 million) cash payment including salary, severance pay and bonuses adding up to a total of 18.8 million euros ($24.7 million). Siilasmaa says he thought he could soften the blow and do a favour for Nokia shareholders by asking Microsoft to pay part of the payoff. He turned to Ballmer and again implored him to consider how important the perception of Microsoft in Finland would be for the future of Microsoft mobile devices in Finland.

It was a bad idea. The value of Elop’s stock awards — totalling in 14.6 million euros ($19.2 million) at the current rates at the time — went public from a filing of the extraordinary meeting voting on the sale of the Nokia mobile device business. The media went crazy. The payment was considered outrageous since the general impression was that Elop had brought Nokia to ruins. And when the buyer, Elop’s former and future employer, was to foot part of the payout bill, many considered it to be an additional reward for selling Nokia to Microsoft.

For instance, the Wired magazine had a bold headline: “Microsoft Brings its Trojan Horse Home”.

On top of everything, Siilasmaa blundered in his communication. According to him, the reward was based on Elop’s CEO contract, which essentially was the same as Kallasvuo’s. But Finland’s largest newspaper Helsingin Sanomat dug out the truth. Kallasvuo’s contract did not have the controversial clause entitling him to an immediate share price performance bonus in case of “change of control”.

The controversy reached political proportions. The then finance minister Jutta Urpilainen considered the judgement of the payoff justified. She called for consideration of new rules that would allow shareholders to decide on executive compensations at the general meeting. She also insisted upon introducing a clause in collective labor agreement requiring “responsibility and moderation in all reward practices”. Even the American Forbes magazine quoted the then prime minister Jyrki Katainen who called the reward “quite outrageous”.

On top of that, Elop refused to take a cut in the payoff for marital reasons. Elop had separated from his wife Nancy in October 2012 and filed for a divorce in August 2013 after 26 years of marriage. The family had never moved to Finland but stayed in Seattle, and Elop had decided to sell the family residence.

Since there was no prenuptial agreement, Nancy would be entitled to half of Steven’s assets. Allegedly, Elop had justified his refusal to Siilasmaa by claiming that Nancy’s divorce lawyers would accuse him of destroying Nancy’s assets.

The imagination of speculants was flying sky high. One thought that Elop was hired to prepare Nokia’s mobile phone unit to a sellable condition. Another speculates that the accelerated stock grant “change of control” clause was included in Elop’s contract on purpose, because Elop and Nokia both knew at the time that Nokia’s mobile phone unit would soon be taken over by Microsoft.


The media, as well as the speculants, forgot about one crucial fact. If you want an American executive, you must compensate them on American terms.

The median compensation for CEOs of US publicly traded companies on Standard & Poor 500 index (S&P500) in 2012 was about $10 million per year. In 2012, Elop’s tech peers like Honeywell’s David Cote received $56 million, Qualcomm’s Paul Jacob $36 million and AT&T’s Randall Stephenson $26 million.

The type of stock award previously commonly used in Nokia, viz. stock options, are not so common in the US anymore. Their bad reputation and taxation practices have made corporations change the way they incentivize executives: Restricted stock units. It is not uncommon for CEOs nowadays, also within Nokia, to be awarded performance-related stock. The CEO is incentivized to stay on. Should he/she resign during the three-year performance period, he/she would lose the stock reward.

Restricted stock units have a major advantage. They align the interest of CEOs to those of the shareholders. A big salary comes out of the shareholders’ pockets. In the US, there is also a corporate tax law limiting the employee salary deduction to $1 million per employee. For example, Qualcomm’s Jacobs had an annual base salary of 1.2 million euros ($1.65 million). The rest of his 36 million euros ($49.4 million) payment was awarded in stock.

However, restricted stock units raise three questions:

  • What to do in the event of change of control within the performance period and the company’s direction changes?
  • What if the responsibilities of a CEO diminish so much so that he/she can no longer influence actions to meet the performance criteria?
  • What if the CEO is fired?

Wouldn’t it be unfair for the CEO to lose his/her stock grant in cases like this? He/she might just be on the verge of reaching the set targets. Wouldn’t it be right to take protective measures against situations like these?

Americans seem to think so. This is in the core of the reward controversy. In the US, almost without exception, CEOs have stock “change of control” clauses in their contracts requiring their stock compensation to be vested in an accelerated manner should they resign following a change of control. The number of stock units they receive is calculated as if their targets were met. It is impossible to hire a top American executive to Europe without this clause even though it is uncommon in Europe. This is the reason why Elop’s contract differed from Kallasvuo’s. In the event of “change of control”, Elop stood to have all unvested stock vested in an accelerated manner should he resign. The takeover triggered the accelerated bonus.

It would have been in Elop’s interest to resign following the takeover. Nokia, however, wanted him to stay through the transition. Hence, the amendment to the employment contract. Elop was granted the same compensation if he was to stay on. He did, and made a smooth transfer back to Microsoft.


Elop’s CEO employment contract was reasonable by American standards. He himself commented on it at the time of the appointment: “The Nokia Board of Directors, particularly the chairman, are fully aware of contractual matters”.

Some commentators were of the opinion that the CEO contract created a strong incentive for Elop to take substantial risks with Nokia. One of the many conclusions reported that Elop stood to gain a huge reward if

  • the share price drops deeply as the company is driven to a cash flow crisis
  • Nokia sells the mobile phone business under pressure to raise cash
  • share price rebounds sharply on a takeover bid but still remains far below where it was when Elop joined the company

And that is exactly what happened between 2011–2013, much to the amazement of the speculants.

Restricted stock grant may well encourage a CEO to sell the business. BlackBerry, formerly RIM, CEO Thorsten Heins was perceived to have had this specifically in mind. He stood to make 40 million euros ($54 million) if the company was sold and he is ousted. Should he be forced to step down without the company changing hands — which he was — the compensation would only be half of that. Heins and the BlackBerry board were criticized the same way Nokia was: What is the point of rewarding the CEO for failing to turn the company around?

This was of no concern to BlackBerry. The new CEO John Chen was awarded restricted stock units valued at 61 million euros ($82 million) on top of his annual salary.

Historical data shows that even this sum is small. The Finnish business magazine Tekniikka & Talous reviewed earlier cases. General Electric’s CEO Jack Welch is at the top. He collected a severance payment of 300 million euros ($417 million) when he was fired in 2001. Viacom’s CEO Tom Freston was sacked in 2006 after holding office only for 9 months receiving a severance package for nearly $100 million. Heinz’s William Johnson stands to gain over $200 million in the event of change of control. If any consolation to the Finnish people, Sanjay Jha received a severance pay of 50 million euros ($63.7 million) when he resigned as Motorola’s mobile phone business was taken over by Google in 2011.

In Elop’s case, we are now approaching the main point. Did the “change of control” clause set an incentive for him to sell a Nokia business unit to Microsoft?

是。 It may well have done.

Nokia shares had plummeted, economy in ruins. Elop knew he was unlikely to meet the performance criteria, which meant that he would be left without stock grants. By triggering the change of control, he would stand to gain a substantial amount without meeting the set performance criteria. Furthermore, the takeover might increase the value of stock options, which were also part of the compensation package.

It would still be unreasonable to claim that Nokia Board of Directors were fooled. An expert on executive compensation packages said that corporate executives are like top athletes. They are genuinely passionate about the task in front of them and will only agree to take it on if they feel excited about it. The change of control clause is a minor detail in the employment agreement, more like a safety valve. It would be highly suspicious if a CEO were to prioritize that issue high among other requirements.

Now for the grande finale: Elop had no reason to deliberately damage Nokia. Not even with the change of control clause. He would have gained a lot more by achieving the set goals. Every rational being would have set out to reach for the rewards through Nokia’s success.

The truth is that a company on the verge of a bankruptcy is of no interest to anyone. What if Microsoft had not been keen to purchase the Nokia mobile device business? Elop would have been left with nothing. Above all, Elop did not sell the device business to Microsoft. That was done by Risto Siilasmaa and the Nokia Board of Directors.

Elop’s huge compensation package was a follow-up of American corporate culture and the common practice of overwhelming compensation rewards. The business school giant has it all figured out regarding risks in the use of restricted stock awards and the change of control clauses. Despite that, these kinds of compensation packages are widely used.

Then, a human argumentation as the icing of the cake. Elop chose Nokia although he stood to gain more had he stayed in the US. More than monetary benefits, he was driven by ambition.


Naturally, Elop was paid a salary, too. His employment contract outlined the following:

  • 1.05 million euros ($1.47 million) annual salary.
  • 2.3 million euros ($3.22 million) as compensation for loss of income at Microsoft.
  • 510,000 euros ($710,000) to cover for Microsoft reward refund.
  • 312,000 euros ($434,000) for legal fees relating to Elop’s transfer to Nokia.
  • 3 million euros ($4.2 million) as a second compensation for loss of income at Microsoft due October the following year from joining.

Adding the stock rewards and stock options, Elop received 6.7 million euros ($9.38) in total during his first year at Nokia.

The following took place according to the 2011 Annual Report:

  • 1.02 million euros ($1.4 million) annual salary
  • 2.1 million euros ($2.94 million) additional bonus (including the second Microsoft compensation, which apparently remained lower than mentioned above)
  • 6.7 million euros ($9.38 million) of stock grants and options at the then current rates including annual salary and bonuses

2012 was like this:

  • 1.08 million euros ($1.43) annual salary
  • 4.3 million euros ($5.69 million) compensation including stock rewards and options

Allegedly, Elop earned 9.7 million euros ($13.3 million) in 2013. Along with the stock gain, the severance pay rose to 24.2 million euros ($33.12 million) which indicates Nokia having compensated Elop 52.8 million euros ($72.3 million) in total.

错误。 The media in Finland got the figures wrong from the start. The biggest mistake was to interpret the 24.2 million euro reward to be an additional severance pay. It was not. Those appalled were not aware of the actual details behind the figures. The reported yearly payments included theoretical calculations on his equity awards. Nobody actually knew what their value would be in a year’s time. International Financial Reporting Standards require the stock grant units to be reported in closing share price calculated as if the targets were met.

By going through four years of Annual Reports, it turns out that by the time of the change in his position, he had not been granted any equity awards. Neither options nor restricted stock. Why not? Because the performance period was still ongoing. For that reason, the whole controversy surrounding the reward was partly unreasonable. Elop was not paid 24.2 million euros as additional severance pay as many commentators and politicians imagined. [20] He received the money that Nokia had already reported as having paid him.

We have calculated Elop’s total earnings based on Annual Reports. The sum is 34.7 million euros ($47.5 million) including 18 months of base salary and management short term cash incentives 14.7 million euros ($20.1 million), equity awards, ie restricted stock grants 12.7 million euros ($17.4 million) and stock options 7.3 million euros ($10 million). Particularly profitable were 2013 options of which the closing price was 2.73 euros ($3.73). Elop received 4.6 million euros ($6.3 million) for those.

Huge sums, but still smaller than what many of the politicians agitated by the controversy were criticising.

We want to emphasize that we are not taking a moral stand on the size of the rewards. We feel it is more important to understand that without this, it would have been impossible for Jorma Ollila to hire an executive from North America, and that compared to North-American practices of reward, Elop’s compensation was reasonable.

As Nokia CEO, Elop was expected to purchase Nokia shares himself, too, worth three year’s annual salary according to the board’s recommendations. Elop was fairly lazy in this, partly due to stock market regulations. He purchased his first shares in February 2011 with 1 million euros ($1.36 million), ie roughly his annual salary. At the same time he reported having sold his Microsoft shares that had come under criticism. A top up of Nokia shares worth 500,000 euros ($780,000) followed six months later, after which he had 425,000 shares in total. By the end of 2013, there was no change, meaning that the recommendation for 3 million euros was not reached even after the stock gain by the takeover.

The board’s recommendation does not define any time frame for share purchases. The members are expected to increase the number of their shares with half of the reward profits but as mentioned before, Elop did not have any stock compensations vested until he stepped down.


[20] Presumably a typo in the original text, €20.1 million changed to €24.2 million.


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Stephen Elop, in many respects, is one of the worst CEOs in the world, if not the worst. The fall of Nokia’s mobile phones was one of the most dramatic ever among the companies listed in Global Fortune 500.

Let’s play a little number game. A day before Elop started, the market value of Nokia was 29.5 billion euros ($37.5 billion). When Nokia announced that it would sell its mobile phone activities to Microsoft, the value was only 11.1 billion euros ($14.7 billion). Elop’s term as CEO lasted 1,020 days. Every day Elop was at work — counting 7 day work weeks — ate away 18 million euros ($23.8 million) from the shareholders’ assets. This achievement is mind-boggling.

Still, some defend him and blame the failure on Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo.

This conclusion is shaky. When Elop started, the sales of Nokia smartphones grew. Elop’s task was to plug the leaks. When Elop accepted the task, he believed that things could be fixed. It was futile to try to explain afterward. Elop failed in his task all by himself.

The “Burning Platform” speech has become a legend how a CEO can destroy almost everything with one stroke. Consultant and ex-Nokian Tomi Ahonen has created the fitting term: “Elop Effect”. Elop combined two different CEOs cardinal blunders: The Osborne and Ratner Effects.

In 1983, the computer manufacturer Osborne announced several new models of computers, which they said would be launched in sales after one year. In the meanwhile, sales of the old models plummeted because the consumers were waiting for the new models. Osborne ended up in bankruptcy. Gerard Ratner, on the other hand, was the CEO of the jewelry company Ratners. He gave a speech in 1991, where he said that Ratners products were so cheap because they were “total crap”. The consumers believed him and stopped buying.

Elop announced that Nokia is giving up on Symbian before any Windows Phone smartphone was ready (Osborne effect) and with his “burning platform” speech, expressed that Symbian and MeeGo were trash (Ratner effect).

In parallel with the “burning platform” speech, another serious mistake was made with the binding Microsoft agreement. It was senseless to lose freedom in the most dynamic sectors of the business world. How would anyone know what the world would be like in 5 years? It is ironic, as we showed earlier, that Nokia was afraid of becoming Google’s slave through Android. A prisoner or a slave, it is the same, but as Google’s slave, one could always run away from their master at any time. With Microsoft, Nokia was cornered without any alternatives.

Elop chose a daredevil one-path policy, even when the fast-moving internet era demands more. For example, Google does all sorts of experiments, sometimes even when logic defies them. By experimenting, the company confirms whether or not it has not overestimated its possibilities in its chosen path.

Elop also made quite many little mistakes. Many foreign recruitments went bad. Foreigners do not have the same kind of commitment to Nokia as Finns do. In the organizational upheavals, entire teams were lost: The best left and were replaced by people with the wrong skills. US-centricity backfired in other parts of the world. Sales of the Lumia phones launched at the wrong times. The effect of the ultra-cheap Android prices was underestimated. 清单很长。

And as one of the interviewees reminisces, there were many PowerPoints and initiatives to save money during Elop’s time. It was very seldom taken into account what the consumers wanted and how to get the sales back to the old levels.

And what does Elop himself think about his mistakes?

The answer comes from Elop’s long time leadership coach, Stephen Miles. “The greatest thing about Stephen is that he never gets down or gets stuck in regret. 决不。 He is a machine.”

Apparently, even when 20,000 people have lost their jobs as well.


After over a hundred interviews, wee are completely convinced about one thing: The talk about any conspiracy behind Elop is without any basis. Elop was not a Trojan horse. Microsoft did not smuggle him into Nokia with a plan to later buy Nokia’s phone business for a low price. Our interviews gave no indication — none, whatsoever — that would have hinted that this could have been even possible.

A Trojan horse is a war stratagem from ancient Greek mythology. In the Trojan war, Greek troops entered the enemy city of Troy by hiding inside a hollow wooden horse. Trojans dragged the wooden horse inside their city walls because they thought it was a gift. Inside the wooden horse, the Greek soldiers waited until the night and then took over the city.

The conspiracy theory is absurd because this time the wooden horse was not a gift but was selected by Jorma Ollila and the Nokia board. It was not possible for Microsoft to influence this process.

The conspiracy theorists then say: Elop turned into a mole when he was injected into Nokia by chance.

It is difficult to understand why Microsoft would have wanted Nokia to fail. A successful Windows Phone ecosystem was of utmost importance to Microsoft — and it is good to keep in mind that in those days, device manufacturing was a side note in the Microsoft corporate strategy. And above all: why would anyone pay one billion a year for a company hoping it to fall? Risto Siilasmaa may be childlike in appearance, but based on our interviews he is a pedantic, prudent, and rigorous negotiator. He involved Elop in the negotiations with Microsoft. Siilasmaa has been very convinced that Elop worked only in the interests of Nokia.

The pension fund Ilmarinen is one of the large shareholders of Nokia. Deputy CEO Timo Ritakallio of Ilmarinen thinks that the claim of the Trojan horse is totally absurd. Ritakallio says that the conspiracy theorists seriously underestimate the Nokia board of directors if they believe that the board had stood still when an outsider was preparing the phone business for sale. He says that no actions by the board or by Elop support this claim.

The last nail in the Trojan horse theory was revealed in March 2014 when the news agency Bloomberg disclosed details of a June meeting with Ballmer and the Microsoft board. Several members of the board objected to Ballmer’s intention to buy Nokia’s phone business, according to Bloomberg . Even Ballmer’s longtime supporter Bill Gates was against him. The division hinged on whether Microsoft should expand to hardware manufacturing or remain as a software company. Ballmer’s yell was heard outside of the conference room, according to the news agency. He claimed that he could not act as CEO if the proposal was not accepted. Several members in Microsoft’s executive team also expressed their objection to the deal, including the future CEO Satya Nadella.

Conclusion? In 2010, when Elop was “smuggled” into Nokia, Microsoft did not want to become a phone manufacturer. In 2013, when it was time to turn the Trojan horse plan into action, the desire was almost as weak. Where would the horse have been needed?


When the result was what it was, it must be asked, was it all Elop’s fault? If a movie was made about Nokia’s phones, would Elop be the bad guy?

The plot of a movie requires that there is good against evil. In real life, things are much more multicolored.

The big strategic plans of a publicly listed company are made by the board. The highest responsibility fell on the chairman, Jorma Ollila. Nokia’s board was professionally run, but looking back, when choosing the CEO, it also outsourced the company’s strategy. To a large degree, it is a question of the ways of working and ethics of the board. In Google’s board, the decision making power rests on three people (founders Sergei Brin and Larry Page, and the CEO Eric Schmidt). They have concluded that there are other factors pressing in decision making than economic metrics. Apple has the same principle. You have to say “no” to Wall Street. This point is also made by Clayton Christensen, in his book The Innovator’s Dilemma : If we obey money, it does not solve the bigger problems. Nokia’s board had begun to optimize. There were shortcomings in the ways the operative leadership was monitored.

Elop got an important role to act in favor of Windows Phone, while preparing his choice. The choice was made sincerely, and the decision was justified.

Let’s listen for a moment to a CEO of one of the largest mobile network providers in the world. In his opinion, time has shown that Windows phone was the best choice of all the alternatives available in 2011 for Nokia’s owners. He raised a relevant question: If Nokia had gone with Android and was in the same boat as before the sale to Microsoft, who would have bought it then? An Android mass-producer that is in financial difficulties? 没有人。 Because of the Microsoft decision, Nokia could get a price for its phones. And a new start as a networks company.

He even defends the “burning platform” speech. It was surprising that Symbian lived as long as it did, he says. A year before Elop, according to him, everything at Nokia had begun to decline and that people were depressed. No one was really able to do their work, when no one knew what was happening. After the burning platform, Elop had to let people go, but then people were reinvigorated and the energy level was high. The network provider CEO remembers Nokia first as very strong, then very weak, and finally strong again, a manufacturer with its pride back, whose market share was increasing. The return of the pride was because of Elop, according to him.

“Elop made one very big mistake. He let Microsoft pay some of the rewards when transferring to Microsoft”, the network provider CEO says.

That mistake, as pointed out by the CEO, was not made by Elop, but by the chairman of the board, Siilasmaa. The decision was ethically intolerable and gave birth to unnecessary speculation, according to the network provider CEO.

Another CEO of a mobile network provider says he talked to several of his colleagues about Elop’s future after the Microsoft deal. Almost all of them are of the same opinion: They would have wanted Elop to continue leading the phone division at Microsoft, and they were happy with Elop’s ways of handling cooperation.

If we give the Trojan Horse theory a possibility, Elop was excellent in that role. As a Canadian, he gave a convincing impression that he really cared about Finland and Nokia. To top things off, he was modest and dressed like a Finn without false Bohemianism (Apple) or false relaxedness (Google). He fit in with Finns, even if he was a real talking-machine. Sugar-coated flattery and bravado remained in check. An employee of the communications department vividly remembers seeing him at the Heathrow airport in London. He looked fed-up and tired with a little backpack on his shoulder, waiting in security. It was hard to believe this was a CEO of a globally listed company.

People who worked with Elop were invariably in agreement that he did his work like a machine. Many said that he was the hardest working person they had ever met. He flew over 60,000 miles a month on business, or more than twice around the world. He used a lot of energy to motivate people and to take care of business relationships, and raised the level of work to a new level. Nokia got its humility back, started making decisions, implemented them effectively, and started to think about the markets from a consumer’s perspective. Not just anyone could have made this happen. It required an exceptional leader, and an extraordinary work effort from him. Why be bothered if the goal was to destroy Nokia?

Nokia’s phones were not killed off by a murderer from Canada. What killed them was the arrogance born in Nokia’s own country, concentrating on costs, unclear responsibilities, and bad decisions made by the company’s board.

Elop’s role is summarized here: He failed in his attempt to save Nokia. He made gigantic mistakes — but in good faith. Inspired by his success with Macromedia Flash, he put all his eggs into one basket at great risk. He pushed ahead like a Finnish small business entrepreneur, into whose head was driven the teaching that you can only succeed if you believe in yourself. Sure, success requires belief, but many who have believed have ended up bankrupt. Belief does not guarantee success. It is a requirement of success. For Elop, everything was all or nothing. If there was even a small possibility of contributing to the success of Windows Phone, it was chosen, even if another option would have been more useful elsewhere. When Elop arrived, Nokia was arrogant and thought it knew how things were done, didn’t listen, and made decisions slowly. Because of Elop, everything had to be decided very quickly.

Now let’s give a chance to speak to a former American executive of Microsoft. He tells us that he was shocked by Nokia’s choice of Windows Phone, even if he worked at Microsoft. The only explanation was that Elop subconsciously wanted to do a favor for his former employer and boss, Ballmer. Microsoft leaves an impression on people as an employer, according to the American leader, which is hard to get rid of. It becomes like part of the DNA.

“Many former Microsoft employees go through the same phase”, he said.

According to a large shareholder, someone from a small company should have been chosen to lead Nokia, rather than someone like Elop, who was a division leader of a large company. At Microsoft, Elop continuously had his boss nearby. The work of a CEO is a thoroughly lonely job. It is important to have networks, where you can throw ideas around and get new perspectives. If one’s network is former colleagues from Microsoft, the ideas get stuck.

The final conclusion is simple. Elop was the wrong man for leading Nokia. Someone else would have been able to save Nokia.

There was only one person who claimed to have known with certainty that Elop was the wrong choice. Hindu astrologer Shyamasundara Das states on his website that he has consulted in the selection of leaders of many large companies. The results are good, according to him. He says how he knew beforehand that Carly Fiorina was the wrong person to lead computer manufacturer Hewlett-Packard. The effectiveness of his method is proven by how the astrologist would have advised Nokia to hire someone other than Elop.

Should Ollila have listened to him?


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Speculating about the fate of Nokia phones has been a popular national pastime in Finland, as of late. [21]

The news about Microsoft closing the Oulu mobile phone R&D unit has added fuel to the fire. The same fate is threatening the Tampere and Salo R&D units. Microsoft seems to be ramping down the phone activities it bought from Nokia, after Satya Nadella took the reins of CEO from Steve Ballmer. Stephen Elop was not able to get profitable growth in the phone business neither at Nokia, nor at Microsoft.

Hindsight is the cheapest of all the forms of wisdom. One of the most pathetic forms is “what if” speculation. We still dare to think about what if Nokia had done differently, what should it have done, and what would have happened.


Most of the people interviewed in this book believed that Elop would have ended up with a strategy like Samsung, that is having multiple software platforms. The Korean company sells, besides Android and Windows phones, phones made with its own software platform, Bada. Many of those interviewed were of the opinion, that if Nokia had announced a strategy of having multiple software platforms, and had gone with Symbian and MeeGo in parallel, Microsoft would have had to flex and give the Windows Phone bundle with more enticing terms.

It remains a mystery to us, whether having multiple platforms was ever an option for Elop at any point. At first, he praised MeeGo. Was it manipulation done by a talented actor? Or did Elop change his mind as the situation got worse?

Elop knows the answer best himself, but the hours of thought behind his reasoning seem to be clear. Splitting the poker chips would, in his mind, have weakened the possibilities of creating a real ecosystem out of MeeGo, likewise with Windows Phone. The efficiency would have suffered. One member of the board reminds us that the decision to change the strategy to drop Symbian took 24 months. After focusing, it took 6 months to create the first Lumia. The same would not have been possible in the world of multi-platform.

One can try to throw the ball in the other direction as well. Symbian would have still made billions if its ramp-down had not been so dramatic. With that money, it certainly would have been possible to get phones with different operating systems into sales.

How would a multi-platform model have worked?

It would have been difficult. At any rate, the majority of those interviewed for this book were of the opinion that the phones had left Nokia behind. There was certain death ahead. Nokia made phones which were unsustainable for its profitability. It would have required massive changes.


Don’t get us wrong. We are not knocking the choice of Windows Phone. It might have been the best strategic option of all those available. Perhaps the same thing had happened as before, the execution of the strategy failed.

In hindsight, it is easy to say that the exclusivity of the Microsoft agreement should have been revealed later. The most important things in Finland have been done using secret meeting minutes. It should have been done without announcing burning platforms, that Lumias would come side-by-side with Symbian. If the devices were done with proper hardware, the combination would have survived a while. When the Lumias were ready, then the exclusivity agreement could have been announced. Even better, if they had launched directly with Windows 8 phones.

A managed transition. It would have opened up a possibility for Lumia. In the shops, Lumia phones would have replaced Nokia’s own phones instead of Android phones. Everything rested on this point. Dropping Android from places where it had already taken over proved to be impossible.


What if Elop had chosen Android and hopped onto the winner’s train?

Let’s back up a little. What if Nokia had chosen Android in 2007, when there would have been a chance? If Nokia had become the first ruler of the Android world, something beautiful could have been created. Maybe even a renaissance of Nokia phones. But that did not happen. Samsung got there first.

But let’s think still for a moment, what would have happened if Elop had chosen Google instead of his previous employer in the beginning of 2011.

We can start from the speech of Risto Siilasmaa, chairman of the Nokia board, in the exceptional general meeting in the fall of 2013. Small investors chastised him about the choice of Windows Phone and how, through that, Nokia ended up in the lap of Microsoft. He was moved by the criticizers. He asked: What could have been done differently?

The question is indeed relevant. Was Android an option?

According to Siilasmaa, it was not. We have a different opinion. Android was a real option, and a better option than what Nokia had publicly stated. Managed transition is the keyword here as well. With the help of Android, Nokia would have been able to replace its cheap phones before the competitors.

Elop and Siilasmaa defended Windows Phone with the argument that Samsung’s key position strangled the other Android manufacturers, and it would have been impossible to fit in. Elop and Siilasmaa had left the consideration of this important question halfway: Why did Samsung and Android get such a strangling position? Because Nokia opened this opportunity up to them with its Symbian catastrophe. At least in part.

Choosing Google in 2011 would have undoubtedly been a bold move. Android would still have been a sure choice, and in the long run, fewer people would have lost their jobs than with the Microsoft choice. Especially when the combination would have enabled Nokia to compete in the lower mid-price category without all the image and device restrictions from Microsoft. We believe it to be very possible, that by choosing Android, Nokia would have stayed in the game longer.


The Elop way of putting all the eggs into one basket might have even worked with MeeGo as well. Especially if Symbian had been ramped down to make way for MeeGo already before 2010, the world today might look very different. In our interviews, there were a lot of people in support of MeeGo. It would have been possible to build an ecosystem around it, and time would have opened new possibilities in the free world of Android.

We still want to emphasize that we have understood the nature of opinions. Some of them are expressions of bitterness from former employees and conclusions made from their own narrow point of view. MeeGo is also romantic and stirs up feelings of longing, and bypasses rational thought. We also understand the idealism of Free Open Source Software, and that also blinds people from the truth. Our mission here is to sort through what is relevant, and hopefully we have succeeded in this.

We have also understood that the people who have agreed to being interviewed by us are more likely people who have left Nokia than people who have stayed, and people who have left MeeGo are numerous, which has certainly colored the interviews.


More speculation: What if someone else had been chosen, rather than Elop.

If Anssi Vanjoki had become CEO, MeeGo would have lived. More resources would have been put into it. Symbian would have been ramped down, but in a controlled manner, spanning 2–3 years. In parallel, Android might have also been taken, but not Windows. Vanjoki would have probably chosen a multi-platform strategy.

If Symbian had been ramped down in a controlled manner, it would have been compensated with an increasing amount of MeeGo and Meltemi phones, and Nokia could still be in the phone business. The crash of Symbian would have been less sudden and new solutions could be brought in at a reasonable pace. We must also keep in mind that the smartphone markets were growing. If the market share had been stabilized in some form or another, the sales would have increased. With Meltemi and MeeGo, Nokia would have also been a solid player with tablets as well. Nokia could have caught up with the growing markets, because both cheap and flagship tablet models would have been developed at a fast pace.

If the MeeGo/Meltemi ecosystem would not have been created, there would still have been Android apps. So they could have chosen the Jolla way. It is its own ecosystem which also operates as a parasite on another ecosystem, Android. The consumer doesn’t care if an app is a Qt or Android app. The important thing is that Facebook, Instagram and other key apps work.

The above paragraph might sound technical, but that is a topic related to the crash. The brand was lost, because the wrong operating system and ecosystem were chosen. Even if money was being made on mid-price and cheap phones, their image should have been used to help strengthen the world’s’ best and most advanced mobile phone.

The decisive blow to the profitability of Nokia’s phones was the smartphones becoming cheaper.

Neither Vanjoki nor anyone else would have been able to stop this chain of events. Speculation around the idea that Ollila’s original first choice candidate would have come to far away Finland to lead Nokia leads to a short chain of reasoning. He would been subject to the same set of rules as Elop: A large business made impossible by its lack of profitability. This super savior would have needed to make massive, correctly targeted cost reductions, without losing the ability to innovate. This would have been a tough cookie for anyone, when they were up against very powerful players. Nokia would have certainly achieved a sustainable growth in the phone business if the Samsung–Android pair had encountered some unexpected setbacks. Even if Apple had collapsed, it would not have automatically saved Nokia.


There are yet more topics of speculation. What if Nokia had not sold its phones to Microsoft? The experts unanimously agree: Nokia would have ended up in a cash crisis and the existence of the entire company would have been at risk. The phones had become a dangerous burden that needed to be dropped. Nokia got a good price for its phones and turned its activities into a profitable direction.

Now finally: What if Jorma Ollila had stepped down earlier as chairman? The board led by Ollila got a CEO from the New World, but Nokia itself represented history. A CEO cannot work wonders by himself. He needs the support of the board, who have enough understanding to bless the strategy and other critical decisions. Many uphold Siilasmaa as the hero of this story, who managed to save Nokia from certain disaster at the last moment and sell the phones. Many who decried the sales price of the phone activities, gave praise.

A leader of a large American hedge fund says directly, that he underestimated the desperation of Microsoft, upon which Siilasmaa managed to cash in. The exclusive agreement with Nokia had left the American giant vulnerable. The sales price of Nokia phones was, in his opinion, far too high. 为什么? Because the sales volume of the Lumia phones, which they were following, was continuously decreasing. The right price, according to him, would have been 1–1.5 billion euros ($1.3–2 billion) or even less.


Nokia under Siilasmaa’s leadership got a new start. Even if the signs look optimistic, the world can change suddenly. It may be that the situation in the company can undergo extreme changes. Siilasmaa’s real final value still remains to be seen.

The change of rhythm in the board and the commitment of the chairman in bringing Nokia upward, in any case, made a huge impression on large shareholders. If Siilasmaa had replaced Ollila earlier, the process of recuperating would have started more quickly. The decisive thing from Nokia’s stance would have been who Siilasmaa’s board had chosen to be CEO.

In summary, Nokia was in such deep water in 2010 from long procrastinated solutions and because of the quickly growing market, the board made the wrong decision: To hire Elop as CEO. The Microsoft man lashed up Nokia as a beast of burden for Windows, and then tied its hands. The result was a historical loss of market share and sales, a cash crisis and the end of the legendary Finnish mobile phone industry.


[21] Note that the text reflects the situation in October, 2014.


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We interviewed 102 people for this book. We heard the sentence “Nokia’s biggest mistake was …” almost as many times. Each time the ending of that sentence was different.

There are as many versions of Nokia’s recent history as there are storytellers. So we don’t even try to insist that our book illustrates the ultimate truth. The book is a synthesis of multiple views and interpretations; as such we have tried to make it as accurate as possible. Economic history will reveal a more accurate truth after sufficient passage of time since these events, Nokia will open its files, and the people involved will start to publish their autobiographies.

Rumors and conspiracy theories will likely continue to thrive, although as we have described, they do not have any solid basis.

During the course of this book project we have reviewed multiple rumors and some partially imaginary claims.

One such claim is that Jorma Ollila was the Trojan horse. Seriously: We saw no reason to even investigate this further. Dear conspiracy theorists, please cool down! Jorma Ollila and Stephen Elop came to their decisions based on the best available information they had at that time, acting sincerely. They wanted to save Nokia, and they worked relentlessly towards this goal. Kudos to them for this.

The fact that decisions made turned out to be wrong does not make the decision makers traitors.

Another rumor has it that Steve Ballmer’s superyacht was in the Helsinki harbor in the summer of 2010 and that Ballmer was in Finland to negotiate the deal with Jorma Ollila. Except that it was not Steve Ballmer’s superyacht. It belonged to Paul Allen, a Microsoft co-founder who had left the company in 1983.

A third rumor claims that after the Nokia Board of Directors had decided on the Windows Phone strategy, Microsoft people waiting outside the meeting room were ready to take over. 错误。 According to sources in the board, neither Microsoft nor Google representatives were ever seen in or around those meetings.

According to a fourth rumor, after a year at Nokia, Elop realized that the Windows strategy would be a dead end. He supposedly contacted Steve Ballmer and told him that Nokia’s Windows phones would not have a chance. Ballmer was then said to have contacted Risto Siilasmaa. This is a grave accusation. It means that Elop bypassed his own superiors to reveal Nokia company secrets to Microsoft — even if these might have been construed as his personal opinions.

We were not able to have this rumor confirmed or denied but it is hard to believe that Elop had come to such a conclusion before the Lumia sales had even started. He had been working for Nokia for one year by October 2011. If there is any truth behind this rumor, it must have leaked from Microsoft since for Elop to disclose this would have been tantamount to playing with fire.


We thank everyone who has been interviewed. You have invested your time altruistically to benefit our writing project.

The takeaway message after all these pages can be summarized as: Nokia’s phone business did have a chance. Yet, it was still merely a chance that would have required a long series of right decisions, luck and a lot of skill. The end result could still have been the same as what actually transpired, but the probability of this might have been smaller.

What is gone is gone and will not come back. Great memories will remain, as do the ample amounts of world-class know-how and lessons for posterity. Goodbye Nokia Mobile Phones!

Stephen and Nancy were officially divorced on July 3, 2014. The family residence in Redmond, Washington, was still on sale in September 2014. The price had been dropped from the original $5.8 million to $4.5 million. In April 2013, Stephen moved a little closer to the Microsoft headquarters. The new residence in Grousemont Estates in Redmond cost $1.1 million and Elop is probably still living there.

Events have followed a familiar pattern. In July 2014 Microsoft announced the layoffs of 18,000 employees, of which 12,500 were former Nokians. In Finland, this will impact 1,100 employees. According to media reports in July 2014, Microsoft is planning to discontinue the Asha and S40 feature phones inherited from Nokia in the next 18 months. The Android-based Nokia X product line will switch to Windows Phone even though it seems to have been a success: Information from September 2014 indicates that Nokia X series was the best-selling smartphone in the under-$150 price category in 40 countries. Nokia’s smartphone market share had roughly tripled in those countries. The Lumia share had remained stagnant.

It looks like the brand still has appeal as long as the phone is inexpensive enough and the operating system presents the right image. In particular, the X series did beat cheap Android phones from local Asian manufacturers and seems to have been performing well against the cheap models by Samsung as well.

The story in our book reached its final conclusion one day before going to press — Microsoft announced that it will stop using the Nokia brand for its smartphones from the beginning of 2015.


We would like to thank journalist Katja Boxberg, software developer Antti Koivisto and managing director Timo Salminen for their support and assistance. We also thank editor-in-chief Arno Ahosniemi for arranging the time to work on this book and for his support. We thank our spouses and children for their patience.


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Please note that this reflects the situation in October 2014 when the original book was published.

MARKO AHTISAARI left the Nokia head of product design job in October 2013. He is a Director’s Fellow at the MIT Media Lab. The Media Lab at MIT tries to combine technologies, multimedia, arts, and design.

JERRI DEVARD who led marketing at Nokia quit in July 2012. She worked in her own company until March 2014, when she started as the Chief Marketing Officer of the US company ADT selling security services to homes and small companies.

STEPHEN ELOP stepped down from his Nokia CEO role after the Microsoft deal was announced to become the acting head of the Nokia phones unit. He was one of the candidates to succeed Steve Ballmer as the next Microsoft CEO but lost to Satya Nadella. Elop is currently in charge of the Microsoft devices unit, including the phones bought from Nokia, Xbox gaming consoles and Surface tablets.

COLIN GILES quit his Nokia head of sales job in September 2012. In July 2013, Giles started at Huawei, heading phones marketing and moved forward in May 2014 to another Chinese company, Lenovo, as their Vice President leading sales.

MICHAEL HALBHERR continued in the new Nokia in his old job but his title changed from the Executive Vice President of Here to the CEO of Here. He quit in August 2014 presumably after having differences in opinion with Nokia CEO Rajeev Suri regarding the future of Here.

JO HARLOW who was leading the smartphones operation at Nokia, transferred to Microsoft in the deal and is in charge of the phone operations.

TIMO IHAMUOTILA held the role of Nokia interim President after the Microsoft deal was announced. Ihamuotila is the CFO in the new Nokia.

OLLI-PEKKA KALLASVUO quit his job as the CEO of Nokia in September 2010, and later started as a board member and is the vice-chairman of the Board of Directors of TeliaSonera and construction company SRV. He is the chairman of the board of the Swedish Zenterio company developing software for digital television receivers.

MARY MCDOWELL left her job as the head of Nokia feature phones in June 2012. She has been working as a board member of the event company UBM and software company Autodesk.

JORMA OLLILA left his post as the Nokia chairman of the board in the spring of 2012. Ollila is the chairman of the board at Shell and Outokumpu, the chairman of the board of the EVA thinktank in Finland, and an advisor-partner of the consulting company Perella Weinberg Partners.

JUHA PUTKIRANTA transferred from his job as the Nokia head of manufacturing and subcontracting to Microsoft to lead the two company integration operation.

NIKLAS SAVANDER left Nokia from his job as the head of the Markets unit in August 2012. In April 2014, he started as the CEO of the Swedish Elekta company manufacturing radiotherapy equipment, after having worked as an advisor to several venture capital funds.

MARJORIE SCARDINO left the Nokia Board of Directors in the spring of 2013. She had quit her job as the CEO of the media company Pearson before that, and after Nokia she has worked primarily as a board member, including the board of Twitter.

RISTO SIILASMAA was the Nokia interim CEO after the Microsoft deal was announced. Siilasmaa is currently the chairman of the board of the new Nokia.

RAJEEV SURI is the CEO of the new Nokia from May 1, 2014.

TIMO TOIKKANEN moved from his job as the head of Nokia feature phones to Microsoft and continues to be in charge of feature phones.

ALBERTO TORRES left his job as the head of Nokia MeeGo in March 2011, and started as the head of Hewlett-Packard mobile business in September 2012.

ANSSI VANJOKI started in August 2013 as a Professor at the Lappeenranta Technical University in Finland. Vanjoki is the chairman of the board of the sporting goods manufacturing company Amer Sports and a startup investor.

CHRIS WEBER transferred from his job as the head of Nokia sales and marketing to Microsoft where he is currently in charge of phone sales.

JUHA ÄKRÄS transferred to the new Nokia to lead Human Resources.

KAI ÖISTÄMÖ did not move to Microsoft in the Microsoft deal. Öistämö’s permanent employment with Nokia ended in April 2014, and he works as an advisor to Nokia.


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3G(3RD GENERATION)3G的缩写,表示第三代蜂窝移动网络。 第一代网络使用模拟标准,例如NMT(北磁盘移动电话),而第二代网络则使用数字标准,例如GSM(全球移动电信系统)。 3G使更快的数据通信成为可能。 第一个3G网络于21世纪初部署。

4G(4TH GENERATION)紧跟3G的第四代蜂窝移动网络的缩写。 4G可加快数据通信速度。 定义尚不清楚:网络提供商还以4G的名字推销其最快的3G数据网络。 在上个十年的末期部署了第一个4G网络。

ANDROID由Google开发的免费智能手机和平板电脑操作系统。 Android是基于Linux的开源软件。 Google版本的Android需要手机上的Google服务,例如移动应用商店Google Play。 如果制造商对其Android版本进行了修改,则将无法在其手机中使用Google服务。

CDMA(码分多址)全世界大约有三分之一的蜂窝移动网络是基于第二代蜂窝移动网络技术的,尤其是在美国和亚洲。 CDMA是GSM的竞争对手,并且经常看到它也包括称为cdma2000的3G版本。

企业电话 (芬兰语: YRITYSPUHELIN )面向企业客户的高性能智能手机,包括安全功能。 著名的公司电话包括加拿大RIM公司的诺基亚E系列智能手机和黑莓智能手机。

ETHERNET用于计算机的局域网技术。 局域网包括单个建筑物中的计算机网络或单个办公室位置中的公司网络。

功能电话 (芬兰语: PERUSPUHELIN )一种廉价的手机,缺乏某些智能手机功能,例如快速的数据传输和各种各样的应用程序。 使用功能电话,您可以以有限的方式拨打电话,发送和接收短信以及访问互联网。

FLASH Macromedia的动画和多媒体软件工具包。 Adobe在2005年购买了Macromedia和Flash。

GOOGLE DOCS免费办公应用程序套件,用于文字处理,电子表格和其他应用程序。 这些应用程序与Internet浏览器一起使用,文档存储在Google服务器中。 Google文档是价格昂贵的Microsoft Office套件和免费OpenOffice的竞争对手。

图形加速器 (芬兰语: GRAFIIKKAKIIHDYTIN )微处理器,可使计算设备更快地在显示器上产生图形。 将图形软件操作转移到图形加速器上可以释放计算机中其他组件的容量,以完成其他任务。 许多智能手机和计算机都具有图形加速器。

GSM(全球移动通信系统) 1980年代在欧洲开发的第二代蜂窝移动网络技术。 GSM引入了SIM智能卡来识别用户,从而允许根据电话号码而不是设备进行计费。 芬兰最早的GSM网络建于1990年代初期。

iOS iOS由Apple开发的操作系统,用于iPhone智能手机和iPad平板电脑。 Apple并未将iOS操作系统许可给其他制造商。 iOS的第一版于2007年6月发布。

Sun Microsystems开发的JAVA编程语言。 从电话到超级计算机,大约38亿种设备都使用Java。 它用于开发低端电话的应用程序。

LINUX操作系统由芬兰的Linus Torvalds发起,基于免费提供的开源软件,并允许进行进一步修改。 Google的Android基于Linux,就像诺基亚长期开发的MeeGo操作系统一样。

LTE(长期演进)新型蜂窝移动网络技术。 基本LTE通常被视为3G,而更高级的版本(如LTE Advanced)则是4G的一部分。 LTE大大提高了数据传输速度。 由于GSM和CDMA技术的网络提供商都可以迁移到LTE,因此它正成为第一种真正的全球网络技术。

由诺基亚和英特尔通过合并早期的操作系统(Maemo和Moblin)开发的MeeGo移动设备操作系统。 MeeGo原本计划成为诺基亚智能手机操作系统,但是当斯蒂芬·埃洛普(Stephen Elop)宣布诺基亚将开始使用Windows Phone时,该计划被取消。

MELTEMI诺基亚于2011年至2012年间秘密开发的功能手机和中端智能手机操作系统。 当Android智能手机的价格达到与计划的Meltemi手机相同的价格时,开发工作终止。 诺基亚还计划生产Meltemi平板电脑。

MULTITASKING (芬兰语: MONIAJO )操作系统的功能,该功能允许设备并行执行多个应用程序,从而使用户在应用程序之间进行切换更加方便。

开源 (芬兰语: AVOIN KOODI )一种开发计算机软件的方法,它使任何人都可以自由访问原始软件并对其进行进一步的修改。 开源许可条款通常指示软件修改不受限制的可用性。 热心的开发人员或公司通常会推动开放源代码软件的开发,该软件无需许可费用即可使用。

操作系统 (芬兰语: KÄYTTÖJÄRJESTELMÄ )计算机或智能手机中其他应用程序正常运行所需要的中央软件程序。 智能手机操作系统包括Symbian,Android和iOS。

运营商账单 (芬兰语: OPERAATTORILASKUTUS )即使资金最终流向了网络提供商之外的其他方,用户仍会通过电话账单为购买的商品付款。

平台 (芬兰语: ALUSTA )在本书中,平台主要表示智能手机操作系统和所需的电子和硬件的组合,或者仅表示操作系统。 诺基亚智能手机中的第一个平台是Symbian,然后是Windows Phone。 平台还可以表示一些方法,其中软件或移动电话技术基于经过修改以开发新产品的单个基准版本。

由挪威的Trolltech开发的QT软件开发框架,于2008年被诺基亚收购。Qt简化了移动应用程序开发人员的工作。 可以一次性开发用于多个操作系统的应用程序。 诺基亚放弃框架后,芬兰的Digia继续进一步开发Qt。

诺基亚为其功能手机开发的S40操作系统。 S40是世界上使用最广泛的手机操作系统。 截至2012年,诺基亚已售出超过15亿部S40手机。

由诺基亚开发的S60用户界面平台,建立在Symbian操作系统之上。 S60是一个用户界面平台,因为它具有比用户界面更广泛的功能。

SMARTPHONE (芬兰语: ÄLYPUHELIN )具有丰富应用程序,图形用户界面和良好互联网连接的中型或昂贵手机。 智能手机通常具有开放的操作系统,用于第三方开发的新应用程序。

SYMBIAN智能手机操作系统由诺基亚发起并提供给其他制造商。 Symbian的鼎盛时期在2010年结束,当时Android变得比Symbian更流行。 诺基亚将Symbian转变为开放软件,但Stephen Elop终止了Symbian,将其作为诺基亚的主要智能手机平台,并选择了Microsoft Windows Phone。

片上系统 (芬兰语: PIIRISARJA )包含大量小型电子元件的小块硅片。 在本书中,片上系统表示一个硅芯片,其中包含用于手机的所有最重要的电子组件,包括微处理器。 Lumia手机使用高通公司的Snapdragon芯片。 片上系统的同义词包括微芯片和集成电路。

TD-LTE(时分长期演进)基于LTE的第四代蜂窝移动网络技术。 LTE变体还包括LTE FDD(频分长期演进)。 TD-LTE标准是由中国移动,华为,诺基亚解决方案和网络,三星,高通和ST-Ericsson开发的。

TD-SCDMA(时分同步码分多址)在中国使用的第三代蜂窝移动网络无线电技术,避免使用西方技术。

TIZEN用于移动设备的操作系统是在诺基亚结束MeeGo开发之后诞生的,英特尔与三星一起继续进行这项工作。 Tizen例如在三星的可穿戴设备中使用。

用户界面,用户界面 (芬兰语: KÄYTTÖLIITTYMÄ )用于用户控制产品的控制设备和软件。 在电话中,UI由电话显示屏上可见的元素和方法(例如用于控制设备的键盘或触摸手势)组成。

WINDOWS 8用于Windows 7之后的计算机的Microsoft操作系统。Windows8于2012年10月上市。它包括针对平板电脑进行了优化的启动屏幕,并且在外观上类似于Windows Phone用户界面,该界面被其“实时磁贴”识别。

WINDOWS PHONE 7 Microsoft智能手机操作系统和Windows Mobile的后续产品。 Windows Phone 7于2010年底开始提供。Microsoft收取Windows Phone 7的许可费用。

WINDOWS PHONE 7.5 Windows Phone 7的改进版本,也称为代号Mango。 Windows Phone 7.5引入了新功能并带来了新的语言。 首批Lumia智能手机使用Windows Phone 7.5,但诺基亚没有机会影响其中的功能。

WINDOWS PHONE 7.8创建Windows Phone 7的一个版本是为了纠正运行Windows Phone 7的手机未升级到版本8的事实。可以像Windows Phone 8一样调整磁贴的大小,但Windows Phone 8应用程序无法正常工作。

WINDOWS PHONE 8 Windows Phone 7.5的后继产品,作为诺基亚智能手机的操作系统。 Windows Phone 8与以前的版本大相径庭,以至于为其开发的应用程序无法在其先前的版本中运行,并且早期的手机无法升级到新版本。

英文译本词汇表附录

我们提供以下针对英语翻译的其他说明。

网络提供商 (芬兰语: OPERAATTORI )芬兰术语“ operaattori”是指为订户提供网络访问和通信服务的公司。 在诺基亚内部,标准的英语翻译是“操作员”。 在北美,更常用“网络提供商”和“运营商”之类的术语。 在此翻译中,为了一致起见,我们通常始终使用“网络提供商”,除非逐字记录原始英文报价。

董事,经理 (芬兰语: JOHTAJA,PÄÄLLIKKÖ )这本书提到了多个具名和匿名的人,其芬兰语的称呼为“päällikkö”或“ johtaja”。 通过与Google和LinkedIn的一些侦探工作,我们发现了本文中提到的某些人的更准确的英语标题,但在许多情况下,尤其是在匿名引用的情况下,我们通常使用“ manager”作为原始术语“päällikkö”以及“ johtaja”的“导演”。

法定 谈判 (芬兰文: YT-NEUVOTTELUT )芬兰劳动法要求计划裁员(或影响雇员的其他重大变动)的雇主必须与雇员代表就减少/变更的实施方式进行一系列谈判。 芬兰的消息来源有时将其翻译为“合作谈判”。


返回目录


返回目录

面试

诺基亚高层管理人员 (董事会和集团执行董事会)
11个人

其他
SAMI AAVIKKO,芬兰网络提供商DNA的零售商店总监
芬兰经济研究所(Etla)的研究经理JYRKIALI-YRKKÖ
钟China(Daniel CHUNG),诺基亚中国运营商营销总监
JULIEN CODORNIU,前微软员工
HORACE DEDIU,分析师
JYRIENGESTRÖM,前诺基亚软件开发商兼Jaiku Oy创始人,目前居住在硅谷的投资者
Evli银行分析师MIKKO ERVASTI
前诺基亚产品开发总监JYRI HAGMAN
诺基亚MeeGo前总监JUSSI HURMOLA
PEKKA ISOSOMPPI,前诺基亚公共关系经理,现任芬兰驻伦敦大使馆新闻顾问
前诺基亚人力资源员工SALLAJÄMSÄ
TERO KUITTINEN,分析师
SAMPSA KURRI,创始人
Muropaketti网站
商业报纸编辑JR LESKINEN
Kauppalehti ROBIN LINDAHL,前诺基亚全球运营商关系总监,现为Outotec Oyj领导团队成员
NEIL MAWSTON,Strategy Analytics分析师
MIKKO MERIHAARA,前诺基亚奥卢研发中心首席店长
CAROLINA MILANESI,分析师
弗洛里安·穆勒(Florian Muller),知识产权专家
LESLIE NAKAJIMA,曾在诺基亚Lumia工作过的美国市场营销专家
HELENA NORDMAN-KNUTSON,分析师
微软生态系统关系负责人VESA-MATTI PAANANEN
PEKKA PESONEN,诺基亚桥总监
MIKKO PULLIAINEN,《
阿穆莱蒂
前诺基亚Windows市场经理SARIPÄIVÄRINTA
OP-Pohjola银行分析师HANNU RAUHALA
Inderes分析师MIKAEL RAUTANEN
前诺基亚亚洲零售总监RAMASHISH RAY,现任三星公司总监
MAGNUS REHLE,Telia-Sonera总监
Ilmarinen保险公司副总裁TIMO RITAKALLIO
ROSS RUBIN,分析师
MIRJAMI SAARINEN,新闻编辑
Kauppalehti报纸
Nordea银行分析师SAMI SARKAMIES
组件制造商Okmetic首席执行官KAI SEIKKU
TIMOSEPPÄLÄ,芬兰经济研究所(Etla)的研究经理
PETRASÖDERLING,Symbian产品管理,Symbian Open Source的前任董事和Symbian Foundation的董事
前诺基亚销售经理PIRKKO TASKINEN
前诺基亚Meltemi营销经理JUKKA TASKINEN
诺基亚芬兰前人力资源主管VILLE VALTONEN
李·威廉姆斯(LEE WILLIAMS),前Symbian基金会执行董事
CCS Insight分析师Ben WOOD
哈佛大学教授大卫·约菲(David B.Yoffie)


总编辑
移动软件企业企业家
董事会成员
欧洲移动网络提供商的首席执行官
应用开发总监
美国技术公司董事
国际移动电话公司董事会主席
设计专家
一家全球移动网络提供商的首席执行官
诺基亚市场部员工
美国技术公司董事
诺基亚设计部总监
国际咨询公司董事
诺基亚Meltemi经理
美国技术公司董事
国际咨询公司专家
咨询公司总监
芬兰移动电话公司董事
诺基亚财务与控制总监
国际咨询公司董事
诺基亚Meltemi主任
诺基亚通讯员工
诺基亚战略部员工
诺基亚MeeGo主管
诺基亚中层管理人员
诺基亚运营商关系部员工
诺基亚研究中心研究员
诺基亚中层管理人员
诺基亚用户界面开发人员
财务编辑
芬兰国会议员
诺基亚通讯员工
诺基亚中层管理人员
诺基亚西门子通信总监
诺基亚中层管理人员
诺基亚中层管理人员
诺基亚理财员工
诺基亚销售总监
网络提供商公司董事
芬兰大股东的代表
美国的风险投资家
分析员
诺基亚总监
知道诺基亚Salo制造工厂的总监
诺基亚设计总监
分析员
诺基亚通讯员工
诺基亚通讯员工
诺基亚软件开发人员

最重要的书面资料

图书
JyrkiAli-Yrkkö:诺基亚-在一个小国家里的大公司。 Etla 2000。
克莱顿·克里斯滕森(Clayton M. Christensen):创新者的困境。 《 Harper Business 2011》。
David J. Cord:诺基亚的衰落。 Schildts&Söderströms2014年。
沃尔特·艾萨克森:史蒂夫·乔布斯。 Simon&Schuster,2011年。
Paula Kilpinen:跨国公司内部的能力发展。 阿尔托大学,2013年。
MarcoMäkinen:诺基亚传奇。 Kertomusyrityksestäjaihmisistäjotka muuttivat sen。 Gummerus 1995年。
乔玛·奥利拉(Jorma Ollila),哈里·索科科玛(Harri Saukkomaa):马赫顿的狂欢。 Kasvun paikkana诺基亚。 Otava 2013。
Anna-Liisa Palmu-Joronen:Nokia-vuodet。 Mitäjohtamisesta voi oppia。 雅典娜2012。
Ari Hakkarainen:Menestyksen hinta。 Readme.fi,2009年。
蒂莫·沃里(Timo Vuori),奎伊·休伊(Quy Huy):“可以拯救诺基亚,以及其他公司可以学到什么?” Insead Knowledge Insight 2014。

报纸,杂志和网络上的文章 “股票期权与受限股:风险与回报的案例”,《今日美国》,2003年7月14日。
《宏观经理》,福布斯,2005年7月19日。
“谁是微软新的业务部门负责人斯蒂芬·埃洛普(Stephen Elop)?”《计算机世界》,2008年1月11日。
“微软的斯蒂芬·埃洛普·丑闻在有害的9月代理权后发表讲话”,技术权利,2009年1月11日。
“微软和诺基亚出于错误的原因做正确的事”,Betanews,2009年8月12日。
“ Stephen Elop saa heti suuren vallan Nokiassa”,Kauppalehti,2010年9月13日。
“诺基亚如何从宽限期跌落”,彭博商业周刊,2010年9月15日。
“诺基亚会制造Windows手机吗?” Venture Beat,2010年9月23日。
“ Elop meneeläpiharmaan kiven”,Kauppalehti Optio,2010年10月15日。
“ Elop hioo Nokiasta timanttia”,Kauppalehti,2010年10月22日。
“ Kaikkialla Android”,Kauppalehti Optio,2011年1月20日。
“ Elop ohitti Vanjoen kalkkiviivoilla Nokiassa”,Kauppalehti,2011年1月26日。
“全文:诺基亚首席执行官斯蒂芬·埃洛普(Stephen Elop)的“刻录平台”备忘录”,《华尔街日报》,2011年2月9日。
“独家:诺基亚的史蒂芬·埃洛普(Stephen Elop)谈论他如何做出重大OS决策”,Allthingsd,2011年2月10日。
“对诺基亚2011年战略公告的反应(与Microsoft关系)”,关于移动性,2011年2月11日。
“ Kaikki vaihtoehdot tutkittiin-Nokian toimitusjohtaja lupaatöitäosalleSymbian-kehittäjistä”,HS,2011年2月12日。
“ Elop vannoo:Windows vahvistaa”,HS,2011年2月17日。
“诺基亚的烦恼使Google害怕微软”,《华尔街日报》,2011年2月18日。
“Hyväpaha Microsoft”,Kauppalehti Optio,2011年3月3日。
2011年3月18日,路透社,“第一批Windows Nokia手机的开发工作已开始:Elop”。
《与诺基亚首席执行官史蒂芬·埃洛普(Stephen Elop)的问答”,《金融邮报》,2011年4月1日。
“诺基亚内部:试图复兴巨人”,《金融时报》,2011年4月11日。
“诺基亚内部:从内部重建”,《金融时报》,2011年4月13日。
“ Suomi selvisi remontista luultua helpommalla”,考帕莱蒂,2011年4月28日。
“独家:微软的Lees和诺基亚的Oistamo谈论他们刚刚签订的合同”,Allthingsd,2011年4月21日。
“警惕苹果:诺基亚的斯蒂芬·埃洛普(Stephen Elop)抢到你了”,《环球邮报》,2011年5月26日。
“斯蒂芬·埃洛普(Stephen Elop)的诺基亚历险记”,《彭博商业周刊》,2011年6月2日。
HS,2011年6月23日,“ Eul sulkee pois Meegon paluun”。
“斯蒂芬·埃洛普(Stephen Elop)嘲笑诺基亚Windows Phone,但分析师称N9将是DOA。”《卫报》,2011年6月23日。
“驯鹿鹿角和雷克雅未克:微软和诺基亚如何共同开展业务”,Allthingsd,2011年7月11日。
“ Nurkkaan ajettu Nokia vauhdittaa kulujen perkaamista”,Kauppalehti,2011年7月22日。
《 Elopin Nokiakäykohti tuntematonta》,HS,2011年9月21日。
“诺基亚与行业:看一场针对移动广告的全球战争”,Tech Crunch,2011年10月29日。
“Käytännönparityötä”,Kauppalehti Optio,2011年11月24日。
2011年11月25日,“将军掌控”加拿大人事务。
埃洛普面试。 Arto Nyberg / Yle,2011年12月18日。
“ Olemme muutoksensyvässäytimessä”,Kauppalehti,2012年1月27日。
“ Windows Phone 7.5更新将在4月支持256MB RAM和较慢的处理器”,The Verge,2012年2月27日。
HS,“Kiristyväkilpailu sopii Elopille”,2012年2月29日。
“Pääpystyyn!”,Kauppalehti Optio,2012年3月15日。
“斯蒂芬·埃洛普(Stephen Elop):让诺基亚重返竞赛”,《环球邮报》,2012年3月23日。
“ Nokia antoi tulosvaroituksen”,Kauppalehti.fi,2012年4月11日。
“ Elop nousi surkeimpien johtajien listalle”,塔卢萨诺马特,2012年4月12日。
HS,“ Elop vaikenee uusistasäästöistä”,2012年4月20日。
“约玛·奥利拉(Jorma Ollila)–死,乔勒·诺基亚(Killet Nokia)oli kaikki”,考帕帕蒂(Kauppalehti Optio),2012年4月26日。
“ Vappuaatto Elopin kanssa”,Kauppalehti,2012年5月4日。
2012年5月11日,“前20大R&D投入者-不好的投资”,forbes.com。
“ Nanin Nokiassa – pomotkaaneivätuskalla omistaa”,Taloussanomat,2012年5月19日。
“微软承认Windows Phone 7在设计上注定了失败”,Cnet,2012年6月2日。
“ Elop haki syntipukit johtokunnasta”,Kauppalehti,2012年6月15日。
“诺基亚Meltemi幸存者表明,已砍伐的操作系统已准备就绪”,Slashgear,2012年6月21日。
HS,2012年9月6日,“ Nokian uudistus etenee hitaasti”。
“ Liianvähän,liianmyöhään”,Kauppalehti,2012年9月7日。
埃洛普:2012年10月3日,塔卢萨诺马特(Taloussanomat Digitoday)。
“诺基亚MeeGon tarina”
www.taskumuro.com,2012年10月10日。
HS,2012年11月21日,“ Parastatyötäpitkäänaikaan”。
“ Elopin luottojengi”,Kauppalehti,2012年12月19日。
“诺基亚Meltemi:本地平台的详细功能”,我的诺基亚博客,2013年3月4日。
“VerkkoyhtiöpitääNokiaa pinnalla”,Kauppalehti,2013年7月19日。
“报告:诺基亚仅在一天之内就决定了’Lumia’的姓氏”,我的诺基亚博客,2013年7月22日。
“ Barcelona Rendezvous,促成微软交易的50次诺基亚董事会会议”,Allthingsd,2013年9月2日。
“来自’我们可以说话吗?’ 咖啡桌上的不幸事件-内部故事”,Allthingsd,2013年9月4日。
“诺基亚”,Kauppalehti,2013年9月4日。
“诺基亚首席执行官斯蒂芬·埃洛普(Stephen Elop),微软首席执行官”,彭博商业周刊,2013年9月5日。
“ Nokia antoivääräätietoa Stephen Elopin toimitusjohtajasopimuksesta”,HS,2013年9月24日。
“ Elop vetosi avioeroon palkkioneuvottelussa” HS,2013年9月25日。
“ Elopin korvaus onkin pikkurahaa verrattunanäihinerorahoihin”,Tekniikka&Talous,2013年9月25日。
“ Siilasmaa torjuu palkkiokritiikin” HS,2013年9月26日。
“ Stephen Elop osti huhtikuussa asunnon Microsoftinpääkonttorinläheltä”,Arvopaperi,2013年9月26日。
“史蒂夫·乔布斯(Steve Jobs pyysi Anssi Vanjokea Applelletöihin)”,芬兰,库瓦莱蒂,2013年11月11日。
Suunmen Kuvalehti,“ Tunnollinen mies”,2013年11月15日。
“ Windows 8认证失败者”,《悉尼先驱报》数字生活,2013年12月3日。
“到目前为止,诺基亚在Windows Phone上的押注看起来还不错”,《福布斯》,2013年12月4日。
“微软,诺基亚和其他任何人都不应使用Android,这是不可分叉的”,《技术评论》,2014年2月8日。
“前诺基亚首席执行官史蒂芬·埃洛普(Stephen Elop)以500万美元的价格重新列出西雅图房屋”,《不动产》,2014年1月11日。
2014年2月23日,Taloussanomat Digitoday,“Mitäjos Nokia tekisi Android-puhelimen – Microsoft巨大的机会”。
“微软的纳德拉(Nadella)管理鲍尔默-董事会拆分的遗产”,《彭博商业周刊》,2014年3月5日。
“Kännyköidenjälkeen”,Tietoviikko,2014年6月/ 7月。
Conner Partners网站上的“燃烧平台的真实故事”文章
www.connerpartners.com“ Microsoft Laskee Windows Phone -lisenssin hintaa jopa 70 prosenttia”,Arvopaperi,2014年2月27日。
“我说不应该信任Tomi Ahonen的十大理由”,Dominies Communicate网站,2014年6月25日。


返回目录

页码是指原始印刷书籍。

阿维科,萨米158
Aho,Esko 17,25、248、250
Ahonen,Tomi 116,315
阿诺西(Arnos)Ahosniemi 11
Ahtisaari,Marko 150、154、178、215、335
Alahuhta,Matti 20,73
阿拉卡胡(Juha 144)
阿拉·皮蒂莱(Ala-Pietilä),佩卡20号大街263号
阿里·伊尔科(Jirki)247
阿拉斯,培养皿287
艾伦,保罗127,332
奥兰多艾拉243
莎莉·巴尔道夫20
鲍尔默,史蒂夫53,56,71,80,90-91,96,105,107-108,114,119,127-128,182,195,206,217,244-245,281,289-293,296 –298、304、317、318、321、323、332、335
贝雷斯福德·威利(Beresford-Wylie),西蒙294
贝格罗斯(Ismo)286
贝克,杰夫82
布莱默,帕特里克162
布林,谢尔盖24-25、318
布罗根(休)126–127
坎贝尔,比尔25
坎普,尼尔116
戴维·卡普森49
陈约翰308
克里斯滕森,克莱顿276,318
钟丹尼尔174
丘吉尔,温斯顿113
克拉克,亚瑟·C。208
维托里奥科劳33
康纳(Conner),达里尔(Daryl)136,137
库克,蒂姆21
Cord,David J.22,295
科特迪瓦306
克莱默,吉姆31
达萨(Shasasundara)322
道森,道格12、13
贺拉斯Dediu 24
DeVard,Jerri 80、198、259、278–279、335
狄龙,马克164,249
多尔·L·约翰25
伊夫·多兹(Doz,Yves)37
德雷克斯勒,米拉德25
杜尼尔·苏尼尔231
埃洛普,考特尼55
南希埃洛普49,53,305
埃洛普,史蒂芬1、7、9、11-15、19-20、25-33、36、38-40、43、45、47-59、62、66-80、82-85、88、90-93 ,95-98、101-102、104-105、107-109、112-114、116-119、121-122、124-126、128-130、132-133、137-141、145-153、155 – 157、159-162、166-168、172-174、177、181、183、185、188-190、192、196-198、201-203、205、207-211、213、215、217、220 -222、224-226、228、231-234、237-239、242-248、251、253、255、257-259、263、266、268-270、272、274-275、278、281、285 ,289-291、293​​、297-299、304-328、330-333、335
恩德勒,罗布31
恩吉斯特洛姆(Jyri)46
卡莉·菲奥莉娜322
伊恩福格229
弗里斯顿汤姆309
弗里德伊纳289
加塞,让·路易123
盖茨,比尔53,60,127-128,289-290,317
吉尔斯(Giles),科林(Colin)95、111、336
戈尔巴乔夫(Mihail)176
戈尔(Al 25)
绿色,丰富111、154、243
冈多特拉(Vic 109,112)
拉利塔古普特23,24
卡彭哈彭嫩163
Harkimo,Hjallis“ Harry” 73
Harlow,Jo 97,111–112,124,140,142,177,195,336
哈里森,安德鲁117
海因斯(托斯滕308)
轩尼诗,约翰·L。25
Holen,恩德雷82–85、87–88
霍尔姆斯特罗姆(Bengt)23
胡西拉(Jussi)160
哈卡米斯(Jyri 240)
伊哈赖宁(Lahal 240)
贾科(Iakuotila)贾科(95)
米哈95埃哈莫蒂拉
艾哈莫蒂拉(Ihamuotila),蒂莫(Timo)92、95-96、226、279、291、293​​、296-299、301、336
雅各布,保罗306–307
贾,桑杰309
乔布斯,史蒂夫12、24、28、30-31、57、72、128
约翰逊,凯文83–84
约翰逊,威廉309
琼蒂·塞波240
Jämsä,Salla 132-133、140、145、252
卡格曼(Henning)23,103
Kallasvuo,Olli-Pekka 11,13,16-18,20,32-35,40-42,47,52,64,66,69,82,120,150,153,156,167,177,223,254 –255、305、307、314、336
卡利奥(Marjo)238
坎普拉德(英格瓦)19
Karlsson,每18-19、23-24
卡文恩(Jouko)284
卡塔宁,吉尔基296
Kiili,Kalle 117,118
克莱内布拉姆(Ulrike)172
彼得·克莱因291
佩特里Koponen 46
科斯金宁,劳里236
培养皿Koskinen 14
米可·科松宁37
约翰·科特(Kotter),第136页
Kuittinen,Tero 77,116
拉格林(约翰98)
Lees,Andy 96、106、177、182
莱农嫩,汉奴14,284
莱文森,亚瑟·D。24
琳达·罗宾158,272
基督教徒林霍尔姆130
喇嘛,拉蒙T.156
Marey-Semper,伊莎贝尔23–24
马里尼,乔191
马歇尔,加里117
马瑟·安25
莫斯顿,尼尔228
玛丽莎·梅耶22
麦克道威尔(McDowell),玛丽(Mary)70、112、167、169、171、220–221、223、227、336
麦克马斯特,威廉49
麦克尼利,斯科特22
Merihaara,Mikko 251、253-256、259-261
Mewawalla,拉胡尔100–101,105
卡罗莱纳州米拉内西161,174,193–194
迈尔斯·斯蒂芬316
莫坎·安德鲁136
穆斯顿·安蒂14
穆兰阿兰116
迈尔森(Myerson),特里(Terry)96、176-177、181、291-292
纳德拉(Sadya)318、323
中岛莱斯利259
Niinistö,索利73
诺代尔(Fjalar)236
诺德曼·努特森,海伦娜235
努尔米(Ilari)203
奥巴马80
Ojanperä,Tero 37,47,65,112,264
Ollikainen,Pasi 163
奥利拉(Ollila),约玛(Jorma)7、12-23、26、30-31、40-42、60、66、69、76、103、138、254-255、284-286、296、303、312、317-318、322 ,328–332,336
奥尔蒂斯·C·恩里克115–116
欧德宁,保罗·S。25
佩吉,拉里24-25,318
帕克(Mika 242)
彭南嫩,马蒂243–244
彭蒂卡宁(Mentiel)30
彭特兰,路易丝111,291
波罗卡里(Perokti)143
Putkiranta,Juha 237,239,337
兰塔科科,安提240–241
兰达·尼科10
拉特纳,杰拉德315
拉特纳,贾斯汀243
雷,拉玛什(223)232
里根(Ronald)176
雷勒·马格努斯226
Riiber Knudsen,特隆84–85
Rinsema,西奥58
Ritakallio,Timo 18,73,317
鲁宾,安迪46,61,97
鲁宾·罗斯162
萨里宁,米尔贾米10-11
萨卡卢斯,瓦尔德玛178
沙美林(Eero 144)
萨尔米嫩,梅里纳14
Sarkamies,Sami 79、125、270
克里斯蒂娜·萨文德94
萨凡德,马格努斯94
Savander,Niklas 19-20、33、37、64-65、88、92、94-96、112、198、222、238、337
Scardino,Marjorie 16,18–19、23–25、27–28、76、337
施密特,埃里克24–25,97,105,221,318
舒斯特·雷内117
乔纳森·施瓦兹22
赛拉芬Zig 88
苏珊·希恩71
盾牌,凯文178
Shiram,K.Ram 25
西瓦库玛(D.231)
阿尔伯特省Shum,178
锡拉斯玛(Siilasmaa),里斯托(Risto)23、103、122、281、284-293、296-299、304-305、310、317、319、326、329-330、337
锡尔纳,伊尔卡14
杰夫82,斯基林
彼得,233
史密斯,布拉德291
卡迪284
兰德尔·斯蒂芬森306
亚历山大·斯图布190
糖,罗纳德D.25
静条水原市23,24
特穆苏伊拉88
Suominen,Arja 12,71
Suri,Rajeev 294–295,336–337
索德林,佩特拉69
塔西宁(Jukka 161)
蒂尔曼(Tilghman),雪莉(Shirley M.)25
蒂里·亨利171
Toikkanen,Timo 227,337
托雷斯(Torres),阿尔贝托(Alberto)103–104、112、155、337
托瓦尔兹,莱纳斯62
乌尔皮莱宁(Jutta 305)
Valtonen,Ville 252,257,263–264,268
范约基(Vanjoki),安西(Anssi)11、19-20、26-27、29、30、32-33、103、120、140、154-155、327-328、338
瓦萨拉,安蒂166
Vesterbacka,彼得225
约翰·怀波基80
王小初196
韦伯,克里斯198,207,338
韦尔奇,杰克308
威尔科克斯,乔118
温莎·理查德285
伍德,本194
赖特,奥维尔112
赖特·威尔伯112
吉冈信一242
Zavirovski,迈克128
Äkräs,Juha 70,244,338
Öistämö,Kai 26,33,37,92–94,96,98,104–108,112,124,129,155,177,182,338


返回目录

这本在线书是由前诺基亚现任团队和现任诺基亚团队做出的无偿努力,旨在将原始的芬兰《经营埃洛普》一书从芬兰语翻译成英语。 这一切始于2014年10月出版原始书时。那时,诺基亚的电话业务正经历着艰难和动荡的时期; 它已经卖给了微软,诺基亚则专注于其电信基础设施业务。 在空中的阴谋和阴谋论泛滥成灾—芬兰的皇冠上的明珠和整个欧洲技术产业的拥护者崩溃了。 得益于作者梅丽娜·萨尔米宁(Merina Salminen)和佩卡·尼卡嫩(PekkaNykänen)通过采访大量诺基亚员工,高管和其他利益相关者而进行的背景研究,许多读者赞扬这本芬兰语原著对诺基亚事务的客观处理。 在阅读完书评后,非芬兰读者在社交媒体上询问该书是否也将以英语提供。

像当时的许多其他以前和现在的诺基亚人一样,哈里·基尔詹德(Harri Kiljander)买了该书后就立即购买。 在第二天晚上看完这本书之后,哈里向出版商发送了一封电子邮件,要求他们向作者们致谢,以感谢他们写一本好书。 令Harri感到惊讶的是,梅丽娜·萨尔米宁(Merina Salminen)和佩卡·尼卡嫩(PekkaNykänen)很快就回复了他的电子邮件,在接下来的几封电子邮件中,产生了一个松散的主意:召集一群诺基亚人来引导该书的英文翻译,并最终出版了该书的英文版。书。 Harri将这个想法介绍给了Janne Parkkila,后者邀请了Timothy Jasionowski来帮助进行这项工作。 团队同意作者的翻译,作为预告片,以加快他们寻找英语版本发行人的任务。 到2015年秋天,已经准备好一套示例章节,作者已经与出版代理商签定了协议。

2016年5月,微软宣布将关闭芬兰几乎所有的电话研发部门。 哈里决定与作者核对英语书籍的状况。 没有进展,所以哈里问无偿服务团队是否可以翻译和出版整本书-不幸的是,与出版代理的交易不允许这样做。

由Microsoft触发,于2017年10月宣布Windows Phone死亡.Harri再次与作者核实了英语书籍的状态。 英文版本的发布没有任何进展,因此与Merina和Pekka达成了交易:如果他们的经纪人到年底无法与他们签订合同,则公益团队可以翻译和发布非商业英文版本这本书。

诺基亚超越社交网络是一个封闭的Facebook集团,面向全球前诺基亚员工,于2018年2月拥有27,000多名成员。有关如何使诺基亚前社区保持团结的故事已经发表,并且该论坛仍是诺基亚旧的Connecting People使命宣言的体现之一。变得强大。 2017年10月13日,哈里(Harri)在超越诺基亚(Beyond Nokia)中发出了征集参与者的信息:

呼吁贡献者!

Windows 10移动版本周被裁员,众所周知,诺基亚的发展道路与微软的移动平台事业交叉。 斯蒂芬·埃洛普(Stephen Elop)在这一发展中起着关键作用,在2014年诺基亚手机被出售给微软之后,两位芬兰记者梅丽娜·萨尔米宁(Merina Salminen)和佩卡·尼卡嫩(PekkaNykänenen)撰写了一本书,讲述了2010-2013年诺基亚史无前例的诺基亚手机业务。诺基亚首席执行官。 书“ Operaatio Elop”(“ Operation Elop”)以芬兰语出版,但未出版英语版本。

本书发行后,我与Pekka进行了交流,我们提出了一个想法,将英语中的某些章节进行众包,以加快本书的英文版。 但是,他们选择的出版代理商做得不好,所以没有英语版本出现。 与代理商的协议一直禁止Pekka和Merina继续以其他任何方式发布英文版本。

与代理商的合同期已于一段时间前结束,Pekka和Merina只是让我们知道,如果我们要翻译和发行该书的免费英文版,对他们来说还可以!

珍妮·帕基拉(Janne Parkkila)和我自己都对英语版的书感兴趣。 我们翻译和校对了一些章节,我们认为,例如在适当的Creative Commons许可下,Medium将是发行本书的良好平台。

前诺基亚的志愿者开始以翻译和校对的身份签约,最终有20多人的团队,从加利福尼亚的圣地亚哥,到德国的乌尔姆,再到芬兰的奥卢,再到印度尼西亚的巴淡岛,以及许多其他地方。 人们曾在诺基亚工作过,有些仍在工作,担任工程师,营销人员,设计师和经理。 一些团队成员在工作生涯中曾经或曾经是专业的词匠,但大多数人只是对在诺基亚故事中开辟一个新的篇章感兴趣。 诺基亚内部的公司语言被幽默地称为“英语破损”,而我们团队的筛选标准是“英语足够好,以便人们可以积极地为一本可靠的商业书籍做出贡献”。 我们的一些团队成员是最初由Merina和Pekka接受芬兰语采访的人。 在历史的某个时刻,我们每个人都为诺基亚工作,一些人也为微软工作,我们中有些人甚至是同事,但是我们大多数人实际上从未在现实生活中见过面。 我们决定将Google Docs [22],Facebook Chat和Medium用于翻译项目。

有人问我们为什么要过去居住。 他们说,他们想离开诺基亚而继续前进。 我们也要向前迈进-我们正在向前迈进。 即使不再是诺基亚的专职团队,我们也乐于以“ 互联人”的精神团队合作,希望与更多的读者分享一些诺基亚的经验,从而为他们的新工作和生活提供帮助。 我们知道已经写了许多其他有关诺基亚手机的书籍,请参见:

诺基亚传奇:MarcoMäkinen撰写的《 Kertomusyrityksestäjaihmisistä》 (1995年,芬兰语)

Staffan Bruun和MosseWallén撰写的《 Boken om Nokia》 (1999,瑞典语和芬兰语)

诺基亚—小国家大公司 (作者:JyrkiAli-Yrkkö,2000年)

诺基亚Oyj:n历史记录1–3 ,作者MarttiHäikiö(2001,芬兰文)

诺基亚革命:一家非凡的公司改变了行业的故事,丹·斯坦博克(Dan Steinbock,2001年)

诺基亚: MarttiHäikiö的内幕(2002)

移动互联网技术架构(MITA) 诺基亚(2002)

移动可用性:克里斯蒂安·林德霍尔姆,图尔卡·凯能宁和哈里·基兰德(2003), 诺基亚如何改变了手机的面貌

Juhani Risku撰写的《 UusiNokia -käsikirjoitus》 (2010年,芬兰语)

约玛·奥利拉(Jorma Ollila)和哈里·索科科玛(Harri Saukkomaa)的Mahdoton狂欢节(2013年,芬兰语)

埃洛普剧院-梅丽娜·萨尔米宁 (Merina Salminen)和佩卡·尼卡嫩( PekkaNykänen)编写的《诺基亚音乐》(2014年,芬兰语;原书)

Kännykkä— Niko Kettunen和Timo Paukku的Lyhyt历史(2014,芬兰语)

微软和诺基亚合作的一部 (2014)

诺基亚的衰落与衰落 (David J.Cord,2014年)

诺基亚和芬兰。 Carl- GustavLindén撰写Rapportfrånde galnaåren (2015年,瑞典语和芬兰语)

铃声: Yves Doz和Keeley Wilson(2018) 探索手机中诺基亚的兴衰

我们的是一个翻译项目。 因此,请记住我们不是作者。 所有这些功劳归功于Merina和Pekka。 我们将他们在芬兰语中发表的内容作为一个团队翻译成英文。 我们的团队在该项目中学到了很多东西:从拼写破折号“ —”到脚注的使用以及过去如何进行货币换算,如何在美式英语中引用“ palkkajohtaja”和“ vuorineuvos”,以及如何做Google文档中翻译人员和校对人员之间的移交,以及2018年“基本电话”和“功能电话”之间的区别(如果有)。 我们决定主要是为北美受众编写的,而诺基亚的官方语言曾经是美国英语,所以我们用美国英语编写了此文本。 原始书主要使用欧元作为财务数字。 为了帮助非欧洲读者,我们决定使用可以追溯到故事情节原始上下文的汇率添加等值的美元。 许多采访最初是由Merina和Pekka用英语进行的,他们的许多书面资料也都是英语的。 我们无权访问这些采访记录。 因此,每当我们找不到原始来源时,就必须将书中的芬兰语翻译翻译回英语。 同样,我们在附录1和“人员索引”部分中将人员的标题翻译成英语,知道在此翻译中我们无法使用准确的标题来引用所有人。 对此表示歉意。

翻译和编辑这本书很有趣,希望您喜欢阅读。 如果您不喜欢或不同意本书中的某些内容,我们请您考虑不射击信使。

我们要感谢Merina Salminen和PekkaNykänen对这个非商业性翻译和出版项目的高度合作态度。 我们还要感谢更广泛的前诺基亚社区的法律和版式专家,他们为我们免费提供了有关此项目的宝贵指导,并感谢JariIjäs从诺基亚旧总部拍摄的精美封面照片。 请注意,Merina和Pekka拥有这本书的所有商业权利; 因此其他人无权将其用于商业目的。

2018年2月11日[23]


[22] 第5章介绍了Elop在领导Microsoft Office团队时是如何击败Google Docs的。

[23] 巧合的是,也是在2011年2月11日,以埃洛普(Elop)为首的诺基亚宣布了计划 杀死Symbian并与Microsoft合作开发Windows Phone的计划